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SUMMARY 
 
The Australian Government’s Joint Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade observed in 2007 that, when it comes to Australia’s program of public diplomacy, 
‘perhaps the whole is not as great as the sum of its parts’.1
Public diplomacy recently defined for the Australian context as, ‘work or activities 
undertaken to understand, engage and inform individuals and organisations in other countries 
in order to shape their perceptions in ways that will promote Australia’s foreign policy 
goals’
 Such a compelling observation is 
the central hypothesis for this thesis.  It comes at a time of increasing international discussion 
around the emerging role of modern public diplomacy as an important tool for nations in 
advancing foreign policy priorities, a discussion from which Australian foreign policy 
practitioners and academics have been noticeably absent.    
 
2
                                                 
1 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 15 March 2007, p.9. 
2 The Senate Committee definition of public diplomacy was presented to the Australian Senate on 16 August 
2007 upon the conclusion of the Inquiry and delivery of the Committee’s Final report.  Australian Senate, 
Hansard, 16 August 2007, p.42.   
 is a contested and evolving concept.  Closer examination of Australia’s output-
focussed public diplomacy program, coordinated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (DFAT) reveals that public diplomacy is generally not well understood or supported 
within Australia’s political, bureaucratic and academic circles; is lacking in strategic 
leadership and coordination, and is consistently under-resourced.  When considered together, 
these issues point to an underlying systemic failure in Australia’s public diplomacy program, 
that is, a fundamental lack of connection between public diplomacy and strategic foreign 
policy priorities.  Without such strategic alignment, public diplomacy floats around the fringe 
of foreign policy, appearing only at a superficial level in rhetoric and symbolic gestures, one-
off or randomly planned events and activities, and crisis media management. This significant 
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gap raises concerns about Australia’s ability to leverage international image, reputation and 
soft power to deliver on current foreign policy priorities and future challenges.   
 
The overall lag in Australia’s take up and understanding of public diplomacy is the central 
issue of concern for this thesis.  Taking the 2007 Senate Inquiry into Australia’s public 
diplomacy program as the launching point, the responsibility of this thesis in broad terms is 
twofold: 
i) to extend the contemporary body of Australian knowledge in the field of public 
diplomacy, with the aim of bridging a gap between theory and practice; and  
ii) to suggest a policy-based framework that might facilitate coherent and consistent 
consideration of public diplomacy as a strategic instrument of Australian foreign 
policy. 
The thesis explores the current role and structure of public diplomacy in Australia’s foreign 
policy, to better understand why the Senate Inquiry concluded that the whole of Australia’s 
program of current diplomacy is less than the sum of its parts.  In doing so, the thesis moves 
beyond existing literature to establish a policy-based framework to support better 
understanding and utilisation of public diplomacy in a way that might contribute to the 
achievement of strategic foreign policy objectives.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
When it comes to public diplomacy in Australia, ‘perhaps the whole is not as great as the sum 
of its parts’.1  The central hypothesis for this thesis derives from this compelling observation 
reinforced recently by the Australian Government’s Joint Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence (‘the Senate Committee’), following its inquiry into the 
nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program (‘the Inquiry’). The Senate 
Committee findings, highlighting strategic shortcomings in Australia’s public diplomacy 
program put Australia at odds with contemporary thinking and international directions in 
public diplomacy policy and practice.  At a time when international scholars are reporting 
that ‘public diplomacy matters more than ever…and plays a critical role in establishing a 
country’s position in the world, and delivering tangible policy objectives’, Australian foreign 
policy-makers and diplomats appear to be lagging behind.2
Public diplomacy is a contested and evolving concept.  However, in simplest terms is 
understood to be ‘the effort by the government of one nation to influence the public or elite 
opinion of another nation for the purpose of turning the policy of the target nation to its 
advantage’.
   
 
3
                                                 
1 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2007, p.9. 
2 A Lane, ‘Public Diplomacy: Key Challenges and Priorities’, Report on Wilton Park Conference WPS06/21, 
Counterpoint, London, 12 March 2006.  Refer also to A Lane, ‘Diplomacy Today: Delivering Results in a 
World of Changing Priorities’, Report on Wilton Park Conference, WPS 05/4,  London, March 2005. P Fiske de 
Gouveia, ‘The Future of Public Diplomacy’, Presentation to the 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy, 
Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2006. J Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, in The New Public Diplomacy: 
Soft Power in International Relations, J  Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, pp.3-27. 
3 E Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, The Netherlands Institute 
of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, 2001, p.3. 
 Building upon this simple understanding, the Senate Committee presented a 
definition of public diplomacy for the Australian context as, ‘work or activities undertaken to 
understand, engage and inform individuals and organisations in other countries in order to 
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shape their perceptions in ways that will promote Australia’s foreign policy goals’.4 
However, the Senate Committee definition is not the first articulation of the meaning of 
public diplomacy as it relates to the Australian context.  Former Australian Foreign Minister, 
Gareth Evans noted twenty years ago that ‘the essence of public diplomacy is the shaping of 
attitudes in other countries in a way which is favourable to our national interests’.5 
Furthermore, in 1995 Evans and Grant, asserted that public diplomacy is ‘an exercise in 
persuasion and influence that extends beyond traditional diplomacy by leveraging a much 
larger cast of players both inside and outside government’, and engaging both domestic and 
foreign public audiences.6
There is value in noting at this early stage that public diplomacy is grounded in traditional 
diplomacy for the purpose of enabling the ‘conduct of relations between states’.  Yet, as an 
innovation of traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy has moved well beyond the strict 
boundaries and structures set out by traditional diplomacy.  Where traditional diplomacy 
 Such insights into the discussion of public diplomacy demonstrate 
that as an articulated concept, public diplomacy is not necessarily new to the Australian 
experience.  Yet the recent findings of the Senate Committee demonstrate that at some point 
since 1995, public diplomacy in Australia has lost traction as an instrument for advancing 
foreign policy.  Exploration of the policy and practice that sit behind the current rhetoric of 
public diplomacy gives rise to the core argument advanced through this thesis:  that the 
understanding and effective practice of public diplomacy in the current Australian context has 
been seriously neglected and marginalised. 
 
                                                 
4 The Senate Committee definition of public diplomacy was presented to the Australian Senate on 16 August 
2007 upon the conclusion of the Inquiry and delivery of the Committee’s Final report.  Australian Senate, 
Hansard, 16 August 2007, p.42.  A detailed examination of the emergence of public diplomacy from 
foundations in traditional diplomacy, and the evolution of definitions and intricacies of contemporary public 
diplomacy is provided later within Chapters Two and Three respectively of this thesis.   
5 G Evans, ‘Australia and Asia: Role of Public Diplomacy’ Address to the Australia-Asia Association, 
Melbourne, 15 March 1990.   
6 G Evans, B Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 1995, p.66. 
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occurs in a structured environment through controlled process, public diplomacy is fluid. 
Where traditional diplomacy occurs at official levels between professional diplomatic 
practitioners, public diplomacy instead is carried out by a range of government and non-
government actors, and utilises media targeting mass public audiences.7  Where acts of 
traditional diplomacy are generally carried out behind closed doors, and in strict confidence 
with, at times little accountability for due process, acts of public diplomacy tend to occur on 
an open stage and may be open to public scrutiny and subject to the impact of public 
opinion.8
That the Australian program of public diplomacy is not as great as the sum of its parts, the 
hypothesis to be tested in this thesis, implies that Australia’s public diplomacy is lacking in 
overall strategic impact, and raises issues relating to Australia’s ability to leverage 
international image, reputation and soft power to deliver on current foreign policy priorities.  
During the Australia 2020 Summit convened at Australia’s Parliament House in April 2008, a 
range of foreign policy experts, government and non-government representatives noted that 
‘as an active middle power, Australia must be smart and creative in the exercise of its 
international influence’.
 
 
9  As a group they suggest that Australia would better utilise public 
diplomacy instruments to build soft power and influence that will assist in meeting the 
challenges ahead.  However, the Senate Inquiry finding indicates that Australia is not as well 
placed as it could be to gain strategic advantage through public diplomacy, noting that 
‘Australia could improve its public diplomacy achievements’.10
                                                 
7 A Henrikson, ‘What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?’ Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, The Netherlands 
Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2006, p.8. 
8 The core tenets of traditional diplomacy are examined in detail through Chapter Two of this thesis.  The 
definition of public diplomacy vis a vis public diplomacy is also explored further in the discussion of the 
concept of public diplomacy in Chapter Three. 
9 Australia 2020 Summit, Final Report, Australian Government, Canberra, May 2008, p.357. 
10 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.202. 
  Such indications highlight a 
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significant tension between the aspirations of the Australian political, business and broad 
domestic community and the reality of Australia’s current capacity in diplomatic practice, 
with specific regard to public diplomatic practice that has sparked the research underpinning 
this thesis.11
The violence against Indian students in Australia, migration crackdowns, and education 
scams presents a poignant and current example that reveals strategic shortcomings in the 
Australian approach to public diplomacy.
   
 
12  The combined coverage of these issues has 
attracted worldwide criticism of Australia.  Not only has the attention damaged Australia’s 
reputation as a safe and credible destination for international students (putting at risk the 
A$15 billion dollar industry), but have reinforced lingering stereotypes of Australia as a racist 
nation.13  As Michael Wesley commented in a recent policy brief on the subject, ‘students 
who return to their country with negative experiences could become a poisoned alumni, 
conveying critical attitudes in other countries about Australian society and poor impressions 
about Australia's reputation as an education provider.  They could ultimately destroy a strong 
export product’.14
This is an issue which has the interest not only of foreign political leaders, but of business 
and industry leaders, opinion leaders, and importantly the overseas communities and families 
who might otherwise trade with, travel to or support their children moving temporarily to 
   
 
                                                 
11 The aspirations of the Australian community referred to here are those articulated and documented through 
the Australia 2020 Summit, Final Report, as cited in footnote 4.   
12 B Dubey, ‘Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under’, The Indian Times, 3 June 2009.  A. Bolt, ‘We’re 
not the racists’, Herald Sun, 3 June 2009, BBC News, ‘India Calls Off Australia Events’, BBC News Online, 11 
June 2009, viewed on 3 November, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8094682.stm. 
13 Dubey, ‘Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under’. See also, H Gilmore, ‘China Speaks Out on Student 
Attacks’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 June 2009. M Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International 
Education and the Costs to Australia’, Policy Brief, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, August 
2009, p.1.   
14 Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.1.   
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Australia.15   The issues relating to Indian students have sparked a full offensive and crisis 
management response from diplomatic officials led initially by veteran Australian diplomat 
John McCarthy AO.16 As Wesley reports, ‘the Government ‘damage-control’ efforts and 
expenditures in the wake of the violence and media coverage included sending officials to 
India, hosting Indian journalists in Australia, and forming a specific taskforce’.17  In addition, 
since August 2009 high profile political leaders, including Prime Minister Rudd, Deputy 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard and Foreign Minister Stephen Smith have all visited India.18  
The crisis nature and fast pace of the response has served to reinforce the key messages 
delivered through the Senate Inquiry, and  exposed a fundamental lack of strategic 
understanding, planning, and resourcing behind the Australian public diplomacy effort. This 
particular issue has highlighted a typically Australian ‘short-termist’ and crisis driven 
approach to building the Australian image and reputation; images and reputation that might 
otherwise advance national interests on the global stage.19
At a strategic level, Australia’s emerging foreign policy challenges are increasingly global in 
nature.
   
 
20
                                                 
15 Dubey, ‘Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under’. Bolt, ‘We’re not the racists’. 
16 Highly regarded senior diplomat, Peter Varghese was appointed in June 2009 as Australia’s High 
Commissioner to India to take retiring diplomat, John McCarthy’s place.  Varghese is of Indian descent, and 
brings vast experience and understanding in global political and economic developments having spent the past 
five years as the Director-General of the Office of National Assessments (an entity separate from DFAT and 
Defence charged with collating intelligence data, primarily for the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet).  
It appears that his appointment to this role demonstrates the Australian Government’s commitment to rebuilding 
the relationship with the Indian people.  See also M Dodd, ‘Veteran diplomat Peter Varghese appointed High 
Commissioner to India’, The Australian, 9 June 2009. 
  The emerging challenges include for example, shifts in global and regional power 
17 Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.10.  G Healey 
and A Trounson, ‘Moves to Safeguard Indian Students, The Australian, 10 June 2009. ‘Australia Assumes 
Safety of Indian Students’, Australian Associated Press Online, 7 August 2009, viewed on 30 October 2009, 
<http://livenews.com.au/news/student_violence_prompts_rudd_to_visit_India/2009/8/7/215406. C Banham and 
H Gilmore, ‘Rudd Forms Indian Violence Taskforce’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 June 2009.   
18 Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.1. 
19 M Wesley, ‘Planning Australia’s Foreign Policy Future’, Lowy Institute Perspective, Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, Sydney, 2008, p.1. 
20 K Rudd, ‘Australia: the Region and the World: The Challenges Ahead’, Address to the Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 6 November 2009. N Bisley, ‘Advancing 
the National Interest in a Globalised World: Australia’s International Policy in the 21st Century’, Report from 
the Lowy Institute Seminar, Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2007.   
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dynamics as the Group of 20 (G20) takes on a more powerful role in managing global 
governance, economic and environmental management, and as China and India assert their 
economic and military influence, alongside other threats to national interests posed by 
terrorism, climate change, resource scarcity and health.21  Within this environment, 
international relations academics and practitioners are recognising that there is value in 
pursuing foreign policy objectives and addressing global challenges through collaborative 
approaches that engage with broader foreign audiences, including foreign publics.22
                                                 
21 For further discussion of the emerging global challenges see P Fiske de Gouveia, ‘The Future of Public 
Diplomacy’, Presentation to the 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy, Madrid, 2006.  The views 
presented by Fiske de Gouveia are further supported by Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, pp.2-25, and 
B Hocking, ‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’ in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International 
Relations, Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, pp.28-43.  In reference to the Group of Twenty 
(G20), the organisation comprises Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors and was established in 
December 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to discuss key 
issues in the global economy.  Refer to the official G-20 Website, viewed on 3 November, 
  These 
global challenges present new opportunities for foreign policy-makers to engage in the more 
collaborative public diplomacy activities to influence outcomes, as opposed to traditional 
sanctioning military or economic actions aimed at coercion.  Public diplomacy, as an 
http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx. For further reading on the expanding roles of China and India 
within the region see, F Hanson, A Shearer, ‘Tomorrow’s China Offers Scope for Hope as well as Cause for 
Concern’, The Australian, 2 December 2009. Also, F Hanson: ‘China Stumbling through the Pacific’, Policy 
Brief, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, July 2009. R Medcalf, ‘India: Leaving the Village 
behind’, The Australian Literary Review, 2 December 2009. M Wesley, ‘China: An Unfamiliar Terrain’, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 26 September, 2009.   
22 For the broad discussion around public diplomacy in the contemporary environment start with J  Melissen 
(ed), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007. 
N Snow and P Taylor (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, Routledge, New York, 2009. Also 
see the range of ‘Clingendael’ Discussion Papers in Diplomacy on the emerging topic of public diplomacy, 
including J Batora, ‘Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium States – Norway and Canada’, Discussion Paper in 
Diplomacy, The Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, March 2005. E Potter, ‘Canada 
and the New Public Diplomacy’; Henrikson, ‘What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?’; S Rasmussen, ‘Discourse 
Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: Messages and Practice’, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, The Netherlands 
Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’, July 2009.  Also American authors such as: B Gregory, 
‘Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls and Imported Norms’, Presentation to the 
American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict, George 
Washington University, August 2005 and C Ross, ‘Pillars of Public Diplomacy’, Harvard Review.  C Ross 
‘Public Diplomacy Comes of Age’, Washington Quarterly, vol.5, no.2, Spring, 2002. On the intersection 
between public diplomacy and power refer to J Nye, Soft Power: the Means for Success in World Politics, 
Public Affairs, New York, 2002.  
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instrument of soft power, is increasingly being recognised by other nations facing similar 
global challenges as the diplomatic tool of choice.23
Public diplomacy in the modern environment is complex and multi-dimensional, and this 
thesis recognises that there is currently substantial activity occurring across the Australian 
bureaucracy to project a strong and unique Australian image to the rest of the world. 
However, the activity is fragmented and ad hoc, and as the Indian students example 
highlights, is frequently crisis driven.  The overall lag in Australia’s engagement in and 
development of public diplomacy, in a coherent and strategic way, is a central theme for this 
thesis.  Closer analysis of Australia’s political leadership on public diplomacy reveals that the 
issue is more complex.  The Australian Government’s approach to public diplomacy has not 
necessarily followed consistent trends.  For example, political masters during the past fifteen 
years have demonstrated widely divergent views and approaches towards diplomacy 
generally, and public diplomacy more specifically. The Labor-led administration of the 1990s 
put public diplomacy firmly on the agenda.  From this time, then Minister for Foreign 
Affairs,  Gareth Evans noted the significance of  public diplomacy to influence and persuade 
beyond traditional boundaries as it ‘not only reaches out to the decision-makers and opinion-
formers, but also casts its net much wider beyond the influential few to the ‘uninvolved’ 
many’.
  
 
24
                                                 
23 Refer to the discussions and presentations by practitioners (as well as academics) at the international 
conferences include the 2007 Trials of Public Diplomacy Conference held at Wilton Park, the 2006 Madrid 
Conference on Public Diplomacy, 2005 Athens Conference on Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy, and the 
2005 Swedish Institute National Branding and Public Diplomacy Conference.   
23 Lane,  Public Diplomacy: Key Priorities and Challenges, p.1. 
  Indeed the rhetoric and actions surrounding the creation of the Asia Pacific 
24 Evans, Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, p.66.  For further reading on the 
foreign policy approach of the Australian Labor administration in the early1990s see also: P Edwards, D 
Goldsworthy (eds), Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume 2, Melbourne 
University Press, Carlton, 2004; and A Milner, ‘The Rhetoric of Asia’, in Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia 
in World Affairs 1991-1995, J Cotton and J Ravenhill (eds), Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, pp.32-
45; and G Evans, Australia’s Foreign Policy Response to Global Challenges, Address to Advance 100 Global 
Australia’s Summit, Sydney, December 2006;  G Evans, B Grant, ‘Australia’s Foreign Policy: Responding to 
Change’, Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1990;  G Evans, 
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Economic Cooperation (APEC) region, continued and promoted by Evans, combined with 
Australia’s emphasis on the primacy of multilateral institutions, and a desire to be seen as a 
‘good international citizen’ all underpinned emergence of public diplomacy as a concept for 
discussion. 25
Public diplomacy terminology and the public recognition of the wider domestic and foreign 
audience were consistent themes within the political approach to foreign policy during this 
time.
   
 
26
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Australia’s Foreign Policy’, Address to the National Press Club, Canberra, 13 September 1989;  P Keating, 
‘Australia, Asia and Engagement’ The Asia-Australia Papers, No.3, June 2003, pp143-160.   
  The subsequent Liberal administration (led by then Prime Minister John Howard), 
eschewed overt public diplomacy, moved away from multilateralism and good international 
citizenship, with a firm tendency towards building bilateral relationships based on economic 
25 Founded formally in 1989, APEC’s origins can be traced to discussions through 1960s and 1970s within the 
circles of intellectual elites with an interest in the possibilities for regional economic cooperation.  In particular, 
Australian economist and senior trade official John Crawford actively engaged his Japanese counterparts and 
colleagues in discussions around the notion of economic cooperation with significant success.  In September 
1980, John Crawford, then as Chancellor of the Australian National University convened the first major 
conference on regional economic cooperation with full support of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sauro Okita 
and the Prime Ministers of both Australia and Japan (Malcolm Fraser and Ohira Masayoshi respectively).  The 
1980 Conference was a catalyst for building consensus around the Crawford-Okita proposal for an 
“Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development” (OPTAD), and enabled the subsequent establishment of the 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) to formally consider proposals such as OPTAD in more detail. 
PECC provided a successful format for ongoing discussion between key officials from Australia, Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, and the United States; with the ASEAN nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand; with the Republic of Korea and a Pacific delegation through the early 1980s.  The 
significant consensus building undertaken by Crawford and Okita from within PECC established the platform 
from which Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation  could be launched.  Indeed, APEC was subsequently 
orchestrated by then Prime Minister Bob Hawke and the first meeting of the 12 founding members was chaired 
by the then Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans in Canberra that year.  APEC today is the forum for 21 
Pacific Rim economies, comprising the original PECC member economies in addition to Brunei Darussalam, 
Chile, Peru, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Taiwan, Viet Nam.  The APEC purpose is to cooperate on and 
promote regional trade, investment and liberalisation opportunities.  APEC Leaders have met on an annual basis 
since that time, around a range of other officials meetings, and have developed the famous tradition of dressing 
in the national costume of the country hosting the annual meeting.  APEC Secretariat Website: viewed on 3 
November 2009, http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html.  For further discussion of the origins of APEC see 
R Pitty, ‘Regional Economic Cooperation’, in Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement in Asia, pp 
13-46; also S Harris, ‘Pacific Economic Cooperation: Australia and Japan’, speech delivered to the 13th Annual 
Australia-Japan Relations Symposium, Sydney, 19 March 1985 in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, vol 56, 
no.3, 1985,  p.174; and R Bell, Reassessed: Australia’s relationship with the United States’, in Seeking Asian 
Engagement: Australia in World Affairs 1991-1995, pp 213-215. 
26 Refer generally to sources indicated in footnote 19.  Also see D Jones, A Benvenuti, ‘Tradition, myth and the 
dilemma of Australian foreign policy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol 60, No.1, March 2006, 
pp.103-124;  
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and security foundations.27
However, there is a disconnect between the political leadership and bureaucracy which has 
seen public diplomacy remain the lowest priority in Australia’s international policy agenda.  
The evidence for such statements lies not in the political or bureaucratic rhetoric, but more 
importantly in the policy commitments and budgetary allocations, and suggests that in reality, 
effective or strategic public diplomacy is not valued nor understood beyond the lip service 
paid at conference and media events.  Australia’s diplomats (and the supporting bureaucracy), 
are discouraged from doing more in the field than crisis management, such as responding to 
international media reports of Indian student bashings in Melbourne, leaving strategic 
relationships and outcomes on key foreign policy challenges open to risk of failure.
  In contrast again, the current Labour administration embraces 
certain aspects at a political level, manifested in the hectic international travel and speaking 
agendas of high profile political players.   
 
28
The Senate Inquiry reveals that practitioners find difficulty in clearly articulating why public 
diplomacy matters, and in pointing to concrete achievements of public diplomacy, beyond the 
  
Australia’s approach to public diplomacy, while well-intentioned, appears instead to be 
superficially understood, crisis-driven and under-resourced.  As a result, the opportunity lost 
for advancing Australia’s strategic interests is significant, particularly in furthering national 
interests in emerging regions of Asia and in the Pacific, and in addressing global challenges, 
such as terrorism.    
 
                                                 
27 P Kelly, ‘Howard’s Decade: an Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal’, Lowy Institute Paper 15, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 2006. See also J Howard, ‘Australia in the World’, Address to the Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 31 March 2005.   
28 Interview, Confidential Source, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs 
Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009.  Australian Government, Annual Budget 
Statements: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AGPS, Canberra 2006-2007, and 2007-2007. 
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number of media reports about Australia in certain parts of the world.29  This arises partly 
from the widely held ‘pessimistic (or convenient) view that the effects of public diplomacy 
are difficult, if not impossible, to measure’.30  Indeed, as demonstrated through the Senate 
Inquiry, the evidence-base surrounding public diplomacy outcomes is slim and anecdotal at 
best.  The Committee drew attention to the ‘importance of measuring the effects of public 
diplomacy programs over time, or progress towards public diplomacy objectives’, and 
recommended that the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) take on the role of assisting 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) monitor and assess the effectiveness of 
its public diplomacy programs.31
Not surprising then, that the effectiveness of public diplomacy as it is currently practiced in 
the Australian context, is questioned more widely among Australian scholars and opinion 
leaders.  Michael Wesley, appointed in June 2009 as Executive Director of Australia’s Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, remains sceptical about the impact that public diplomacy 
will have on progressing Australian national interests – certainly at the strategic level.
  
 
32  In 
part the rationale behind Wesley’s remarks come from the fact that the purpose of public 
diplomacy has not been well articulated in the Australian context, and as is noted in the 
recently released Blue Ribbon Panel Report on Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit, it is a 
‘conceptual muddle’.33
                                                 
29 The evidence provided to the Senate Inquiry by Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials  refers to a 
quarterly internal evaluation process of public diplomacy programs run via overseas posts, although the 
description provided indicates that the department is focused on the quantification of outputs of public 
diplomacy, without a subsequent analysis or evaluation of the respective outcomes related to national interest. 
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 14 March 2007, p.17. 
30 B Goldsmith, Y Horiuchi,  ‘Spinning the Globe? U.S. Public Diplomacy and Foreign Public Opinion’, 
Journal of Politics, (Forthcoming issue), December 2009, p.3. 
31 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.213. 
32 Interview, Michael Wesley, Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 13 July 2009.   
33 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, Blue Ribbon Panel Report, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2009, p.32. 
  This report compiled by the Lowy Institute points to the fact that 
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public diplomacy is not aligned to, nor integrated with specific international policy 
objectives, and as such is ineffectual, vague and marginalised.34 In the absence of evidence to 
the contrary and when considered in light of three decades of evidence-based policy making 
within Australia, there is a case to argue that at many levels, including the political level that 
Australian public diplomacy is ineffective, and therefore seen to be not of critical importance 
by political leaders.35
Alison Broinowski is cognisant of the policy gap and presents a disturbing rationale as to 
why she believes Australian policy-makers and politicians should be concerned with public 
diplomacy, and why it matters through her recent work About Face: Asian Accounts of 
Australia.  Broinowski presents the Bali Bombings of October 2002, which resulted in the 
deaths of 89 Australians, as her key evidence.  She argues that the bombings may have been 
avoided had Australia taken greater care in development and delivery of its public diplomacy 
program on the international stage, but particularly with Asian neighbours.
 
 
36  The more 
recent October 2005 and July 2009 terrorist attacks in Indonesia, targeting tourist sites, and 
killing and injuring Australians among others might be similarly highlighted by Broinowski 
to further this line of argument.37
In highlighting gaps in Australia’s public diplomacy program, Broinowski has followed the 
trend of similar arguments advanced by opinion leaders within the United States of America 
   
 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 G Banks, ‘Evidenced-based policy-making: what is it? How do we get it?’, Australian and New Zealand 
School of Government/Australian National University Public Lecture Series, February 2009, p.3.   
36 A Broinowski, About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2003, p.231. 
37 In October 2005 a bomb exploded in the Indonesian resort island of Bali killing 32 people.  Later on 17 July 
2009 bombs exploded in the Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotels in Jakarta. Reuters, ‘Indonesia Investigates Bali 
Bombings’, ABC News Online, 2 October 2005, viewed on 15 December 2009, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200510/s1472723.htm.  Also, AFP, ‘Timeline: Indonesia Bomb 
Attacks’, ABC News Online, 17 July 2009, viewed on 15 December 2009, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/07/17/2628953.htm. 
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(USA) which has been besieged by unfavourable sentiment from across the globe.38  Both 
advocates and critics of public diplomacy claim that continued terrorism against America has 
escalated because of inconsistent, superficial and poorly delivered public diplomacy 
programs.39  The underpinning concern being that the unfavourable views held by foreign 
publics … pose a real and ongoing security threat to American interests where, ‘the 
perceptions of foreign publics have domestic consequences’.40 The American experience 
must be recognised as being starkly different to that of Australia, most obviously because the 
USA is positioned as a global economic and military superpower leading and supporting a 
range of conflict-based activities particularly with the Moslem world.41
After analysing the various views regarding the inadequacies of Australia’s public diplomacy 
program from an engagement, leadership and resourcing perspective, a central issue emerges:  
a fundamental absence of alignment of public diplomacy to strategic foreign policy 
objectives.  Without such strategic alignment, public diplomacy floats around the fringe of 
foreign policy, appearing only at a superficial level in rhetoric and symbolic gestures, one-off 
or randomly planned events and activities, and crisis media management. Against this 
background, the real benefits of strategic public diplomacy in tangibly advancing national 
interests are rarely realised.  
  However, the overall 
theme relating to the potential effect of negative foreign opinion, and the opportunity for a 
coherent public diplomacy program to exert strategic impact in the advancement of national 
interests of security and peace, remains the same. 
 
                                                 
38 According to the Djerejian Report, ‘surveys indicate that much of the resentment across the globe towards 
America stems from real conflict and displeasure with policies including those involving the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, and Iraq’.  For the full report refer to EP Djerejian ‘Changing Minds, Winning Peace’, Report of the 
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Moslem World, US House of Representatives, 1 October 
2003, p.9. 
39 For example, C Wolf, Jr B Rosen, ‘Public Diplomacy: How to think about it and improve it’, Occasional 
Paper, RAND Corporation, California, 2004, p.3.  Refer also to Djerejian, ‘Changing Minds, Winning Peace’. 
40 Congressman Henry Hyde quoted in Wolf, Jr and Rosen, ‘Public Diplomacy: How to think about it and 
improve it’, p.3. 
41 Wolf, Jr and Rosen, ‘Public Diplomacy: How to think about it and improve it’, p.3. 
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Taking the 2007 Senate Inquiry as the launching point, this thesis tests the stated hypothesis 
that Australia’s public diplomacy program is less than the sum of its parts, by analysing more 
deeply the evidence and implications of the Senate Inquiry, and exploring and critiquing the 
many layers of Australia’s public diplomacy program.  From the outset, the thesis seeks to 
understand the relevance of public diplomacy within the broad field of foreign policy and 
diplomacy, and to distinguish contemporary public diplomacy activities and outcomes from 
the complementary but distinct activities and outcomes of traditional diplomacy. The thesis 
relies upon international research and literature regarding public diplomacy in a general and 
theoretical sense, combined with the documented experiences of international practitioners 
and academics to show the direction of current and emerging thinking on public diplomacy.   
Interviews with Australian practitioners and academics assist in building an understanding of 
how Australia’s public diplomacy program might fit into a strategic policy framework.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to extend the contemporary body of Australian knowledge in the 
field of public diplomacy, with the aim of bridging a gap between theory and practice.  The 
thesis will explore more deeply the current role and structure of public diplomacy in 
Australia’s foreign policy, to better understand why the Senate Inquiry concluded that the 
whole of Australia’s program of current diplomacy is less than the sum of its parts.  In doing 
so, the thesis moves beyond existing literature to establish a policy-based framework to 
support better understanding and utilisation of public diplomacy in a way that might achieve 
foreign policy objectives.   
 
To fulfil the responsibility of this study, the first half of the thesis sets the scene for the in 
depth discussion of contemporary public diplomacy.  Chapter One introduces the Senate 
14 
 
Inquiry and explores the background against which contemporary public diplomacy in the 
Australian context has emerged.  Chapter Two establishes a foundation for discussion by 
briefly revisiting the tradition of diplomacy, from which public diplomacy originates. 
Revisiting the traditionalist perspective reveals that the basis for public diplomacy practice 
today is grounded in the well established traditions of diplomacy.  Traditionalists, such as 
Berridge, are clearly sceptical of the nature and role of public diplomacy and struggle to find 
meaning in contemporary writings about public diplomacy.42
Chapter Three draws more closely upon the international literature and the Australian Senate 
Inquiry process, hearings and findings, and further deconstructs the parameters of 
contemporary public diplomacy.  This chapter resolves the definition and scope of public 
diplomacy that is relevant not only to the broader practice of diplomacy, but also to the 
Australian context.  To this end the thesis identifies where public diplomacy both builds upon 
the traditions of diplomacy, and moves beyond those traditions to meet the extended needs of 
the modern environment within which international relations are conducted.  This chapter 
explores the major shifts in the environment, including the increasingly multilateral and fluid 
nature of international relations, an emerging global agenda, and the ‘complex 
  However, consideration of the 
foundations of traditional diplomacy provides a necessary starting point for understanding the 
emergence of public diplomacy as a contemporary concept.  This thesis also recognises that 
Australian diplomatic practice builds upon a traditional structure and approach, and 
understanding this approach is fundamental to identifying the ongoing challenges for public 
diplomacy to take hold within the Australian context.   
 
                                                 
42 GR Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Palgrave New York, 2002; also online updates viewed on 30 
October 2009, http://grberridge.diplomacy.edu/Teaching/display.asp?Topic=TheoryPractice1. 
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interdependence between domestic and foreign policy issues’ that have changed the way in 
which states cast their foreign policy objectives and interact in the pursuit of outcomes.43
Against the backdrop of the modern environment within which states currently interact and 
conduct their international affairs, the thesis explores the deeper cultural divides that continue 
to challenge the boundaries of the state based system, and the structures and processes of 
traditional diplomacy in the twenty-first century.  The discussion draws upon Samuel 
Huntington’s theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’, and more recently the deep political, 
economic and religious cultural divides as defined by Leonard, Small and Rose.
  
 
44
By way of qualification, while recognising that public diplomacy is a tool utilised by both 
state and non-state actors for the purpose of advancing a strategic agenda, this thesis will 
focus primarily on the public diplomacy planned, designed, and delivered by the state, where 
the lead responsibility is owned by the relevant Ministry or Departments of Foreign Affairs. 
Additionally, in order to ensure sufficient analysis the thesis will be confined to an 
  Such 
theories present a world view that lends validity to the increasing role and relevance of public 
diplomacy in building relationships and addressing foreign policy goals in a chaotic, complex 
and less predictable world. These perspectives highlight the systemic challenges that exist 
within the modern diplomatic environment, including for Australia; and draw attention to the 
opportunities that exist for coherent and consistent public diplomacy approaches that engage 
and build meaningful relationships with foreign audiences. 
 
                                                 
43 Melissen, ‘Introduction’ in Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p.iii. 
44 Samuel Huntington first raised the notion that civilization, culture and identity would create the divides in the 
future in his work, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1993. Huntington expanded upon 
the theory in his subsequent book, S Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World 
Order, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996. Key themes regarding the significance of cultural divides in 
international politics are raised and expanded developed further in M Leonard, A Small with M Rose, ‘British 
Public Diplomacy in the “Age of Schisms”’, Counterpoint, London, February 2005.  The latter research 
identifies key heads of cultural divide as political, religious and economic, which transcend civilizations and are 
expected to be at the core of future clashes between publics in the future.   
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examination of Australian practice since 1986, from the time that the then Senator Gareth 
Evans took on the Foreign Affairs portfolio as a part of a newly merged Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), also incorporating the former Australian Information 
Service (AIS).45
In building the picture of contemporary public diplomacy, Chapter Four explores the 
significance of public diplomacy in building soft power, for which the key public diplomacy 
currencies, such as values and identity, are critical.  Through effective use of such currencies, 
public diplomacy can create an enabling or disabling environment for the ongoing conduct of 
relations between states.  The discussion of values, identity and image, is supported through 
particular reference to the diplomatic challenges that Australia has consistently faced in 
understanding and reconciling an Australian approach to foreign policy positioning with the 
Asian region.  Once again the theories and perspectives relating to deep cultural divides (as 
previously discussed via Huntington’s theory) provides for a relevant background against 
which the importance of leveraging values, identity and image in the pursuit of foreign policy 
objectives is important.
   
 
46
Chapter Four devotes considerable and worthy attention to two key areas of practice, cultural 
diplomacy and development assistance, as distinct methods of public diplomacy that are 
frequently underutilised, but can have far reaching and powerful impacts for the engagement 
of, and building relationships with foreign audiences.  The nature of Australia’s cultural 
  More specifically, the discussion in Chapter Four supports the 
proposition of this thesis that public diplomacy is a strategic instrument of foreign policy, is 
relevant to, and could be applied more effectively for the Australian context. 
 
                                                 
45 International Public Affairs Network, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, April 2007, p.38. 
46 Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’; Leonard, Small, Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the ‘Age of 
Schisms’’, pp.5-8. 
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exchange and development assistance programs particularly within the Asia-Pacific region is 
such that they provide a subtle, credible platform from which Australian government officials 
can engage with foreign audiences around tangible issues and concerns and build reputational 
advantage.47  These programs can establish a strong sense of Australian goodwill within the 
region, and act as subtle levers that enable the opening up of and facilitate manoeuvrability in 
critical relationships.48
With a basic understanding of the nature of contemporary public diplomacy, including within 
the Australian environment the thesis moves into the second half of the study to bring public 
diplomacy from the periphery of Australian diplomatic practice, and to establish public 
diplomacy as a strategic instrument of foreign policy.  Chapter Five sets out the scaffolding 
for the policy based framework, drawing upon the policy stages identified by Gyngell and 
  The Senate Inquiry highlighted that while cultural diplomacy and 
development assistance programs are evidently understood to have a public diplomacy 
impact by default, the strategic value of such programs as central to Australia’s foreign policy 
interests is overlooked.    
 
                                                 
47 Australia’s Agency for International Development (AusAID) is the Australian Government agency 
responsible for managing Australia’s overseas aid program, and falls within the Foreign Affairs and Trade 
portfolio.  Refer to the AusAID website: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/about/default.cfm.  See also G. Evans, 
‘Australia’s Foreign Policy Response to Global Challenges’.   
48 For example, the AusAID, Better Education: A Policy for Australian Development Assistance in Education, 
Australian Government, Canberra, 2006: 
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pubout.cfm?Id=7331_3301_1176_5126_9027. Additionally, the 
Australian Youth Ambassadors for Development program (AYAD), places skilled young Australian volunteers, 
aged 18-30, on short-term assignments of between 3-12 months, in developing countries throughout the Asia 
Pacific region. In another example, the Community Peace and Restoration Fund which has been activated in the 
Solomon Islands, funds project worker to work at a local community development level in bringing together 
communities riddled with conflict. However, the Senate Inquiry revealed that while there is anecdotal evidence 
that individuals such as those involved in the AYAD program may ‘serendipitously’ develop strong 
relationships and linkages with public in other countries, and ‘may come back to us [DFAT] through other 
programs as they develop a long-term interest in a particular country so that we might connect back with them 
later in their lives and careers’, there is no formal mechanism in place for the tracking or evaluation of such 
outcomes.  Indeed as noted by the Senior DFAT Official providing evidence to the Committee, ‘To some extent, 
I do not think these programs should necessarily be about us trying to script everything.  Sometimes, as with our 
other programs, it is about establishing a relationship which can come into play in later years’.  For a description 
of aspects of the AYAD program in operation refer to http://www.ausaid.gov.au/closeup/solomons.cfm.  For 
further discussion regarding the evaluation and tracking of relationships and contacts developed as a result of 
the AYAD program refer to: Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee 
Hansard, 14 March 2007, p.18. 
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Wesley alongside recognised strategic foreign policy drivers.49  This discussion examines key 
concepts related to foreign policy, including the structures and processes involved in the 
development and delivery of foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on policymaking 
within the Australian context.  The layers or phases of the policy process as identified by 
Gyngell and Wesley are adapted for the purpose of constructing a practical policy reference 
tool.50  These layers are aligned alongside the strategic foreign policy objectives (including 
two policy objectives of particular relevance to Australian foreign policy), in order to identify 
the strategic objectives, contextual considerations, targeted audiences, and mechanisms 
employed to deliver upon the policies via public diplomacy activities.51
Chapter Five examines each of the strategic foreign policy concepts in isolation. However, it 
is through drawing these strategic foreign policy considerations into a policy framework that 
the thesis gains insight into the scope and versatility of public diplomacy.  In doing so, the 
thesis addresses the overlaps between public diplomacy and other related concepts such as 
public affairs and propaganda.  Recognising also that there may be a tendency for discussions 
around public diplomacy to occur in a disorganised and chaotic manner; and acknowledging 
the uneven layers of understanding in the field on this issue, the responsibility of this thesis 
rests in setting out a framework for organised and logical discussion.  The intention of the 
framework is to clearly align public diplomacy to recognized strategic foreign policies in 
  
 
                                                 
49 A Gyngell, M Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, 
p.24. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Henrikson reminds us of the core strategic foreign policies of consolidation, containment, penetration, 
enlargement and transformation via A. Henrikson, ‘What can public diplomacy achieve?’, The thesis adds the 
contemporary policy strategy of diversion as discussed most recently by J. Glassman, former United States 
Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs as articulated in ‘Opinion: How to Win the War on 
Ideas’, Opinion, Wall Street Journal, 24 July 2008. Additionally the key foreign policy strategies of relevance to 
Australia of regional stability and engagement (identified primarily in Evans , Grant, Australia’s Foreign 
Relations in the World of the 1990s) are explored through this discussion.   
 
19 
 
such a way that will allow the concepts and methods to become more accessible and relevant 
to the Australian practitioner.      
 
Chapter Six brings the components of the strategic foreign policy drivers together with the 
policy phases into the policy-based framework (the Framework), that is developed as a 
unique contribution to the field of diplomacy through this thesis, and seeks to provide a 
starting point for practitioners to identify the role of public diplomacy in advancing primary 
foreign policy objectives.  The purpose of this chapter is to bring the relevant pieces of the 
public diplomacy puzzle together, and drawing on examples that are relevant to the 
Australian context, provide guidance on how the Framework might then be applied.   
 
Chapter Seven concludes this study reflecting upon the policy analysis of the previous 
chapter with the aim of fulfilling the thesis’ responsibility to bridge the existing gap between 
theory and practice in the area of public diplomacy.  The intention of this chapter is to enable 
a broader understanding of the complex and multi-dimensional nature of public diplomacy, 
while demonstrating the common and consistent threads and underpinning principles that 
provide clarity and direction, and improve the effectiveness of public diplomacy at work.   
  
Through this exploration, the overall aim of the thesis is to facilitate a better understanding of 
how public diplomacy operates within the Australian context and identify opportunities for 
public diplomacy to be utilised as an effective tool to advance Australia’s national interests.  
The responsibility of the thesis is to develop a framework that might engage Australian 
practitioners in discussion about the future direction and enhancement of public diplomacy 
practice.  In pursuing a practical line of discussion around public diplomacy, the thesis also 
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aims to bridge the divide between theorist and practitioner in this one area of diplomatic 
enquiry and practice.  
 
The thesis draws upon contemporary international literature relating to public diplomacy in 
the modern environment.  A large portion of this literature emanates from Europe as the 
product of both international conferences bringing practitioners and academics together in the 
discussion of public diplomacy trends.  European research and literature (particularly that 
from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, under the 
directorship of public diplomacy authority, Jan Melissen), presents a wide range of 
perspectives that explore various facets of public diplomacy practice.  In contrast, the United 
States of America has developed a distinct brand of public diplomacy that remains relatively 
separate from the European blend.  American literature is specifically focused upon 
America’s perceived public diplomacy crisis that has emerged from the ‘war on terror’.52   
American think-tanks, advisory boards, politicians and bureaucrats are well entrenched in the 
discussion of America’s public image, and while American literature is of value to the 
exploration of the Australian experience, the literature presents an insular, self possessed 
perspective.53
                                                 
52 In particular see, Djerejian, ‘Changing Minds, Winning Peace’; Snow, ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy’, S. 
Riordan, ‘Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: a New Foreign Policy Paradigm’, in The New Public Diplomacy: 
Soft Power in International Relations, J. Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005, pp180-195, also 
J Glassman, How to Win the War on Ideas, Wall Street Journal, 24 July 2008, and J Glassman, ‘US Public 
Diplomacy and the War of Ideas’, Briefing on Public Diplomacy, The Washington Foreign Press Centre, 
Washington D.C., 15 July 2008, and C Rice, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’, Address to Georgetown University, 
Washington D.C., 18 January 2006. 
53 For example, Djerejian, ‘Changing Minds Winning Peace’ a report by the U.S. Advisory Group on Public 
Diplomacy for the Moslem and Arab World, 2008, ‘Building America’s Public Diplomacy through a reformed 
Structure and Public Diplomacy Resources’, a report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 
2002, ‘Finding America’s Voice: a Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy’, a Report by the 
Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, U.S. Public Diplomacy, a Report 
by the U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003, ‘Managed Information Dissemination’, The Report of the Defence 
Science Board Taskforce, Office of the Under Secretary for Defence Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
2001, ‘Strengthening U.S.-Moslem Communications’, from the Centre for the Study for the Presidency, 2003, 
Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy, Heritage Foundation, 2003.  
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The thesis acknowledges, as did the Senate Inquiry that there are only a handful of 
contemporary academic works that specifically relate to the Australian experience of public 
diplomacy.  These gaps in current Australian academic literature and discussion regarding 
public diplomacy are likely to be more indicative of the more fundamental gap in Australian 
foreign policy research and discussion.  To address the gap in understanding the Australian 
experience of public diplomacy, the thesis draws primarily upon the official documentation 
submitted to and produced by the Senate Committee through the course of the Inquiry into 
the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program.  Further evidence was 
gathered through interviews obtaining the views of a range of stakeholders, from across 
Australia’s political, government and non-government; business, academic and arts sectors.  
Participants were interviewed in relation to their particular insights and interests in public 
diplomacy.  In some cases, interviewees were identified because of their involvement in the 
Senate Inquiry process, whether as a member of the Committee or its supporting Secretariat, 
or as a contributor and witness to the Inquiry.  Lastly, the study draws upon the analysis of 
official documents produced by key agencies, including DFAT, Austrade and AusAID.   
 
Of particular relevance, the delay in the development and tabling of the government’s 
response to the Senate Inquiry deterred officials from DFAT commenting directly on this 
thesis through a formal interview process.  However, senior DFAT officials (based in 
Australia and overseas) have taken part in informal discussions surrounding the concept and 
conduct of public diplomacy.  These discussions have collectively informed much of the 
development of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1:  PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN AUSTRALIA 
1.1 Senate Inquiry throws light onto Australia’s Public Diplomacy 
Program 
 
On 7 November 2006, the Australian Senate referred the matter of the nature and conduct of 
Australia’s public diplomacy to the Joint Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade for ‘inquiry and report with particular reference to the:  
i) extent and effectiveness of current public diplomacy programs and activities in achieving the 
objectives of the Australian Government;  
ii) opportunities for enhancing public diplomacy both in Australia and overseas;  
iii) effectiveness of and possible need to reform administrative arrangements relating to the 
conduct of public diplomacy within and between Commonwealth agencies and where 
relevant, the agencies of state governments; and 
iv) need, and opportunities for expanding levels of funding for Australia’s public diplomacy 
programs, including opportunities for funding within the private sector.1
 
 
The Senate Inquiry process ran over six months during 2007.2  The Committee publicly 
invited submissions from interested parties, and conducted a series of open hearings and 
roundtables in Canberra, Melbourne, and Sydney, extending upon the information presented 
through the submissions.3
                                                 
1 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry onto the Nature and Conduct of 
Australia’s Public Diplomacy Program: Terms of Reference, Commonwealth of Australia, November 2006.   
2 At the time the Senate Committee commenced the Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public 
diplomacy program (March 2007) the Committee comprised the following members:  Senator Johnston (Chair), 
senator for Western Australia and member of the Australian Liberal Party (LP); Senator Steve Hutchins (Deputy 
Chair) Senator for New South Wales and member of the Australian Labor Party (ALP); alongside Senators 
Mark Bishop, Senator for Western Australia (LP); Alan Ferguson, Senator for South Australia (LP); Michael 
Forshaw, Senator for New South Wales (ALP); John Hogg, Senator for Queensland (ALP); Marisa Payne, 
Senator for NSW (LP); and Russell Trood, Senator for Queensland (LP).    
3 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of 
Australia’s Public Diplomacy Program Website found at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/committee/fadt_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-
07/public_diplomacy/index.htm 
 The Senate Committee faced a challenging task in unravelling the 
strands of public diplomacy strategy and practice within Australia, with terms of reference 
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that straddled the strategic and tactical aspects of public diplomacy development and 
delivery.4
By way of background, there is relevance in discussing the scope and authority of a Senate 
Committee such as the Joint Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade, particularly in relation to an Inquiry process.  A Senate Inquiry carried out, as in this 
instance by a Joint Standing Committee, does not necessarily carry the same weight or 
authority as an independent inquiry, but is nonetheless an important mechanism for 
investigating and highlighting issues of relevance to the national agenda. As stated in the 
available Senate information regarding committees, ‘the role of committees is to investigate 
and to draw attention to what they find. They throw ‘light in dark corners’ and give advice’.
   
 
5 
The nomenclature, Joint Standing Committee means that the Committee is established by 
virtue of a standing order of both houses of parliament.6  The Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade is one of six such committees. The overall purpose of a 
Joint Senate Standing Committee (along with other types of senate committees) is to ensure 
efficiency and flexibility in the workings of the Senate where issues considered to be of 
national importance require detailed examination or further report without the full resources 
or attention of the full Senate or Parliament. The powers and proceedings of such a 
committee are determined by resolution of both houses of parliament; and membership is 
drawn from both houses of parliament and all sides of politics, depending upon the interest of 
the members.7
                                                 
4 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of 
Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Terms of Reference. 
5 Parliament of Australia, Senate Committees, Senate Brief No. 4, February 2008.   
6 Other senate committees, such as legislative and general purpose committees are established solely by the 
Senate (including by way of statute).  
7 Parliament of Australia, Senate Committees. 
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The Joint Standing Committee does not operate with any powers of its own, but on the basis 
of the powers delegated by the Senate.  As such, the Committee can take evidence under oath 
and ‘require’ the submission of information either through a written submission or oral 
hearing.  It is unusual for the Committee to exercise the full extent of its delegated authority, 
and information is gathered through ‘invitation’, as both government and non-government 
agencies are generally keen to utilise Senate Inquiries as an opportunity to publicly present 
their position on key issues.  At the conclusion of an inquiry process the Senate Committee is 
required to provide a report to parliament which may prompt further parliamentary debate, 
and subsequently inform government policy or procedure.   
 
The 2007 Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy 
program was conducted in what appeared to be a low key manner.  The Senate Committee’s 
Final Report was tabled by Committee member, Senator Marise Payne without dissent from 
Committee members.  The Report attracted only minor discussion prior to its acceptance by 
the Senate.  The Senate discussion was fully supportive of the ‘importance of public 
diplomacy to Australia’s many interests, including to trade, investment, security and those in 
the political arena’.8  More pointedly, Senator Payne referred to the ‘very strong connection 
between Australia’s international reputation and its ability to influence the regional and 
global agenda in ways that promote Australia’s interests’.9 As Senator Payne noted, ‘Our 
international reputation can either promote or undermine our foreign policy objectives.’10
                                                 
8 Senate of Australia, Senate Hansard, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 16 August 2007. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
 In 
other words, in Payne’s view, public diplomacy could play a more substantial role beyond 
information provision and peripheral campaigns aimed at foreign audiences, in underpinning 
and progressing Australia’s strategic foreign policy interests and objectives on the global 
stage. 
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The Senate Committee sought to establish understanding of the broad range of issues related 
to contemporary public diplomacy practice as a starting point for gauging the role of public 
diplomacy in the Australian environment.  The rhetoric which emerged through the Senate 
hearings and subsequent report indicates a small but increasing political interest and buy-in to 
utilising ‘effective and effectively coordinated public diplomacy strategy [as] critical to the 
overall endeavours of Australia to effectively tackle some of our greatest foreign policy 
challenges…’.11
Of interest to this line of research, some years earlier in 2003, the same Joint Committee 
conducted an inquiry into Australia’s foreign and trade policy - Advancing the National 
Interest. At that time, public diplomacy was given only a passing mention and only in the 
Government’s response to the final report.  Public diplomacy activities were described by the 
Government as being confined to ‘annual reports and other departmental publications and 
resources’.
   
 
12
In presenting the Committee’s final report on public diplomacy to the Senate, Senators 
Payne, Trood and Kemp also pointed clearly to both ad hoc and systemic issues impacting on 
the current nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program.  They referred to the 
twenty specific recommendations outlined in the report which if implemented, would raise 
 The stark change in the perceived scope of and approach to public diplomacy in 
Australia in only four years is significant, and adds credibility to the fast pace of international 
discussion on this issue and overall view that public diplomacy is of increasing relevance in 
diplomatic practice. 
 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, The (not quite) White Paper: Australia’s 
Foreign Affairs and Trade Policy – Advancing Australia’s Interests, Parliament of Australia, December 2003. 
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the profile and effectiveness of Australia’s public diplomacy program.13  The Government, 
through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) formally tabled its response to 
the Inquiry report to Parliament in January 2009 (well outside the agreed timeframes for 
government response; a delay more than likely caused in part by the change in Government 
which occurred after the Inquiry report had been tabled, and subsequent staffing changes 
within the DFAT business unit responsible for the response).14  Many of the twenty 
Committee recommendations made were ‘noted’, with occasional recommendations 
‘accepted’, by the Government.15  While there were some positive elements, the 
Government’s overall response to the Senate Inquiry report and recommendations was 
ambivalent, and any potentially concrete or positive actions have since been stymied by a 
lack of operational budget to deliver.  The Government response, although significantly 
delayed, confirms a bureaucratic intellectual commitment to the benefits of public diplomacy, 
and to developing an improved strategic understanding of the role of public diplomacy that 
was not necessarily evident prior to the Inquiry process. However, there remains a tangible 
sense of disappointment and lack of direction evident from key figures and officials involved 
in the Inquiry, as well as from those operating within the bureaucracy about the future of 
Australian public diplomacy. 16
                                                 
13 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.xi. 
14 The Images of Australia Branch experienced three changes in Assistant Secretary from the time of the 
commencement of the Inquiry through to the tabling of the Government response – an unusually high staffing 
turnover, even by DFAT standards.  Interview, Confidential Source, Senior Officials, Consular, Public 
Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 November 2007 
and 22 June 2009. 
15 Australian Government, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, Australian Government 
Response to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Report, Australian 
Government, Canberra, January 2009.  
16 Interview, Senator Russell Trood, 30 June 2009, and Interview, Confidential Source, Senior Official, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, 22 
June 2009. 
  For this reason, question marks linger around the overall 
impact and value of the Senate Inquiry in taking a serious look at and throwing light into the 
dark corners of Australia’s public diplomacy program.   
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For these reasons, the Senate Inquiry must be the starting point for the analysis of 
contemporary public diplomacy, particularly as it fits within the Australian context. In 
particular, the Senate Inquiry points to five systemic issues with Australia’s public diplomacy 
program that include the: 
i) lack of Australian practitioner and academic engagement in current international 
discussions – and subsequent  shortfalls or gaps in Australian understanding of 
public diplomacy as an instrument of strategic and tactical foreign policy; 
ii) lack of political will and direction driving Australia’s public diplomacy objectives 
and outcomes; 
iii) poor coordination of delivery across the public diplomacy system;  
iv) lack of sufficient resourcing to support effective public diplomacy delivery; and 
v) significant gaps in the engagement and consolidation of the Australian domestic 
public in shaping Australia’s  public diplomacy program.17
 
Examination of each of these issues provides insight into the overall complexity faced by the 
Senate Committee in unravelling the concept of public diplomacy as an instrument of 
strategic foreign policy, as well as the multi-dimensional and dynamic layers of process, 
structure, players, and outputs that shape public diplomacy activities and outcomes.  Further 
exploration of these issues provides the direction required in testing the initial hypothesis that 
the whole of Australia’s public diplomacy program is less than the sum of its parts, and may 
contribute to developing resources that might assist the practitioner in their understanding of 
public diplomacy in action.   
 
1.2 Key issues regarding public diplomacy in Australia 
1.2.1 Engagement in international directions 
 
While there was no critical event of issue sparking the need for the Senate Inquiry, it is likely 
that it was instigated as a result of the interest of Committee members in the increasing 
                                                 
17 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’. 
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academic discussions about developments occurring internationally, particularly in Europe 
and Canada.18 A number of international conferences have been convened in recent years, 
bringing academics and high profile practitioners together in dialogue on the emerging role of 
modern public diplomacy as a tool for achieving foreign policy priorities.19 The discussions, 
which have engaged a range of small, middle and large power states including Norway, 
Spain, United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Turkey, consistently highlight the fact that public 
diplomacy is no longer on the periphery of diplomatic activity, but has ‘acquired greater 
prominence on the agenda of [international] policy-makers since 2001’. 20  Scholars are 
recognising that public diplomacy, because of its potential to reach and influence a wider 
public audience through cost effective media, has a ‘key role to play in meeting some of the 
grand geo-political challenges of our day’. 21
Queensland Liberal Senator, Russell Trood, member of the Senate Committee and 
International Relations academic, who spearheaded the 2007 Senate Inquiry noted his 
concern that the Australian Government appeared disinterested in these discussions, and was 
not playing an active role in conference proceedings.
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18 Recent conferences held in Europe have sparked more relevant discussions and literature on the use of public 
diplomacy as a strategic tool within contemporary international relations.  The nomenclature has varied, and 
public diplomacy has at time been referred to under such terms as the new diplomacy, although current literature 
and discussion consistently utilises the terminology of public diplomacy.  Recent discussions have centred on 
the role of public diplomacy for global giants such as China playing catch-up with the information explosion, as 
well as for smaller and medium sized states to boost their competitive positioning in the global market, and 
bolster their political standing in global discussions (Spain, Norway and Canada being key examples).  In 2006, 
both the United Kingdom and Canada separately instigated reviews of their public diplomacy strategies, 
programs and operations.  In both cases the result has been significant structural and operational changes and 
substantial funding and resourcing increases to their public diplomacy programs. 
19 Key recent international conferences include the 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005 Conferences on Public Diplomacy at 
Wilton Park which attracts a diverse group of participants each year.  In 2008 participants represented Romania, 
Mozambique, Vietnam, British Virgin Islands, Liechenstein, Mexico, the U.K., Afghanistan, Canada, Denmark, 
and the USA. The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy held at Real Instituto Elcano included 
participants from Spain, Madrid, the United Kingdom, European Union.  Other Conferences included the  2005 
Athens Conference on Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy Conference, 2005 Swedish Institute National 
Branding and Public Diplomacy Conference. 
20 Lane Public Diplomacy: Key Priorities and Challenges, p.2. 
21 Fiske de Gouveia, ‘The Future of Public Diplomacy’, and R Schlegeter, ‘German Public Diplomacy’, The 
2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, March 2006.  
22 Interview, Senator Russell Trood, January 2008.  
 While the government’s response to 
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the Senate Inquiry refutes this point, Australia’s lack of visibility in a range of high profile 
academic and practitioner based discussions is notable.  More so, such an absence is of 
interest given the extent and profile of literature and discourse within international circles 
around the increasing role of public diplomacy in contemporary foreign policy development 
and delivery.  Public diplomacy has been labelled by notable diplomacy and communications 
scholars as ‘the hottest topic under discussion in the world’s diplomatic services’.,23
Yet, Australian academics and practitioners have not played any substantive role nor 
appeared to have contributed to international discussions, research or literature relating to this 
‘hot topic’.  While DFAT officials in the Images of Australia Branch are informed of latest 
trends and developments through journal subscriptions, there is no budget within the area to 
support practitioner participation in such conferences.
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Contemporary Australian academic discussion and published literature regarding the 
Australian position on and practice of public diplomacy is virtually non-existent.  Pauline 
Kerr, of the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University (ANU), 
  Non-participation in high level 
conferences and discussions represents not only a loss for Australian practitioners in the field 
in terms of the informal development of networks and sharing of knowledge and experience; 
but also an opportunity lost in terms of engaging in the more formal rigour and scrutiny of 
other practitioners within a learning environment.  As a result, there is a net cumulative loss 
to the Australia’s practice of diplomacy. 
 
                                                 
23 Melissen, ‘Public Diplomacy Between Theory and Practice’, The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public 
Diplomacy, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, March 2006.  However, international diplomacy scholar and author 
Berridge does not agree with this assessment, and notes on his website that ‘it is not easy to distinguish between 
the sense and the nonsense currently being written on this subject’. Refer to Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and 
Practice, online updates found at http://www.grberridge.co.uk/dip_comp-1.htm.   
24 Interview, Confidential, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Division, Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009. 
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admits that ‘little has been written on the subject domestically’.25  She continues that ‘it is 
quite noticeable, when looking through the diplomatic literature that public diplomacy really 
is not a topic that Australian academics find all that interesting’.26  There are a small number 
of academics working in the field, including through the Australian National University 
School of Asian Studies, Sydney University and the Royal Melbourne Institute of 
Technology (RMIT).  Studies are focused on drilling into the development of a better 
understanding and quantification of public diplomacy outcomes.27  At present there is no 
graduate course in any Australian university specifically addressing the field of public 
diplomacy.  This is in contrast to the many well established and high profile international 
academic centres, all promoting opportunities for targeted and substantial postgraduate 
research, study and practice in the field of public diplomacy.28
After some discussion on the topic, the Senate Committee noted on record this concern, that 
‘it would seem Australia is not actively involved in the international conversation about 
public diplomacy’.
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25 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image, p.27. 
26 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 11 April 2007, p.8.   
27 Benjamin Goldsmith, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the 
University of Sydney conducts research and study in the areas of international public opinion and US foreign 
policy.  Goldsmith has collaborated with Yusaku Horiuchi (Lecturer, Policy and Governance, Crawford School 
of Economics and Government, Australian National University), and Trevor Wilson (Visiting Fellow, 
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School in Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National 
University) in the hosting of a Comparative Seminar on Public Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific in Canberra on 6 
March 2007 (prior to the commencement of the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of public 
diplomacy).  Horiuchi and Wilson continue to progress research into the area of public diplomacy evaluation, 
while Joseph Siracusa currently of the International and Community Studies School at RMIT is furthering a 
project to develop the concept of an Australian Year Book, which might be utilised as a key public diplomacy 
product.   
28 For example, including as The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Brookings Institute, 
University of Southern California Centre for Public Diplomacy, Tufts University Murrow Centre, and Spain’s 
Real Instituto Elcano. 
29 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image, p.30. 
 The line of questioning pursued by the Committee through the Inquiry 
process, particularly towards government agencies appeared to drill into the rationale for 
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Australia’s absence from the international debate.  In particular, the Inquiry process and 
questioning attempted to ascertain whether such non-engagement might be a reflection of 
complacency or disinterest on the part of the Australian politicians, policy-makers, academics 
and publics. Perhaps such a view was reinforced by the surprisingly slow government and 
public response to the Senate Inquiry, where ‘the call for submissions received a poor 
response even from government departments or agencies actively engaged in public 
diplomatic activities’. 30  The level of disinterest and lack of public response to the initial 
public call for submissions was such that the Committee was required to make specific and 
targeted requests for submissions from key organisations.  In all, even after these targeted 
invitations were made by the Committee Secretariat, twenty seven submissions were received 
by the Committee from across government, private and community sector organisations as 
well as private individuals.31
Rather than necessarily revealing a level of complacency on behalf of the Australian agencies 
and publics, submissions received from key agencies including DFAT and the Department of 
Defence, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Asialink, and the National Gallery of 
Victoria, demonstrated pockets of understanding and action in the area of public diplomacy.  
Yet on several occasions the Senate Committee remarked on the serendipitous approach 
taken within Australia to public diplomacy outcomes, with particular regard to the DFAT 
approach.
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30 Ibid.  
31 The number of submissions received might be compared to other Senate Inquiries which have taken place at 
similar times to provide an indication of how well attuned to and engaged the community is in relation to the 
issue.  As an example of contrast with other Inquiries, the 2008 Inquiry into the Effectiveness of the 
Broadcasting Codes of Practice – attracted some 86 written submissions from across all sectors of the 
community. 
 Along these lines, Michael Wesley, refers to Australia as being marked by ‘a 
32 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2007, p.8.  
In this particular instance, Senator Trood made comment on the fact that DFAT had no mechanism in place to 
maintain networks between those participants in the youth ambassadors exchange program.  As noted by 
Senator Trood, ‘it seems to me if you wait for serendipitous encounters…they might not be around the particular 
corner that you turn’.  As Trood further comments to the DFAT official, ‘you have an extraordinary pool of 
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‘culture of serendipity’ that infects much thinking about Australia’s place in the world’, and 
influences the approach taken to international policy planning and development.33  Wesley’s 
comments point out that Australia has benefited from ‘remarkable luck in its international 
progress’, and has not been subjected to the full hardships or international challenges that 
have beset other states, whether security or resource driven. Australia has not had to plan to 
forge out a path for itself, and is ‘not naturally disposed to think hard about the future’.34
                                                                                                                                                        
people who have had quite remarkable experiences, compared to the rest of the Australian population going to 
places where we are making long term investments in both aid and defence and generally in foreign affairs 
engagement, and it seems to me that we could look at doing a lot more with them’.   
33 Wesley, Planning Australia’s Foreign Policy Future, Lowy Institute Perspective. 
34 Ibid.  As an aside, it is in this way Australia’s behaviour when it comes to its place in the international sphere, 
might be likened to that of a ‘last born child’, characteristically described as ‘ambivalent’ because of their place 
in the family birth order. Contrast this to the characteristic behaviour of a ‘first born’ child that has had to pave 
its way at times through some struggle with the parental structure as being goal and purpose oriented.  While it 
may be considered tenuous to draw linkages from birth order studies grounded in the discipline of psychology, 
to the behaviours of states in conducting international policy, there are some interesting synergies that merit 
discussion. There are a range of personality and social science studies relating to the impact of birth order on the 
personalities of siblings.  While this is a superficial connection to make with Australia’s approach to the world 
for the purpose of this thesis, it is an aspect of diplomatic conduct that may warrant further study.  Refer also to 
Dr Frank Sulloway, Born to Rebel: Birth Order, Family Dynamics and Creative Lives,  Knopf Doubleday, 
1997, or M. Grose, ‘Why first borns want to rule the world and last borns want to change it’, Random House 
Australia, Sydney, 2003.   
 
Wesley’s comments are relevant both to this discussion, and provide some context to 
Australia’s lack of participation in international discussions regarding public diplomacy.  By 
looking at Australia’s approach to the study of public diplomacy, and the lack of engagement 
in international discussions, through Wesley’s perspective, it becomes evident that in the case 
of Australia, greater effort is focused on the day to day activities and actions related to public 
diplomacy across government, than the more theoretical study and discussion, let alone 
planning or forecasting. Such an approach does have drawbacks, particularly in the 
development of shared understanding of what public diplomacy is, and can achieve, the 
articulation of clear public diplomacy related objectives, and coordination of efforts to align 
with those objectives.  These drawbacks appear as consistent themes throughout the Senate 
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Inquiry, as well as through more recent studies regarding Australian diplomatic performance, 
including the Lowy Institute Blue Ribbon Panel Report on Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit.35
As expected, many submissions ultimately received by the Inquiry indicated a general sense 
of confusion and misunderstanding within the Australian public about the terminology 
‘public diplomacy’ and its real meaning for government policy development and delivery.
 
 
36  
During the hearing proceedings Committee member, Senator John Hogg, noted his own 
doubt as to what public diplomacy is really about, and a concern ‘that government 
departments and institutions jump on the bandwagon and say,... “Yes, that’s a good 
catchphrase. We will use that this month. We’re all for public diplomacy”, but really no-one 
quite has a real idea as to what it is about.’37 The submissions and subsequent hearings into 
Australia’s public diplomacy program indicated that ‘there is a lot of activity in the 
international arena conducted by Australian organisations which might be broadly 
characterised as public diplomacy’, yet many organisations are not fully aware that the 
activities they are undertaking are public diplomacy activities, and may be linked into a 
broader Australian public diplomacy agenda.38  As a result, the linkages that do occur are the 
obvious ones (generally driven through the major government departments based in 
Canberra) or occur on an ad hoc basis with out regard to strategic foreign policy objectives or 
priorities.39
                                                 
35 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’.  
36 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2008, 
p.34. Of interest, Senator Trood noted during interview that he had embarked on an education program to 
provide his Senate Committee colleagues with a basic level of understanding of public diplomacy prior to the 
Inquiry because of the low levels of understanding that existed amongst them at that stage.  Also confirmed in 
Interview, Senator Russell Trood, 13 January 2008 and 30 June 2009.  
37 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2007, 
p.34. 
38 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 12 April 2007, p.41. 
39 Ibid, p.42. 
 
34 
 
1.2.2 Political will and strategic leadership  
Submissions to the Inquiry indicated that Australia’s recent positioning on public diplomacy 
was not necessarily due to disinterest in the area, but was more indicative of a deliberate 
political strategy to move away from soft power tactics where public diplomacy would 
normally be an instrument of choice. In terms of practice during the past decade, Australia 
had quite openly moved away from the well established and overt public diplomacy 
mechanisms, such as image building through multilateral dialogue and activity on global 
issues like human rights, refugees, and the environment, including through the United 
Nations.40  The former Howard Government promoted a position during its administration 
that ‘what really counts is less the building of deeper cultural or popular ties than the creation 
of practical relations between Australia and other states based on shared interests’.41 
Evidence of Howard’s approach is found in the concentration of diplomatic effort on the 
negotiation of bilateral FTAs (with counterparts including China, United States, and Thailand 
as examples).  In Howard’s view while certain activities might ‘build on a nation’s popular 
image or appeal, and add diversity to relationships, they are no substitute for political, 
economic or strategic substance’.42
                                                 
40 John Howard distanced Australian policy from the UN through a range of actions during his administration.  
For example, in 2000 when attending the UN Millennium Summit in New York, Prime Minister John Howard 
refused to ratify the Protocol on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women as a means to advance the 
then Australian position calling for treaty reform within the United Nations.  See A Cusak, ‘John Howard 
Defends Rejection of UN’, ABC National Radio, 6 September 2000.  Later through his political term, John 
Howard maintained Australia’s distance from joining in global action to combat climate change by similarly 
refusing to commit to the Kyoto Protocol relating to the reduction of greenhouse emissions, noting only that his 
Government might sign an amended version post 2012, AAP, ‘Howard Still Not Keen on Kyoto’, The Age, 13 
October 2007.  For further insight into Howard’s position on foreign policy, including the UN and 
multilateralism refer to S Firth, Australia in International Politics, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2005, pp.252-
259; Kelly, ‘Howard’s Decade: An Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal’, and for further reinforcement of 
Howard’s foreign policy approach see Howard, ‘Australia in the World’, Address to the Lowy Institute of 
International Policy, 31 March 2005; also G Smith and D Lowe, ‘Howard, Downer and the Liberals’ realist 
tradition’, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, No. 51 (3), September 2005, pp.459-473.   
41 A Bubalo, ‘Football Diplomacy’, Lowy Institute Policy Brief, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
November 2005, p.10. 
42 Ibid. 
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During ‘Howard’s decade’, Australia’s key foreign policy initiatives were firmly focused on 
building bilateral trade43 and security ties, deploying military and police power, including as 
‘deputy sheriff’ 44 within our own region, and strengthening a key alliance, with the United 
States of America (US). Howard engaged with the notion of Australia as “deputy sheriff” to 
the US, reinforcing Australia’s strategic, but also political and cultural connection with this 
powerful friend and ally, as the centrepiece of Australian foreign and strategic policy.45
The Howard Government was ‘sceptical about the norms of so-called “global citizenship”’, 
and ‘applied a blunt nationalism to dealings with Asia, and opposed efforts to limit 
Australia’s sovereignty by resort to the United Nations instruments, human rights 
conventions and international law’.
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43 It should be noted that by 2005 under Howard, Australia had signed FTAs with Thailand, Singapore and the 
United States of America, and had significantly advanced bilateral ties with China, Japan, India and Indonesia.   
44 F Benchley, ‘The Howard defence doctrine’, The Bulletin, 28 September, 1999, pp. 22-24. The notion of 
Australia playing the role of “deputy sheriff” to the United States within the Asia Pacific region was first posed 
to John Howard during an interview conducted and reported by The Bulletin.  Howard’s prima facie acceptance 
of the notion as reported through The Bulletin interview was significant, and created subsequent tensions with 
influential regional neighbours, such as Malaysia.  For further discussion of Australia’s role as “deputy sheriff” 
or the “Howard defence doctrine”,  refer also to R Leaver ‘The meanings, origins and implications of the 
“Howard Doctrine”, The Pacific Review, Vol 14(1), pp15-34; Kelly, Howard’s decade: an Australian Foreign 
Policy Reappraisal, p.13; A Milner, “What’s left of engagement in Asia”, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol 54 (2), 2000, p.177; M Beeson and K Jayasuriya, ‘The Politics of Asian Engagement: Ideas, 
Institutions and Academics’, Australian Journal of History and Politics, Vol 55(3), 2009, pp360-374.  
45 The importance of the “Howard defence doctrine” in Australia’s foreign policy approach is discussed further 
at p.160 of this thesis.   
46 Kelly, Howard’s decade: an Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal, p.15. 
  Howard’s personal influence over foreign policy and 
strategy was an important feature of his administration, and his apparent disinterest in the 
strategic use of public diplomacy (outside the less complex subset area known as cultural 
diplomacy) to win influence in international relations, was reflected in the bureaucracy’s 
limited attention to public diplomacy policy and practice at that time. Notable Australian 
foreign policy expert and former DFAT head, Richard Woolcott, commented on Australia’s 
lack of focus on delivering public diplomacy outcomes during this time.  In his view, 
Australia’s image and reputation on the international stage had diminished during the Howard 
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administration and, ‘…our standing has been undermined in much of the international 
community and some of the important countries in our own region’.47
In the area of cultural diplomacy, it should be noted that Howard’s Foreign Minister, 
Alexander Downer successful injected renewed vigour into the Australian International 
Cultural Council (AICC), a body responsible for the promotion of Australia’s identity and 
values through cultural exchange, promotions and tours. Robyn Archer, high profile artist and 
international festival director, and appointed member of the AICC at that time, confirmed that 
Downer’s support of the Council provided an enormous boost to Australian cultural 
diplomacy, including through a financial allocation of $20 million over four years.
  
 
48 
However, while there was no questioning of the Council’s mandate to showcase Australian 
assets through culture and the arts, it was clear to Archer that even still there was insufficient 
understanding of the area, or strategic planning carried out through the AICC.49  For 
example, Archer notes that Australia’s cultural diplomacy program fostered through the 
Council focused on big budget one-off gala events, such as a performances by the Melbourne 
Symphony Orchestra, the Sydney Dance Company or Opera Australia at a key diplomatic 
functions.50
 …although there have been attempts in the past to use culture to underpin initiatives with other countries 
during periods of exchange for the development of trade and other relations between countries, it seems 
that the use of culture was at best last minute, funding was not always related to costs and timing, and 
exploitation of the use of art exhibitions, symphony orchestra tours, etc…were not tied strongly enough 
to the activities aimed at particular outcomes in such exchanges.
 As a representative of the Art Gallery of Western Australia remarked to the 
Inquiry: 
51
                                                 
47 Richard Woolcott, cited in Kelly, ‘Howard’s Decade, an Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal’, p.8. 
48 Interview, R Archer, 3 November 2008.   
49 Ibid. Archer’s view of cultural diplomacy under the current administration is more disappointing.  In her view 
despite the current Minister for Arts, Peter Garrett’s background as an artist, the bureaucracy remains 
insufficiently aware of the potential of the arts to project a very unique image of Australia into the world as a 
smart and creative nation and to foster strategic alignments with foreign audiences.   
50 Ibid. 
    
51 Art Gallery of Western Australia, Submission to the Senate Inquiry on the Nature and Conduct of Australia’s 
Public Diplomacy Program, Australian Government, March 2007.  In 2007, the Orchestra embarked on its 
second European tour to Spain, Paris, Berlin and Milan.  Yet, as an example of the fragmented nature of 
Australia’s public diplomacy program, particularly in the area of cultural diplomacy, tours to these nations did 
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As will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter, while such gala events can spark a 
new awareness or immediate appeal of the initiating country, without a clear connection to a 
strategic foreign policy objective, they have little lasting effect on building lasting 
relationships with foreign publics for a strategic outcome.   
 
The Senate Inquiry into public diplomacy occurred prior to Kevin Rudd’s election as 
Australian Prime Minister and does not take into account any changes in political structure of 
policy that may have occurred as a result of this transition.  However, the events and rhetoric 
over the first twelve months of Rudd’s term indicated that public diplomacy policy and 
practice was likely to take on a greater priority under his administration.  For example, the 
Final Report of Australia’s 2020 Summit held in April 2008, released by the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet provides overall support for more resources to be devoted or 
re-allocated to soft power and cultural diplomacy, with an emphasis on achieving foreign 
policy interests through increased collaboration, participation in multilateral and regional 
institutions and policy analysis based on synergies.52 Early initiatives delivered after Rudd 
took office as Prime Minister, including Australia’s signing of the Kyoto Protocol, high 
profile official presentations to the Chinese Government and students in Mandarin language, 
and the formal apology delivered to Australia’s Stolen Generation, (reviewed and commented 
upon overseas), presented a positive outlook for a highly visible public diplomacy program.53
                                                                                                                                                        
not align with  relevant priority areas in cultural diplomacy as set out by the AICC or the FCIs, nor did they 
align with foreign policy priorities of that year.  2007 was the year in which the federal election was held and 
priorities at that time including USA and China.  In 2010, the Sydney Dance Company will perform for one day 
at the World Expo at Shanghai, after spending a week performing in Venice.  See: 
http://www.mso.com.au/cpa/htm/htm_article.asp?page_id=97. Once again, given the significance of the World 
Expo, and Australia’s strategic interests in China the lack of performance time in China appears to be missing 
the significance of the relationship.  Refer to: http://www.sydneydancecompany.com/performances/calendar/. 
52 Australia 2020 Summit, Final Report, p.359. 
53 G Fergusen, ‘Kevin Rudd’s Mandarin words impress China APEC delegates’, Herald Sun, 7 September 2007. 
C Porteous, ‘World Cheers as Rudd Signs Kyoto’, The Courier Mail, 4 December 2007; D Welch, ‘Kevin Rudd 
Says Sorry’, The Age, 13 February, 2008.   
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Rudd’s initial commitment to soft power approaches in international relations has not been 
fully explored or articulated at a political level, and bureaucrats remain somewhat unclear of 
the political imperative driving Australia’s public diplomacy program.54 As reported by The 
Age, much of the work in foreign policy is ‘stemming from Kevin Rudd’s office, with the 
constant complaint from the Department of Foreign Affairs that they are out of the loop’.55 
Furthermore, despite Rudd’s apparent enthusiasm for public diplomacy approaches, other 
factors, including the lack of strategic leadership and coordination, and initial poor budgetary 
commitment to Australia’s official representation and networks abroad, further confuse the 
government’s overall commitment to development and implementation of an effective public 
diplomacy program.  During his first months of office, Rudd scrapped the planned marketing 
campaign called, Australia on the World Stage; along with and the four-year recurrent 
funding set up within the AICC.  At the time Downer commented that, ‘I believe they [the 
ALP] are philistines, and they have no understanding and no desire to understand the 
importance of promoting culture internationally.’56Paradoxically, these measures were 
implemented after the Senate Inquiry found that that ‘to ensure that Australia's public 
diplomacy efforts are not overshadowed in the highly contested international space, Australia 
must ensure that it takes advantage of opportunities to capitalise on the positive outcomes 
from its many public diplomacy activities’.57
However, Rudd’s ambitions for public diplomacy and diplomacy more generally have not yet 
fully unravelled, and there are signs that the approach of the Rudd government may change. 
Recent political announcements indicate that, Rudd’s foreign policy agenda is still forming, 
  
 
                                                 
54 Interview, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 10 January 2009. 
55 D Flitton, ‘Stretched to the limit’, The Age, 18 March, 2009. 
56 N Pickard, Rudd Government is bad for the arts, Crikey.com, 21 January 2008. 
57 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.30. 
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and it appears that in the mid-years of his political term, Rudd is reaffirming Australia’s 
commitment to being engaged on the world stage.  Rudd has clearly articulated his vision that 
Australia win a seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2013-14 term.58 He has 
also pledged Australia’s commitment to the ‘establishment of a regional institution that will 
span the entire Asia-Pacific region’, and to ‘reinvigorating nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament negotiations’.59
                                                 
58 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008-2009 Portfolio Budget Statement:  
Australian Government, AGPS, June 2008.   
59 Flitton, ‘Stretched to the Limit’, and Lowy Institute of International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit 
Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy’, p.ix.   
  Each of these tasks is firmly wedded to the international 
system, and none will occur without a strong emphasis on image building through a strong 
and coherent public diplomacy program.   
 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is apparent that Australia’s lack of engagement in the 
international sphere around public diplomacy identified through the Senate Inquiry is more 
reflective of the political priority placed on public diplomacy rather than a general sense of 
complacency or lack of interest.  From a structural perspective the DFAT bureaucracy 
operates quite clearly on the political imperatives set by government administration, and most 
particularly in recent years, on the imperatives set by the Prime Minister.   It is important to 
note that the Rudd administration is still within its first term, and there are signs, both through 
the rhetoric and through the most recent 2009 budget statements that Rudd aims to change the 
current focus of the DFAT bureaucracy, and at this stage, public diplomacy remains a low 
priority.  Public diplomacy is likely to remain a low priority with only minimal funding 
attached until there is an overt change in the overall political will and strategic leadership to 
ensure public diplomacy is incorporated into the strategic priorities of the portfolio.   
40 
 
1.2.3 Strategic coordination of policy  
Importantly and related to the central theme of anchoring public diplomacy activities to 
foreign policy priorities, DFAT does not only hold the lead responsibility for delivering the 
Australian public diplomacy program, but is also responsible for coordinating this public 
diplomacy program across a significant number of Government agencies.  The Lowy 
Institute’s Blue Ribbon Panel Report into Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit notes that DFAT’s 
role in leading and coordinating foreign policy responses has become more complex in an 
environment where ‘almost every conceivable policy issue has an international dimension’, 
and ‘18 of 19 Commonwealth Departments now have a dedicated international policy area’.60
Other Commonwealth government agencies including the Department of Education Science 
and Training, the Department of Defence, the Australia Film Commission, Invest Australia, 
Austrade, Museums Australia and the Australian Broadcasting Commission all submitted 
evidence relating to their own diverse public diplomacy agendas and activities. For example, 
the Committee was impressed by the ‘sheer volume of public diplomacy activities’ that ran 
across government.
 
When considering the use of public diplomacy in foreign policy development and delivery, 
and the additional overlap it brings with strategic communications and public relations, the 
complexity of this task intensifies significantly.  As a result, it becomes more difficult for 
DFAT with lead responsibility, to identify and drive the key policy objectives across 
Government, and align the Government’s public diplomacy program accordingly.   
 
61
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.30. 
  However, this extensive activity noted by government agencies under 
the label of public diplomacy demonstrates only a superficial and operational commitment to 
the concept of public diplomacy. As the Senate Committee noted in its final report, ‘a number 
41 
 
of witnesses questioned the effectiveness of such programs’.62  Alison Broinowski noted that 
Australia’s public diplomacy program was a ‘hotch-potch’, and witnesses such as ‘former 
DFAT Public Affairs officer, Chris Freeman, suggested that Australia had not reached its full 
potential in the effectiveness of its public diplomacy programs.’63
From a strategic perspective, DFAT currently leads and coordinates the public diplomacy 
Inter-departmental Committee (IDC) which was established in 2002, and brings together the 
26 federal agencies ‘to share information and identify synergies across the spectrum of 
agency programs’.
   
 
64  Usually meeting twice each year, the purpose of the IDC is to ‘ensure 
that government departments and agencies project an accurate image of Australia 
internationally and that their activities are consistent with the whole-of-government 
approach’.65  However, a number of witnesses to the Senate Inquiry questioned the 
effectiveness of the IDC in the absence of any strategic goals and decision-making.  As one 
witness to the Inquiry observed, the IDC is ‘not normally a high powered policy making or 
coordinating unit as such; it is really a good on-the-ground grouping.’66
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63A Broinowski quoted in Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s 
Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, p.31. 
64 Ibid, p.104. Note the reference to 26 federal agencies reflects the structure of the bureaucracy at that time.  
This number has since been reduced to 19 agencies as a result of the machinery of government rationalisation 
that occurred after Prime Minister Rudd took office.   
65 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image, p.105. 
66 Ibid. 
  Additionally, while 
this ‘on-the ground’ grouping brings interested Commonwealth agencies together, there is no 
representation from, nor connection to state or local government, the tertiary education 
sector, or the non-government sector – all of which can link-in and also play a valuable role 
in promoting positive messages and networks that would advance Australia’s interests.   
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This operationally based description of the IDC purpose, its extensive membership 
representing the lower levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and its infrequent meeting 
schedule illustrates that the IDC coordinated by DFAT is not set up to play a strategic role in 
the development of a coherent public diplomacy approach aligned to national interests (as 
such interests are articulated by the Government). Nor does the IDC (based on the above 
description) necessarily encourage a whole-of-government partnership or collaborative 
approach to Australia’s public diplomacy program.67
The limited scope of and representation on the public diplomacy IDC, and absence of any 
other high level strategic body focused on public diplomacy policy highlights critical gaps in 
Australia’s strategic approach to public diplomacy.  The sheer volume of activity taking place 
within the current fragmented public diplomacy system is evidence that public diplomacy is 
on the agenda, and activities and outputs may be coordinated and quantified on the ground.  
Yet, as Broinowski commented, ‘Australia looks like little bits and pieces of little bits of 
departments instead of one identifiable thing’.
   
 
68 Because of a gap in strategic commitment 
and direction, public diplomacy activities and outputs and do not necessarily link, from a 
process or systems perspective into meaningful outcomes for Australia’s national interests.  
This perspective reinforces the significant gaps in Australia’s current public diplomacy 
program.  As private Australian public relations company, Media Gurus noted through the 
Inquiry, ‘a coordinated, committed, high-level approach, along with a series of training 
programs is vital’.69
                                                 
67 In particular the IDC does not allow for representation or attendance by the third tier of government (that is, 
local government), yet some local governments are keenly aware of the importance of public diplomacy and 
actively taking up public diplomacy activities to promote the image of their city onto the world stage.  For 
example refer to The City of Melbourne, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of 
Public Diplomacy, Commonwealth of Australia, April 2007.  
68 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2007, p. 
20. 
69 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Public Image: Australia’s 
Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image, p.104. 
  Christopher Stewart, member of the International Public Affairs 
43 
 
Network and witness to the Inquiry, stated, ‘we need, in a strategic sense to be looking ahead 
5 or ten years and developing a vision for where Australia wants to be in the world.’70
1.2.4 Resourcing of public diplomacy 
   
The Senate Inquiry process revealed that overall Australia’s public diplomacy program is 
poorly resourced when compared to others.  For example, in its submission to the Senate 
Inquiry, University of Melbourne organisation, Asialink, indicates that ‘Australia spends just 
17 cents per capita on cultural diplomacy (a recognised and substantial subset of public 
diplomacy), compared to Germany which spends approximately A$3, and the United 
Kingdom, which spends an impressive A$19 per capita’.71
the reality is that Australian public diplomacy has been relegated to a level of importance equivalent to 
that of Embassy gardens…under DFAT this incredibly important function will remain in the domain of 
the garden shed while the increasingly redundant work of the traditional diplomat will maintain its place 
in the ivory tower.
  While the United Kingdom and 
Germany have established a structured approach to public diplomacy over time, with a 
particular emphasis on culture, through the British Council and Goethe Institute respectively, 
the contrast to Australia in per capita expenditure is significant.  According to one witness to 
the inquiry: 
72
Perhaps one of the clearest measures of Australian Government interest and commitment to 
public diplomacy can be found in the DFAT budget statements.  While public diplomacy 
clearly features within the strategic language of DFAT, it is undermined by a funding 
allocation which has shrunk by $A35.5 million over the past two financial years.  Overall 
government funding allocation has shrunk from A$93.5M in 2005-06 to A$58M in 2007-
 
 
                                                 
70 Ibid, p.122. 
71 Asialink, Submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on the Nature and 
Conduct of Australia’s Public Diplomacy Program, March 2007.  The Asialink representative noted that these 
figures were obtained through publicly available documents and annual reports. 
72 Mr Kirk Coningham quoted in the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 
Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image, p.188.  
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08.73  Further Rudd Government cuts (targeting the cultural diplomacy program), to the 
2008-09 budget labelled as DFATs ‘contribution to the cost-cutting anti-inflationary 
measures’, combined with consistent budgetary and resourcing cuts into Australian 
diplomatic representation overseas over the past two decades indicate that diplomacy, 
including public diplomacy is not high on the agenda.74
At the time of writing, the 2009-2010 federal budget had delivered on additional resources 
including A$106.5 million over four years ‘to strengthen the contribution of diplomacy to 
national security; advance economic wellbeing through trade; and protect Australia’s 
abroad’.
    
 
75 The statement also commits to the reinvigoration of Australia's engagement with 
the multilateral system, and to this end an amount of A$11.2 million is allocated over two 
years to continue Australia's campaign to win election to a non-permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council for the term 2013-14.76  The overall language and tenor of the 
budget statement is clearly focused on tackling hard issues of advancing trade and national 
security, and protecting Australians.  The lack of resourcing that is dedicated to strategic 
public diplomacy activities in the federal budget statement, places significant distance 
between the ‘soft power, creative diplomacy’ rhetoric of the 2020 Summit, and the reality of 
Australia’s diplomatic agenda.77
As the Lowy Institute argues, ‘diplomacy is by far the most cost-effective way to shape the 
behaviour of other international actors in ways which support our international policy goals’, 
so the on-the-ground success of current foreign policy endeavours will rest largely in the 
  
 
                                                 
73 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008-2009 Portfolio Budget Statement:  June 2008. 
74 Ibid.   
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. Also see M Fullilove, ‘The Case for Australia’s UN Security Council Bid’, Perspectives, Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, Sydney, September 2009 and  M Fullilove, ‘Rudd Right to Press for UN Security 
Council Seat’, The Australian, 23 September 2009.   
77 Australian 2020 Summit, Final Report, p.357. 
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diplomatic skills (traditional and otherwise) of the 542 Australian diplomats working across 
some 90 overseas posts.78  DFAT Secretary, Michael L’estrange, reassures the public that 
‘our diplomacy will therefore need to be responsive, adaptive and with a clear-eyed view of 
Australia’s interests and priorities’.79  However, the Lowy Institute continues to sound an 
alarm with regard to Australia’s relative under-representation overseas, diminished foreign 
policy capacity, and overstretched diplomats whose capacity to contribute to wider national 
policy objectives continues to be displaced by declining overall funding and increased 
expectations.80 The Business Council of Australia (BCA) echoes the concerns of the Lowy 
Institute, noting that ‘current resources and priorities for international diplomacy, especially 
those relating to the operation of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, do not meet 
Australia’s needs’.81  In a more specific comment regarding the resources available to DFAT 
to pursue national interests through diplomacy, the BCA points to a concern that, ‘DFAT’s 
resources are overstretched, and for more than a decade the financial efficiency of the 
department appears to have been a higher priority than its effectiveness’.82  If the current 
broad policy and business view is that Australia’s diplomatic program generally is well under 
resourced, and overstretched, it might be surmised that the Australian public diplomacy 
program will as a consequence suffer.  Australia’s public diplomacy program can be 
described as active even with a shoe-string budget.  However, without the underpinnings of 
political will, policy rigour and capacity, over time the environment of scarcity begets a less 
than optimal outcome for ‘smart and creative’ public diplomacy.83
                                                 
78 Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit, Blue Ribbon Panel Report, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, February 2009, p.vii, and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007-2008 
Annual Report, Commonwealth of Australia, 2008, Appendices 2 and 13.  
79 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007-2008 Annual Report, Commonwealth of Australia, 2008. 
80Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.vii. 
81 Business Council of Australia, ‘Diplomatic Capabilities Vital to Australia’s Interests’, News Release, 
Business Council of Australia, 17 March 2009.   
82 Ibid.  
83 The Australian 2020 Summit, Final Report, p.357. 
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1.2.5 Gaps in the engagement of the Australian domestic public 
 
Currently, the Australian domestic public has little or no involvement in the shaping of the 
Australian public diplomacy priorities or program, and appears to be seen as little more than a 
recipient of bland department information or fact sheets (including annual reports).  There are 
no formal or consistent mechanisms by which agencies such as DFAT, with lead 
responsibility for public diplomacy, can both tap into the thoughts and aspirations of the 
many diverse Australians whose story it is that is being shared with the rest of the world; let 
alone raise awareness about public diplomacy and the importance of Australia’s image and 
reputation in pursuit of national interest.  
 
Anecdotally, DFAT might even be guilty of downplaying the role of diplomats for fear of 
sparking a backlash from the egalitarian elements of the Australian national psyche.  Much 
attention is given within diplomatic circles to administering public service principles that aim 
to ensure parity of lifestyle between diplomats and their Canberra-based public service 
counterparts.84  There are only a small number of long-serving diplomats such as Australia’s 
former permanent representative to the United Nations, Richard Butler, and highly regarded 
career diplomat, Richard Woolcott, alongside former career diplomats Stephen Fitzgerald, 
Allan Gyngell, Geoff Miller, Sue Boyd, Alison and Richard Broinowski and Tony Kevin who 
have taken on profiles within the broader Australian community.85
                                                 
84 Interview:  Confidential Source, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs 
Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009. 
  Such profiling has not 
always been driven by DFAT and as in the case of Richard Butler was not always positive or 
engaging for the Australian public.  Yet, there is little in general that promotes the skills 
85 Alison Broinowski, Richard Broinowski and Tony Kevin are examples of former diplomats who have taken 
on visible roles within the wider community, in the fields of academia, journalism and writing each 
incorporating political and diplomatic commentary into their respective approaches.  For example, see, 
http://www.tonykevin.com.au for political commentary and links to speeches, book reviews and other published 
works by Tony Kevin.  Also, examples of publications by Alison Broinowski include, About Face – Asian 
Accounts of Australia; and The Yellow Lady: Australian Impressions of Asia, Oxford University Press, 1996.  
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employed or the work undertaken on a daily basis by Australia’s diplomats.  There is even 
less conveyed about what these diplomats do on a daily basis to project a positive image of 
Australia overseas for the purpose of advancing Australia’s national interests.86
However, as one DFAT official pointed out through the interview process, other states have 
taken on the role of promoting the work of their diplomats and seeking to engage their 
domestic audiences in a dialogue about the importance and value of diplomacy.  An example 
is found in the United Kingdom’s equivalent of DFAT, the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO).  The FCO interfaces proactively with the UK public, primarily 
through its website.  The site directs public users to a suite of options for engaging with the 
agency, including through the use of latest social networking technology such as FCO Flickr 
(for latest photos), FCO Twitter (latest alerts), FCO UTube (latest videos), and FCO Really 
Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds, which provide regular news and content updates 
highlighting the latest formal statements, remarks or actions of FCO officers or others in 
relation to foreign policy issues or events, and providing information on ‘How we Promote 
UK interests overseas’.
   
 
87  Most impressive is the FCO Global Bloggers site, which provides a 
space for UK diplomats to ‘maintain a weblog about their experiences living and working 
overseas in the diplomatic role, and to provide informal comment on key foreign policy 
issues’.88
                                                 
86 Interview:  Confidential Source, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs 
Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009. 
87 British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), accessed at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/who-we-
are/ 
88 Ibid. 
  The blogs not only raise the profile of the UK diplomats and the work that they 
undertake, they also allow for interaction and engagement between ambassadors and 
diplomats and members of the general public (both international and domestic).  The 
language and format of the site is accessible and invites the audience to engage in a way that 
will promote understanding on the part of the audience, while enabling insight into the public 
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perception, expectations and reactions to certain issues on the part of the FCO and may guide 
foreign policy actions.   
 
By contrast, according to one senior DFAT official, DFAT makes no connection between the 
work of the Australian diplomats overseas in building the Australian image and pursuing 
national interests and the domestic or foreign public audience.89 That official noted during 
interview that DFAT’s website had not changed to reflect the introduction of new 
technologies and new methods of networking or engaging on a personal level with the wider 
audience.  Such an example provides another example of opportunity lost in building the 
Australian image, and points to Australia’s lag in adapting to and utilising new and emerging 
tools in the fast paced field of public diplomacy practice.90
1.2.6 Australia’s public diplomacy program: opportunity lost? 
   
 
When viewed together, the five key issues set out from 1.2.1 to 1.2.5 present a poor picture of 
Australia’s public diplomacy program.  The current lack of strategic commitment to and 
direction of Australia’s public diplomacy program along with, insufficient integration with 
policy, gaps in coordination and engagement and past and recent departmental budgetary 
constraints all highlight a critical shortfall in DFAT’s overall capacity to deliver strategic 
thinking around the planning and development of public diplomacy policy.  The Senate 
Inquiry highlighted these issues clearly, against a background of general disinterest, 
confusion and ‘conceptual muddle’ that surrounds the policy and practice of public 
diplomacy within Australia.  From there, it might be argued the issue of improving Australian 
public diplomacy has not moved much further.   
                                                 
89 Interview, Confidential Source, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs 
Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009.  
90 Fiske de Gouveia ‘The Future of Public Diplomacy’.  In his presentation Fiske de Gouveia suggests, ‘public 
diplomacy is evolving fast.  Developing political climates and technological environments mean that the real 
and virtual landscapes in which public practitioners operate, and the tools available to them are changing’.   
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In an address relating to Australia’s international future, Wesley asserts the need for broad 
public involvement in international policy making within this challenging environment 
because: 
 …the choices we make about these challenges require more than simple technical fixes. They involve 
choices about some of our most fundamental values as a society.  They involve basic questions that will 
touch the lives, identity, and self perceptions of all [Australians]. And so they need to be discussed and 
debated at the broad societal level.  There needs to be broad public engagement with the challenges faced 
and public ownership of the choices made.91
While Wesley remains somewhat sceptical of the strategic value of public diplomacy per se, 
his vision for international policy making process relies upon the ability of Government to 
effectively communicate to and engage in two-way dialogue with the domestic public on 
international policy, an activity that is enabled through public diplomacy. As will be 
discussed later in this thesis, such engagement and dialogue, for the purpose of consolidating 
identity and purpose is more than ‘public affairs’, and sits well within the realm of public 
diplomacy.
  
 
92
Discussions undertaken with key stakeholders (both within and outside of DFAT) for the 
purpose of the research in this thesis also consistently supported the work undertaken by 
DFAT in the area of public diplomacy.  This was so despite the critical issues relating to 
insufficient staff, limited funding and policy development capacity, and lack of exposure to 
current discussions and trends.  As discussed later in this thesis, accountability for raising the 
priority of public diplomacy firmly rests in the first instance with Australian political 
leadership which holds responsibility for setting the foreign policy agenda and enables that 
   
 
                                                 
91 M Wesley, ‘Australia’s International Future’, Lowy Institute Perspectives, Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, July 2009, p.7. 
92 For references regarding the intersection and distinctions between public diplomacy and public affairs see 
Melissen, ‘Between Practice and Theory’; also RS Zarharna, ‘Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy 
Initiatives’, in Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, Snow and Taylor (eds), Routledge, New York, 2009; 
and K Heller, L Persson, ‘The Distinction Between Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy’, in Routledge 
Handbook of Public Diplomacy, Snow and Taylor (eds), Routledge, New York, 2009.  
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agenda to take effect via sufficient resources.  Where DFAT resources have been consistently 
subjected to budget reductions, the Department of Defence has seen its budget share increase 
dramatically.  The Lowy Institute’s Blue Ribbon Panel Report reports: 
In 2008-09 the Commonwealth budgeted over $22 billion for the Department of Defence, but less than 
$1.2 billion for DFAT.  With DFAT’s operating budget declining and government committed to 
increasing real defence spending by three percent annually until at least 2010, this gap will only widen 
further.93
Such statistics reinforce the perception that diplomatic practice overall is seen within 
Australia’s strategic political framework to be of limited value in delivering upon foreign 
policy objectives.
  
 
94
1.3 Aligning public diplomacy practice with policy objectives 
   
The Senate Inquiry covered an enormous scope in the consideration of Australia’s public 
diplomacy program.  In doing so the Committee highlighted a number of gaps in practice that 
are indicative of systemic failures in public diplomacy.  Yet, this study is concerned with one 
underlying issue not explicitly dealt with by the Senate Committee during this process. That 
is, the lack of connection or alignment between Australia’s public diplomacy program and 
strategic foreign policy objectives.95
Outside the political process, DFAT holds lead agency responsibility for the development, 
coordination and implementation of Australia’s public diplomacy policy and program.  
DFAT notes that that public diplomacy programs are firmly tied to the advancement of 
Australia’s foreign and trade policies to the benefit of all Australians through the two tiered 
 
 
                                                 
93 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.vii. 
94 Ibid.   
95 While not dealing with this key issue explicitly, the Committee remarked, that the first task in improving the 
effectiveness of Australia’ public diplomacy is to ‘map out a long-term strategic public diplomacy plan’,…and 
to do that public diplomacy, ‘needs to be in close contact with Australia’s key foreign policy makers and fully 
informed about relevant foreign policies’. For further details see, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’; p.206.   
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approach of ‘promoting a better understanding of Australia’s identity, values and ideas 
overseas; and  
a better understanding of Australia’s foreign and trade policy agenda in Australia’.96
Public diplomacy is specifically embedded as a key departmental outcome area ‘to advance 
the interests of Australia and Australians internationally’.
   
 
97  More specifically, the 2007-08 
departmental annual budget statement provides that DFAT works ‘to foster public 
understanding in Australia and overseas of Australia’s foreign and trade policy and project a 
positive image of Australia internationally’.98  At an organisational level, DFAT reports to 
have ‘integrated public diplomacy into the fabric of the department’s work as a core 
mainstream activity’.99  However, such statements are vague on why public diplomacy 
programs are important to policy objectives, and provide little evidence of an understanding 
of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. A purely superficial example is that 
the Images of Australia Branch (the work area within DFAT that holds responsibility for 
leading DFATs public diplomacy program) is located within the Consular and Protocol 
Division of the department, with no natural or even structured linkages into the policy 
development areas.100
                                                 
96 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Budget Statement 2007-08, p.1. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid, p.21.  Refer to Outcome 3 set out in the Budget Statement.   
99 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Inquiry, 2007, p.12. 
   
 
100 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Organisational Structure, Australian Government, Canberra, 
October 2007, also published online at http://www.dfat.gov.au.  This current structural positioning of the Images 
of Australia Branch was reaffirmed in Interview, Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and 
Parliamentary Affairs Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, June 2009.  The current structural 
positioning of the Images of Australia Branch actually reflects the fact that DFAT has not ever comfortably 
incorporated at least the informational side of public diplomacy, with those functions being carried out by 
specialist officials via the Australia Information Service for some fifty years, until machinery of government 
changed in 1987.   
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Yet, as this thesis proposes, strategic policy lies at the crux of Australia’s traditional 
diplomacy structure and efforts, and provides the impetus for a coherent, effective and 
measurable public diplomacy program. To be clear on this point, public diplomacy itself is 
not the policy.  Public diplomacy is an effective instrument (from within the diplomat’s 
toolbox), that drives policy.  In the new modern environment, clear coherent policy messages 
are important, and relevant to both domestic and foreign audiences.  In this environment, 
‘manipulative spin and propaganda are not the answer, indeed, foreign policy counts’.101
1.3.1 Australia’s foreign policy priorities:  identifying synergies with public 
diplomacy 
   
 
DFAT, and related portfolio agencies Austrade and AusAID, set out their policy priorities on 
an annual basis.  In the past, longer term policy platforms have been set out under the 
auspices of a White Paper.  However, in more recent years the annual budget statement has 
provided the vehicle for overarching policy objectives. Interestingly, the foreign policy 
priorities of the three agencies are not reproduced together, but appear separately on the 
separate websites and in separate annual reports.  This in itself is an opportunity lost for the 
three portfolio agencies to draw upon and reflect the synergies across Australia’s foreign, 
trade and development assistance policy platform. Therefore, this thesis brings the foreign 
policy priorities together, to identify areas of synergy.   
Drawing on current budgetary statements, Table 1 below sets out the key policy priorities 
across the three portfolio agencies for the 2009-2010 financial year. The portfolio does not 
report priorities as a whole across the relevant agencies, and this table has been compiled for 
the purpose of this thesis.  The policies have not been arranged within the table in any 
particular order of importance, but the thesis attempts to align ‘like’ areas of policy 
                                                 
101 Djerejian, ‘Changing Minds Winning Peace’.  
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horizontally within the table.  From this table, it is possible to note that the priorities stretch 
across a range of multilateral and bilateral issues across regions and states.  However, there 
are consistent themes across the three agencies driving policies of global security and 
engagement, particularly within Asia and the Pacific.  Policies associated with the 
improvement of security outcomes, or trade and investment opportunities and results, 
whether through multilateral or bilateral channels clearly advance the national interest in 
making Australia a more secure and prosperous nation.  By contrast, those policy priorities 
associated with development assistance (delivered primarily by AusAID in conjunction with 
DFAT) are less overtly tied, but just as critical to advancing national interests.  Given the 
clear indication and ambitious nature of the stated policy priorities, it might be expected that 
DFAT would also articulate clear linkages between these foreign policy objectives and the 
overall public diplomacy program, however, this is not the case.   
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Table 1:  Current Australian Foreign Policy and Trade Priorities 2009-2010102 
Foreign Policy Priorities 
DFAT 
 
Trade Policy Priorities  
(DFAT / Austrade) 
Development Assistance Policy 
(DFAT / AusAID) 
National security and protection of 
citizens 
 
Reform of WTO – Doha Round Food security and development in 
Asia–Pacific and Africa 
Regional engagement 
 
APEC – Asia-Pacific Development Economic infrastructure in Asia-
Pacific 
 
Pacific engagement 
 
Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations (PACER) 
Pacific partnerships for 
development – including in 
economic and financial 
management; 
essential infrastructure; and 
health & education 
Global security – nuclear non 
proliferation 
Free Trade Agreement 
In Negotiation: 
China 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Korea 
Trans-Pacific (Brunei, Singapore, 
Peru, Chile New Zealand, United 
States) 
Feasibility stage: 
India 
Indonesia 
Pacific region 
Engagement beyond Asia-
Pacific: 
Africa 
Afghanistan & Pakistan 
 
Multilateral engagement – UN 
Security Council 
Free Trade Agreements 
Current: 
ASEAN - New Zealand –Australia; 
Singapore 
Thailand 
United States 
New Zealand  
Chile 
 
Support to multilateral economic 
and development institutions 
(World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank) 
 
 
Despite DFAT’s corporate articulation of the strategic and organisational importance of 
public diplomacy to its core business as well as to Australia’s national and foreign policy 
interests and activities, there is a sense of haziness and confusion around the actual meaning 
and purpose of public diplomacy, and its potential for advancing Australia’s national 
                                                 
102 Australian Government, Federal Budget Statements 2009-2010, Australian Government, Canberra, June 
2009. 
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interests.103
This study reveals that it is at this juncture where the articulation of the interface between 
policy and public diplomacy is required, that the Australian understanding and practice of 
public diplomacy begins to unravel.  One DFAT official confusingly noted in evidence to the 
Senate Inquiry Committee that public diplomacy ‘spans…everything from integrated 
promotions, encompassing culture, business and politics, all the way through to quite 
specific, targeted activities’. 
 There is no mention in any official documentation of how public diplomacy 
might be utilised in the realisation of Australia’s ambitious agenda.  Nor is there any 
reference either stated or implied between foreign and trade priorities and public diplomacy 
programs.   
 
104 Another witness to the Inquiry noted that public diplomacy in 
Australia is ‘spread across a large canvass with many contributors all trying to project a 
positive image of Australia to the world’.105  These comments align with the Senate 
Committee’s statement that ‘clearly public diplomacy is not a term commonly used or 
understood within Australia’.106
The lack of clarity evident in official statements, such as those noted above, resonated 
through much of the remaining evidence provided to the Senate Committee, from 
representatives of government and non-government agencies, as well as the small number of 
academics currently engaged in and observing Australia’s public diplomacy activities.  Dr 
Julie Wells, of RMIT University noted that ‘[public diplomacy] is not a term that is well 
   
 
                                                 
103 Ibid.  Outcome Three sets out the DFAT portfolio responsibility to ‘promote a better understanding of 
Australia’s identity, values and ideas overseas, and a better understanding of Australia’s foreign and trade policy 
agenda in Australia’. 
104 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2007, 
p.30. 
105 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image, p.202. 
106 Ibid, p.30. 
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understood by the people we would expect to be the government’s partners in the project’.107 
Dr Alison Broinowski, former diplomat and academic witness noted to the Inquiry that 
Australia’s public diplomacy program is at best, ‘a hotch potch… - some education centre 
here, and there a little information office, and over here something else.  In one country there 
will be somebody doing cultural relations and in another country there will be none’. 108
The Senate Inquiry process demonstrated that DFAT in particular can point to an ‘extremely 
wide range of activities which are focussed on promoting Australia’s national interest, on 
shaping and influencing opinion, and on building long term relationships’.
 
 
109  DFAT 
submitted a lengthy report detailing the range of activities conducted and outputs produced in 
the name of projecting a positive image of Australia overseas.  These included funding and 
support of eight bilateral Foundations, Councils and Institutes (FCIs), the AICC, and the 
International Media Centre, along with support to a range of cultural and media exchanges, 
and dissemination of information through publications, Internet and annual reports.110  DFAT 
also noted to the inquiry that these activities are framed around three key interconnected 
strands: ‘managing the news cycle and responding to the story of the day; running proactive 
projects over several weeks or months; and building long term relationships’.111
                                                 
107 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2007, 
p.28. 
108 Ibid, p.4.  
109 Ibid, p.2. 
110 The following nine FCI’s have been established under legislation since 1979:  Australia-Japan Foundation, 
Australia-China Council, Australia-India Council, Australia-Indonesia Institute, Australia-Korea Foundation, 
Council on Australia-Latin America Relations, Council for Australian-Arab Relations, Australia-Malaysia 
Institute, and Australia-Thailand Institute.  For early analysis relating to the role of FCIs and the use of cultural 
diplomacy in the Australian context see also R Smyth, “Managing Australia’s Image in Asia”, Australian 
Journal of International  Affairs, Vol. 49 (2), November 1995, pp.223-236.  
111 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of 
Australia’s public diplomacy program, April 2007, p.4. 
  According 
to DFAT, when combined, these strands engender a greater understanding of Australia’s 
identity; values and ideas, ensuring that ‘Australia’s international image is contemporary, 
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dynamic and positive’.112  These strands are further addressed in a later section of the thesis, 
and mirror the key categories of public diplomacy activity identified by Professor Joseph 
Nye, a well known United States expert in the field of public diplomacy and soft power.113
During the Inquiry process, one senior official noted DFAT’s public diplomacy priorities, 
expressed in terms of those posts in which full-time Australian-based diplomatic resources 
were secured specifically for public diplomacy activity, included the United States 
(Washington), China, Indonesia, and Japan.  The same official also noted after further 
questioning that the public diplomacy priority (and specific resourcing) attached to these 
countries had evolved over time, and was not subject to any regular review.
 
 
114  More than the 
specific focus on those states, the absence of a regular review by DFAT of public diplomacy 
priority targets was a key concern for the Inquiry.  As a consequence DFAT may not 
necessarily have kept pace either with Australia’s own shifting policy priorities or with 
shifting global and regional power dynamics.115
To drill down further on Australia’s public diplomacy priorities, the FCIs, a key mechanisms 
for delivery of Australia’s public diplomacy activities, represent another set of public 
diplomacy priority countries and regions, adding India, Malaysia, Thailand, Latin America, 
Korea and Arab states into the mix.  Furthermore, the AICC formally identifies regional 
cultural diplomacy priorities over the next four years broadly as including, Asia, South 
Pacific, the Middle East and Africa, and the Americas and Western Europe (while this is the 
order in which the priorities are set out by the AICC, it is not clear if they are indeed ordered 
 
 
                                                 
112 Ibid. 
113 Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics.  
114 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2007, 
p.28. 
115 Ibid.  For example, during the Inquiry, Senator Mark Bishop noted his concern that India had not been noted 
as a priority target for Australia’s public diplomacy program. 
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to reflect further priority).116
Table 2 below sets out the key public diplomacy priority areas, as reflected during the Senate 
Inquiry, and also through current and publicly available information on the DFAT website.  
As with the portfolio policy priorities shown in Table 1, there is no single reference source 
provided by DFAT to align the various public diplomacy priority areas against each other, 
nor any framework that sets out the full picture of diplomatic priorities in one view.
  Additionally, the AICC runs a country focus each year.  In 
2009 the country-focus programs target the United States of America, while in 2010 China 
will be the country focus.  When this information is cross-referenced against successfully 
negotiated free trade agreements as evidence of hard diplomacy outcomes (Australia has free 
trade agreements in place now with Singapore, Thailand, Chile, New Zealand, the United 
States and ASEAN), there is an apparent lack of clear coherency.  While some broad 
priorities align (China, India and Japan) they are not necessarily articulated in a way that 
cross references the more significant ‘hard’ priorities of DFAT, AusAID and Austrade.   The 
picture of how public diplomacy priorities are identified, and measured with any reference to 
foreign policy outcomes is unclear.   
 
117
                                                 
116 For complete list of the AICC priority regions and target countries refer to 
  When 
the contents of Table 2 are cross-referenced against the stated foreign, trade and development 
assistance priorities set out in Table 1, there is evidence of little internal reconciliation against 
or consistency between priority issues or target countries, and little connection to positive 
outcomes (such as improved trade relations). When combined, this information points to a 
serious deficit in DFAT’s policy capacity, and ability to connect public diplomacy activities 
to strategic policy objectives.   
 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/regions.htm. and http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/focus.htm. 
117 Table 1 and Table 2 have been developed and cross-referenced for the purpose of this research.  There is no 
known source or publication available to the public that provides such a view.   
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Table 2:  Current Australian Public Diplomacy Priorities 
Public 
diplomacy 
positions 
118 
AICC – 
Priority 
Regions119 
AICC Focus 
Country 
programs120 
Tourism 
Australia 
promotion 
2008121 
International 
Education 
Priority 
States (based 
on top export 
performers)122 
Current  
FCIs  
  
Washington 
 
Asia Indonesia (2008) U.S.A.  China Japan 
 
China  
 
South Pacific U.S.A. (2009) New Zealand India  China 
Indonesia (x2)  
 
Middle East & 
Africa 
 
China (2010) Japan Rep of Korea Indonesia 
Japan Americas and 
Western  
 
Korea (2011) United 
Kingdom 
Malaysia India  
 
Korea 
 Europe India (2012) South Korea Thailand  
Thailand 
   France Hong Kong Latin America 
 
   Italy Indonesia Arab 
Relations  
Council  
 
Malaysia  
 
The physical resourcing of dedicated public diplomacy positions overseas is deficient when 
compared both to the changing global dynamics, and to the breadth of Australian policy 
initiatives in 2009-10.  For example, after analysis of the foreign and trade policy priorities 
against current public diplomacy priorities, further designated public diplomacy 
representation (by Australian-based officers) would be beneficial in India, Afghanistan and 
more broadly throughout Asia (particularly Korea), and in the Pacific, in order to further and 
support engagement, particularly in relation to the negotiation of free trade agreements, and 
                                                 
118 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2007, 
p.8. The list comprises those full-time A-based officer positions, specifically designated for public diplomacy 
activities.  As noted in the table above there are two full time equivalent Australian based public diplomacy 
officers at Australia’s Embassy in Jakarta (Indonesia).   
119 DFAT website found at:  http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/regions.html 
120 DFAT website found at:  http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/focus.html 
121 Tourism Australia website found at: 
http://www.tourism.australia.com/Research.asp?sub=0297&al=2424#TargetsMarkets 
122 Australian Education International, ‘Export income from education services from the top 50 nationalities’, 
Research Snapshot, Australian Government, June 2009.   Found at: 
http://aei.gov.au/AEI/PublicationsAndResearch/Snapshots/20090620_pdf.pdf 
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advancement of the non-proliferation agenda as well as Australia’s bid for a seat on the 
United Nations Security Council.   
 
Similarly, the range of established FCIs does not necessarily provide a strong indication of 
public diplomacy interconnecting with policy.  FCIs distribute minimal (DFAT-sourced) 
funds into the community in support of cross-cultural education and exchange.  However, 
there is little evidence linking such organisations to the strategic foreign policy and trade 
priorities, such as the successful negotiation of free trade or security agreements, or the 
current push to address environmental challenges.  The sweeping priorities (that actually 
include every major continent) set by the AICC are well outside the bounds of targeted policy 
setting, and bear little or no correlation to foreign policy, trade or development assistance 
priorities.   
 
Lastly, it is apparent across all public diplomacy perspectives that the Pacific, an area that is 
tied to Australia’s ongoing national interests (identified across the foreign, trade and 
development priorities as an area for strategic concern) is neglected through current overt 
public diplomacy mechanisms.  Yet, the subtle and critical public diplomacy impact achieved 
through Australia’s development assistance program within the Pacific cannot be ignored.  
As discussed in later chapters within this thesis, development assistance aid also known as 
the ‘diplomacy of deeds’ must be identified and embraced as a key pillar of Australia’s 
strategic public diplomacy efforts.123
The Senate Inquiry made a number of recommendations aimed at addressing the key 
systemic issues, and other minor issues aimed at improving the effectiveness of Australia’s 
   
 
                                                 
123 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 14 March, p.7. 
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public diplomacy program. The twenty recommendations included calls to strengthen 
bureaucratic leadership and coordination of the government’s public diplomacy program; 
significantly boost funding for public diplomacy (and in particular cultural diplomacy 
activity); and impose external evaluation of the government’s public diplomacy programs 
through the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO).  The recommendations, while 
reasonably conservative and low-key, provide a solid starting point for implementing 
systemic improvements to Australia’s public diplomacy program.  The Rudd Government’s 
response, tabled by DFAT in January 2009, (some sixteen months after the Senate Inquiry 
Report was tabled in Parliament), while non-committal in its uptake of many of the 
recommendations, acknowledged the validity of only a few of the recommendations raised by 
the Inquiry.  As noted earlier, little follow-up action has occurred.124
While no reference is made to specific areas of deficit identified by the Senate Committee, 
the Government response merely ‘welcomes the committee’s commendation of the work of 
Australian departments and agencies, cultural and educational institutions, and private 
organisations actively engaged in promoting Australia’s reputation overseas’.
   
 
125 The response 
is intended to ‘reflect the Government’s commitment to continue to pursue Australia’s public 
diplomacy programs designed to positively influence the perceptions, opinions and attitudes 
of people overseas on Australia’s values identity and ideas in a way that directly serves the 
advancement of Australia’s foreign and trade policy interests’.126
                                                 
124 Interview, Confidential Source, Senior Officer, Consular, Public Diplomacy, Parliamentary Affairs Division, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 22 June 2009. 
125 Australian Government, Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 
‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, p.1. 
126 Ibid.   
  However, the tone of the 
report is lacklustre and refers to minor if any changes in existing practice to align with the 
Inquiry recommendations.  Regardless of the content submitted within the Government’s 
response, the 2009-2010 budget statement already referred to in this thesis provides a more 
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accurate and perhaps disheartening picture of the Government’s intentions regarding public 
diplomacy.  
 
Gaps remain in understanding how public diplomacy fits within the foreign policy machine, 
and in clearly articulating the structures and processes underpinning its development and 
delivery.  The Inquiry findings alone are predictable and conservative addressing the 
minimum threshold for improving Australia’s public diplomacy program.  However, the 
background and evidence provided to the Inquiry by government and non-government 
agencies, and the Committee’s lines of questioning and discussion are instructive.  The 
Senate Inquiry process and findings are important to the maturing of Australia’s approach to 
public diplomacy.  The Senate Inquiry attempts to unravel and understand public diplomacy 
as it operates within Australia, and provides a superficial analysis of public diplomacy. As 
stated, Australian practitioners and academics have not yet fully engaged with the subject of 
public diplomacy, and there is little political imperative upon DFAT to drive and resource 
public diplomacy as an instrument of strategic policy.  As a result the DFAT coordinated 
public diplomacy program has developed without sufficient attention to its purpose and 
place.127
                                                 
127 Although publicly available statements issued by DFAT indicate that changes are occurring at a departmental 
level to better plan, coordinate, monitor and evaluate outcomes, in line with key Senate recommendations made 
as a result of the recent Inquiry. 
    The key issues raised through the Inquiry in terms of strategic leadership, political 
will and commitment, resourcing, and engagement in discussions and research have potential 
application not just to public diplomacy, but into other areas of Australian public policy 
outside the traditional realm of foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC 
DIPLOMACY WITHIN THE TRADITION OF DIPLOMACY 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the origins of public diplomacy (as recognised today), 
within the tradition of diplomacy, particularly as diplomacy has evolved from the time of the 
Westphalian Settlement, close to four hundred years ago.1  This chapter affirms public 
diplomacy as a subset that has existed within the wider field of diplomacy, and identifies 
where public diplomacy has been enabled, though not always overtly through the political 
realities, the protocols, and the structures of the wider field of diplomacy.  The Australian 
diplomatic experience will be shown to have similarly provided space and opportunity for 
early public diplomacy practices to emerge and to evolve, though generally at arms length 
from foreign policy development and delivery.2
2.1 Understanding the origins of public diplomacy 
   
 
The Senate Inquiry of 2007 into the nature and conduct of public diplomacy deals directly 
with content surrounding the meaning and method of public diplomacy as it has emerged 
recently in the modern international environment.3  The Senate Committee did not, through 
the process of inquiry, nor in the development of the final report delivered to the Australian 
Parliament touch on public diplomacy within the broader sense of traditional diplomatic 
practice.  Prima facie, the divergence between the traditional practice of diplomacy and 
public diplomacy is wide, spanning role, method, audience and channels of activity.4
                                                 
1 Westphalian Settlement of 1648 is considered to provide a watershed period from which traditional diplomatic 
practice as practiced today has emerged.  
2 This separation between public diplomacy and foreign policy within the Australian diplomatic system is an 
issue that remains today and can be traced back to the origins of Australian public diplomacy activity.   
3 The Senate Inquiry investigates and consolidates an understanding of public diplomacy based on the most 
recent and well documented experiences of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States of America.  
These examples are expected, yet limited in the context of emerging trends particularly given the extent of 
works available on public diplomacy emerging in other European states including Norway and Spain, as well as 
China, Japan, Korea, India Singapore and New Zealand.   
4 Each of these aspects of public diplomacy are dealt with in further chapters of this thesis. 
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Interestingly, various participants in the Senate Inquiry presented a range of inconsistent 
views on whether and how public diplomacy might sit with the wider tradition of diplomacy.  
In particular those DFAT officials currently engaged in diplomatic practice overseas strongly 
voiced the position that public diplomacy fell squarely within the domain of diplomatic 
responsibilities, whereas others more closely involved in the development of public 
diplomacy specific programs appeared less certain of the connection.5  However, a key 
premise of this thesis is that the origins of public diplomacy practice do rest within the 
broader traditions of diplomatic practice.  Public diplomacy concerns (such as the cultivation 
of state image and reputation) and practice (though not always known as such) have been 
established over time as legitimate threads of diplomacy more broadly.  As Melissen states, 
‘image cultivation, propaganda and activities that we would now label as public diplomacy 
are nearly as old as diplomacy itself’.6
Diplomacy, as Adam Watson described, is ‘a major and ubiquitous activity of governments in 
our time’.
  The value, role and focus of public diplomacy 
practice have, quite reasonably, remained fluid, depending upon the immediately prevailing 
political imperatives and interests of the day, combined with the expectations of the foreign 
publics and the methods of interaction available.  As a result, the practice of public 
diplomacy has moved and stretched beyond traditional boundaries to become more relevant 
to the challenges of the modern environment within which international relations are 
conducted.  
 
7
                                                 
5 Interviews, Confidential Source, Senior Officials (A-based and overseas)  Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 22 June 2009 and 9 September 2009.   
6 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.3. 
7 A Watson, Diplomacy: Dialogue between States, Eyre Methuen, London, 1982, p.15.  
  Watson’s description, while referencing diplomacy more broadly, and dated from 
1982, sets the tone for this thesis in demonstrating the fluid necessity of traditional and public 
diplomatic practice in meeting the challenges of the environment. Furthermore, diplomacy is 
65 
 
traditionally and widely viewed and utilised by sovereign states as one of the primary (but not 
the only) instruments for implementing foreign policy.8  The foundations of traditional 
diplomacy provide legitimacy to public diplomacy as a means of diplomatic practice relevant 
to foreign policy interests, and enable further understanding of the impact and reach of public 
diplomacy beyond the accepted boundaries of traditional diplomacy.9 Theorists would 
suggest that the term ‘traditional diplomacy’ be constrained as a reference to the type of 
diplomacy that occurs strictly on a state to state basis where the influence of historic tradition 
prevails.  In such discussions traditional diplomacy is synonymous with European diplomacy, 
as demonstrated through the examination of the origins of diplomatic practice within this 
chapter.10
                                                 
8 Diplomacy is highlighted as one of the instruments of foreign policy, as distinct from other activities such as 
economic sanction or military action.  Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p.9.   
9For further discussion of the central tenets of (capital T) traditional theory of diplomacy refer to Berridge, 
Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, and Berridge Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, Palgrave, 
London, 2001; R Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, Routledge, London, 1995; H Kissinger, Diplomacy, 
Simon & Shuster, New York, 1994; F de Callieres, The Art of Diplomacy, MA Keens-Soper (ed), Leicester 
University Press, Leicester, 1983; A Watson, Diplomacy: the dialogue between states, Eyre Methuen, London 
1982, H  Nicolson, Diplomacy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1950, and E Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic 
Practice, 4th edition, Longman, London, 1957.   
10 S Murray, ‘Reordering Diplomatic Theory for the Twenty-First Century: A Tripartite Approach’, Faculty of 
Humanities and Social Sciences, Bond University, 2006.  
  While the distinct subset of traditional diplomacy is important for the discussion 
within this thesis, this thesis takes the [small ‘t’] approach to traditional diplomacy.  In this 
way traditional diplomacy is taken to include diplomatic practice generally as conducted by 
the state within the parameters set under codified international law, but also incorporating 
more recent developments in the role of international government organisations and non 
government organisations – provided that such diplomacy occurs within the confines of 
official  government to government relations.  The Senate Inquiry, limited in terms of time 
and scope was not positioned to thoroughly revisit the key elements of traditional diplomacy.  
Yet, such an omission leaves a distinct hole in current Australian understanding and literature 
about public diplomacy generally, and subsequent gaps in understanding about why 
Australia’s practice in the area of public diplomacy may be lagging today.   
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For this reason, understanding the wider practice of diplomacy becomes an important 
foundation from which to explore public diplomacy.  Establishing the linkages between the 
two areas is critical to developing a more full understanding of the timing, method, channels 
and delivery of public diplomacy, as a means to advancing strategic national interests.  
Indeed, if public diplomacy is to be accepted as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy (as 
diplomacy is recognised), such linkages must be established. Interestingly, Australian 
diplomatic practice has emerged to reflect a strong focus on tradition.  Therefore, Australia’s 
ability to engage with public diplomacy in a more contemporary context will depend to a 
significant degree upon how such public diplomacy might be seen to be congruent with the 
current Australian institutions and practice. 
 
As noted, the purpose of this chapter is to address and define the broader field of diplomacy, 
and to provide a perspective of diplomacy that sets out the strong traditions as founded within 
the origins of diplomacy, and to explore where and how public diplomacy fits within these 
traditions.  This chapter proposes that public diplomacy today is an instrument of diplomacy 
for the purpose of advancing foreign policy, and while grounded in the traditions of 
diplomacy is a natural extension of diplomacy to meet the challenges of the modern 
international environment, and expectations of foreign and domestic publics.11
                                                 
11 The changes and challenges of the modern environment in which international relations are conducted are 
important to the discussion of both diplomatic practice, but also public diplomacy practice, particularly as such 
practice is emerging today.  Most writings on contemporary public diplomacy will begin with reference to the 
key challenges affecting the modern diplomatic environment.  For example, some of the key issues including the 
increase in the number of states now interacting on the global level, the expansion of democracy across many of 
these states and the correlated explosion in the number of other international actors apart from states such as non 
governmental organisations, as well as politically savvy interest and lobby groups.  As the same time the success 
of innovative technologies and communication patterns have added a dimension to the complicated and complex 
web of information, communications and media that overlay political processes, and at times ‘circumvent the 
foreign ministry and the embassy’.  Refer to Melissen (ed), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p.xiv.  These 
challenges are addressed in further detail within Chapter Three of this thesis.  However, for further readings and 
insights into key changes and challenges refer to K Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, 
International Security, 18 (2), 1993, pp.44-79; N Snow, ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy’, The Routledge 
   This chapter 
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also examines the emergence of diplomatic practice in Australia, in terms of structure and 
conduct, and offers background to the emergence of public diplomacy within Australia’s 
traditional diplomatic practice and administration.   
 
From the outset, this thesis acknowledges that public diplomacy neither replaces nor exceeds 
the value and place of traditional diplomacy.  Public diplomacy as employed today, extends 
beyond the limitations of traditional diplomacy, and represents a fundamental shift in the way 
states manage their relations.12  However, such public diplomacy ultimately leverages and 
complements traditional diplomatic activities.13  In order to facilitate a better understanding 
of how public diplomacy operates within the Australian context and identify opportunities for 
public diplomacy to be utilised as an effective tool to advance Australia’s national interests, 
there is value in understanding the foundations from which public diplomacy emerges.14
Diplomacy, commonly defined as the ‘art or practice of conducting official relations between 
sovereign states in such a way as to avoid arousing hostility’ is widely accepted as an 
instrument of foreign policy.
   
Traditional diplomatic practice offers that foundation.    
 
15
                                                                                                                                                        
Handbook of Public Diplomacy, Snow and Taylor (eds), Routledge, New York, 2009, pp.3-11; B Hocking, 
Rethinking the new Public Diplomacy’, in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations,  
Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, pp.28-43; Melissen, Between theory and practice, and E. 
Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, The Netherlands Institute for 
International Relations, 2001.  
12 Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, p.1.  
13 In the words of a former Canadian Ambassador, ‘the new public diplomacy requires different skills, 
techniques and attitudes than those found in traditional diplomacy’.  Refer to Potter, ‘Canada and the New 
Public Diplomacy’, p.3.  
14 Chapter Three explores public diplomacy in more detail, and identifies in particular where has emerged from 
the traditions of diplomacy, alongside those areas where public diplomacy offers an extension of traditional 
diplomatic practice in order to meet the needs of a changing environment.   
  This common definition reflects the words of Australian 
international relations theorist, Hedley Bull that diplomacy is ‘the conduct of relations 
15 Found at: http://thinkexist.com/dictionary/meaning/diplomacy/.  Foreign policy is also defined simply by 
Gyngell, Wesley as ‘that dimension of public policy that deals with the outside world’, the purpose of which is 
to create ‘an international environment conducive to the nation’s interest’. To refine the hierarchy of concepts 
even further, diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy, is the tool used to implement the foreign policy 
which gives rise to foreign or international relations. Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.24. 
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between states, with standing in world politics by official agents and peaceful means’.16  
Clearly, a common theme crossing through both the definition provided by Bull to the 
common understanding of diplomacy relies upon the ‘essential condition of plurality’.17 As 
Watson surmises, diplomacy ‘arises out of the coexistence of a multitude of independent 
states in an inter-dependant world’.18 Watson’s approach is not necessarily as ‘statist’ as that 
of other scholars such as Bull.19  For Watson, the entity appears to be of lesser importance; 
rather diplomacy in this way is ‘a response to the recognition by several decision-making 
beings, that the performance of each one is a matter of permanent consequence to some or all 
of the others’.20
Applying a traditionalist and functional view of diplomacy, Berridge defines diplomacy as 
‘the term given to the official channels of communication employed by the members of a 
system of states’.
 The focus on plurality as the central core of diplomacy, where there is a 
sense of interdependence and a need for dialogue, gives a more flexible starting point from 
which to define diplomacy.  In this way, plurality becomes a pivot point that allows other 
features of diplomatic practice, such as the entities and requirements for interactions to 
emerge more flexibly and meet the needs of the international system at the time.     
 
21
                                                 
16 H Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 
1977.  Bull acknowledges the society of states as central to the maintenance of order in an otherwise anarchical 
international arena.  By doing so, Bull sets the tone for diplomacy as a mechanism for states to maintaining 
balance and order within this environment.  
17 Watson, Diplomacy: Dialogue between States, 1982, p.15.  
18 Ibid.  
19 For many traditionalists, the entity of the state is the central precondition for diplomacy to function.  
Following on from Bull, Wight for example suggests that diplomacy is ‘inextricably connected to the existence 
and operation of the state system’.  Wight in Jackson, ‘Martin Wight’s Thoughts on Diplomacy’, Diplomacy and 
Statecraft, 13(4), p.3, Berridge utilises similar terminology in Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, 
p.1. 
20 Watson, Diplomacy: Dialogue between States, p.15. 
21 Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, p.1. 
  Batora reinforces this view, with again a particular emphasis on the role 
of the state, defining diplomacy as ‘the set of norms and rules regulating relations between 
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states’.22  Batora draws upon this functional perspective by noting that diplomacy is 
‘embedded in organisational structures, routines, procedures and habits of foreign 
ministries…and carried out by diplomats according to institutionalised professional skills and 
habits’.23  Berridge writes that the chief purpose of diplomacy is to ‘enable states to secure 
the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda or war’.24
Other prominent writers on traditional diplomacy, including Satow similarly rely upon the 
essential conditions of plurality and interdependence, and draw upon the theme also noted in 
earlier definitions that traditional diplomacy occurs as a means  of reinforcing ‘the conduct of 
business between states by peaceful means’.
  Plurality 
in Batora’s approach is a given, but the additional themes from across the definitions start to 
converge, including the role of the sovereign state, the envoy and embassy, and the 
importance of rules and protocols.   
 
25  In essence, for diplomacy to play a role, there 
must be more than one state (or entity), and there must be a level of interaction between those 
states or entities.  Satow refers to the ‘application of intelligence and tact’ in the ‘constant 
search for mutually acceptable terms and conditions in an atmosphere of confidence and 
understanding’.26
                                                 
22 Batora, ‘Multi-stakeholder public diplomacy of small and medium sized states: Norway and Canada’. 
23 Ibid, p.1. 
24 Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, p.1. 
25 Ibid. p.134.  
26 Ibid. 
  As such, Satow’s works draw a clear line between the role of diplomacy 
and that of force in progressing foreign policy interests.  Satow’s implied suggestion that 
‘diplomacy and conflict are mutually exclusive’, emerges with some regularity from the 
common understanding of diplomacy (including Berridge’s interpretation), though it is not 
necessarily a widely held view amongst other theorists and writers on politics and diplomacy, 
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including Clausewitz and Grotius.27  Lastly, underlying Satow’s view is a deference provided 
to the elitist practice of diplomacy exercised within the confidences of the officials of the 
state.  The presumption reflected by Satow and others in a range of the definitive and classic 
writings on diplomacy is that diplomacy occurs as a restricted or closed practice between the 
elite officials in secret and away from the public view or opinion.28
Batora’s concise synopsis of diplomacy noted previously also highlights the key themes of 
discrepancy between traditional diplomacy and the emerging field of public diplomacy.  
These themes are addressed briefly here, though will be dealt with in more detail in the next 
chapter.  For example, public diplomacy as a modern practice occurs in a multi-dimensional 
and layered approach, not in accordance with well established rules and protocols.  Nor is 
public diplomacy necessarily embedded in the organisational structure, routines or habits of 
the foreign ministry.  While the foreign ministry provides a critical development hub (where 
public diplomacy activities might hopefully be developed in line with foreign policy 
strategies), the foreign ministry and diplomatic service provide just one channel of delivery.  
The various channels of media, universities, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and 
non government organisations (NGOs) are all similarly important to the delivery of public 
diplomacy.
   
 
29
                                                 
27 Murray, ‘Reordering Diplomatic Theory for the Twenty-First Century: A Tripartite Approach’, p.46.  Satow’s 
view supports the anarchist perspective of international relations, where the state system is in a constant state of 
anarchy, and diplomacy is one mechanism to maintain some sense of balance within that anarchy.  Other classic 
writers such as Carl von Clausewitz would oppose Satow’s interpretation, arguing that war is simply as the 
continuation of policy by other means. Clausewitz, On War, Penguin Books, Victoria, 1982, p.122.   
28 The prominent writers that support the traditional perspective of diplomacy as an elitist function of officials 
between states and away from the public domain, include Machiavelli, Grotius, Callieres, Satow, Nicholson, 
Kissinger and Berridge.   
29 Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice; Hocking, ‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’, p.30.   
 In this way, public diplomacy reinforces a sense of openness that is abhorrent to 
the traditional secrecy of official diplomatic interactions. Officialdom and secrecy run 
entirely at odds with the principle that public diplomacy from the outset is open to and 
engages the public.  These and other matters relating to the specific aspects of difference 
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between traditional and public diplomacy are critical to understanding, (and are addressed in 
more detail in Chapter Three).   
 
The changing needs of the international environment have challenged many accepted tenets 
of traditional diplomacy, including the supremacy of the sovereign state, where non state 
actors, including IGOs and NGOs may also play a role in the conduct of international 
relations and diplomatic practice, as well as the growing interest of the public in issues of 
both domestic and foreign policy.30  However, in all instances the essential condition of 
plurality is maintained, though only in a more complex form.  In the words of Dr Jorge 
Heine, Chair of the Centre for International Governance Innovation, ‘Otto von Bismarck’s 
dictum that ‘diplomacy is the art of gaining friends abroad’ remains valid.  What has changed 
is the sheer number of friends that need to be gained has increased exponentially’.31
The nature of plurality even during the earliest decades of diplomacy in action may well have 
encouraged the need for states to foster early forms of public diplomacy. Even the nature of 
Machiavelli’s early writings on diplomacy convey the underlying yet subtle theme that image 
is vital in maintaining control of and managing the affairs of the state, both to the domestic 
audience and the foreign audience.
    
 
32
                                                 
30 Traditional roles and boundaries that have previously separated states from non-government actors including 
IGOs have broken down dramatically in recent decades, to the point that IGOs participate within core 
multilateral institutions like the United Nations, and carry significant influence within and across states.   
31 J Heine, ‘On the Matter of Practicing the New Diplomacy’, in Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds 
Apart?, A Cooper, B Hocking and W Maley (eds), Palgrave McMillan, London, 2008.  
32 N Machiavelli, The Prince, Wordsworth Reference, Hertfordshire, 1993.  
  Projecting an image of the state, including one that 
might define and set the state apart or facilitate allegiances was as important in the 
seventeenth century as it is today. As Melissen reinforces, ‘official communication aimed at 
foreign publics is after all no new phenomenon in international relations.  Image cultivation, 
propaganda and activities that we would normally label as public diplomacy are nearly as old 
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as diplomacy itself’.33
2.2 Understanding the origins of diplomacy 
  For this reason, and to fully understand the nature of contemporary 
public diplomacy, there is value in exploring the historical origins of diplomacy in more 
detail. 
 
Many studies of diplomacy will refer in some part to the historic origins of the discipline.  
The trend to relate diplomacy to the origins of the past is far more prevalent amongst those 
known as the traditionalists who place a high value on the basic tenets of diplomacy which, 
while diluted by changes in the international relations environment, remain relevant to the 
discussion of modern diplomacy.34  Diplomacy boasts substantial historical stability that 
emerged from the Westphalian Settlement.  The concept of the Westphalian system was 
described by Hedley Bull as, ‘an international society composed of genuinely independent 
sovereign states all juridically equal despite enormous disparities of size and power, and free 
from all or almost all hegemonial power’.35
The strong historical context of diplomacy is such that discussions of traditional diplomacy 
are incomplete without an examination of those origins.  There is little theoretical discourse 
in the area of diplomacy, perhaps because it is a subject so embedded within the context of 
international law and accepted historical practice.
  Thus the Westphalian system, Eurocentric and 
dated though it may be, is accepted by many traditional diplomacy scholars as having 
established a largely immutable pattern for the conduct of international relations between 
states.   
 
36
                                                 
33 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.3.   
34 For example, refer to Callieres, Satow, Nicholson, Kissinger and Berridge.   
35 Bull quoted in A. Watson, Diplomacy: the Dialogue Between States, p.xi. 
36 Most prominent writers on diplomacy, including de Callieres, Satow, Nicholson, Watson and Berridge are 
focused on the functional aspects of how diplomacy is conducted rather than the theoretical underpinnings or 
opportunities for diplomacy. 
  As a result of a strong history of codified 
rules, there is little room for theoretical manoeuvrability or creativity within the discourse on 
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traditional diplomacy.   Scholars emerging in more recent times, including Der Derian, Sharp, 
Puchala and Murray express frustration with the limited and patchy nature of diplomatic 
theory, suggesting that diplomacy itself has been ‘particularly resistant to theory’. 37  This 
thesis is less concerned with the theoretical underpinnings or resilience of diplomacy, 
although, it notes that the patchiness in the theoretical groundings of traditional diplomacy 
has been similarly lamented by scholars with an interest in public diplomacy, and there is 
certainly room to further develop the existing body of knowledge. 38
As a consequence of the rigid boundaries that apply to traditional diplomacy, discourse on the 
subject tends to be constrained.  In particular, the discourse tends to focus upon the structured 
and official channels of communication and activities of negotiation employed both 
bilaterally and multilaterally to avoid hostilities (that is, to ensure relationships between states 
are maintained at least just short of war).  The codification of legal principles and protocols 
  However, this thesis is 
concerned with what might be learned from the practice and function of diplomacy, and the 
degree to which such practice and function influences or enables practice in the area of public 
diplomacy.   
 
                                                 
37 Der Derian defines diplomacy as ‘a set of discursive practices mediating human estrangement legitimating 
some forms of foreign policy discourse while rejecting others as threatening to ordered global interaction’.  Der 
Derian’s theoretical exploration of diplomacy provides an important insight into possible opportunities for 
addressing what he views as gaps in current diplomatic theory.  However, such theoretical discourse is largely 
unhelpful for the purpose of this examination of public diplomacy within the wider tradition of diplomacy.   
38 Gregory notes that a deal of scholarly and academic research into public diplomacy has emerged almost 
unintentionally as a result of the analysis of events, and through the interest of think-tanks and media in the 
content of public diplomacy.  The same cannot necessarily be said for traditional diplomacy.  While scholars 
such as Der Derian refer to the scarcity of traditional diplomacy theory, there is an argument that traditional 
diplomacy deliberately developed within the bounds of a state system and agreed historically recognised rules 
requires no additional theoretical discourse.  Der Derian, Craig, Puchala, Sharp and Murray all argue for the 
expansion and modernising of diplomatic theory to reflect modern practice.  Refer to Der Derian, J, On 
Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987; G Craig, ‘The 
Historian and the Study of International Relations’, American Historical Review, 88(1), 1983, pp.1-11,  D J 
Puchala, ‘The Pragmatics of International History’, Mershon International Studies Review, 39(1) 1995, pp.1-39, 
P Sharp, ‘For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations’, International Studies 
Review, 1(1) 1999, pp.33-57. For further discussion on the nature of the theoretical work related to public 
diplomacy refer to N Cull, ‘Public diplomacy before Gullion: the evolution of a phrase’, in The Routledge 
Handbook on Public Diplomacy, Snow and Taylor, (eds), Routledge, NY, 2009; and B Gregory, ‘Public 
Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, University of Leeds, May 2008, pp.274-290.  
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of diplomatic practice undertaken and finalised in the aftermath of World War Two, and set 
out within the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) has validated this 
structured focus on diplomatic practice.  The VCDR is recognised today as the cornerstone of 
diplomatic practice, and provides a ‘complete framework for the establishment, maintenance 
and termination of diplomatic relations based on consent between independent sovereign 
states’.39
However, the concepts underpinning traditional diplomacy were well established long before 
the development and codification of practice via the VCDR.  As Berridge states, diplomacy, 
known in the earliest forms as ‘negotiation’ is ‘an essentially political activity and [when] 
well resourced and skilful, [is] a major ingredient in power’.
  
 
40 Even before the sovereign 
state existed, power and power dynamics were a significant concern for distinct and 
organised groups of people as they sought to interact and transact with each other.41  
Traditional diplomatic practice as it emerged after the Westphalian settlement, remains 
relevant today as the backbone of the conduct of international interactions.42  Premised upon 
the key features of the primacy of the sovereign state in international relations, and the 
facilitative role of the envoy and the embassy, traditional diplomacy operates via a system of 
historically recognised rules and protocols (now codified in international law), based on 
reciprocity and mutual consent.43
 
   
                                                 
39 E Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International 
Law, United Nations, New York, 2009, p.3. 
40 Berridge, Diplomacy Theory and Practice, p.1. 
41 Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.3, and Berridge, Diplomacy Theory and Practice, 
p.1. 
42 The Westphalian settlement of 1648 provides a watershed in marking the origins of traditional diplomatic 
practice.  While only brief attention is paid to the Westphalian traditions further readings on the development 
and emergence of diplomatic practice are found in Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919, 
Langman, London; G Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, Dover Publications, Mineola, 1955, and Berridge, 
Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger. 
43 Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.3, and Berridge, Diplomacy Theory and Practice, 
p.1. 
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Early records of such diplomatic interactions and transactions drawn upon by Denza in 
discussion of the foundations of the VCDR illustrate the role of the envoy (also known as the 
herald or intermediary) as central to the concept of diplomacy, where groups of people sought 
to interact on a basis ‘other than conquest or subjugation’.44  Furthermore the ‘personal 
inviolability of envoys’ was enshrined as sacrosanct in order to maintain and protect their 
effect and purpose from as early as the interactions between the cities of Ancient Greece in 
the fourth and fifth centuries.45  Along with the role and immunity afforded to the envoy, a 
number of other features of diplomacy are likely to have originated from this time, including 
‘the dependence on communication by messengers, concept of a mission, where a locally 
engaged person might also be employed’.46  Through these early recordings of diplomatic 
practice ‘diplomacy remained chiefly in the hands of the special envoys, limited by time and 
task’.47
Diplomacy as it is practiced today, is most closely linked to the practices that emerged with 
the establishment of permanent resident embassies by the states of the Italian peninsula 
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
  The nature of the practice was therefore limited and undeveloped, yet still provides 
us with insight into the foundations for diplomatic practice.   
 
48  The nature of the environment and conditions 
that existed on the Italian peninsula during this time were such to give rise to what is in 
essence the tradition of diplomatic practice today.  For this reason, diplomacy has always 
been viewed as a distinct product of the fifteenth and sixteenth century European 
experience.49
                                                 
44 Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.1. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Berridge, Diplomacy Theory and Practice, p.2.  Berridge and other writers such as Eileen Denza also 
acknowledge the interactions of the states of ancient India as reflecting the early concepts of diplomacy. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.1.  
  Europe, and specifically the Italian peninsula at this time was in effect the 
culture in which the diplomatic organism thrived, and then with time grew in relevance to 
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have application across the interactions of other states outside that culture.  Kissinger 
describes the conduct of diplomacy at this time, as being ‘predicated not on the peace loving 
nature of states but on their propensity for war, which needed to be discouraged or 
balanced’.50  Kissinger’s view aligns with the picture provided to us by Machiavelli who 
wrote of the unpredictability of the balance of power and the need for the nobility of the state 
to remain on their guard because it is ‘when the prince has thought more of ease than of arms, 
they have lost their state’.51  Berridge also notes that ‘when it became clear that the rulers of 
Europe had a common interest in regulating their frequently bellicose ‘foreign’ relations, 
diplomatic theory acquired an explicitly political flavour’.52
The establishment of the permanent mission or embassy as a lasting feature of diplomacy 
occurred during this time of significant insecurity on the Peninsula, from the growing 
numbers of independent sovereign units, and the growing security concerns between them.
  
 
53   
According to Mattingly, ‘under jungle law, the price of survival was incessant alertness.  One 
method of providing for this alertness and countering dangers of constant war was found in 
the new style of diplomacy’ of the Italian states.54
                                                 
50 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p.222. 
51 Machiavelli, The Prince, p.111.   
52 Berridge, Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, p.2.  For further insights into the emergence of 
diplomatic tradition on the Italian peninsula see reading suggested at footnote 204. 
53 L Viola, ‘Talking States: A theory of diplomacy’, Presentation to Comparative Politics Workshop, University 
of Chicago, 12 May 2004, p.6. 
54 Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p.50.  Further reinforces Hedley Bull’s perspective that diplomacy 
restores the power balance within an otherwise anarchical system of states, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical 
Society: a Study of Order in World Politics, p.8.   
 The resident mission was headed by a 
resident ambassador, a representative selected and vested with the powers of the sending 
sovereign, and allowed to set up residence with the approval, authority and protection of the 
receiving or host state.  Clear expectations between the sending and hosts states regarding the 
role and authority of the ambassador, secured the treatment of the ambassador as an 
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accredited official, and his residence as that of a mission.  From this point, the structure and 
protocols of diplomacy gained recognition and approval across states.55
By the mid-seventeenth century the permanent missions and ambassadorial representatives 
were seen as the normal foundation upon which relations between states could occur.  
Resident ambassadors were employed within other states of Europe, and a web of reciprocal, 
bilateral diplomatic exchanges emerged.
   
 
56 The emerging structures and rules of diplomacy 
were therefore taking hold (within a primarily European, rules-based framework), and as 
Mattingly notes, ‘success now depended less upon the brutal shock of massed force than 
upon the vigilant and agile politics…the diplomat was needed to supplement the soldier’.57
The ceremony and formality of diplomacy carried out by elite envoys and political figures in 
line with accepted protocols, and within the European state system ensured that diplomacy 
was carried out in a closed format, at a distance from the general public; such behaviours 
reinforced ‘the remoteness of the ordinary citizen from foreign policy’.
 
 
58  This perspective of 
diplomacy as a closed system carried out by elites, supported and reaffirmed by the force of 
an intricate set of rules has become a significant platform of diplomacy that has lasted into 
recent years.59
  
  
                                                 
55 Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.3. 
56 Viola, ‘Talking States: A theory of diplomacy’, p.7. From this time, as Denza notes, writers such as Grotius 
wrote of the roles and methods of the ambassadors, the agreed and intricate rules regarding the immunity of 
ambassadors, their families and staff from criminal proceedings, their exception from normal customs and taxes 
and the inviolability of the embassy premises.   
57 Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p.53. 
58 K Younger, ‘Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy’, International Affairs, Vol 40, No.1. 1964, p.22. 
59 As discussed later in this thesis, the concept of closed diplomacy is one of the features challenged by the 
emergence of public diplomacy. 
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2.2.1 An inkling of public diplomacy 
 
The concept of closed diplomacy is one that is open to challenge.  At the same time that elite 
rulers and official envoys were negotiating the interests of their respective states behind 
closed doors, those same rulers and statesmen were also conscious of their image amongst 
wider audiences, and that of the state on whose behalf they negotiated.60  Melissen reminds 
us that biblical references reinforce the importance of image of the state, and ‘international 
relations in ancient Greece and Rome, Byzantium and the Italian Renaissance were familiar 
with diplomatic activity aimed at foreign publics’.61 Indeed the advent of the printing press 
was a significant shift in the early practices of image cultivation, with official 
communications distributed more widely amongst foreign publics.  States such as seventeenth 
century France, and later Turkey (in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire), ensured 
significant effort was focused on ‘managing their country’s reputation as one of the principal 
sources of a nation’s power’.62
Similar trends continued into the twentieth century.
 While not labelled public diplomacy, there is a clear link 
between the activities of the early state system in image cultivation and information 
provision, and what is seen as public diplomacy today.  Herein lie the origins of what has 
emerged today into public diplomacy.   
 
63
                                                 
60 Machiavelli, The Prince.  
61 Melissen, ‘Between theory and practice’, p.3. 
62 Ibid. 
63 A compelling challenge was mounted during World War One when United States President, Woodrow 
Wilson made one of the first modern references to public diplomacy when he called for an ‘international system 
founded on open covenants of peace, openly arrived at’. For further references regarding early usage of the 
terminology of public diplomacy refer to Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase’, 
p.20.   
 However, the activities associated with 
public diplomacy through the twentieth century detoured for several decades into the specific 
area of ‘supplying approved information’, an activity that has been more commonly referred 
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to as propaganda.64 For traditionalists such as Berridge, propaganda is synonymous with 
public diplomacy.65  Other scholars more closely aligned to the study of public diplomacy 
propose that the delineation between propaganda and public diplomacy is a fine, but distinct 
one.66  Propaganda is characterised by negative historical baggage related to the use of 
propaganda through the Second World War and later through the Cold War.67  From these 
eras, propaganda is understood to reflect manipulation and deceit of publics both domestic 
and foreign, and as Zaharna notes is ‘perhaps the oldest, and most prominent type of 
information initiative that political entities use with publics’.68
2.2.2 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
  In short, public diplomacy 
having re-emerged within the modern environment as a credible tool for building upon 
engagement with foreign audiences has moved beyond the information-based, one-way focus 
of propaganda.  The distinction between the two concepts is important in advancing foreign 
policy interests in the modern diplomatic environment, and is addressed in more detail later 
in this thesis.   
 
The parameters regarding the formal practice of diplomacy were not formally set out until a 
Regulation adopted by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.69
                                                 
64 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p.17. 
65 Ibid.  Berridge further defines public diplomacy from the traditionalist framework noting that public 
diplomacy is ‘foreign propaganda conducted or orchestrated by diplomats’.   
66 The delineation between propaganda and public diplomacy is routinely dealt with in writings on 
contemporary public diplomacy.  For example refer to Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, pp.16-19,  
Hocking, ‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’, pp.36-37, Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a spectrum of Public 
Diplomacy’, pp.89-90. 
67 Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a spectrum of Public Diplomacy’, p.89 and Melissen, 'Between theory and practice’, 
p.17.   
68 Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a spectrum of Public Diplomacy’, p.89.   
69 Further codification of immunities and privileges was commenced within the American context via the 
Havana Convention of 1928.   
  Yet, it was not until the 
International Law Commission was established within the United Nations framework, over a 
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century later that the task of comprehensive codification of the law of diplomacy in the form 
of the VCDR was undertaken.70
The VCDR is said to be ‘the most successful of the instruments drawn up under the United 
Nations framework’, primarily because of the significant engagement of state representatives 
in the development process, but also because of the historical stability of the rules of 
diplomatic law, and the ‘effectiveness of reciprocity as a sanction against non-compliance’.
 
 
71 
States continue to be bound by the VCDR today and engage routinely in traditional 
diplomacy as a matter of course.72  The success of the established practice of diplomacy is 
demonstrated through the adherence to the VCDR, along with the broad representation (by all 
universally recognised sovereign states) at the United Nations, formalised representation 
across other states, and through the general investment of states in their diplomatic corps and 
infrastructure to support the corps.73
The International Law Commission sought to work across states within the United Nations to 
confirm and codify the agreed rules and practice that had governed diplomatic relations 
   
 
                                                 
70 Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.1. Established in 1948, the International Law 
Commission's mandate is the progressive development and codification of international law, in accordance with 
article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations.  See International Law Commission viewed on 20 October 
2009, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/.  The codification of international law, unlike municipal law is slow moving.  
The codification of diplomatic and consular law represents a significant achievement, ‘as yet not much has been 
achieved towards the realisation of the codification of international law’.  A Piip, ‘Codification of International 
Law’, Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science, Vol. 168(1), 1933, p.1. 
71 Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.1. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
1961 can be accessed via the United Nations Website viewed on 20 October 2009, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf. The codification of international 
law, unlike municipal law is slow moving.  For the reasons provided the codification of diplomatic and consular 
law represents a significant international achievement, ‘as yet not much has been achieved towards the 
realisation of the codification of international law’.  A Piip, ‘Codification of International Law’, Annals of the 
American Academy of Social and Political Science, Vol. 168(1), 1933, p.1. 
 
72 For the fulsome discussion of principles of international law including codification and progressive 
development of international law generally, as well as more specific discussion regarding the evolution, 
codification and operation of the VCDR and VCCR refer to J Starke, I Shearer, Starke’s International Law, 11th 
ed, Butterworths, London, 1994; and M Shaw, International Law, 6th ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2008.   
73 United Nations Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, http://www.un.org.au/. 
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between states with some stability over the preceding two hundred years.  The negotiation 
and drafting process began in 1952, and concluded with the agreement of the 81 states to the 
VCDR at the defining Conference in Vienna in 1961.74  The success of the negotiation 
process, and ultimately adherence to the Convention is, as noted earlier attributed to the fact 
that the VCDR confirmed established practice and conduct that had remained relatively stable 
within the European context for some two hundred years.75  For example, while some of the 
practicalities and activities surrounding the establishment of the permanent diplomatic 
mission has changed somewhat over that time, ‘their basic functions of representing the 
sending state and protecting its interests and the interests of its nationals, negotiation with the 
receiving state observing and reporting on the conditions and development there remained 
and still remain unaltered’.76
The very stability of accepted and agreed practice between states is a key feature of 
diplomacy.  Yet potentially, as noted earlier, the same stability is a source of frustration for 
those that argue diplomatic theory is lacking.  There is little space for theory, particularly 
around innovations or extensions of practice, when the practice is already highly structured 
and almost universally accepted.  In addition to these key themes of stability and acceptance, 
is the complementary feature that the entire practice of diplomacy is based on reciprocity and 
mutual consent between states.   In this way, the ‘establishment of permanent missions takes 
place by mutual consent, every state is both a sending and receiving state’.
  This certainty of function as a result of consistent and accepted 
practice appears to be sustained across the field of traditional diplomacy.   
 
77
                                                 
74 International Law Commission: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ 
75 There is value in noting that diplomacy as codified in the VCDR reflects a predominantly European model 
and is less representative of the practice and conduct of the non-Western world.  The exploration of the 
relevance and emergence of diplomacy in the non-Western world might be an avenue for exploration, but is not 
a task for this thesis.   
76 Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.2.  
77 Ibid.  
  As a 
consequence the opportunity for opposing interests both in the negotiation of the VCDR, but 
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also in the subsequent implementation of the VCDR by participating states is minimal.78
2.2.3 Key aspects of the VCDR 
  By 
contrast the potential for acceptance and adherence amongst states is maximised. 
 
The VCDR came into force internationally in 1964 only three years after being adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, upon receipt of the twenty-second ratification.  
Australia was among those states that signed the VCDR early.  Australia was subsequently 
bound by the obligations established under the VCDR after ratifying the convention in 1968.  
By this time, Australia had implemented domestic legislation that would give the effect to the 
international provisions under Australian law.79
i) functions of diplomatic missions, the formal rules regulating appointments, declarations of persona 
non grata of a diplomat who has in some way given offence, and precedence among heads of 
missions; 
 The VCDR has been ratified by most states 
party to the United Nations, and is now accepted as universal international law.   
 
The VCDR sets out the agreed nature of practical diplomatic interaction which establishes the 
foundation for the diplomatic network and diplomatic practice still relevant to diplomatic 
practice today as the: 
ii) privileges and immunities that enable diplomatic missions to operate without fear of coercion or 
harassment through enforcement of local laws, and to communicate securely with their sending 
governments; and 
iii) requirements for the withdrawal of a mission and for the breach of diplomatic missions which may 
occur as a result of the serious deterioration in relations between the sending and receiving 
states.80
 
 
                                                 
78 Specific issues did cause minor friction during the negotiation process, including the use of wireless 
communication transmitters, the right to return a diplomatic bag unopened should the receiving state raise 
suspicions about the contents, and the extension of diplomatic privileges and immunities to administrative and 
technical staff at the mission.  However, each of these issues was resolved for the purpose of the VCDR without 
significant controversy, again pointing to the converging interests of states in diplomatic law.  See Denza, 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, p.3. 
79 The Australian law enacted by the Commonwealth to give effect to the VCDR is the Diplomatic Privileges 
and Immunities Act 1967 (Cth).  The Act binds all Australian states and territories to comply with Australia’s 
international obligations under the VCDR.  
80 Denza, ‘Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations’, p.3. 
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Quite apart from the practical guidance provided by the VCDR on interactions between states 
(as noted above), the Article 3 of the VCDR established the functions of the mission and 
thereby sets out the key aspects of traditional diplomatic practice.  These key aspects include:  
i) representation and protection of the interests and nationals of the sending state within the 
boundaries of the receiving state;  
ii) negotiation with the government of the receiving state; ascertaining the conditions and 
developments within the receiving state for reporting to the sending state (commonly known today 
as political or economic reporting); and  
iii) promoting friendly relations between the two states via economic, cultural and scientific 
exchange. 81
 
  
The key features of traditional diplomacy are thereby well established and apparent from 
reviewing the terms of the VCDR.  The VCDR provides a common platform which governs 
the conduct of official relations between states (both on a bilateral, but also on the 
multilateral level), that not only transcends differences in language, culture, and interests, but 
reinforces commonalities in accepted diplomatic language, channels, culture and interests. 82
  
 
In particular, and as evident from the above list, the VCDR provides a clear mandate and 
space for public diplomacy to occur as a part of recognised diplomatic practice through the 
development of relations based on exchange.  The exchange aspects of public diplomacy will 
be discussed in depth at a later stage within this thesis.  However, suffice to suggest that these 
activities remain extremely successful and widely utilised by states in the development of 
lasting personal relationships outside of official channels.  Building upon commonality within 
the society of states is a well established and necessary feature of all diplomatic practice that 
has remained unchanged over time. 
                                                 
81 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961 
82 For more detailed discussion of the VCDR refer to E. Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998; and Langhorne, ‘The Regulation of 
Diplomatic Practice: the Beginnings to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961’, Review of 
International Studies, 18, pp. 3-17.   
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2.2.4 The MFA – supporting diplomatic practice 
 
The diplomatic practice and conduct of relations between states that is endorsed via the 
VCDR does not just occur loosely within the network of embassies and envoys posted across 
the globe.  Such practice is controlled, enabled and monitored through the key structure of the 
Ministry or Department of Foreign Affairs (generically referred to as the MFA).  The MFA 
generally provides the central diplomatic authority for any state, administers the terms of the 
VCDR within both the international and domestic contexts, and facilitates the practice of 
diplomacy by the state.  The MFA plays a critical role within the state to develop foreign 
policy priorities in accordance with the broader domestic political agenda of the day, and to 
give effect to such policies, primarily through the diplomatic network.83
In light of the basis of diplomacy set out by the VCDR, Hocking provides an appropriate 
description of traditional diplomacy that applies today, as an activity where ‘the foreign 
ministry and the national diplomatic systems over which it presides acts as a gatekeeper, 
monitoring and controlling the interactions between the domestic and international policy 
environments and funnelling information between them’.
  
 
84
The MFA not only provides the structural and administrative support for the diplomatic 
network.  More importantly, the MFA supports the mechanics of strategic and day-to-day 
  Hocking’s description is 
sufficiently broad to allow for a public diplomacy activity to develop within the portfolio 
responsibility of the MFA.   
 
                                                 
83 Berridge provides comprehensive detail around the generic detail on the structure of the MFA and diplomatic 
network as it relates to the practice of traditional diplomacy.  See Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, 
pp.5-20.  Other related sources include, J Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, Chapman and Hall, London, 1992, 
B Hocking, (ed) Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1999, C 
Jonsson and M Hall, ‘Essence of Diplomacy’, Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations, Palgrave 
MacMillan, London, 2005.  Also, S Harris, Review of Australia’s Representation Overseas, AGPS, Canberra, 
1986, Evans, Grant Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s; and Gyngell,Wesley, Making 
Australian Foreign Policy, for the Australian perspective.   
84 Hocking, (ed), Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation, p.4. 
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foreign policy development, including the translation of political policy into foreign policy 
initiatives, and the negotiation and planning for the delivery and implementation of policy via 
diplomatic networks. 85
2.2.5 Features of Diplomatic practice 
The internal workings of the MFA reflect the development of 
priorities over time and are organised into areas of speciality whether based on geographic 
representations (such as South East Asia, Europe and the Americas) or long more functional 
lines, such as treaty law, protocol, media or public diplomacy.   
 
From within this structure of the MFA and the corresponding diplomatic network in which 
states are able to participate on an official basis with the international agenda, an agenda that 
occurs through both bilateral and multilateral channels.  Primarily the work that occurs within 
this space relates to the initiation of actions or anticipation of and response to developments 
within the foreign policy space, where those actions or developments have a bearing on the 
national interest.86
The central concern of the MFA is the promotion of the national interests of the state, as 
articulated through foreign policy priorities, and delivered through supporting diplomatic 
practice.  However, there is validity in identifying key themes that drive diplomatic practice, 
and are therefore reinforced from within the MFA through to the diplomatic networks. There 
is broad consistency in these themes as discussed both by Berridge, and also from within the 
 As a mechanism for policy development and coordination, the MFA 
undertakes consultations across the entire bureaucratic structure of government, where issues 
of foreign policy have relevance to ongoing domestic policy outcomes.  The machinations of 
the bureaucracy and other structures in the development and delivery of policy, and 
specifically foreign policy are addressed in more detail within chapter four of this thesis.   
 
                                                 
85 Ibid.   
86 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.64.   
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Australian context by Evans and Grant and Gyngell and Wesley; all of which remain 
consistent with the terms of the VCDR as described earlier.  As such the key themes include: 
i) a sense of formality and protocol; ii) the promotion of economic and commercial concerns; 
and the iii) promotion of public diplomacy activities.   
 
Review of these key themes of diplomacy demonstrates that there is opportunity for public 
diplomacy activity as an element of diplomatic practice.  Firstly, the business of ceremony, 
formality and attention-paying is ‘all important in establishing the parameters for the 
relationship and laying the ground work for mutual respect between officers’.87  This function 
includes the setting up and maintenance of diplomatic relations, and is a powerful tool that 
might be wielded to give effect to a significant policy decision.  For example, the withdrawal 
of diplomatic representation by the sending state from the receiving state is a strong statement 
of dissatisfaction with the relationship.  Such withdrawal is usually met with reciprocal 
action, symbolising the breakdown of official bilateral relations.88  Similarly, official 
communications that occur between states usually through the diplomatic envoys and the 
MFA will incorporate particular and antiquated language and styles, such as that exhibited in 
the ‘aide memoire’.89
                                                 
87 Evans, Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, p.60. 
88 As occurred on 4 November 2009  when the Australian High Commissioner to Fiji was declared to be persona 
non grata and expelled from the country.  Within hours, the reciprocal action was taken by the Australian 
Government and the Fijian High Commissioner similarly expelled.  Such action reinforces the foreign policy 
positions of each of those states.  C Merritt and P Walters, ‘Fiji expels High Commissioner’, The Australian, 4 
November, 2009. 
  The language is frequently excessively flowery and unclear, but still 
makes up the common form of communication between states.   Embassy officials and 
Ambassadors attend to formality in everyday operations within the receiving state.  Such 
89 For the purpose of diplomatic interaction, an aide memoire refers to a document of  memorandum of 
discussion or proposed agreement.  http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=1769&dict=CALD. 
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formality is frequently described at length in the memoires of retiring officials, and provides 
more entertainment than insight into the value of this aspect of practice.90
The second critical theme of practice is the promotion and support of economic and 
commercial interests.  Such practice incorporates both the functions of observing and 
reporting on economic trends within the receiving state, as well as the negotiation of trade 
terms including the reduction of tariffs or other forms of protection that might secure 
improved trade or economic conditions for both states.
   
 
91  Frequently, states utilise the 
bilateral communications to gauge interest in or to build momentum for key initiatives being 
advanced at the multilateral level.  Traditionalists might argue that this is not reflective of the 
origins of diplomatic practice, where the traditional approach would ‘privilege political 
transactions and neglect economic transactions’.92 However, such suggestions hold little 
weight.  In the modern diplomatic environment, with the clear guidance of the VCDR, this is 
not the case, and the pursuit of commercial interests forms the mainstay of diplomatic 
discourse.  Indeed, commercial aspects of diplomacy are ‘rudimentary to ancient, modern and 
contemporary diplomacy’.93
Lastly, as noted in the VCDR, public diplomacy features prominently as a key area of 
diplomatic practice.  Drawing on the established understanding that image cultivation has 
always been an important element of diplomacy, even traditionalists refer to the practice of 
 
 
                                                 
90 See for example, R Woolcott, The Hot Seat, reflections on diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali 
Bombings, Harper Collins, Sydney, 2003, or R Broinowski, Driven: A Diplomat’s Autobiography, Harper 
Collins, Sydney, 2009.  
91 Economic interests of the state are also a key issue addressed through multilateral fora, such as the World 
Trade Organisation negotiations.  Grant and Evan  Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, 
p.60. 
92 D Lee and D Hudson, ‘The Old and New: Significance of Political Economy in Diplomacy’, Review of 
International Studies, 30, 2004, pp.343-360. 
93 Evidence of the diplomatic practice in Australia would support the recognition that pursuit of positive 
economic and commercial outcomes have been central to Australia’s diplomatic practice.   
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diplomacy as incorporating information provision, cultural and educational exchanges.94  
From the Evans and Grant perspective, the public diplomacy function sits well within the 
purview of the MFA and the associated diplomatic network and is an established thread that 
underpins other official diplomatic work. 95 However, Berridge notes also the role of the 
generic press and information department – a key bureaucratic structure of the twentieth 
century diplomatic landscape as being specifically focused on the management of news and 
media with regard to foreign audiences.96
need to be concerned with what other nations think of us for the good reason that the images which 
others carry of us influence their attitudes towards us – not only in the general sense, but also with regard 
to our security requirements, to our goods and services, to our appeal as a place to invest in, to migrate 
to, to visit and so on.
  The information department is historically aligned 
to the production of propaganda materials, as noted earlier, and as discussed through this 
thesis, is an area from which public diplomacy has developed.  However, drawing on the 
intrinsic and soft power value of public diplomacy activities, Evans and Grant suggest that in 
the modern diplomatic environment states: 
97
This viewpoint reinforces the early writings of Machiavelli and reinforces Meissen’s view, 
that public diplomacy can been seen as old wine in new bottles.
  
 
98
                                                 
94 For example, Berridge also notes in Diplomacy: Theory and Practice that public diplomacy is synonymous 
with propaganda – though this is a view that is not explicitly shared by others including those writing as public 
diplomacy experts, such as Melissen, Taylor or writing about diplomacy from the Australian perspective such as 
Evans, Grant, or Gyngell, Wesley.   
95 Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, p.66. 
96 Berridge, Diplomacy: theory and practice, p17.  Berridge notes that ‘the chief task here is to give ‘breaking 
news’ the best possible ‘spin’’.    
97 Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, (1995), p.66. 
98 Melissen, Between Theory and Practice, (2007), p.3. 
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2.3 Traditions of diplomacy and the Australian experience 
With an understanding of the nature, structure and practice of diplomacy, brief attention is 
required to examine how the traditions of diplomacy have emerged in the Australian 
landscape.  The Department of Trade and Customs, and the Department of External Affairs 
were established as two of the first seven Commonwealth Government departments at the 
time of Australian federation.99  Historian Peter Edwards, quoted in Gyngell and Wesley 
indicates that the Department of External Affairs was a minor agency and dealt only with 
miscellaneous issues under the auspices of the Prime Minister and his department.100  The 
Department of Trade and Customs played a more significant and active role in representing 
Australia’s interests, particularly overseas. This imbalance in significance was less a 
reflection of Australia’s commitment to traditional diplomacy, and more a reflection of 
Australia’s continued reliance upon the British Empire for a foreign policy lead during the 
early years of federation.  Additionally, the lesser stature of external affairs also reflects that 
Australian’s foreign representations overseas, even from the earliest years of federation were 
driven by trade concerns (reflective of Australia’s positioning in the world, from federation, 
and strong reliance on building trade relationships in external markets).101
A significant shift occurred in the Australian bureaucracy when in 1935 the Department of 
External Affairs gained full administrative authority, according to historian Peter Edwards, 
this ‘was the birth of the present day Department of Foreign Affairs’.
  
 
102
                                                 
99 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, History of the Department, viewed on 20 October 2009, 
  By this time: 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/history.html. 
100 P.G.Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: the Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1949, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1983, p.93. 
101 Ibid. Refer also to sources cited at footnotes 19 and 20 for further discussion of the development of 
Australia’s independent foreign policy, and the establishment of supporting bureaucratic structures including 
DFAT and its diplomatic network.   
102 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: the making of Australian foreign policy 1901-1949, p.93. 
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the growth in Australia’s international commitments, the deterioration in the international situation and 
the increasing interest by Australians in world affairs combined to force a reluctant government to accept 
that the tiny foreign office at least had to be regarded as a department in its own right.103
The Department of Foreign Affairs actively worked for a fifty year span to progress 
Australia’s foreign policies, while the Department of Trade promoted commercial and trade 
interests separately.  Interestingly, as further explained below, for this period in the 
development of Australia’s diplomatic practice, the Department of Foreign Affairs only fully 
delivered on one of those key aspects of diplomatic practice.  That is, the department 
delivered upon the practice of formality and ceremony (which included the recognition of 
diplomatic relations and aspects associated with such relations).  The business of commercial 
promotion was carried out by the Department of Trade; and that of public diplomacy activity 
(primarily information provision), was delivered quite separately by the Australian 
Information Agency.
   
 
104  There was no surprise in the fact that some ninety years after their 
initial establishment, Australia’s Department of Trade merged with the Department of 
Foreign Affairs in the Machinery of Government changes of 1987.105 From that time the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Trade have shared the primary 
responsibilities within the double portfolio.106
2.3.1 An inkling of public diplomacy in Australia’s diplomatic tradition 
  
 
From quite early in federation Australia had developed an overseas information capacity 
aligning to some degree with traditional diplomatic practice.  However, Australia’s public 
diplomacy capacity, which was information provision at that stage, developed in a way that 
was fundamentally separate to the structures of traditional diplomacy.  For example, the 
                                                 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid.  
105 DFAT, History of the Department. 
106 Including responsibility for the activities of AusAID and Austrade falling to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and the Minister for Trade respectively.  The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) also falls within the 
purview of the foreign affairs portfolio, but carries out activities that are essentially distinct from but aligned to 
the activities of diplomacy.   
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Commonwealth Government’s publicity overseas was one of the ‘miscellaneous’ functions 
attributed initially to the Department of External Affairs.107  However, this function of 
overseas publicity was quickly excised from External Affairs and managed through various 
incarnations of the Australian Information Service (AIS) for several decades.108
Importantly, historical evolution reveals a fundamental gap that existed in the way that public 
diplomacy was delivered within Australia.  That is, public diplomacy was largely 
disconnected from the development and delivery of foreign policy, and delivered from 
outside the traditional structures of diplomacy.  Such a gap is indicative of the difficulties that 
Australia’s public diplomacy program is experiencing today.  The information provision 
activities carried out during this time by the AIS (also referred to as public affairs) were 
focussed on both foreign and domestic audiences, and through times of war gained a 
distinctly propaganda feel (that is, the persuasion of audiences through one-way 
communication from the authority to the public audience (domestic and external).
   
 
109  In some 
cases the focus of the information was to promote the Australian lifestyle to potential 
migrants.110
                                                 
107 According to the DFAT history of the department, ‘external affairs’ meant in the first decades of Federation a 
miscellany of ‘overseas’ functions such as immigration, off-shore fisheries, exploration of Papua New Guinea 
and Antarctica, and Commonwealth Government publicity. To be clear, the (then) Department of Territories 
held responsibility for the administering and handling the affairs of Papua New Guinea until World War II, at 
which time responsibility was transferred to the Department of External Affairs.   
108 International Public Affairs Network, Submission to the Senate inquiry into public diplomacy, Senate Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 3 April 2007, p.38. 
109 Melissen, ‘The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice’, p.18.  As noted earlier, Zaharna 
reports that ‘propaganda is perhaps the oldest, and most prominent type of information initiative that political 
entities use with publics’.  However the elements of control, deception and manipulation that frequently 
characterise propaganda weaken the persuasive power of this form of information provision, and separate 
propaganda from public diplomacy, see Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a spectrum of public diplomacy initiatives’, 
p.89. Yet, traditionalists such as Berridge refer to public diplomacy in the contemporary environment as a form 
of propaganda.  The contrast between public diplomacy and propaganda is more specifically addressed in 
chapter five.   
110 Though as Broinowski reports in some cases the portrayal of Australia’s egalitarian lifestyle was repelled 
particularly by Asian audiences who saw the portrayal of an egalitarian life as a terminal servantless condition, 
where ‘besides being the breadwinner the head of the Australian family has to be the gardener, the chauffeur, 
carpenter and handy man around the house’.  At the same time, Broinowski claims that public affairs broadcasts 
sought to reinforce negative Asian stereotypes to the Australian audience, affirming the racist white Australia 
policies of the time.  Broinowski, About Face, pp.124 and 128.   
  At other times the activities reflected a ‘large publicity campaign necessary to 
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support Australia’s war effort’.111 In the style of propaganda, the war effort campaign was 
‘centered principally on increasing and sustaining the people’s faith in the cause for which 
they were fighting, and sought to gain support for the government’s security and fundraising 
activities and distribute ‘sound’ facts on the war and its progress’.112  In order to carry out the 
information provision duties, the AIS maintained a linkage to diplomatic structures and a 
number of specialist journalists or information officers were ‘posted overseas across 10 
Australian diplomatic missions and posts’.113
The AIS developed as a specialised agency that engaged in aspects of traditional diplomacy 
purely via the overseas missions network, but not necessarily through diplomatic activities.  
Instead the information officers are said to have brought a specific set of journalistic and 
media qualifications and skills to the corps.
 
 
114
AIS is a unique information organisation.  The uniqueness results from a capacity to research, obtain and 
develop and successfully place information in support of Australian interests with overseas print, radio 
and television media organisations.  No other organisation in Australia and few in other countries have 
these capabilities, and fewer still have the capabilities within an organisation of 150 people.
  The divergence was reinforced by the 
structural divisions between the niche information agency and the traditional arm of 
diplomacy, then known as the Department of Foreign Affairs.  Indeed the following was 
stated in a 1984 consultancy review of Australia’s overseas information service: 
115
As a result, there were shockwaves when in 1987, machinery of government changes 
integrated Australia’s specialised overseas information capability (the AIS) within the newly 
merged foreign affairs and trade portfolio (from that point known as the Department of 
 
 
                                                 
111 DFAT, History of the Department.  
112 Ibid 
113 International Public Affairs Network, Submission to the Senate inquiry into public diplomacy, p.38.  
Mainstream texts (such as Evans, Grant, and Gyngell, Wesley) that discuss Australian foreign policy or 
diplomacy rarely connect the work of the information agency to the portfolio responsibilities of external affairs 
or DFAT providing some insight into the separation of traditional diplomacy and information based activities 
and purpose.   
114 International Public Affairs Network, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into public diplomacy, p.38.   
115 Price Waterhouse review of Australia Information Service referred to in International Public Affairs 
Network, Submission to the Senate inquiry into public diplomacy, p.40. 
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Foreign Affairs and Trade or DFAT). Despite internal restructures and reshuffling, during the 
decade of operation within DFAT the International Public Affairs Branch as it was then 
known carried out a range of information based activities of public diplomacy significance.  
Indeed, reports provided of some activities indicate that the role of the International Public 
Affairs Branch was developing during this time beyond pure information provision, and 
connecting with the broader engagement aspects of modern public diplomacy.  
 
For example, activities which included international campaigns including the campaign 
launched in 1992 against wild pig hunting in Europe which threatened Australian meat sales, 
through to a separate campaign against French nuclear testing in the Pacific in the late 1990s 
both engaged with and influenced foreign audiences in a way that effected international 
policy changes.116  The activities carried out by the International Public Affairs Branch might 
be said to be more closely aligned to modern public diplomacy.  In conjunction, at about this 
time the then Foreign Minister, Evans began talking publicly about the role and using the 
terminology of public diplomacy, particularly within the context of Australia building its 
image in Asia. In Evans’ words, the objective of public diplomacy at this time was to ‘shape 
attitudes in other countries in a way which is favourable to Australian national interests’.117
                                                 
116 Ibid. 
117 Evans, Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the world of the 1990s.  
  
Consequently, by the 1990s the International Public Affairs Branch, was beginning to take 
shape.  The Branch enjoyed an environment that recognised the value of engaging with 
audiences beyond the traditional parameters.   However, the emerging shape of public 
diplomacy in Australian practice halted with the change of government in 1996.  The 
International Public Affairs Branch was abolished altogether.  The subsequent Howard 
government established the Images of Australia work unit to continue giving effect to 
Australia’s public diplomacy effort, by allocating the unit the task of projecting a positive 
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image of Australia.118 However the rhetoric around public diplomacy as an instrument of 
policy ceased and many specialised staff were abolished, and public diplomacy remained 
separated from policy activities within the mainstream DFAT, with a seriously reduced 
budget.119
2.3 Australia’s contemporary diplomatic environment 
 
 
As foreshadowed in the previous chapter, Australia’s current diplomatic capacity has come 
under scrutiny in recent months, sparked by the Lowy Institute’s panel report into diplomatic 
capacity and resources.  Today, Australia spends approximately A$4.4 billion on the 
development and delivery of foreign policy.120  Australia actively pursues foreign policy 
interests via DFAT, which supports 91 overseas missions across the globe.121  A total of 542 
Australian diplomats are currently posted overseas throughout this network.122
 
   
                                                 
118 DFAT Annual Budget Statements, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008.   
119 International Public Affairs Network, Submission to the Senate inquiry into public diplomacy, p.40. 
120 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.17.  The Report also notes that this sum of $4.4 billion equates to just 13 per cent of the 
$34 billion currently spent on national security through the combined budgets of the Department of Defence, 
Australian Security Intelligence Office (ASIO), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and the Office of 
National Assessments (ONA). 
121 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.17.  The Report provides these numbers based on July 2008 reporting, and notes that the 
91 missions comprise 73 embassies and high commissions, 12 consulates-general and consulates and four 
permanent missions/delegations and two offices.   
122 Details of the staff attached to missions are set out in the previous chapter.  By way of comparison, Evans, 
Grant note that in 1994 (some 14 years, and two administrations ago), a total of 918 diplomatic staff were posted 
overseas across 72 missions and 25 consulates-general and consulates.  By and large, such statistics provide 
evidence (albeit superficial) that the key savings in Australia’s diplomatic practice has occurred in the number 
of diplomats supports overseas.  Some eight years earlier in 1986 Stuart Harris conducted the Review of 
Australia’s Overseas Representation.  In his final report Harris challenged a familiar argument that might be 
relevant today when comparing numbers of diplomats posted overseas, noting (with implied sarcasm), that ‘it is 
a common argument that changes in the world have reduced the need for overseas representation through 
resident missions.  Developments in communications it is suggested, reduce the needs for resident 
representation because of speedy alternative sources of communications. Telephones it is argued enable 
Ministers and home based officials to discuss and negotiate directly and easy plane travel enables Ministers or 
expert officials to replace Ambassadors in much international negotiations, reducing perhaps…the need for local 
representatives at all’.  However, Harris concluded that despite such developments, the complexity of 
Australia’s bilateral and multilateral relations and the challenges emerging in the environment within which 
relations are conducted requires more, not fewer diplomats.  Evans, Grant add, ‘there is no substitute for 
continuous on the ground contact to pull together shifts in attitudes and policies and to develop the kind of 
person-to-person understandings upon which analyses [of information] have to be based’.   
S Harris, Review of Australia’s Overseas representation, AGPS, Canberra, 1986 p xv; Evans, Grant, Australia’s 
foreign relations in the world of the 1990s,  p.57. 
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As a moderate economic power with relatively small military clout, Australia actively 
pursues foreign policy interests through the diplomatic network.  In particular, Australian 
diplomatic practice is aimed ‘at influencing the decisions of other states and persuading those 
states that actions proposed or supported by Australia are also in their own interest’.123  
Australia promotes strong regional engagement, (including though APEC) and 
comprehensive engagement within the Pacific via regional partnership.124
advocacy of Australian interests to other governments, representing Australia at multilateral meetings 
and monitoring multilateral agreements that affect our interest, negotiating agreements to implement 
Australian government policy and collecting, analysing and reporting back to Canberra information 
relevant to the formulation of Australian foreign policy.
  Furthermore, 
Australia has maintained a strong voice and position within multilateral for a including the 
United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) , and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), primarily as a key player in the Asia Pacific (where such multilateral 
organisations have developed and retain strong interests).   
 
Australia relies upon the smaller diplomatic network to engage across these networks and 
pursue the foreign policy agenda in line with traditional diplomatic practice.  The Lowy 
Institute notes that the key aspects of Australia’s diplomatic practice today relate to the: 
125
Despite recent concerns aired primarily as a result of the Senate Inquiry, and followed up by 
the Lowy Institute, the Australian government can point to a well-established tradition of 
diplomacy as managed through the structure of DFAT.  Within this contemporary 
environment, Australian public diplomacy currently plays only a minor role that clearly 
   
 
                                                 
123 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.9.  
124 Regional partnerships including the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), and the 
Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Arrangements (PACER).   S Crean, ‘The Pacific Region: Realising the 
Potential’, Speech delivered to the PNG Business Council Ministerial Forum, Business Breakfast in Brisbane, 
10 June 2009. 
125 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.10.   
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reflects the traditional practice and priority of information provision, educational and cultural 
exchange, and remains separate from the policy arena.   
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CHAPTER 3: CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
In tabling the Final Report to the Australian Parliament regarding the nature and conduct of 
Australia’s public diplomacy program, the Senate Committee provided their definition of 
Australian public diplomacy as, ‘work or activities undertaken to understand, engage and 
inform individuals and organisations in other countries in order to shape their perceptions in 
ways that will promote Australia’s foreign policy goals’.1  This thesis suggests that the 
Senate Committee may have undersold public diplomacy to the Australian constituency.  The 
definition provided by the Senate Committee, while bearing some resemblance to the 
definitions of public diplomacy developed in the United Kingdom and Canada presents 
inadequacies.2
Firstly, the Senate Committee definition of public diplomacy makes only a tenuous link 
between public diplomacy and Australia’s tradition in diplomacy. The fact that the Senate 
Committee definition of public diplomacy does not make reference to role of the sovereign 
state, nor highlight the role of the professional diplomat, nor imply the requirements of strict 
protocol (the cornerstones of traditional diplomacy), poses no issue. This is because as this 
thesis suggests, public diplomacy in a contemporary context has stretched beyond these 
traditional boundaries. 
 
 
3
                                                 
1 Australian Senate, Hansard, 16 August 2007, p.42. (emphasis added). 
2 The United Kingdom definition as set out by The Lord Carter Review expresses the more direct role of public 
diplomacy as being to ‘improve the understanding of and influence of the United Kingdom…’, and the 
Canadian definition refers to ‘cultivating long term relationships, dialogue and understanding abroad and to 
underpin advocacy and increase influence’.  Refer to the Lord Carter, ‘Public Diplomacy Review by Lord 
Carter’, Presented to the Foreign Secretary of the Treasurer, London, 13 February 2008, and ‘Diplomacy: 
Canada’s International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence in the World’, tabled in Parliament, 
April 2005.   
3 Refer to Chapter Two for a more fulsome examination of the traditions of diplomacy.  Additionally, Chapter 
Two, footnote 185 sets out those guiding texts that enable further discussion of traditional diplomacy.    
  However, the final phrase, ‘to promote…foreign policy goals’ 
presents a passive and superficial picture of public diplomacy.  From this phrase public 
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diplomacy might be considered as merely a vehicle for encouragement or advertisement of 
policies. Such a phrase does not necessarily convey the true ambition and potential of 
contemporary public diplomacy, that in fact public diplomacy ‘may be formulated in direct 
support of a foreign policy initiative’.4
The connection between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy is pivotal, because this 
linkage lends validity to public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy.  In this way, if 
strategic policy objectives are at the crux of Australia’s traditional diplomacy structure and 
efforts, such strategic policy objectives could also be at the crux of public diplomacy efforts.  
From this point, public diplomacy might move in from the periphery of Australian diplomatic 
practice to be incorporated into strategic foreign policy development and delivery.
   
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine public diplomacy as an increasingly important element 
of diplomacy (recognising from the discussion in the previous chapter that the origins of 
public diplomacy are well established and in fact embedded within the traditions of 
diplomacy) that may be employed directly in the pursuit of the foreign policy objectives.   
5
public diplomacy diplomats cannot do their job as long as people at the top of government see public 
diplomacy as primarily a smokescreen for ineffective or wrongheaded policy. The assumption that public 
diplomacy can move in one direction while policy goes in another shows how little understanding exists 
of what public diplomacy can and cannot do. As U.S. public diplomats (Edward R. Murrow among them) 
have long observed, policy making and public diplomacy planning must move forward in tandem.
   This 
point was articulated forcefully in 2009 by Philip Seib, when he wrote that: 
6
                                                 
4 Potter, ‘Canada and the new public diplomacy’, p.4. To draw upon the themes presented by Potter, a core 
theme of this thesis is to establish public diplomacy as a strategic instrument of policy in and of itself, not just a 
supporting mechanism for traditional diplomatic practice. 
5 As noted in the previous chapter, public diplomacy sits, literally removed from strategic policy areas, at the 
periphery of DFAT operations within the Consular, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Division.   
6 P Seib, ‘Connecting Public Diplomacy and Policy’, Perspectives, Vol 1, Issue 5, September 2009.  Seib is 
Professor of Journalism and Public Diplomacy, and Professor of International Relations at the University of 
Southern California and director of University of Southern California Centre on Public Diplomacy supported in 
connecting public diplomacy to policy by various other works including most specifically Henrikson, ‘What 
Can Public Diplomacy Achieve’; Djerejian, ‘Changing Minds, Winning Peace’, and Melissen, ‘Between Theory 
and Practice’.   
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Acknowledging that the roots of public diplomacy are found in the traditions of diplomacy 
(and accepted as valid within codified diplomatic law), this thesis further proposes that public 
diplomacy has emerged in recent years (since 2001) to take on a vastly expanded shape that 
stretches well beyond the boundaries of traditional diplomacy.  In particular, public 
diplomacy today reflects the innovation of diplomatic practice in response to the complex 
challenges of the modern environment, and high expectations of the connected and involved 
public audience.  This thesis proposes that public diplomacy fills the void where traditional 
diplomacy has been revealed as having limited reach, impact or endurance.7
There are two important caveats to note in setting the scene for this investigation.  Firstly, 
that this thesis is concerned with public diplomacy as an activity initiated by the state in the 
pursuit of foreign policy objectives. The first caveat is particularly important in 
understanding public diplomacy in an Australian context, as well as providing the necessary 
linkage between public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy.  This thesis is concerned with 
public diplomacy efforts that are defined as being driven by the state in the pursuit of national 
interests (while recognising that broader perspectives exist regarding public diplomacy being 
generated by a range of non-state entities and individuals).
  With the 
foundations of public diplomacy established, this chapter will further investigate the critical 
emerging questions of what is contemporary public diplomacy, and how does it intersect with 
and extend from traditional diplomacy to advance foreign policy interests in the international 
system?   
 
8
                                                 
7 For example, those very central tenets of traditional diplomacy and that require interactions between the 
sovereign states to occur through structured, official and frequently closed channels of communication 
frequently neglect the complexity of international relations, the increase and role of actors including NGOs and 
IGOs and a wide range of individuals, the increasing role of communications technology and media.   
   
8 For example, Canada’s International Policy Statement clearly articulates the expectation that public diplomacy 
is generated by a range of actors, including, but beyond the state.  Research into the Canadian experience of 
public diplomacy demonstrates that the Canadian Government has taken a significant interest in incorporating 
public diplomacy as an integrated strand of policy development and delivery.  Understanding of and approaches 
to public diplomacy in the Canadian context are well developed, and Batora’s study of public diplomacy in the 
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Public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy remains within the purview of the state, 
and is well aligned to traditional diplomacy. This baseline understanding is critical for the 
purpose of clearly defining public diplomacy and understanding the impact of public 
diplomacy (as a component of diplomacy) in advancing the national interests of a state in 
international relations. At the same time, the thesis recognises that non-state entities and 
individuals make valuable and necessary contribution to evolution, texture and complexity of 
public diplomacy.  The role of such non-state entities as actors in international relations 
ensures that such entities will also have an interest in public diplomacy activities for their 
own purposes.  As Berridge provides, ‘diplomacy is not merely what professional diplomats 
do.  It is carried out by other officials and by private persons under the direction of 
officials…it is also carried out through many different channels besides the traditional 
resident mission’.9
The key point for emphasis at this stage is that in discussions of public diplomacy there is a 
requirement for clarity about how and why public diplomacy is initiated, and such clarity 
emanates from the ‘state’.  An approach that clearly and definitively links public diplomacy 
to the foreign policy objectives of the state is helpful also in distinguishing public diplomacy 
from the similar, but predominantly commercially-based and potentially superficial 
disciplines of strategic communications, branding / marketing or public relations. 
   
 
10
                                                                                                                                                        
Canadian context suggests that Canada’s public diplomacy program has matured beyond that of states still 
grappling with an understanding of the concept, such as Australia.  Refer to Batora, ‘Public Diplomacy in Small 
and Medium States – Norway and Canada’.   
9 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, p.1. 
10 For references regarding the intersection and distinctions between public diplomacy and public affairs see 
Melissen, ‘Between Practice and Theory’, and Zarharna, ‘Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy 
Initiatives’.  Works outlining the concept of nation branding as a concept intersecting with public diplomacy 
refer to S Anholt, ‘Public Diplomacy and Place Branding: Where’s the Link?’ Place Branding and Public 
Diplomacy (2), 2006, and S Anholt, Brand New Justice, Butterworth-Heinemann, New York, 2003. 
 For 
example, with regard to strategic communication,  Nye refers to strategic communications as 
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a subset of public diplomacy that takes the form of a long range campaign, and Gregory 
suggests that ‘public diplomacy and strategic communication are analogous (shaped by other 
concepts of advocacy, propaganda, branding etc), and states that both terms describe an 
instrument of statecraft with multiple components and purposes’.11 In relation to the latter 
point, Australian publications, such as the Lowy Institute’s Blue Ribbon Panel Report on 
Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit, refers to public diplomacy as ‘strategic communications’.  
However when addressed during a confidential interview with a senior DFAT official 
involved in public diplomacy activities,  that official presented a different view that ‘public 
diplomacy is more than strategic communications, but I am not sure how’.12
Such clarity of purpose is missing from the Senate Committee’s definition of public 
diplomacy as provided to the Australian Parliament.  For this reason, this thesis is not 
necessarily limited by the Senate Committee definition, but revisits the discussions around 
the defining of public diplomacy.  Furthermore, the discussions and findings of the Senate 
Inquiry indicate that the nature, scope and complexity of any state’s public diplomacy 
program may vary depending upon the understanding and engagement of practitioners, along 
with the resourcing, and opportunity for expanded networks in support of state activities.  In 
contrast to states such as Norway, Canada, the United States or the United Kingdom where 
practitioners and academics have been grappling with the issues of public diplomacy for 
some time, Australia’s program appears somewhat less developed and less mature.
   
 
13
                                                 
11 Nye, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics, pp. 107-111, and B Gregory, Public Diplomacy and 
Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls and Imported Norms’, Presented to the American Political 
Science Association Conference on International Conflict and Communication, 31 August 2005.   
12 Confidential Interview, Senior DFAT Official, 30 June 2009.   
  The 
13 Quite apart from the significant independent reviews that have occurred within the United Kingdom and 
Canada in recent years, there is a growing body of knowledge developing around the public diplomacy of states 
such as the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada.  This body of knowledge particularly visible through the 
Discussion Papers in Diplomacy series produced by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 
‘Clingendael’ demonstrates greater practitioner experience in public diplomacy and subsequent professional 
maturity shaping the public diplomacy methodologies. Public diplomacy practice in these states evidences high 
levels of engagement (through consultative mechanisms) with the target audiences utilising innovative and 
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Senate Inquiry addressed such a wide spectrum of perspectives on public diplomacy theory 
and practice, that it did not necessarily enhance clarity and understanding for the Australian 
context.  For this reason there is value in unravelling the many threads of public diplomacy, 
to ensure that at the core of Australia’s public diplomacy program the linkage between public 
diplomacy and foreign policy objectives is clearly established and articulated.    
 
In progressing the second caveat, references to public diplomacy in this thesis, relate to the 
concept of the ‘new public diplomacy’ that has emerged within the field of diplomacy since 
2001.  This caveat recognises that the terminology of ‘public diplomacy’ is frequently 
accompanied by historical connotations of the phrase which are more closely related to the 
propaganda and information programs relevant to the Cold War era.  United States public 
diplomacy scholar Bruce Gregory clearly tells us that the ‘historical approach to public 
diplomacy is too narrow, and no longer fits today’s multi-player, multi-issue public 
diplomacy universe’.14
‘it is unhelpful to hang on to past images of diplomacy…nor is it advisable to make a forward 
projection of historical practices into the present international environment (in the case of 
equalling public diplomacy to traditional propaganda)’.
  Similarly, to provide clarity of terminology, Melissen refers to ‘the 
new public diplomacy as relevant to the modern international environment and cautions that:  
15
                                                                                                                                                        
interactive technologies as well as face-to-face relationship building. For example, refer to: A Henrikson, ‘Niche 
Diplomacy in the World Arena: the Global ‘Corners’ of Canada and Norway’, in The New Public Diplomacy: 
Soft Power in International Relations, J Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005; S Rasmussen, 
‘Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: Messages and Practice’; Batora, ‘Public Diplomacy in Small and 
Medium States -  Norway and Canada’, and Potter, Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’.   
14 Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications: Cultures, Firewalls and Imported Norms’, p.39. 
15 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’ p.11.  Note also the number of scholars who have taken up 
Melissen’s lead in referring in some way to the ‘new’ public diplomacy, including Hocking ‘Rethinking the new 
Public Diplomacy’; Snow, ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy’; Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, 
Riordan, ‘Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: a New Foreign Policy Paradigm’; and Ross, ‘Public Diplomacy 
Comes of Age’.   
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On the international stage, discussions around the ‘new’ public diplomacy have escalated in 
recent years, and scholars such as Melissen consider that public diplomacy has re-emerged in 
the last decade in response to fundamental evolution and changes in the international 
landscape, and consequently in the conduct of international relations.16  At the fundamental 
level of that ‘essential condition of plurality’ such changes include the significant increase in 
the number of recognised sovereign states (from 51 founding state members of the United 
Nations in 1945, to 192 recognised state members in 2009), and the subsequent increase in 
the complexity of the relationships, conventions, protocols and other interventions required to 
govern those relationships.17 From a strategic perspective other major shifts in the 
environment, including the increasingly multilateral and fluid nature of international 
relations, an emerging global agenda, and the ‘complex interdependence between domestic 
and foreign policy issues’ have changed the way in which states cast their foreign policy 
objectives and interact in the pursuit of outcomes.18
The previous chapter examined the key tenets diplomacy that have developed and emerged 
over centuries.  Whilst there is evidence of significant stability in diplomatic practice deriving 
from the combined effects of historical practice and clear codified protocols, there is also 
evidence that diplomatic practice does change depending upon the needs or challenges of the 
international environment.
  
 
19
                                                 
16 J. Melissen, ‘Introduction’ in Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p.iii. 
 Evans and Grant commence Australia’s Foreign Relations in the 
17 United Nations member states found at: http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml.  The United Nations 
also recognises some 46 Intergovernmental Organisations and 4 international entities which maintain permanent 
headquarters attached to the United Nations.   The United Nations Secretariat currently administers 500 major 
multilateral conventions (of the 158,000 treaties currently contained in the United Nations Secretariat 
collection).  Refer also to Watson, The Dialogue Between States, p.15, and to the previous chapter two of this 
thesis for further discussion on the essential condition of plurality and interdependence in diplomacy.   
18 Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p.iii. 
19 This is particularly evident in the way that diplomatic practice has evolved to accept and define the role of 
inter-governmental organisations and non government organisations particularly operating within the 
multilateral context.  One significant example of this is the fact that international organisations have received a 
standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, and to 
maintain permanent offices at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.  As Lane notes, ‘foreign policy 
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World of the 1990s by noting a dominant idea that, ‘in international relations, change is the 
only constant’.20  Melissen picks up on this well understood theme and applies it to the nature 
of diplomacy arguing that ‘confronted with change in many forms, diplomacy itself must be 
inherently adaptive and elastic’.21  Melissen continues that such inherent characteristics of 
innovation go to the heart of diplomacy itself.  In particular, Melissen draws upon the 
statements of George Kennan made at the time the Cold War, that ‘the function of a system 
of international relationships, is not to inhibit the process of change by imposing a legal 
straightjacket upon it, but rather to facilitate it…But this [facilitation] is a task for diplomacy 
in the most old fashioned sense of the word’.22  Melissen concludes that if diplomacy is about 
the management and facilitation of international relations in a changing environment, then 
diplomacy must be firmly aligned to and supportive of adaptation and innovation.23
Based on Melissen’s approach, public diplomacy has emerged to extend beyond the 
parameters of traditional diplomacy.  Public diplomacy offers the diplomat more choice and 
greater scope in opportunity to utilise alternative structures, processes and channels to engage 
with a broader audience while still ‘serving strategic foreign policy goals’.
   
 
24 In Leonard’s 
view, public diplomacy is becoming increasingly relevant as ‘enabling’ tool of diplomacy, 
providing pathways that might complement (or even circumvent) the traditional pathways for 
advancing foreign policy priorities.25
                                                                                                                                                        
..involves an array of government and non government actors and networks which require new ways of 
managing international politics’, in Lane, Diplomacy Today.   
20 Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, p.3. 
21 Melissen, (ed), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, p.xix. 
22 Kennan quoted in Melissen (ed): Innovation in Diplomatic Practice’, p.xix. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p. 9. 
25 Leonard, Diplomacy by Other Means. 
 This is particularly the case, as states grapple with the 
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changing nature of international relations, and pursue national interests in an ‘ever more 
globalised and interdependent world’.26
The sphere of diplomacy is changing in response to the organic needs of the international 
stage and the actors who are actively engaged in it.  The review of traditional diplomacy 
theory and practice undertaken in the previous chapter reveals that the accepted boundaries, 
structures, and conventions of traditional diplomacy continue to be relevant and provide the 
foundation for the ordered conduct of international relations between nation-states in pursuit 
of foreign policy goals.  However, such review also reveals that in a changing and 
increasingly competitive international arena, there are emerging opportunities for innovations 
in traditional diplomacy to emerge.  At this point the discussion around public diplomacy, an 
increasingly valuable subset of diplomatic practice that operates outside of the norms of 
traditional diplomacy, or as phrased by Leonard, ‘diplomacy by other means’, takes centre 
stage.
  
 
27
Tuch suggests that public diplomacy ‘does not in any sense replace the discreet and 
confidential relationships between state representatives’.
   
 
28  As public diplomacy scholar 
Melissen adds, ‘it is indeed important… not to overstate the importance of public 
diplomacy’.29
                                                 
26 Evans, ‘Australia’s Foreign Policy Response to Global Challenges’, p.1. Evans’ statement draws the fine line 
balancing realism and interdependence in the world of diplomacy.  
27 Leonard, Diplomacy by Other Means.  
28 Tuch, ‘Communicating with the World: US public diplomacy overseas, p.3.  
29 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.12. 
  However, public diplomacy is taking on a place of significance in diplomatic 
practice and method, and arguably underpins, or sits alongside traditional diplomatic 
activities.  Fiske de Gouveia asserts, ‘effective public diplomacy can only complement 
traditional diplomacy – it ‘paves the way for traditional diplomacy: it lays the groundwork, 
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like a sapper’.30 This statement reinforces that public diplomacy is more than a crisis 
management or damage control response, and sets the scene for an ongoing role for public 
diplomacy in building lasting relationships with foreign publics upon which traditional 
diplomatic practice is overlaid.31
3.1 Understanding the public diplomacy environment 
   
Before advancing to the definition of contemporary public diplomacy, the thesis seeks to 
understand firstly the modern landscape in which public diplomacy has re-emerged, and 
continues to develop.  The working environment plays a significant role in identifying the 
nature of the innovations made to diplomatic practice through public diplomacy, and in 
understanding the parameters that sit somewhat loosely around it. The emergence of public 
diplomacy can be mapped to significant features of the changing global environment, such as 
the increasing role and influence of non-state actors (including highly informed and active 
individuals) in enabling foreign policy, prodded on by the impact of significant and 
unexpected international events, like the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the 
United States.32
                                                 
30 Fiske de Gouveia, ‘The Present and Future of Public Diplomacy’. 
31 Note in the Introduction, commentary on Australia’s response to the Indian student crisis categorised such a 
response as the ‘damage control’ pointing to a potential hole in the underlying Australian-Indian relationship.  
Refer to: Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.1; 
Healey and Trounson, ‘Moves to Safeguard Indian Students; News.com, ‘Australia Assumes Safety of Indian 
Students’, Australian Associated Press Online; and Banham and Gilmore, ‘Rudd Forms Indian Violence 
Taskforce’.  
32 For example, Snow reports that ‘in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. Government emphasised a new strategy in 
public diplomacy designed to get out more and better coordinated information about the U.S. response to the 
attacks.  This was followed by a further change in direction to focus on aspects of common values in engaging 
with the Moslem world. Snow, ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy’, p7.  Melissen also notes that ‘between 9/11 and 
the outbreak of the war in Iraq, public diplomacy was without a doubt the hottest item in the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment.’ He further notes that from the broader perspective, while public diplomacy had been on the 
agenda well before 9/11, the events of that day provided an ‘important trigger for the present debate on public 
diplomacy throughout the global community’.  J. Melissen (ed), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in 
International Relations, pp.xvii-xix.   
  As an example, the latter event created shock waves through the political, 
academic and diplomatic communities across the globe, and thrust public diplomacy into the 
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international arena for discussion and debate.33  As if in response to such an event, over the 
past decade states such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, China and New 
Zealand reviewed and restructured their approach to public diplomacy, and while resulting in 
different approaches and methods, such reviews have also further contributed to the learnings 
and body of knowledge relating to the practice of public diplomacy.34
While there are quite differing perspectives on the definition and practice of public 
diplomacy, key contemporary commentators on the topic, including Melissen, Sharp, Fiske 
de Gouveia, Batora and Leonard make similar references to the key environmental features or 
shifts which have sparked the forceful re-emergence and relevance of public diplomacy.
   
 
35
i) highly connected, inter-dependent environment in which foreign and domestic 
policy weave in an out of each other, and both exert influence in the conduct of 
international relations; 
 
The literature relevant to public diplomacy, that has been produced by each of these scholars 
generally springboards from this point.  For this reason, this chapter must also reflect upon 
the environmental and other external factors which have created the tipping point for public 
diplomacy to take on greater significance as a strand of diplomatic practice, alongside official 
or traditional diplomacy.  These environmental and other external factors can be categorised 
as follows to include the: 
                                                 
33 Both Melissen and Hocking comment on the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the discourse on 
public diplomacy (while noting that the United States experience should not distract from the observation that 
many countries became interested in public diplomacy before 9/11 and for very different reasons’.  Refer to J. 
Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, pp6-10, and B. Hocking ‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’, 
pp.28-33; S. Riordan, ‘Dialogue Based Public Diplomacy’, and P. Taylor, ‘Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
Communications’.  For each of these writers, September 11 2001 is a key, but not necessarily dominating theme 
regarding the shift in public diplomacy practice.   
34 See for example, Public Diplomacy Review by Lord Carter, presented to the Foreign Secretary of the 
Treasurer on 13 December 2005, UK Government, Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy, March 
2002, Diplomacy: Canada’s International Policy Statement, ‘A Role of Pride and Influence in the World’, tabled 
in parliament, April 2005, United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2005, p.2. Government 
Administration Office, ‘U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant 
Challenges’, September 2003,  
35 For example, Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, pp3-10.  
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ii) increased influence and relevance of a web of non-state actors in advancing (or 
derailing) strategic state-based foreign policy interests;  
iii) impact of key events (including the September 11 terrorist attacks); and  
iv) the increasing interest in and influence of individuals (via public opinion) in 
achieving foreign policy outcomes. 
 
Each of these factors is highly relevant both to the re-emergence, but also to the ongoing 
evolution of public diplomacy, and requires further attention. 
3.1.1 A highly connected interdependent environment 
The international environment has been transformed over the last two decades by dual 
impacts of ‘globalization - the integration of peoples, societies, and economies - and 
information technologies that now link nations, cultures, and societies in complex and 
unprecedented ways’.36  With a slightly different slant on the current environment, UK 
diplomacy expert, Leonard writes about factors such as the ‘spread of democracy, the media 
explosion, the rise of global NGOs and protest movements as key factors behind the growing 
importance of public diplomacy.’37  Similarly, Leonard draws on the words of German 
bureaucrat Schlegeter as pointing to the impact of the ‘global media and information society, 
in which billions of people worldwide witness events in real time via the electronic media, 
where states are competing more than ever for markets, investment, tourists, value systems 
and political influence’, as the major impetus for renewed international interest in public 
diplomacy.38  Schlegeter observes that ‘as a result of electronic and digital media 
incorporating radio, television, the internet, a wider public has to – and can be addressed’.39
                                                 
36 C Ross, ‘The Pillars of Public Diplomacy, Grappling with International Public Opinion’, Harvard 
International Review, Vol. 25 (2) - Summer 2003, p.1.  
37 M Leonard with Snead and Stewing, Public Diplomacy, The Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2002, p.95.   
38 Schlegeter, ‘German Public Diplomacy’.  
39 Ibid. 
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More importantly, media and information advances since the 1990s have created a web of 
information and news services that link publics across the globe on a range of issues of 
domestic and foreign policy importance.  Batora describes this environment as a ‘complex 
information-intensive global environment in which international crises play out directly into 
domestic political debates of nations and domestic issues are debated by foreign audiences’.40 
Today audiences on a mass scale across the globe are connected to ‘round the clock’ 
information and data streams.  Domestic and foreign policy events or activities are no longer 
distinctly separated from each other, but as Batora describes, have become interconnected 
and play out to a broader, more highly connected audience.  Melissen surmises, that ‘public 
diplomacy above all thrives in highly interdependent regions, between countries that are 
linked by multiple transnational relationships, and therefore a substantial degree of 
‘interconnectedness’ between their civil societies’.41
3.1.2 A web of non-state actors  
 In this way, public diplomacy activities 
move easily between the layers of audiences and can adapt to the many channels of 
communication in a way that traditional diplomacy cannot. 
Within this interconnected world, journalists, private individuals, think-tanks, activists, 
academics and school students all participate in global debate and discussion surrounding 
international events.  Much of the discussion around the changing international environment 
points to the increasing role of non-state entities in international relations.   Non-state entities 
including NGOs, have led the way in engaging with and influencing foreign audiences on 
issues of domestic and foreign policy concern. For example, organisations such as Amnesty 
International and the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) 
                                                 
40 Batora, ‘Public diplomacy in small and medium sized states: Norway and Canada’, p.1.  
41 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.10. 
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rely upon their ability to engage with foreign publics using smart technology, convey 
powerful messages, persuading large scale action by individuals which is ultimately aimed at 
changing government policy outcomes.42  Additionally, rogue states, or terrorist groups like 
Al Quaeda have also become adept at spreading key messages through their expansive 
networks by utilising global networks connected via media channels and new technologies, 
including the internet.43
NGOs have access to networks of activists, experts, and foreign politicians - and they know how to 
marshal those networks to exert pressure in a given policy area. No diplomatic mission possesses, or 
   
 
For the purpose of this study, the discussion of public diplomacy is confined to those 
activities generated by the state to engage foreign audiences in the pursuit of national policy 
goals.  However, it is important that both scholars and practitioners discuss public diplomacy 
from an expanded viewpoint and including the broader range of activities carried out by state 
and non state entities to engage with and influence foreign audiences in such pursuit.  This 
may be a reflection of the maturity of public diplomacy programs operating within the state.  
The approach taken in this study reflects a state-initiated public diplomacy program more 
relevant at this point in time, to the Australian context.  In particular, the increase in the role 
of non-government organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (some of which 
may have quasi-diplomatic status in some countries, (such as the Hong Kong Economic and 
Trade Office in Australia), in international relations has stretched the boundaries of 
diplomatic practice.  As Leonard notes: 
                                                 
42 Hocking, Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’, pp.30-31; Henrikson, ‘Niche Diplomacy in the World 
Public Arena: the Global ‘Corners’ of Norway and Canada’, p.70. Also Interview, Mr Greg Vickery, President, 
Australian Red Cross, 26 May 2009; and Interview, Mr Chris Lamb, Special Adviser, International Federation 
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 13 May, 2009.   
43 P Sharp, ‘Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy’, in The New 
Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Melissen (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005, 
pp.117-121.  
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would wish to possess, the capability to organize street demonstrations, nor are diplomats well positioned 
to coordinate sustained lobbying campaigns.44
Importantly NGOs can offer to both the domestic and foreign public audience key qualities of 
credibility, expertise and appropriate networks, and in doing so can at times exercise greater 
influence over a public that may be sceptical of its government.  Public audiences frequently 
trust organisations such as the Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies or 
Amnesty International, even where scepticism of the government regime is high.
  
 
NGOs and other entities weave in and out of the public diplomacy spectrum at any stage 
without the same constraints on practice as apply to state entities such as DFAT.  These non-
state entities can initiate a range of public diplomacy activities, with or without the goodwill 
of the state, coordinate the public diplomacy response, or deliver the message or activity into 
the community.   
 
45  These 
NGOs are effective in undertaking highly sensitive work (that might include humanitarian 
relief, family tracing or assisting and visiting detainees in hostile or conflict situations) 
because of these very qualities.  Increasingly, governments are recognising the place of 
NGOs in the development and delivery of domestic public policy, and even formalising the 
level of connectivity through the development of high level agreements or protocols through 
the Compact model.46
                                                 
44 Leonard, ‘Diplomacy by Other Means’, Philip Taylor’s Website, The Institute of Communications Studies, 
University of Leeds, viewed on 20 October 2009, 
 These formalised and sweeping connections, while popular in the 
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=7&paper=1062. 
45 While not all NGOs will live up to the reputation proposed in this thesis, particularly that they might be 
trusted more than governments, many do.  For example, the adherence by the ICRC broadly, and national red 
cross or red crescent societies to key principles such as independence, impartiality and neutrality can and does 
impact significantly upon the access the NGO might be granted to political prisoners / detainees or conflict 
territories in order to administer appropriate assistance and conduct normal functions.  Similarly, such adherence 
is critical to the perceived credibility of the organisations and consequently to the trust that the public might 
place in their work or comment.  Interview, G Vickery, President, Australian Red Cross, 27 May 2009.   
46 The Compact model – establishing a formalised partnership between government and the NGO (or Third 
Sector) has been developed and implemented with success in the United Kingdom, Canada and Scotland.  
Australia is progressing the negotiation of a national Compact at present.   
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delivery of domestic policy, have not been replicated as such in the foreign policy sphere, yet 
there are clear opportunities for the development of partnerships between state and NGO 
actors under the public diplomacy umbrella. 
 
The vast numbers of people who live overseas away from their country of birth, as a part of 
their nation’s ‘diaspora’ is also of relevance to the significance to the web of public 
diplomacy actors.  Diasporas make up the ‘living link’ connecting virtually every nation state 
in the world.  This largely untapped resource  (which is estimated in the case of Australia to 
amount to some one million people), operates under the radar for much of the time, 
cultivating important personal relationships, usually in the local language within the host 
state that ultimately can link in to trade and security interests, and influence foreign public 
perspectives about the home state.47 MacAulay makes the key point that the unique narrative 
of each individual member of a diaspora is relevant.  As she notes, ‘the overall effects of 
large-scale movements such as migration and transnationalism, tend to overwhelm the person 
unless they are encountered “one story, one memory at a time”’.48
                                                 
47 Leonard, ‘Diplomacy by Other Means’.  
48 S MacAulay, ‘Diaspora by degree: narrative and performance in interviews of expatriates from Wanganui’, 
The Journal of American Folklore, Vol 117(465), p.2. For further reading on diaspora refer to S Castles, A 
Davidson, Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging, Macmillan, London, 2000; 
and M Fullilove, C Flutter, ‘Diaspora: the world wide web of Australians’, Lowy Institute Paper No. 4., Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2004.   
  MacAulay’s exploration 
of the individual narratives that make up diasporas strikes at the core of the craft that is public 
diplomacy. As a “living link”, a diaspora therefore comprises individuals, each bringing a 
unique story, particularly in relation to their land of origin.  The understanding of this notion 
of diaspora is vital to enable meaningful engagement. 
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The general view expressed through the Senate Inquiry was that Australia’s diaspora is ‘far-
flung, influential and well-disposed’.49  According to Wells, ‘so much of people’s 
impressions and understanding of Australian values and the Australian way of life come from 
person to person engagement…it is our expatriate diaspora which is working with industry 
offshore, that is doing that engagement on the ground’.50 While the Committee noted DFAT 
maintains contact with a number of expatriates living and working overseas through the 
Embassy network, the contact is usually ad hoc and fragmented, and driven by specific 
events.51 However, the Senate Inquiry revealed that there is no central or systemic approach 
in place to proactively leverage the perspectives, networks and intelligence of the Australian 
diaspora.52  The Senate Committee referred through their Report to a 2004 Senate Legal and 
Constitutional References Committee which noted: … ‘expatriate Australians represent an 
under-utilised resource.  Not only are they an asset in terms of promoting Australia and its 
social economic and cultural interests; they are also ambassadors for our nation, which is 
otherwise disadvantaged by our geographic remoteness and small population’.53 The findings 
of the Senate Inquiry in relation to diaspora reflected similar findings of the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional References Committee which had examined the issue of the Australian 
diaspora some three years earlier. Essentially both Inquiries recognise that such a diaspora is 
a major element in Australia’s public diplomacy kit bag.  A potential opportunity exists to 
leverage the ‘personal networks and influence held by many Australian expatriates in their 
respective industries and fields of endeavour abroad, for the purpose of supporting or even 
progressing strategic national interests.54
                                                 
49 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.135.  
50 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 15 March, 2007, 
p.25.  
51 Each of the Australian Embassy websites advertises coming events of interest to the diaspora. Refer to  
52 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image, p.137. 
53 Ibid, p.135. 
54 Ibid, p.140. 
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3.1.3 The impact of key events  
While it is widely acknowledged that transformations in global communications and 
information have changed the international landscape, the events and aftermath of September 
11, 2001 played an important role in bringing public diplomacy to the fore as ‘the hottest 
topic under discussion in the world’s diplomatic services’.55  Specifically, the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and subsequent media coverage and public 
engagement that followed, known generally as the ‘CNN effect’, brought attention to the 
instantaneous global reach and impact that worldwide media and digital communications can 
have on relations between states.56Importantly, CNN and other media attention simply 
focused the international spotlight onto public diplomacy, but it should be noted that 
contemporary public diplomacy itself was already in existence.57
For UK academic Brian Hocking, the events and media rush following September 11, 2001 
highlighted public diplomacy activities like never before in diplomatic, media and academic 
circles.
   
 
58 Melissen agrees that September 11, 2001 was an important trigger for the present 
debate around the new public diplomacy throughout the global diplomatic community.  
However, he notes that the United States’ experience and rhetoric does not necessarily reflect 
the approach of other states, and cautions his audience not to apply too strong an emphasis on 
the United States’ experience post September 2001, because for ‘many countries it was not 
the beginning’.59
                                                 
55 Melissen, J, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.9.   
56 Hocking, ‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’, p.30. 
57 Also known under various guises such as the ‘new public diplomacy’ or ‘new diplomacy’.   
58 Melissen, (ed), The New Public Diplomacy - Soft Power in International Relations, p.xvii. 
59 Melissen, (ed), ‘Introduction’, The New Public Diplomacy - soft power in international relation’, p.xiv. 
   Instead, the role of the media in engaging foreign and domestic publics in 
the official responses to September 11 heightened awareness of the emerging role of public 
diplomacy in navigating and achieving strategic outcomes in a changing international 
environment.    
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3.1.4 The increasing influence of foreign and domestic publics 
The ‘global information-intensive’ environment sets the scene within which public diplomacy 
is acquiring a new prominence.  Many scholars such as Melissen refer to the ‘new public 
diplomacy’ acknowledging that the world is a very different place today, and public 
diplomacy takes on a different shape than in earlier decades.  As United States 
Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs asserts, the ‘new world is a 
marketplace of ideas’.60 In this vein, Melissen acknowledges that ‘In an era in which it has 
become increasingly important to influence world opinion, domestic and international 
communication with the public has become an increasingly complex challenge for foreign 
ministries’.61  Therefore, Melissen concludes ‘foreign publics now matter to practitioners in a 
way that was unthinkable as little as twenty five years ago’.62
The public in all parts of the world make up an increasingly information hungry, and 
technologically savvy consumer group.  These consumer stakeholders, whether they comprise 
the domestic or foreign public audience, are increasingly informed about and interested in the 
impact of policy on their lives, shifting what has traditionally been a state-based power 
balance in international relations to include a range of non-state actors, structures and 
processes. This is a dynamic that has not gone unnoticed by the well known expert in power 
dynamics, Joseph Nye as he notes, the ‘information revolution and globalisation are shrinking 
the world…’.
   
 
63
Additionally, in the age of information technology, most individuals making up the bloc of 
foreign publics are linked into the world on a 24 hour cycle via smart, portable technology 
    
 
                                                 
60 J Glassman, ‘Public Diplomacy 2.0 – A new Approach to Public Engagement’, speech to New America 
Foundation, Washington, DC, 1 December, 2008 
61 Melissen, ‘Introduction’, The New Public Diplomacy-  soft power in international relations, p.31. 
62 Ibid, p.xvii. 
63 Nye, Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics, p.30. 
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modes.  For example, in 2007 Reuters reported that ‘global mobile phone use had topped 3.25 
billion with demand surging in China, Africa and India’.64  As an indication of the 
accelerated pace with which technologies are being taken up worldwide, the report noted that 
while it ‘took over twenty years to connect the first one billion mobile phone subscribers, it 
took just forty months to reach the two billion milestone’.65 The point to note is that 
overwhelming numbers of individuals from ‘African farmers, to Chinese factory workers and 
Brazilian slum dwellers’ are connecting into the world via new forms of technology each 
minute.66  As Kubalija notes in his study of the impact of IT on diplomatic practice, ‘the last 
decade has brought us growing applications of information technology, in all areas of human 
existence’, which because of ‘lower costs, increased performance power and ease of use, 
have made the use of IT an affordable and functional tool that will alter the way most people 
live and work’.67
Nye is joined by public diplomacy scholars such as Hocking who suggest that the 
accumulated input and opinion of the public marketplace can and does exert a weighty 
influence on the development and pursuit of foreign policy, ‘individuals and groups, 
empowered by the resources provided by the ITC [information technology and 
  Given the advancements made in the IT field, even the most simple 
technology not only allows the individual to connect to and receive information through 
internet and news feeds, but to respond and contribute to the local or global policy debate 
including through the increased use of opinion polls.  The portability and convenience of new 
technologies means that this can occur at practically any location, and any time.    
 
                                                 
64 K Ridley, Global mobile phone use to hit record 3.25 billion, Reuters, 27 June 2007. Found at:   
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSL2712199720070627 
65 Ibid.   
66 Ibid.  
67 J Kurbalija, ‘Diplomacy in the Information Technology Age’, in J. Melissen (ed), Innovation in Diplomatic 
Practice, MacMillan Press, London, 1998, p.xx. 
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communications] revolution – and particularly by the internet – are direct participants in 
shaping international policy’.68
The increasing role of foreign publics and other non state actors in international relations is a 
trend that challenges the traditional institutions of diplomacy.  The methods of traditional 
diplomacy simply do not accommodate the weighty influence of public opinion.  Indeed, as 
will be discussed further, traditional diplomacy methods tend to bypass the public audience 
completely.  As Hocking suggests, ‘all of these developments offer the opportunity for the 
redefinition of public diplomacy in terms of an active role for publics rather than as passive 
objects of government foreign policy strategies’.
  
 
69 While the concept of image cultivation in  
public diplomacy has been in existence alongside traditional diplomacy for centuries, public 
diplomacy in effect has only recently emerged from the ‘periphery’ as an important 
instrument for nations looking to engage with foreign publics and non-government 
organisations in this changed environment in pursuit of national interests.  As Leonard 
surmises, ‘public diplomacy can no longer be seen as an add-on to the rest of diplomacy - it 
must be seen as a central activity that is played out across many dimensions and with many 
partners’.70
As Sharp notes, as a result of September 2001, ‘governments will have to conduct more 
public diplomacy and become better at it’.
 
 
71
                                                 
68 Hocking, ‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’, p.31. 
69 Ibid., p.30.  The significant role of non government actors, including publics from around the world working 
with the Canadian  and other governments to drive unprecedented international agreement on the banning of 
antipersonnel landmines, known as the ‘Ottawa Process’, and manifested in the signing of the ‘Ottawa 
Convention’ in 1999 is an important example of the influence that can be wielded by actors outside the state, 
including individuals. For further discussion of the Ottawa discussion in relation to public diplomacy refer to 
Henrikson, ‘Niche diplomacy in the public arena: Canada and Norway’, pp.76-77. 
70 Leonard, Diplomacy by Other Means.   
71 Sharp, ‘Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy’, p.xvii. 
 To be competitive, and maintain and progress 
security and economic interests, governments are now communicating and engaging more 
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broadly than ever, beyond traditional diplomatic exchanges with foreign public audiences, for 
strategic outcomes.  It is in this environment, where ‘communication of ideas and 
information, arguably has become a powerful form of action’, that Henrikson argues that ‘the 
public diplomacy factor can make a difference’. 72
Adding weight to the importance of the role of public diplomacy is that public diplomacy has 
been clearly linked to the popular though elusive concept of ‘soft power’ initially introduced 
into policy discussions by United States academic, Joseph Nye in 1990.
  
 
73  Nye himself notes 
that public diplomacy plays an important role in ‘shaping the preferences’ of others to 
achieve desired outcomes, including in foreign policy.74 While the intersection between 
public diplomacy and soft power will receive further attention in this thesis, what is clear is 
that international academics and diplomacy practitioners agree that foreign publics now 
matter to practitioners of diplomacy in a complex way that was unthinkable as little as 25 
years ago.75
3.2 Public diplomacy relevance to cultural divides 
   
Adding to the growing discussion about the changing international environment, and 
challenges faced by modern diplomacy, scholars such as Huntington, Leonard, Small and 
Rose point to the emergence of deeper cultural divides that challenge the boundaries of the 
state based system, and the structures and processes of traditional diplomacy in the twenty-
first century.  For this reason, changes in the international landscape cannot be discussed 
without at least brief attention in the first instance to Huntington’s theory of the Clash of 
Civilisations.  At the time the theory was published in 1993, the Clash of Civilisations 
                                                 
72 Henrikson, ‘What can Public Diplomacy Achieve’, p.2.  
73 Nye introduced the concept in 1990 in Bound to Lead, and returned to the theme later in 2001 in The Paradox 
of American Power. 
74 Nye, Soft Power - the Means to Success in World Politics.  
75 Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, pxvii. 
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represented a significant shift in thinking about foreign policy and the international stage in 
the post-Cold war period.   
 
The concept articulated by Huntington has been expanded upon through the more 
contemporary study of the relevance of public diplomacy in an ‘age of schisms’ by United 
Kingdom foreign policy experts Leonard, Small and Rose.76
Huntington argued in 1993 that ‘the great divisions among humankind and the dominating 
source of conflict will be cultural’.
  The two similarly argued 
concepts, relating to the underlying themes of cultural identity as a basis for new areas of 
commonality and division between populations, lend validity to the increasing role and 
relevance of public diplomacy in addressing foreign policy goals in a chaotic, complex and 
less predictable world.   
 
77  In his view the clash of civilisations represented a 
progression in international relations away from economic or ideological divides, towards 
new culturally based divisions between civilisations or ‘cultural entities’, posing a new 
challenge to the relevance of the sovereign state, traditional state-based boundaries and 
traditional diplomatic responses.78 His analysis focused on the ultimate impact such divisions 
might have on the concept of the nation state.  In Huntington’s view, the nation state, as the 
cornerstone of traditional diplomacy and international relations, was weakened in the face of 
this new challenge.79
                                                 
76 M Leonard, A Small, M Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms’, Counterpoint, February 
2005.  
77 S Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilisations?’, Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1993. Huntington expanded upon the 
concept of a ‘clash of civilizations’ first used by his peer, B Lewis, a British-American historian and political 
commentator who first used the phrase in an article ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’ which was published in the 
September 1990 edition of The Atlantic Monthly.    
78 S. Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilisations?’. 
79 Ibid. 
  Huntington provides several intertwined reasons for the progression 
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towards the clash in civilisations, several of which align to the changes in the environmental 
landscape already observed in this chapter, including the: 
i) increased interaction and movement of peoples across nation state boundaries, 
intensifying civilian consciousness and awareness of the differences between and 
commonalities that bind civilizations; 
ii) impact of modernisation and globalisation in weakening the identity of the nation 
state, and providing the opportunity for a re-emergence of religious 
fundamentalism as a basis for affirming identity; 
iii) emergence and reaffirmation of non-Western civilisations, with a focus on values 
and culture, responding to and challenging the values and mass culture of the 
Western civilization; and 
iv) effect of economic regionalism aligning trade partnerships to cultural identity.80
 
   
While Huntington does not dismiss the role of the nation state in international relations, he 
argues that the importance of the nation state will diminish, and foreshadows that the new 
fault lines based on cultural identity may result in incompatible demands, both at the ‘micro-
level between adjacent groups clashing over territory; and at the macro level as civilisations 
compete over the top of nation states for economic, political power and to promote their 
values and identity.81
The more recent work of Leonard, Small and Rose translated and extended the Huntington 
argument, to the post September 11, 2001 environment.  Where Huntington’s work 
established the concept and significance or relevance of the cultural divide, the work of 
Leonard, Small and Rose not only supports the notion that ‘cultural factors underlie many of 
the divides that have recently become important in policy-making’, but provides an analysis 
of the nature of the divides.
   
 
82  By doing so, Leonard, Small and Rose identify ‘a series of 
global schisms’ that define the international stage from the start of the twenty-first century.83
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Leonard, Small, Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms’’, p.8. 
83 Leonard, Small, Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms’’, p.4. 
  
By broadly categorising the key cultural schisms or divides under the three heads of 
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political/cultural, religious/cultural and economic/cultural divides, the trio note that they 
represent not only divides at a diplomatic level, but more importantly for the discussion of 
public diplomacy, divides that can incite ‘clashes between publics, where public opinion for 
the first time in many years is shaping and pressurising foreign policy decisions’.84
Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilisations has attracted voluminous and widespread 
criticism from intellectual leaders and across disciplines worldwide.
  The 
September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the long standing United States-
led ‘war against terror’, the 2003 Bali bombings, the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict and the 
internal violence between the Chinese government and Xinjiang province provide a sampling 
of contemporary international events that might be classified according to the cultural divide 
theory.  In each case, there is value in noting both the increased interest and opinion of 
foreign audiences in the outcomes, and the growing challenges to the impact and reach of 
traditional diplomacy.   
 
85  For example, a range 
of critics characterise Huntington’s theory as an oversimplified explanation that lacks 
sufficient rigour in the definition of civilizations, assumes conflict where it does not 
necessarily exist, neglects the internal fractures and tensions that split cultural groups from 
within, and diminish the importance of shared values or dynamism of culture within an 
interdependent world.86
                                                 
84 Ibid. The three heads of divide are spit further into six specific areas of tension: i) Political/Cultural:  power-
based order vs rule based order, realpolitik vs liberal internationalism, ii) Religious/Cultural:  traditionalism vs 
liberalism, faith-based vs secular government, and iii) Economic/Cultural:  power vs powerlessness, pro-
globalisation vs anti-globalisation.  In some instances, these divides reflect the contrast traditional diplomacy 
and public diplomacy.   
85 According to Wikipedia, ‘Clash of Civilizations?’ Attracted the largest response of any article published in 
Foreign Affairs.   
 Much of this criticism could be equally applied to the Leonard, Small 
86 Leonard, Small, and Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms’.  As noted Huntington’s ‘Clash 
of Civilizations’ thesis attracted wide criticism such as: A Sen, Identity and Violence: The illusion of destiny 
(Issues of Our Time), W.W. Norton, New York, 2006; P Berman, Terror and Liberalism, W.W. Norton, New 
York, 2003; and E Said, ‘The Clash of Ignorance’, The Nation, 22 October 2001, p.3.  Higgott and Nossal 
caution against the use of ‘dichotomous [“Western” or “Eastern”] labels as [being] too closely associated with 
Samuel Huntington’s shonky “clash of civilizations” thesis.  R Higgott and K Nossal, ‘Odd man in, odd man 
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and Rose approach.  However, despite the valid criticisms, the theories of Huntington, 
Leonard, Small and Rose expose the deeper complexities within the international 
environment that are owned and driven by the broad public constituencies and not necessarily 
the officials or the elites.  The analysis of such complexities, as provided by these scholars 
reinforces the value of public diplomacy activities that extend the reach of foreign policy 
interests to the wider public audience, where traditional diplomatic efforts are limited.   
3.3 Public diplomacy responding to a challenging environment 
International discussions regarding public diplomacy have emerged with renewed vigour, 
providing diplomatic options for meeting the challenges of the current international 
environment.  As already noted, the recent focus surrounding public diplomacy in 
international conversations is quick to distinguish the new public diplomacy from historical 
connotations (though the reminder is made that public diplomacy is nearly ‘as old as 
diplomacy itself’).87
                                                                                                                                                        
out: Australia’s luminal position in Asia revisited – a reply to Ann Capling’, The Pacific Review, Vol.21(5), 
December 2008, p.627.  See also K Nossal, ‘Throwing out the baby with the bathwater? Huntington’s “kin-
country” thesis and Australian-Canadian relations’, in Shaping Nations: Constitutionalism, and Society in 
Australia and Canada, University of Ottawa Press, Cardinal, L, and Headon, D, (eds), Ottawa, pp.167-81, 
accessed on 9 April 2010 at: <http://post.queensu.ca/~nossalk/papers/Nossal_2002_Kin_Country.pdf> 
87 In particular, Melissen tracks the origins of public diplomacy back to the diplomatic activity aimed at foreign 
publics carried out in ancient Greece and Rome.  However, he points to the invention of the printing press in the 
fifteenth century as a turning point for official communications by states with foreign publics. Melissen, ed, The 
New Public Diplomacy - Soft Power in International Relations, p.xvii.   
 Recent discussions reveal that the concept of public diplomacy is not 
static, nor it is viewed through a single lens – differing thematic and national interest angles 
impact on the look and feel of public diplomacy for different audiences.  For this reason, the 
study of public diplomacy policy and practice must engage in establishing some parameters 
around the definition and scope of the subject.  There is value in examining not only the 
parameters around public diplomacy in the contemporary environment, but also in exploring 
how and why public diplomacy has evolved in recent years to take on increasing significance 
for an array of small, medium and large states from Australia, Norway, Canada through to the 
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United Kingdom, China and the United States of America - all pursuing their national 
interests on the international stage. The rapid evolution and importance of public diplomacy 
represents a significant transformation in the way that both nation-states and non-state actors 
are carrying out contemporary diplomatic activities in order to win influence, prestige and 
strategic benefits within a globalised ‘mass market’ environment.   
3.3.1 Defining public diplomacy 
The Senate Inquiry process highlighted the difficulties that are encountered in pinning the 
concept of public diplomacy to a fixed definition.  In practice, public diplomacy continues to 
evolve.  Unlike traditional diplomacy which for Berridge, is founded in strong tradition, 
custom and ritual, public diplomacy reflects an organic response to the more complex and 
multi-dimensional transaction-based world in which the role of state and non-state actors and 
individuals are entwined, and domestic and foreign policy debate is blurred.  The points of 
intersection and divergence between public and traditional diplomacy are also relevant to the 
exercise of defining public diplomacy.  However, before these points can be further 
examined, it useful to start with an overview of the definitions of public diplomacy as they 
provide a frame of reference for further discussion. 
 
In the simplest terms, Potter defines ‘public diplomacy as the effort by the government of one 
nation to influence the public or elite opinion of another nation for the purpose of turning the 
policy of the target nation to its advantage’.88
                                                 
88 Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, p.3. 
 Potter indicates that his definition draws upon 
that of Hans Tuch who describes public diplomacy as ‘…a government’s process of 
communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its 
nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current 
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policies’.89
Fiske de Gouveia engages with a definitional format similar to that provided by Potter and 
Tuch, though some years later, leading into a more comprehensive description of public 
diplomacy encompassing, ‘the many and varied activities conducted by governments to 
engage and communicate with foreign publics’.
  The emphasis is placed on the key words ‘influence’ and ‘communicate’ used in 
these early definitions of public diplomacy.  Both these words are indicative of one-way 
contact, that being context or information provided from the government (or state), and 
received by the publics.  In this format, the emphasis tends to attach to the message itself, as 
it is communicated, and little attention is given to the way in which the message is received, 
or impact it might have on the recipient. 
 
90  He takes this definition further by 
asserting the rationale behind public diplomacy ‘is generally to influence attitudes towards 
that government’s country, so as to encourage tourism, and inward investment and to 
facilitate closer political ties’.91  Sharp extends this idea of engagement asserting that public 
diplomacy is ‘the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to 
advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented’.92
                                                 
89 Hans Tuch quoted in Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, p.3.  Hans Tuch is the author of 
Communicating with the World: US public diplomacy overseas, which published in 1990 provided the earlier 
descriptions of and perspectives on the new public diplomacy as it relates to a modern environment.   
90 Fiske de Gouveia, ‘The Future of Public Diplomacy’. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Sharp, ‘Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy’, p.106. 
  Each of these later 
definitions, while similar in format, reflect a subtle extension in thinking and practice around 
public diplomacy from one-way to two-way exchange, where both government and publics 
contribute to the process and outcome.  There is a significant difference in this two-way 
format of public diplomacy (as opposed to the one-way variety), because is requires that 
more attention be given to the way that messages are received, the impact the message has 
and response that the message might evoke from the recipient.  The ability of states to engage 
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in the two-way format is an indication of whether the state has a well developed approach to 
public diplomacy.93
A number of states considered to be leaders in the field of public diplomacy continue to 
review and revise their articulated statements regarding public diplomacy and by doing so 
contribute to the expanding international discussion to define public diplomacy.  For 
example, in 2005, the Lord Carter Review of the United Kingdom’s public diplomacy 
program identified that previous definitions of public diplomacy had been deficient in 
‘explaining what public diplomacy seeks to achieve and why’.
   
 
94  The Lord Carter Review 
then defined public diplomacy as ‘work aiming to inform and engage individuals and 
organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence for the United 
Kingdom in a manner consistent with the governmental medium and long term goals’.95  The 
United Kingdom definition, which pins public diplomacy to strategic government priorities 
remains current in guiding the work of the United Kingdom Public Diplomacy Board.96
Also during 2005, Canada released its International Policy Statement describing public 
diplomacy as being ‘about projecting a coherent and influential voice to all those who have 
influence within a society – not just within its government.’
   
 
97
                                                 
93 Canada is known to engage in strong dialogue with both foreign and domestic publics – through innovative 
modes of communication.  By contrast, the Senate Inquiry demonstrated that Australia’s public diplomacy 
program has remained more closely attuned to the one-way format of public diplomacy. 
94 UK Public Diplomacy Review by Lord Carter, Presented to the Foreign Secretary of the Treasurer, 13 
December 2005, p.8. 
95 Ibid, p.8. 
96 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
our Image’, p.10. 
97 Canadian Government, ‘Diplomacy: Canada’s International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence 
in the World’, Report to Parliament, April 2005.   
  The Canadian policy statement 
goes further to note the important role played by government as well as a range of non state 
actors, including individuals, in carrying out public diplomacy to ‘cultivate long term 
relationships, dialogue and understanding abroad and to underpin advocacy and increase 
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influence’.98  The explicit inclusion non-state actors and Canadian individuals as initiators of 
public diplomacy indicates that Canada is further developed in the understanding of and 
engagement with public diplomacy as a strategic instrument.  In 2006, the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) following a review of its own public diplomacy 
statements, noted that the overall goal of the United States public diplomacy effort was to, 
‘understand, inform, engage and influence the attitudes and behaviour of global audiences in 
ways that support the United States strategic efforts’.99
Through the Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program, the 
Senate Committee drew upon key elements of each of these key definitions.  From them, the 
Senate Committee agreed to the broad view of Australian public diplomacy, reported to 
parliament as, ‘work or activities undertaken to understand, engage and inform individuals 
and organisations in other countries in order to shape their perceptions in ways that will 
promote Australia’s foreign policy goals’.
   
 
100  The Committee definition appears to draw on 
the approach adopted in the early1990s by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans 
who noted that public diplomacy as relevant to Australia ‘is the shaping of attitudes in other 
countries in a way which is favourable to our national interests’.101
                                                 
98 Ibid.   
  However, through further 
analysis of public diplomacy in the Australian context, this thesis suggests that both the 
Evans definition and the subsequent Senate Committee definition overestimate the Australian 
government’s understanding of and engagement with the concepts of public diplomacy.  
Developments in the public diplomacy approaches of states occur incrementally, with layers 
99  United States General Accounting Office, ‘U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain 
Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges’ Testimony before the Subcommittee on Science, 
Departments of State, Justice and Commerce, and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, May 2006, p.4. accessed at: < http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06707t.pdf 
on 19 October 2009.  
100 Australian Senate, Hansard, 16 August 2007, p.42. (emphasis added). 
101 G Evans, ‘Australia and Asia: Role of Public Diplomacy’, address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Trade to the Australia-Asia Association, Melbourne, 15 March 1990.   
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of complexity building upon foundations of understanding.  If the foundations of 
understanding are absent, there is little strategic value to be derived from the layers of 
complexity.  The responsibility of this thesis is to enable more fulsome discussion of the 
foundations of public diplomacy, so as to enhance the development and implementation of 
Australian public diplomacy programs.   
3.3.2 Unravelling the definitions of public diplomacy 
Each of the definitions discussed to this point reinforce the consistent and key messages 
being delivered through international literature, that public diplomacy operates as an 
extension of traditional diplomacy, and involves an extensive cast of government and non-
government actors and public audiences.  In various ways, each definition reaffirms the move 
towards two-way exchange with a broad range of actors, and the need to tie public diplomacy 
activities more closely to strategic interests.  Most specifically, by introducing the element of 
‘understanding’, the United States statement (reflected in the Australian statement) links 
public diplomacy into research and evaluation, not previously built in to public diplomacy 
definitions, (critical to guide strategy development and delivery). 
 
While there are consistencies across each of these definitions, there are also deficiencies and 
gaps in each interpretation, further demonstrating the fluid nature of the terminology itself.  
For example, Melissen cautions that the existing definitions of public diplomacy are of little 
help in clearly distinguishing public diplomacy from the related, but separate concepts in 
international communications including propaganda, public affairs/relations and nation-
branding.  In many cases, the definitions may highlight similar themes, yet the underlying 
principles and resulting outcomes may be vastly different.  The distinction between each of 
these concepts deserves attention and will be addressed within the context of public 
diplomacy as strategic policy in the following chapter.   
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Additionally, while Fiske de Gouveia provides a comprehensive, yet succinct definition, 
evidence today points to the increasingly important role played by both state and non-state 
actors in the development and delivery of a country’s public diplomacy efforts, where ‘the 
roles and responsibilities of actors in international relations are no longer clearly delineated, 
and most actors are not nearly as much in control as they would like to be’.102
Where China’s public diplomacy program is more closely controlled through state-owned 
instruments, governments operating within a liberal democracy are well placed to take on 
more of a strategic and coordination role engaging non-government actors, as well as 
maintaining a delivery role through the diplomatic networks.
  From this it 
may be suggested that in developing a framework for public diplomacy, governments must 
understand their role, but also that of external non-government actors.  The role of 
government and non government actors in public diplomacy within state-centric nations such 
as China, will differ greatly to the role of government in a liberal democracy, such as the 
United Kingdom or Australia.   
 
103  Moreover, as previously 
noted NGOs including the ICRC, Greenpeace and Amnesty International have demonstrated 
that they are adept at influencing foreign publics, and joining forces with each other and with 
governments to do so.  The Ottawa Process, a campaign initiated to ban the use of 
antipersonnel landmines in the 1990s, already referenced in this thesis provides a clear 
example of the influence held by non state actors working in concert to mobilising popular 
support and change international law and policy via the Ottawa Convention 1997.104
                                                 
102 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.106. 
103 d’Hooghe, ‘Public Diplomacy in the People’s Republic of China’, in Melissen, J, (ed), The New Public 
Diplomac: Soft Power in International Relationsy, Palgrave, NY, 2005, p.97. 
104 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.12.   
The 
collaborative activities of the NGOs, individuals and the Canadian Government in broad 
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based advocacy and consensus building among publics for the purpose of influencing 
international policy and enabling the Ottawa Convention is a clear example of public 
diplomacy at work.105
The growing collection of literature and dialogue on public diplomacy reaffirms that public 
diplomacy represents a dynamic area of international policy and practice.   Because of this 
dynamism, scholars such as Gregory have expressed concerns (similar to those expressed by 
Melissen), that from an academic perspective, public diplomacy lacks credibility.
  
 
106  Gregory 
points to a range of factors including the fluid nature of public diplomacy, the wide gap 
separating academic analysis and practitioner-based discussions around public diplomacy, 
and the consequent lack of rigorous academic research supporting policy and practice 
developments, as contributing to a lack of consensus around the analytical boundaries of 
public diplomacy, undermining its credibility as a field of diplomatic theory and practice.107
Gregory asserts that ‘there is no common approach or established method around public 
diplomacy, rather ‘interests, values, identities, memories and geostrategic contexts shape both 
public diplomacy scope and practice’.
 
 
108  Melissen agrees that public diplomacy cannot be 
defined or characterised by a ‘one size fits all model’.109
                                                 
105 As noted previously, such activity of NGOs and citizens in areas previously reserved as the domain of 
traditional diplomacy has been referred to as the ‘new diplomacy’.  However, this ‘new diplomacy’ has been 
subsumed by consistent discussion of the broad discussion of ‘public diplomacy’.  For example, when providing 
examples of public diplomacy at work former Canadian diplomat and diplomacy expert Darryl Copeland, refers 
to the Ottawa example as a case in point.  D Copeland, ‘Guerrilla Diplomacy’, Presentation to the Griffith Asia 
Institute, Brisbane, 30 March 2010.   
106 The distinction here must be noted between the perspectives of public diplomacy as an academic field, vis a 
vis public diplomacy practice.  Gregory’s concern regarding the lack of academic credibility behind public 
diplomacy does not necessarily reflect on the practice of public diplomacy.   
107 At the time of publishing the article ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, Gregory was the 
Director of the Public Diplomacy Institute and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Media and Public Affairs and 
George Washington University, United States of America.   
108 Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, p.274. 
109 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’. 
  For example, the United States’ 
recent perspective and practice of public diplomacy has been preoccupied with and shaped by 
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its ideologically driven political response to the terrorist attacks on September 2001, through 
a ‘war on ideas’.110  By contrast, the European perspective generally reflects a more subtle 
approach to consolidating identities and projecting a brand, to improving economic activities 
and outcomes.111  The Australian perspective on public diplomacy appears to be within the 
early stages of development, maintaining a strong reliance on media responses and standard 
gala events (such as the appearance by the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra at the Australian 
Consulate in Milan).112  There is flexibility within the domain of public diplomacy for 
different objectives involving an array of states and non-state actors depending upon the 
strategic or national interests and political priorities in place.  This argument also reveals the 
dynamic nature of public diplomacy as an instrument of strategic policy.  While scholars such 
as Gregory find the very fluid and organic nature of public diplomacy to be a frustration in 
establishing the underpinning theoretical boundaries, there is also opportunity to apply a 
broad framework that enables creative public diplomacy approaches that better fit the multi-
issue, multi-layer modern public diplomacy environment.113
3.3.3 Public diplomacy vis a vis traditional diplomacy 
    
Having discussed in a broad sense, the parameters around public diplomacy today, it is timely 
to review the boundaries that separate public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy.  Such a 
discussion around the consistencies and inconsistencies between public and traditional 
                                                 
110 Foreign Press Centre Briefing with J. K. Glassman, Under Secretary, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, 
U.S. Department of State, State’s Glassman briefs on Public Diplomacy, War on Ideas, The Washington 
Foreign Press Centre, Washington D.C., 15 July 2008.   
111 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’.  
112 Interview, Robyn Archer, High Profile Australian artist and International Festival Director, 22 November 
2007.  Archer’s statements are backed up by the example (also noted in Chapter Four), provided by an official 
from the City of Melbourne Council participating as a witness in the Senate Inquiry.  The official noted that 
incorporating cultural elements (including a performance by the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra) into 
negotiations between the City of Melbourne and the City of Milan ‘provided the consulate-general with very 
high level access into the city of Milan that they were not able to get just by struggling through the normal 
diplomatic channels.  Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 
15 March 2007, p.20. 
113 Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls and Imported Norms’, 
Presentation to the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and 
Conflict, George Washington University, August 2005, p.38. 
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diplomacy also provides a convenient method of establishing the key elements of public 
diplomacy more closely. Gyngell and Wensley remind us that, in a broad sense, diplomacy is 
the tool used to implement foreign policy:  a means to an end; where ‘foreign policy is that 
dimension of the public policy that deals with the outside world aimed at creating an 
international environment conducive to the nation’s interest’.114  Batora further describes 
traditional diplomacy as ‘a set of norms and rules regulating relations between states’.115  He 
elaborates on this distinction by noting that, ‘diplomacy is traditionally carried out by 
diplomats, according to institutionalised professional standards and habits’.116
…deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It 
encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by 
governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one 
country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication 
between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the 
processes of inter-cultural communications.
  This latter 
definition in particular conveys the sense of strict control and formality that are entrenched in 
and inseparable from the theory and practice of traditional diplomacy.    
 
Many definitions take the relationship between public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy 
as their launching point.  Dating back to the 1960s, an early Murrow Centre publication 
attempts to distinguish public diplomacy as a field that: 
117
The Murrow Centre’s approach to defining public diplomacy as an extension of traditional 
diplomacy continues to underpin the common approach today. Where traditional diplomacy 
revolves around strict government to government relations and the direct efforts of the state 
to influence the activities of another state; public diplomacy generally refers to the more 
subtle, fluid and complex interactions that extend beyond government, aimed at influencing 
 
 
                                                 
114 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.9. 
115 Batora, ‘Public diplomacy in small and medium sized states: Norway and Canada’, p.2. 
116 Ibid, p.3. 
117 ‘Origins of Public Diplomacy’, Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, 
http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm#origins – emphasis in original.   
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an information savy, connected and globalised public.  Australia’s former Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Gareth Evans Evans elaborated on this point of difference through his comments to 
a public conference in 1990, by noting ‘…traditional diplomacy seeks to influence the 
influential. Public diplomacy too reaches out to the decision-makers and opinion-formers, but 
also casts its net much wider, beyond the influential few to the “uninvolved many”.118  This 
point regarding public diplomacy’s extended audience (a notable deficiency in Fiske de 
Gouveia definition), is picked up by Leonard and Small as the defining characteristic of 
public diplomacy, where ‘the major difference between public and traditional diplomacy is 
that public diplomacy involves a much broader group of people on both sides, and a broader 
set of interests that go beyond the government of the day’.119
In taking this approach, it must be noted that the conduct of traditional diplomacy is strictly 
and vertically bound by international treaties, conventions and protocols, and is carried out at 
an official level between governments, through appointed and recognised diplomatic staff.  
For example, the VCDR 1961 recognises the requirements of formal diplomatic relations 
between states and ‘confers not just diplomatic privileges and immunities upon the members 
of diplomatic missions (including consular officials), but also certain limiting expectations 
regarding their activity in the host country’.
   
 
120  Article 41 of the VCDR notes the requirement 
that all ‘official business’ entrusted to the mission ‘be conducted with or through the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs of the receiving state or such other Ministry as may be agreed’.121
                                                 
118 Evans, Speech to the Australian-Asia Association, also found in Evans, Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations 
in the 1990s, p.67.  
119 Batora, ‘Public diplomacy in small and medium sized states: Norway and Canada’, p.3. 
120 Article 111, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, Henrikson, ‘What can Public Diplomacy 
Achieve?’, pp.7-8. 
121 Article 41, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.   
 While 
Article 3 of the VCDR also alludes to the practice of public diplomacy through the 
‘promotion of friendly relations between states via economic, cultural and scientific 
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exchange’, such practice would traditionally have occurred within the traditional structures 
and channels allowed under the treaty.122
Where traditional diplomacy operates within an official bureaucratic framework public 
diplomacy operates through ‘actions, relationships, images, and words; and usually across 
three defined timeframes:  24/7 news streams, medium range campaigns on high value 
policies, and long term engagement’.
  However, public diplomacy as practiced today has 
moved beyond such structures and channels, and must be differentiated from traditional 
practice.  Public diplomacy practice today occurs well outside such official structure, and 
engages a broad audience of foreign publics through channels other than official lines of 
communication.  Contemporary public diplomacy operates outside the regulation of the 
VCDR, and without placing limits on the persons involved or their activities.  This is where 
the deviations between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy are most evident.   
 
123  As supported by Wolf and Rosen, ‘Public diplomacy 
relates to the attitudes and behaviours of publics, whereas official diplomacy relates to the 
attitudes and policies of governments.’124   The language and transactional framework of 
traditional diplomacy has developed over time with the intent to ensure outcomes in a 
controlled, easily understood and linear format.  International scholar, Taylor summarises that 
‘public diplomacy encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional 
diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the 
interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another;…and the 
processes of intercultural communications.’ 125
                                                 
122 Article 3, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961.   
123 Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, p.276. 
124 Wolf, Jnr and Rosen, ‘Public Diplomacy: How to think about and improve it’, p.2. 
125 P Taylor, ‘What is Public Diplomacy?’ The Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, 
United Kingdom, 2006, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.ics.leeds.ac> 
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Nonetheless, there are also significant areas of common ground binding traditional and public 
diplomacy.  Indeed, Gregory continues to expand upon the key features of public diplomacy 
which include the ‘understanding of cultures, attitudes and behaviour; building and managing 
relationships; and influencing opinions and actions to advance national interests and 
values’.126  Each of these key features can be equally applied in a discussion of the theory and 
practice of traditional diplomacy.  Central to the role of diplomacy (traditional and public) is 
its purpose, to exert influence over the policies, dispositions, and actions of other states in the 
interests of national interest, usually defined by states in terms of their security and 
prosperity.  Where traditional diplomacy operates through official and direct channels, public 
diplomacy seeks to exert indirect influence on other states via the broad public audience and 
through non-official channels, ‘notably the press and other media of mass communication, 
such as the internet, along with specialised networks ranging from student and cultural 
exchanges, business connections, scholarly associations, diasporic relationships’.127
The fact that public diplomacy activities are about influencing, albeit by different means than 
traditional diplomacy, other governments for the purpose of advancing national interests, 
means that public diplomacy falls squarely within the scope of diplomacy.  To pick up on the 
Gyngell and Wesley ‘toolbox’ analogy referred to previously, public diplomacy can be 
described as sitting alongside traditional diplomacy: ‘an indispensable tool in the toolbox of 
international diplomacy and politics:  that effectively can and does place a country at an 
advantage in advancing its national interests’.
  
 
128
                                                 
126 Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, p.276. 
127 Henrikson, ‘What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?’, p.8. 
128 Schlegeter, ‘Public Diplomacy and the Media’ p. 21. 
  In view of the changing global 
environment, the stakeholders and range of interests at stake in international relations, it is 
reasonable to surmise that public diplomacy is a necessary strategic response instrument in 
the diplomat’s toolbox, addressing those gaps where traditional diplomacy cannot reach. 
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DFAT asserts in its submission to the Senate Inquiry that, ‘public diplomacy has become a 
standard arm of statecraft’.129
3.4 Australia’s diplomatic response to the changing environment 
  This is an important point of intersection which supports the 
growing recognition afforded to public diplomacy practice and policy.   
Australia’s diplomatic approach to the world in recent decades has been shaped primarily in 
response to the tensions arising and vulnerabilities of the Australian geographic location 
within the Asia Pacific and a Western/European cultural disposition.  In terms of physical 
size, economic activity, access to natural resources, military and aid budgets, Australia is a 
significant nation, but ‘is not of itself a major economic or military power beyond its 
immediate neighbourhood’.130  With one foot in the Western and European Others Group for 
the purposes of United Nations voting, and another toggled between the Asia Pacific in the 
pursuit of regional trade liberalisation, and the Commonwealth satisfying an unusual 
reverence of colonial heritage, Australia experiences difficulty in establishing a natural 
geopolitical position.  There are tensions that cross each of these levels.  In exploring his 
clash of civilizations theory, Huntington makes special note of Australia’s situation, noting 
that Australia is a ‘country torn between its Western civilizational heritage and its growing 
economic engagement with Asia’.131  As a result, for much of the past century, Australia has 
had to take responsibility for the pursuit and protection of its own interests, and a strong 
diplomatic tradition has been at the centre of such an approach.132
                                                 
129 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of 
Australia’s public diplomacy program, April 2007, p.8. 
130 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our instruments of 
international policy’, p.9. 
131 Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilizations?’.   
132 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.9. 
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Australia’s international policy has been and continues to be characterised by the broad 
consensus that ‘Australia should engage actively with the world’.133
sought to influence the decisions of other states – particularly traditional allies and countries in our region 
– in directions conducive to the Australian national interest.  We have done this mostly by persuading 
those states that actions proposed or supported by Australia are also in their interests.
  Indeed, Australia has 
overall: 
134
That is, Australia has successfully given effect to international policy through active 
diplomatic engagement within the immediate neighbourhood and with the rest of the world.  
Although, the political alignment and thrust of the governing administrations has had a heavy 
influence on the methods of (diplomatic) engagement employed. According to Australian 
commentators David Martin Jones and Andrea Benvenuti, ‘a change of federal government 
regularly provokes significant shifts both with regional governments and with great and 
powerful friends beyond’.
  
  
135  Although despite the differences in approach between 
government administrations and political leaders, there have been consistent threads weaving 
through Australia’s international policy program.  These threads pull together as the close 
connection between foreign and trade policy objectives, a strong reliance upon Australia’s 
alliance with the United States, a continued focus on Australian engagement with the Asia 
Pacific region and a substantial aid program.136
The reality of Australia’s geographic, economic and cultural position, has posed significant 
challenges in determining the method of Australia’s diplomatic engagement.  Australian 
practitioners have teetered towards public diplomacy responses at times in order to give 
effect to particular objectives.  Under the (then Minister for Foreign Affairs), Gareth Evans, 
   
 
                                                 
133 Martin Jones and Benvenuti, ‘Tradition, myth and the dilemma of Australian foreign policy’, p.105. 
134 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.9. 
135 Martin Jones and Benvenuti, ‘Tradition, Myth and the Dilemma of Australian Foreign Policy’, p.105. 
136 Kelly, ‘Howard’s decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal’. 
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Australian diplomatic practice of the 1980s and 1990s became concerned with ‘what other 
nations think of us – for the good reason that the images that others carry of us influence their 
attitudes towards us’.137By encouraging diplomats to cast their nets much wider towards the 
‘uninvolved many’, Evans clearly articulated a role for public diplomacy in Australian 
diplomatic practice, and was perhaps ahead of his time in doing so.138 Evans approach at the 
time appeared to have been centred upon mechanisms such as the ABC and the use of media 
broadcasts (radio, film and television)139, as well as strategic campaigns140, and symbolic 
gestures to convey positive, benign and constructive images of Australia to publics across the 
globe, so that they ‘might adopt a generally positive attitude towards Australia’.141
The emerging focus on and understanding of public diplomacy fostered by Evans was 
diminished under the subsequent regime.  Howard’s pragmatic traditionalist approach built 
concrete outcomes in international policy primarily through bilateral economic and security 
agreements.
  Through 
his approach, Evans provided a platform for both traditional and public diplomacy and 
Australian practitioners at this time actively progressed both to realise foreign policy 
objectives of good international citizenship, and engagement in the Asia Pacific region.   
 
142  Indeed, in contrast to the Evans approach, foreign policy under the Howard 
regime was characterised as reactive and ad hoc, based on Howard’s view that ‘there is little 
to be gained from trying to influence the direction in which international affairs is moving, 
rather one is better served by adapting to issues as they emerge’.143
                                                 
137 Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990’s, p.66. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Television series and soap operas such as Return to Eden and Neighbours and films such as Crocodile 
Dundee and Strictly Ballroom have been cited by Evans as examples of such public diplomacy.  Evans and 
Grant, ‘Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s’, p.67. 
140 Including popular and successful campaigns such as Come and Say G’day 1984-1990, and Celebrating 
Australia 1993.  
141 Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990’s, p.67. 
142 Kelly, ‘Howards decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal’. 
 Employing in the first 
143 N Bisley, ‘Advancing the national interest in a globalised world, Lowy Institute Perspectives, Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, NSW, February 2007, p.4. Although Foreign Minister Downer’s strong personal 
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instance traditional diplomacy (and military force in some instances), Howard progressed key 
bilateral and regional foreign policy initiatives.  However, while Howard displayed no overt 
commitment to public diplomacy, his approach to foreign policy may have been in some 
instances propped up by the lasting effects of public diplomacy initiated under his 
predecessor, as well as that which occurred almost unintentionally as Australia’s 
humanitarian disaster relief response to areas affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 26 
December 2004.   Furthermore, Howard always maintained a close eye on domestic public 
opinion.  Bisley argues that Howard more than any other political leader shaped his foreign 
policy via domestic political considerations and electoral calculations.144
Since his take-up of the political leadership in 2007, Prime Minister Rudd has dominated 
Australia’s foreign policy agenda.  Rudd employs rhetoric and aspirations with a strong 
public diplomacy flavour (including speaking to Chinese audiences in their own language).  
His agenda has renewed Australia’s interest and engagement in multilateral systems, and re-
established a role for Australia in shaping international outcomes based upon previous traits 
of good international citizenship.  To achieve this agenda, Rudd has embraced the language 
of creative and collaborative diplomacy and regional community building and has set an 
ambitious agenda for the Australian diplomatic service.  As Allan Gyngell states, Rudd’s 
strategy ‘requires extensive coalition building and a diplomacy with a global reach’, which 
can be outside the boundaries of traditional diplomacy, and brings public diplomacy to the 
 As proposed in the 
subsequent chapter such an attention to and garnering of domestic public opinion as a 
consolidation strategy is a form of public diplomacy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
interest in the arts sparked an effort to revive Australia’s cultural diplomacy activity, under the auspices of the 
Australian International Cultural Council, the impact of which it might be argued was felt only at the margins of 
diplomatic practice. 
144 Bisley ‘Advancing the national interest in a globalised world, p.4. 
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centre of practice.145  Yet the substantial budget reallocations and cuts from the DFAT budget 
along with the removal of diplomatic positions and consolidation of missions, continues a 
trend of eroding DFAT resources that jeopardises the future of strategic public diplomacy in 
Australia. 146
3.4.1 Australia in the Asia-Pacific – a case for public diplomacy 
  
Australia’s diplomatic approach to the Asia Pacific region deserves attention, in particular in 
terms of whether the environment has been and will continue to be responsive to public 
diplomacy practice.  Being a torn country in Huntington’s view of the world, would suggest 
that Australia would need to consider the Australian cultural identity in approaching the Asia 
Pacific region within which it is located.  Huntington (might even) suggest redefinition of the 
Australian cultural identity is required.  The redefinition of national identity does not occur 
easily or quickly, and while Australia continues to look to regional engagement mechanisms 
such as APEC, or ASEAN + 3 as a means of maintaining strong linkages with close 
neighbours, full cultural redefinition remains incongruent with Australian traditional and 
current foreign policy positioning.147
                                                 
145 A Gyngell, ‘Ambition: the emerging foreign policy of the Rudd Government’, Lowy Institute Analysis, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, Sydney, December 2008, p.1. 
146 Chapter 1 (pp.43, 44)  of this thesis provides an overview of the 2009-2010 budget cuts sustained by DFAT.   
147 For example, particularly as a nation that continues to vote within the United Nations as a member of the 
informal Western European and Others Group (WEOG), retains strong and symbolic ties to the colonial 
monarchy, and vigorously pursues the bilateral friendship with the United States as a fundamental pillar of 
foreign policy.  Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, p.61.  Also, as Capling 
alludes the terminology of Asia-Pacific for the purposes of APEC signals a deliberate attempt on the part of 
Australia (and Japan) to ensure the inclusion of the US within the broader membership base, rather than an 
attempt to fully reorient itself in Asia. A Capling, ‘Twenty years of engagement with Asia’, Pacific Review, Vol 
21(5), 2008, p.603. In addition, there is a substantial body of Australian literature regarding Australia’s identity 
within the Asian region spanning several decades.  For further references see M Barr, Cultural Politics and 
Asian Values: The Tepid War, Routledge, New York, 2002; Cotton and Ravenhill (eds), Seeking Asian 
Engagement; S Fitzgerald, Is Australia an Asian Country: Can Australia survive in an East Asian future?, Allen 
and Unwin, St Leonards, 1997; Stephen Castles et al, Mistaken Identity: multiculturalism and the demise of 
nationalism in Australia, 2nd ed., Pluto Press, Sydney, 1988; and A Milner, ‘What’s left of engagement in 
Asia?’.    
 More importantly there is little evidence to suggest that 
the Australian population would support such redefinition, and recent past experiences would 
indicate that the Asia Pacific region may not wholeheartedly welcome Australia into the fold. 
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For example, Capling reminds us that the efforts of the Keating government in the early 
1990s ‘to forge a new national identity for Australia as an independent, cosmopolitan society, 
located in Asia, with an international role’, were ‘challenged and contested, not only by other 
governments in the region but also by many at home who rejected Keating’s attempts to 
reshape Australian identity through engagement with Asia’.148
As already noted, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Labor administration driven by Hawke, 
and Keating, with Evans responsible for the foreign affairs portfolio drew upon the early 
notions of public diplomacy in establishing Australia’s place within the region.  They sought 
to enmesh Australian interests in the Asian Pacific, including through the APEC architecture.  
Official negotiations were and remain underpinned with the symbolism of the Annual 
Leaders’ Summits, and built upon the goodwill engendered for most through high level 
  The challenges therefore 
presented by the cultural divide require consideration in diplomacy method, and provide the 
platform for the consideration of the importance of the Australian image and reputation in 
supporting positive diplomatic outcomes, and the role for public diplomacy activities as 
underpinning traditional practice.   
 
Australia is a significant middle power with much at stake particularly within the broader 
Asia-Pacific region.  Huntington, Leonard, Small and Rose raise pertinent issues in their 
interpretation of the ‘age of schisms’ and potential categories of cultural divides that threaten 
international order and stability, that are relevant to Australia in terms of how Australian 
governments and diplomats might navigate through the potential divides that may directly 
impact upon Australian national interests.   
 
                                                 
148 Capling, ‘Twenty years of engagement with Asia’, p.602.   
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Ministerial and Prime Ministerial visits.149  At the same time, Australia actively pursued 
negotiation roles, including at the helm of the Cambodian peace process, and initiated 
cultural and youth exchange programs within the region.150
ii) recognising that Australia in vigorously pursuing its national interests in the region should do so as a 
confident and natural partner in a common neighbourhood of remarkable diversity, rather than as a 
cultural misfit trapped by geography.
  The Asia-Australia Institute 
(now defunct) emerged as a leading think-tank on Asian engagement from the University of 
New South Wales, and a new push for Asian languages to be taught throughout Australian 
schools came to the fore across each of the Australian states.  In describing Australia’s policy 
approach to the Asian region, in 1989 Evans clearly articulated an approach that incorporated 
public diplomacy practice that included: 
i) building a more diverse array of linkages with the countries of South East Asia, so that they have an 
important national interest in the maintenance of a positive relationship with Australia; and   
151
champion the constitutional monarchy, reject ethnocentric views of multiculturalism, repudiate the ‘black 
arm-band’ view of Australian history, oppose an apology for past injustices upon the indigenous peoples, 
extol the virtues of the traditional family model, promote a nationalism from the foundations of ANZAC, 
mateship and the common man, and champion the ‘Australian way of life’. 
 
 
By contrast, from 1996, Howard approached Asia as a cultural traditionalist, that saw him: 
152
The result was a foreign policy driven more than ever by domestic public opinion, the 
downgrading of Asian engagements, weakened support for multilateral engagement and 
  
 
                                                 
149 While APEC commenced as an informal Ministers’ dialogue from 1989, the first of the Annual Leaders’ 
Meetings was held in the United States in 1993, and from that time the tradition of the leaders’ meeting, at 
which the leaders are photographed together in the national dress or costume of the host country has become an 
important symbol of collaboration.  APEC Website: http://www.apec.org/ 
150 From July 1989 to May 1993 Australia (and particularly DFAT and the Department of Defence) was actively 
involved in the development, diplomatic negotiation and leadership of the United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC), a key initiative to broker peaceful settlement and allow for democratic elections to take 
place in Cambodia.  For further discussion on Australia’s role in the Cambodian Peace process refer to: Gyngell, 
Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, pp 88-95.  See also K Berry, Cambodia – From Red to Blue: 
Australia’s Initiative for Peace, Allan and Unwin, Sydney, 1997.  Also, Asialink provides a positive example of 
the organisations that developed and supported opportunities for cultural and education exchange within the 
region.   Established within Melbourne University in 1990, Asialink's mission is to ‘create a new generation of 
Australians who are knowledgeable about the countries of Asia and who understand more fully what we can 
learn from our neighbours and what we can contribute to the region in which we live. Following a series of 
search conferences with experts from around Australia, Asialink developed programs in education, the arts, 
business and community awareness, with education being its first priority’. See also 
http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/about_asialink/history 
151 Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990’s, p.196. 
152 Kelly, Howard’s decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal, p.23. 
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focus on the U.S. and alliance diplomacy tactics.153  Prime Minister Howard presented his 
policies as ‘promoting national interests in accord with the values of the Australian 
people’.154 Howard’s Foreign Minister, Downer echoed such sentiments in his opening 
speech to the Asia Leaders’ Forum in Beijing when he drew the dangerous distinction 
between cultural and practical regionalism, and by so doing implied that from a value and 
culture-based perspective Australia did not fit into, and was therefore not interested in fitting 
into, the East Asian community.155
The issue of cultural identity flared with the entry of Pauline Hanson and the One Nation 
Party onto the Australian political stage. The One Nation anti-Asia, anti-immigration policy 
agenda gained significant domestic support within Australia and immediately caught the 
attention of Australia’s regional neighbours – reawakening old resentments and provoking 
intense regional anger towards Australia, ‘it served to remind Asians, that Australia had 
within living memory practiced a white Australia policy, and that some influential 
Australians might not yet have entirely renounced its attractions’.
 
 
156  Howard’s response was 
at best cautious, and a campaign was only mounted against Hanson when her ratings in the 
polls climbed to a level which may have posed a threat to Government control of the Senate.  
Howard’s failure to publicly rebuke the One Nation statements, and at the same time 
positively reinforce Australia’s commitment to the region, simply reinforced his own 
perceived position on issues relating to Australia’s position within the region, and some argue 
damaged Howard’s and Australian credibility within the region.157
                                                 
153 Ibid, p 7. 
154 Ibid, p 13. 
155 A Downer, Opening speech to the Asia Leaders’ Forum.  
156 C Kessler, ‘Surely you must be joking, Mr Mahatir’, The Asia Australia Papers, No.3, June 2000, p.163. 
157 Firth, Australia in International Politics, p.256.  See also R Manne (ed), The Howard Years, Black Inc. 
Agenda, Melbourne, 2004, p.50. Capling, ‘Twenty years of engagement in Asia, p. 602.  
  By contrast Capling 
proposes such damage ‘has not transpired, and Australia’s standing in the region is as good if 
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not better than anything Labor could have hoped for in the 1990s’.158 Though as discussed 
later within this thesis, the potential improvements regarding Australia’s positioning within 
the region, ‘resulted more from a serendipitous confluence of interests than as a result of the 
Howard government’s embrace of bilateralism and pragmatism’.159
The crisis in East Timor, and Australia’s seemingly inappropriate and inconsistent response 
sparked vehement criticism, on the domestic, bilateral and regional fronts.
   
 
160  Australia’s 
impressive role in negotiating and leading the International Force for East Timor 
(INTERFET) was overshadowed by Prime Minister Howard’s subsequent suggestion of 
Australia filling a deputy peacekeeping role on behalf of United States interests in the region 
under the guise of the ‘Howard Doctrine’.161  Howard’s claim that because of Australia’s 
characteristics as a ‘European, Western civilization with strong links to the North America’ it 
was able to ‘do something that no other country could do’, in leading of INTERFET drew 
quick criticism from regional neighbours.162 The ‘jingoism, neo-colonialism and latent 
racism’ implied by the Howard Doctrine evoked a bitter reaction from regional leaders – and 
seriously impacted on the fragile relations with the newly elected Indonesian President 
Wahid, at that time.163
                                                 
158 Capling, ‘Twenty years of engagement in Asia, p. 602.  This point is specifically supported by Higgot and 
Nossal, ‘Odd man in, odd man out’, p.626. 
159 For example, Australia’s standing in Asia was impacted by ‘exogenous factors [including] the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997, the ousting of Suharto, the rise of China, and the Australian role in the December 2004 
tsunami’.  Higgott and Nossal, ‘Odd man in, odd man out’, p.626.  
160 For further reading on Australia’s role in East Timor, including with regard to the Indonesia, the Timor Gap 
Treaty and Timor Leste independence see also James Dunn, Timor: A people betrayed, Jacaranda, Milton, 1983; 
Clinton Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the Independence of East Timor, Scribe 
Publications, Carlton, 2004; Firth, Australia in International Politics; and Edwards and Goldsworthy (eds), 
Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Vols 1 and 2.   
161 Woolcott, ‘Stop Waltzing and advance our nation fairly’. See also Leaver, ‘The meanings, origins and 
implications of the “Howard Doctrine”’; and F Brenchley, ‘The Howard Defence Doctrine’, The Bulletin, 28 
September 1999; and Milner, ‘What’s left of engagement with Asia’. 
162 Brenchley, ‘The Howard Defence Doctrine’.  
163 Woolcott, ‘Stop Waltzing and advance our nation fairly’. 
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By 2000, Australia’s standing and reputation in the region had plummeted significantly. A 
host of domestic and international policy issues, including the public rejection of an 
Australian Republic, the continued support of mandatory sentencing laws and failure to act 
on Indigenous deaths in custody despite United Nations attention to such issues, the 
withdrawal from the United Nations Human Rights Committee process, overall lack of 
leadership on national reconciliation and marginalised voting patterns aligned to United 
States interests in the United Nations General Assembly supported the view of Australia as a 
lackey of the US with a cultural traditionalist approach.  These views contributed to regional 
confusion about Australia’s foreign policy direction.  The most vocal and notable critic of 
Australia’s standing was Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad who openly 
stated at the time that Prime Minister Howard would not be welcome in the region.164
Since 2000, Australia’s standing in the Asian region has continued to fluctuate in the absence 
of a consistent long-term approach to relationship-building, including at the grassroots. The 
12 October 2002 suicide bombing in Kuta, Bali, reported by the Australian Federal Police as 
‘Australia’s September 11 because of the number of Australians killed’, gave rise to a 
reinvigorated relationship between Prime Minister Howard with then Indonesian President 
Abdurrahman Wahid based upon the common and serious threat to national security.
    
 
165
                                                 
164 Kelly, ‘Firing from the chip on his shoulder’. Malaysian former Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamad is quoted 
as saying about then Australian Prime Minister John Howard, ‘If Australia wants to be a friend of Asia it should 
stop behaving as if it is there to teach us how to run our country. It is a small nation in terms of numbers and it 
should behave like a small nation and not be a teacher,’.  When asked whether he thought Howard was welcome 
in the region, Mahathir said: ‘No, I don't think so. Not in Malaysia, anyway’.  Business Services Industry, 
‘Asia’s ‘bully’ hits back – the squabble between John Howard and Mahathir Mohamad’, Business Asia, June 
2000 viewed on 20 October 2009 <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BJT/is_10_8/ai_63767966/> 
   The 
relationship has been bolstered by the common commitment to fight terrorism, including 
through the involvement of Australian Federal Police working on the ground with Indonesian 
165 Australian Federal Police, ‘Bali Bombings’, Australian Federal Police website: 
http://www.afp.gov.au/international/operations/previous_operations/bali_bombings_2002.html.  Kelly 
’Howard’s Decade: An Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal’.  I Coton, ‘Australia Ties: East Timor, Bali 
Bombings, Tsunami and Beyond’, The Jakarta Post, 7 March 2005.   
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police in the subsequent investigation.  Australia’s subsequent overwhelming aid and disaster 
recovery response to the Indian Ocean tsunami ‘heralded a new era of close relations between 
the two countries’, according to the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia.166
As these events demonstrate, Australia’s relationship in the region, and particularly with 
Indonesia has been one ‘characterised by peaks and troughs, seldom has there been the stable, 
friendly, cooperative and long-term relationship that some would expect of close 
neighbours’.
  
 
167
Australia faces new uncertainties and challenges within the immediate region, including 
significant shifts in the balance of power bringing China and India to the forefront of regional 
politics.  The way in which these powers participate in and address regional and global issues 
will be ‘significant determinants of the future international system’.
  Opportunities that have allowed personal lasting relationships to develop, 
including in the policing cooperation in the wake of the Bali bombings, and the disaster 
recovery efforts in the aftermath of the tsunami have had significant impact on the overall 
health of the relationship.   However, these events also demonstrate once again that the nature 
of Australia’s current public diplomacy program is fragmented, ad hoc and driven by crisis.   
 
168
                                                 
166 Banham, ‘Australia, Indonesia closer than ever’, Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 2005.  Following the 
Indian Ocean tsunami which ravaged the Indonesian province of Aceh, then Australian Prime Minister 
committed over $500 million in aid to Indonesia, along with 350 military personnel, seven large aircraft, three 
helicopters, the transport warship HMAS Kanimbla, and a 480,000-litre-a-day water purifying plant as part of 
the relief operations.   
167 Banham, ‘Australia, Indonesia closer than ever’. 
168 Gyngell, ‘Ambition: the Emerging Foreign Policy of the Rudd Government’, p.8. 
As a past student of 
China, this is an area of specific and personal interest for Prime Minister Rudd, and when 
speaking last year to students at Peking University (in an act of true public diplomacy), he 
reflected upon the relationship between the two nations as reflecting ‘a true friendship which 
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offers unflinching advice and counsels restraint to engage in dialogue about matters of 
contention’.169
as the first elected Mandarin-speaking leader outside the Chinese-speaking world, Rudd's linguistic 
ability and lived knowledge of China suggested a new, more grounded style of engagement with Asia. In 
China, the fact that Rudd was the first elected leader of a democratic country to have studied and become 
fluent in the main language of the country made him something of a celebrity.
  According to Michael Dutton, Chair of the Griffith Asia Institute: 
170
Australia’s relationship with China has been subsequently marred by issues, including 
China’s jailing of an Australian citizen and executive of Anglo-Australian mining firm, Rio 
Tinto on claims of commercial spying and subversion, and granting of a visa to and 
subsequent visit by the Uighur activist to participate in the Melbourne film festival.
  
 
Rudd evidently was laying the ground work for the bilateral relationship, and establishing a 
position for Australia within the region vis a vis China.   
 
171  While 
diplomatic action was taken by both sides, the Chinese Press have reported Australia as being 
‘sino-phobic’ and ‘challenging China’s core national interests’.172  Such statements not only 
wound the Australian reputation in China, but may reignite past (images of) Australian anti-
Asian sentiment more broadly across the region.  With hindsight, Dutton suggests that ‘Rudd 
may have missed (or even studiously avoided) the opportunity to forge a 'special relationship' 
with the People's Republic of China in the political arena’.173
                                                 
169 K Rudd, ‘Speech to Chinese Students At Peking University, Peking University, 9 April 2009, viewed on 15 
December 2009, < http://www.news.com.au/adelaidenow/story/0,22606,23511829-5006301,00.html> 
170 M Dutton and D Kessler, ‘Australia’s Asia: An Illiterate Future’, China Heritage Quarterly, Australian 
National University, No19, September 2009: 
http://www.chinaheritagenewsletter.org/articles.php?searchterm=019_australia_asia.inc&issue=019 
171 BBC, ‘Australia-China tie challenging’, BBC Online News, Thursday 20 August 2009, viewed on 20 
October 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8211025.stm> 
172 Ibid. 
173 Dutton and Kessler, ‘Australia’s Asia: An Illiterate Future’. 
  With this in mind, perhaps 
Rudd’s earlier ad hoc attempts to employ public diplomacy through language and show 
himself to be a ‘China hand’ may not have been sufficiently strategic to smooth out the 
ongoing diplomatic pressures of the Australia-China relationship in the future. Rudd’s 
experiences in navigating the many challenges of the Australia-China relationship might also 
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serve to caution against the strong reliance upon personal diplomacy, and promote instead the 
need for a systemic, robust and coherent public diplomacy program.  
 
The significant actual and potential impact the effect of such incidents of misunderstanding 
between Australia and China became clear when Rio Tinto pulled out of a $A19.5 billion 
dollar investment deal with China’s Chinalco (before the arrest of Stern Hu); and signature of 
a further $A41 billion dollar agreement between PetroChina and Australia was put at risk.174  
In addition, several Chinese film makers withdrew from the Melbourne Film Festival in 
protest of Australian actions.  In this instance, there is a strategic role for public diplomacy in 
both addressing the negative media, but also in establishing and building Australia’s 
reputation and image with the Chinese people, and more broadly amongst the Chinese 
diaspora across the region.175  The fact that China is Australia largest trading partner (worth 
$53 billion in 2008), may have been the motivation for Rudd to speak to the Chinese students 
of Peking University last year, and continues to motivate Rudd’s push to become the most 
‘Asian literate country in the collective West’.176
                                                 
174 BBC, ‘PetroChina in huge Australia deal’, BBC Online News, Wednesday 18 August 2009, found at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8208877.stm 
175 The gift of Giant Pandas Wangwang and Funi by China to Australia was recently realised when the two 
pandas arrived at Adelaide Zoo.  Such a gift is a strong public diplomacy statement and should be well received 
by Australian foreign policy makers as a sign that the bilateral relationship is in good shape.  Less apparent in 
recent media attention was the fact that the gift was formalised in 2007 between China’s President Hu and 
former Prime Minister Howard, as a lasting reminder of the warm relations between Australia and China and the 
successful visit of President Hu to Australia at that time.  While the gift does not necessarily reflect on the 
nature of the relationship since Rudd took office, the fact that the Pandas arrived might be seen as endorsement.  
Also, while the rhetoric reflects a ‘lasting relationship’ between the two countries, there is value in noting that 
the fine print of the agreement qualifies this as a finite term of ten years, noting that the ‘gift’  is actually 
considered to be a ‘loan’.  Of significance, this is no altruistic gift, and the pandas are expected to have a 
significant impact on tourism to Adelaide and Australia.  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘A Pair of 
Pandas for Adelaide Zoo’, Media Release, Commonwealth of Australia, 6 September 2007.  ‘Adelaide ready for 
Giant Pandas’ Arrival’, NZ Herald, 27 November 2009, viewed on 2 December 2009, 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/asia/news/article.cfm?l_id=3&objectid=10612071&pnum=1> 
 As Rudd himself has reflected, ‘the China-
176 A Gyngell, ‘Kevin Rudd’s Big Idea’, found at: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2008/06/Kevin-Rudd’s-
big-idea.aspx.  BBC, ‘China Urges Respect in Rio Case’, BBC Online News, viewed on 20 October 2009, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8180872.stm> 
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Australia relationship is always full of challenges and can I say it always has been thus and it 
will be thus for quite a long time to come’.177
Globalization might mean the world has become smaller, but one side effect of this process is that 
particular regions have also become much more tightly enmeshed. For Australia, this has meant that the 
much-discussed 'tyranny of distance' has been transformed into an era dominated by the proximity to 
markets and, here Australia has a distinct advantage. Whether in regard to education or the trade in 
primary resources, the nation's wealth is increasingly derived from the north. Yet as a nation, Australians 
generally remain woefully ignorant of their near and important northern neighbours' societies, cultures 
and languages.
   
 
As the DFAT submission to the Senate Inquiry demonstrates, Australia is active in public 
diplomacy, and the Australian public support the use of creative and smart diplomacy to meet 
the challenges of the international environment.  However, Australia’s understanding of 
public diplomacy has not maintained pace with the understanding and emerging trends and 
practices abroad.    
 
Overall, building Australia’s positive standing and longer-term relationship with Asia is 
critical to Australia’s ongoing national interests.  To engage with this challenge means that 
Australia must firstly seek to understand public diplomacy in the contemporary context, and 
carefully consider its strategic commitment to this public diplomacy.  A significant aspect to 
public diplomacy comes from the ‘understanding’ and ‘engaging’ activities, highlighted in 
the Senate Committee definition. Such activities are particularly important to the 
development of Australia’s relationship within Asia.  Furthermore, a public diplomacy 
program must comprise more than one-off or random events like the Prime Minister’s 
speaking at one event in Chinese, or a one-off development response to a disaster.  While 
such actions are positive in themselves, they do not sufficiently build Australian 
understanding of the region, nor maintain a strong and lasting relationship.  As Dutton notes: 
178
 
 
                                                 
177 BBC, ‘Australia-China tie challenging’, BBC Online News, Thursday 20 August 2009, found at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8211025.stm 
178 Dutton and Kessler, ‘Australia’s Asia: An Illiterate Future’. 
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This chapter has covered a range of opportunities that might allow the Australian public 
diplomacy program to be improved.  These include firstly an engagement of academics and 
practitioners in the international discussions on public diplomacy.  The unravelling of public 
diplomacy theory and practice opens new venues for improvements in practice, including in 
understanding the use of new interactive technologies that will allow Australia to be 
competitive upon the already crowded multi-dimensional international stage.  Other 
opportunities, like taking up the challenge to be the ‘most Asian-language literate country in 
Asia’, or developing and deepening linkages with the Australian diaspora are also key 
activities that will provide greater substance to the current program.179
                                                 
179 Ibid. For a summary of the Australian Government’s response to the call made during the Australian 2020 
Summit for Australia to develop a strong sense of Asian literacy  refer to the Australia 2020 Summit, Final 
Report.   
  However, above all 
else, the theme that continues to take precedence is the need to establish the critical link 
between public diplomacy and strategic foreign policy.  Australia’s public diplomacy 
program will need to shift from a currently fragmented and inconsistent approach to a policy-
based approach if public diplomacy is to become an effective tool for leveraging the 
Australian image and reputation, building lasting and solid relationships and ultimately 
progressing Australian foreign policy priorities.   
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CHAPTER 4:  PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN ACTION 
 
Defining public diplomacy, including vis a vis traditional diplomacy as a strategic instrument 
used by nation states in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, provides the fundamental 
platform from which this thesis proposes that contemporary public diplomacy is an 
innovation of traditional diplomacy.  By virtue of the channels, networks, media types and 
audiences that public diplomacy activities encompass, such activities clearly extend the 
reach, impact and relevance of diplomacy within the dynamic and complex modern 
environment in which states operate.  Essential to the understanding of public diplomacy as 
an instrument of foreign policy that sits alongside traditional diplomacy in the diplomat’s 
toolbox, is the need to understand how and why public diplomacy delivers outcomes.  How 
does understanding, engaging and influencing foreign publics achieve foreign policy 
outcomes and advance national interests?  
4.1 Public diplomacy - beyond definitions 
Public diplomacy is complex, subtle and far reaching. Public diplomacy as an instrument of 
‘soft power’ can allow states to gain influence and shape political agendas through the 
engagement of foreign publics, beyond the boundaries of the traditional hard powers, such as 
the use of military or economic strength to make others follow your will.1 At its core, public 
diplomacy refers to the use of ‘government sponsored programs intended to inform or 
influence public opinion in other countries’.2  Potter observes that public diplomacy is not 
just a foreign policy challenge, but also a national challenge.3
                                                 
1 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. 
2 U.S. Department of State Library, Dictionary of International Relations Terms, US, GPO, Washington 
DC,1987: http://openlibrary.org/b/OL2493850M/Dictionary_of_international_relations_terms. 
3 Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, p.6. 
  For example, the conduct of a 
group of UK football supporters can have an impact on the national reputation and image, 
even though those individuals are acting outside the parameters of state sanctioned public 
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diplomacy activities.4
The complexities that underpin the definition of public diplomacy and in particular that link 
public diplomacy to the concept of soft power require further unravelling.  The degree to 
which public diplomacy activities can engage and influence foreign audiences, is supported 
by the national reputation, image and identity of the initiating state, and the extent to which 
receiving audiences will seek to relate to that image or identity.  The concepts of national 
reputation, image and identity are given sporadic attention in contemporary literature and 
discussion about public diplomacy, but the analysis of the degree to which these concepts are 
linked to public diplomacy is developing.
 Such a perspective adds to the layered and complex nature of public 
diplomacy. While liberal democratic states would not normally govern the behaviours of 
citizens travelling abroad, there is value in revisiting the importance of person-to-person 
contacts.  Such individuals are well placed to project the image and reputation of their home 
state abroad.   
 
5
Some years ago the issue of ‘country image’ began to take centre stage in diplomatic and many other 
circles, among other reasons because we are in an increasingly interconnected world, and also, in a way, 
one that is increasingly homogenous and globalised, where every country needs to identify itself and 
offer its own unique and differentiating aspects.
 However, the conclusion that is most widely 
accepted is that image, reputation and identity are critical to the ability of a state to engage 
and influence foreign (and domestic audiences) in the increasingly globalised, connected and 
competitive world.  In her opening speech to the 2006 Madrid Conference on Public 
Diplomacy, then Spanish Culture Minister, Carmen Calvo remarked: 
6
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Public diplomacy readings routinely refer to concepts such as image, reputation and identity.  However, there 
is little further discussion that drills further into these concepts, as if an assumption is made that these concepts 
are well understood.  See for example, Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’; Hocking, ‘Rethinking the New 
Public Diplomacy’; Snow, ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy’; and Nye, Soft power: the Means to Success in World 
Power.   
6 C Calvo, ‘The present and future of public diplomacy:  A European perspective’, The 2006 Madrid Conference 
on public diplomacy, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, 2006.  
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There is value in noting that the concepts of national reputation, image and identity can work 
in both positive and negative ways.  As Leonard explains: 
public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public goods 
which can create either an enabling or a disabling environment for individual transactions.  Work on 
particular issues will feed off the general image of a country and reflect back onto it – in both positive 
and negative directions.7
Australian bureaucratic rhetoric and structures indicate an awareness of the importance of 
national reputation, image and identity to the success of public diplomacy.  For example, the 
DFAT Budget Statement (2007-2008) notes the accountability that rests with the department 
in ‘promoting …better understanding of Australia’s identity, values and ideas overseas’.
 
 
8  
The work unit within DFAT responsible for public diplomacy program is the Images of 
Australia Branch; and the Senate Inquiry was framed under the title, Building Our National 
Image.  However, the naming conventions and rhetoric illustrate only superficial 
understanding of the importance of reputation, image, and identity in Australia’s public 
diplomacy program.  The importance of Australia’s national reputation in pursuit of foreign 
policy came to a head recently with the extremely negative media coverage of Australia by 
Indian and Asian media relating to the Indian student bashings, education related visa scams 
and collapse of high profile educational institutions offering study programs to Indian 
students.9  The racist image of Australia promoted through media (particularly in India, but 
throughout Asia) escalated when the associated international education crisis was revealed.  
The events ‘made headlines around the world and India has warned it could jeopardise 
Australia's lucrative education sector, which earns $2 billion annually from Indian 
students’.10
                                                 
7 Leonard, Public Diplomacy, Foreign Policy Centre, London, 2002, p. 9. 
8 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Budget Statement 2007-08, p.1 
9 Dubey, ‘Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under’; Bolt, ‘We’re not the racists’; BBC News, ‘India Calls 
Off Australia Events’. 
  
10 SBS Online, ‘Rudd moves to reassure India Australia is not racist’, SBS Online, 2 June, 2009. Found at: 
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1020601/Rudd-moves-to-reassure-India-Australia-is-not-racist; Gilmore, 
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The fact that the Indian education crisis issue escalated and was taken up so quickly and 
dramatically within the Indian community, is an indication that Australia had not given 
enough overall attention to building a sufficiently credible Australian image and reputation in 
India over the long term (with specific reference to supporting the needs of Indian students 
and families taking part in the Australian education system) to weather the difficulties when 
they arise.  Such an example gives insight to the varying timeframes against which public 
diplomacy may operate – in some cases public diplomacy is required to be actioned for short-
term crisis response, but there is a place for the development of a long range view within a 
public diplomacy program.  While activities work across both short and long term 
timeframes, there appears to be a greater benefit derived from the latter.  Melissen makes the 
point that, ‘public diplomacy should be in tune with medium term objectives and long term 
aims…and public diplomacy works best with a long horizon’.11
This chapter addresses the intersection between public diplomacy and the core concepts of 
image, identity and reputation.  The examination of such concepts leads to a discussion of 
soft power, and the value of public diplomacy in building the soft power capability of 
states.
   
 
12  Once again, the literature, particularly that emanating from Clingendael (with 
authors such as Melissen, Hocking, and Fiske de Gouveia), is quick to point out that ‘public 
diplomacy is one of soft power’s key instruments’.13
                                                                                                                                                        
‘China Speaks Out on Student Attacks’, Sydney Morning Herald; Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: 
International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.1.   
11 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.4. 
12 The source of readings on soft power is Dr Joseph Nye.  The concept of soft power was first articulated by 
Nye in his book, Bound to Lead (1990).  He further developed the concept in development of the next 
publication, The Paradox of American Power (2001) and has explored the concept again in the more recent 
publication Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics (2004).  Nye is former dean of the Kennedy 
School of Government at Harvard University, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and former 
Assistant Secretary of Defence in the Clinton administration.   
13 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.4. 
  Once the underlying threads of 
reputation, image, and identity are understood as intrinsic to public diplomacy, with the 
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appropriate reflection upon their capacity to generate soft power, the exploration must then 
turn to a discussion of what shape public diplomacy takes in action, and to the many and 
varied tools and methods of public diplomacy activity. 
4.2 Building soft power through public diplomacy  
 
Melissen proposes that ‘public diplomacy can be seen as a symptom of the rise of soft power, 
and a part of the changing fabric of international relations’.14 Soft power, as defined by Nye, 
relates to ‘the influence and attractiveness a nation acquires when others are drawn to its 
culture and ideas’.15  In his 2004 study of the different forms and interrelationships of power 
dynamics, Nye introduces a significant intersection between public diplomacy and his own 
concept of soft power.  According to Nye’s theories of power, public diplomacy is an 
instrument of soft power which can improve a state’s ‘ability to shape the preferences of 
others…and get the outcomes that it wants by co-opting people not coercing them’.16
There are some aspects of difficulty associated with the intersection between soft power and 
public diplomacy.  For example Rasmussen notes that some scholars explicitly define public 
diplomacy in soft power terms, while others such as Melissen, see public diplomacy as an 
instrument of soft power. 
   
 
17
                                                 
14 Ibid, p.8. 
15 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, p. 5. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Rasmussen, ‘Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: Messages and Practices’, pp.7-8. According to 
Rasmussen, examples of those defining public diplomacy in soft power terms include Batora, ‘Public 
Diplomacy in Small and Medium sized States: Norway and Canada’, and Zaharna quoted in K Fitzpatrick, 
‘Advancing the New Public Diplomacy: A Public Relations Perspective’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 
Vol.2, No.3, 2007, p.195.  By contrast, Melissen states, ‘Public diplomacy is one of soft power’s key 
instruments’ in Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.4 (emphasis added). 
 Both Hocking and Henrikson pursue a slightly different line in 
their critique of soft power, ‘highlighting the paradox of associating soft power (or any power 
equation) with public diplomacy, on the basis that if attraction actually worked, there would 
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be no need for public diplomacy’.18 However by reference to Nye, the intersection between 
soft power and public diplomacy becomes clearer, as Nye notes that public diplomacy is the 
instrument that enables the development and wielding of soft power.19
countries most likely to be more attractive in postmodern international relations (that is countries that 
have soft power), are those that help to frame issues, whose culture and ideas are closer to the prevailing 
norms and whose credibility abroad is reinforced by their values and policies.
 Within this context, 
the attractiveness of a state, as portrayed through its identity, values and culture is central to 
soft power. Nye argues that the: 
20
For the purpose of this discussion, it is important to contrast soft power as opposed to the 
notion of ‘hard power – which relies on coercion through force (i.e. military or economic 
force), as the primary means of delivering on key outcomes.
  
 
21  In Nye’s view, public 
diplomacy is one of the tools of soft power; and while the ‘three recognised sources of power 
– military, economic and soft – remain relevant…if the current economic and social trends of 
the information revolution continue, soft power will become more important in the mix’.22
The generic concept of soft power has featured in recent high profile Australian discussions 
and reports including the 2020 Summit Final Report and the Lowy Institute’s Blue Ribbon 
Report on Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit, as being a highly desirable outcome of Australia’s 
  
Despite some scepticism around soft power, Nye’s power theory is widely accepted and 
recognised both within the United States and European academic and practitioner circles.   
 
                                                 
18 Hocking, ‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’, p.35.  Henrikson’s view is similar to that of Hocking, 
noting that ‘power is a misnomer in diplomacy’.  Yet both Hocking and Henrikson acknowledge the reality that 
there is an overlap between soft power and public diplomacy.  However this area of overlap is not fully resolved 
by either Hocking or Henrikson.   Refer to Henrikson, ‘Niche Diplomacy in the Public Arena: Canada and 
Norway’, p.73.    
19  Nye, Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics, pp.99-125.  Melissen’s view aligns with that of 
Nye.   
20 Ibid, p.31. 
21 Hocking, ‘Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplomacy’, p.33.  Hocking also refers to the recently developed 
concept of ‘sticky power’ – the power of economic attraction – which is not widely used, and appears to 
represent a subset of soft power.   
22 Nye, Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics, p.32. 
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diplomatic endeavours. While the language is utilised, the concept of soft power in an 
Australian context remains blurry and intangible, and there is little evidence that Australian 
practitioners or academics have engaged with the notion, beyond high level rhetoric, to 
unpack what soft power means for Australia on the international stage, and how it might be 
achieved.  For example, Lowy Institute Executive Director Wesley views soft power as ‘a 
concept that is still a little underdone’.23  Senator Trood, an advocate for public diplomacy, 
also remarks that the notion of soft power is lacking in any sort of ‘practical or hard-edged 
appeal that would make it relevant to Australian practitioners’.24
However, despite these comments, public diplomacy provides a relevant lens through which 
soft power can be more easily unpacked and understood. The intersection between public 
diplomacy and soft power is critical to understanding the growing importance and discussion 
of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is not an end in itself within foreign policy, ‘nor is it 
an altruistic affair’.
 
 
25  Instead, it is the ability of a nation to employ public diplomacy tools in 
such a way as to influence foreign publics to get the desired foreign policy outcomes without 
having to resort to force or coercion, that is increasingly important: ‘[public diplomacy] can 
pursue a variety of objectives, such as in the field of political dialogue, trade and foreign 
investment, and the establishment of links with civil society groups’.26
                                                 
23 Interview, Michael Wesley, Executive Director, Lowy Institute of International Policy, 13 July 2009.  During 
interview, Wesley also distanced himself from the recommendations of the Australia 2020 Summit, despite the 
high profile role he played through the Summit as facilitator.  He noted that there was a clear intention that the 
facilitators not be seen to have influenced the participants.  This position explains Wesley’s scepticism of ‘soft 
power’ despite the soft power rhetoric of the Australia 2020 Summit.   
24 Interview, Senator Russell Trood, Chair, Senate Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade, 30 June 2009.  
25 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.14.   
26 Ibid. 
 Again this point 
reaffirms Nye’s proposal as supported by Melissen that public diplomacy is an instrument of 
soft power.   
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Leonard builds the intersection between soft power and public diplomacy by articulating the 
key goals of public diplomacy as assisting states to ‘confront two major goals: i) advocacy or 
the presentation of policies in ways that are genuinely convincing and attractive to foreign 
audiences; and ii) trust-building – the creation of a climate of mutual respect, understanding 
and trust, which permits and anticipates disagreement’.27
everyone wants to develop and exercise their ‘soft power’. This is a trend that can only intensify, in a 
globalised world, international communications, and their impact on attitudes and behaviour, have 
profound economic and political implications.  States realise this and are acting accordingly.
  According to Leonard, the ability 
of public diplomacy to progress these goals at a time of complex divides across the political, 
religious and economic landscape places it at the centre of foreign policy for any nation.    
 
As mentioned earlier, Nye suggests that soft power is traded in the currency of shared values, 
ideas and culture reinforced through credible institutions and policies.  Public diplomacy is 
the vehicle that connects such currency to potential traders (those traders being the foreign 
public), on the international stage.  Fiske de Gouveia observes that: 
28
While there appears to be substantial support for the concept of soft power within 
international diplomatic circles, the language of soft power poses a risk in that many political 
leaders and members of the public may relate the notion of ‘soft’ to being a weak option.  In a 
similar way, the language of hard power may translate to some as representing strength (as a 
positive) which can easily move towards bullying (a negative).  Perhaps this is the rationale 
behind Nye’s more recent writings and interviews in which he notes that ‘effective strategies 
in the real world are a mix of hard and soft power, and that combination of hard and soft 
power in effective ways is what is called ‘smart power’.’
  
 
29
                                                 
27 Leonard, Small, and Rose, British Public Diplomacy in the Age of Schisms, p.36. 
28 Fiske de Gouveia, ‘The Future of Public Diplomacy’, p.5.  
29 Nye, ‘Joseph Nye on Smart Power’, Interview with the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 3 July 2008. 
  
 
158 
 
A cynic might argue that ‘smart power’ language introduced by Nye, provides states and 
leaders with a convenient escape from the stereotype perceptions that accompany the 
perceptions of soft and hard, while instead promoting the positive associations that 
accompany the term ‘smart’.  At the same time, Nye’s articulation of smart power has been 
used to describe the United States approach to the Taliban in Afghanistan.30
Prior to Nye’s invention of the concept soft power, former Australian Foreign Minister, 
Gareth Evans coined the term ‘niche diplomacy’ describing the ability of small to middle 
powers who have sufficient size and capacity to play a notable role on the international stage 
through the exercise of persuasive influence (or soft power), where they would not be able to 
impose or coerce outcomes through the use of military of economic force.
  In this instance, 
the use of ‘smart power’ language may achieve value in translating what might be a largely 
‘hard’ and therefore unpopular approach into an approach that may be more palatable to the 
public audiences, because of the label ‘smart’.  The difficulty with the notion of smart power 
representing a mix of hard and soft, is that there is little guidance provided on how that mix 
might be achieved, and this blurs the transparency of actions.  The introduction of 
terminology relating to smart power appears propagandist, and may actually undermine the 
value of distinguishing between hard and soft powers.   
 
31  Evans’ 
description notes that niche diplomacy requires the ‘concentration of resources in specific 
areas best able to generate returns worth having’, and so might be more appropriately aligned 
with today’s concept of public diplomacy as an instrument for building soft power.32
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Evans, Grant, B, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, pp.35-37.  For other applications of 
niche diplomacy to the foreign policy behaviours of small and middle sized powers see Henrikson, ‘Niche 
Diplomacy in the Public Arena: Canada and Norway’, pp.67-85.  Cooper, (ed), Niche Diplomacy:  Middle 
Powers After the Cold War, MacMillan, London 1997.   
32 Evans, Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, p35-37.  
  The 
discussion of soft power from a niche diplomacy perspective is clearly of relevance to 
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Australia as a country that continues to rely on an ability to engage and influence a range of 
actors on the international stage in the interests of progressing foreign policy objectives.33
Evans requires that the state prioritise and focus on the objectives which are identified as 
worth having, and build niche areas or coalitions of interest which may carry greater effect 
than would otherwise be the case.  For example, during Evans’ tenure as Australia’s Foreign 
Minister, emphasis was placed upon building broad coalitions with ‘like-mindeds’, built upon 
a shared common interest (if not common values) through regional and multilateral fora such 
as APEC and The Cairns Group. 
   
 
34  Established in 1986, the Cairns Group brought together 
an interest group of nineteen agricultural exporters from Asia, the Americas, and Australasia, 
and established a sense of commonality of purpose, or an alliance.35  From that point, the 
Cairns Group is recognised as having had significant success in keeping the issue of 
agricultural trade subsidies on the World Trade Organisation agenda – despite resistance from 
major powers of the United States and Europe.36
At the same time, Evans also holds responsibility for pushing Australia’s position on the 
international stage during the late 1980s and 1990s as a ‘good international citizen’.
 The Cairns Group might be seen as an 
example of an unlikely grouping of developing and developed states, all leveraging their soft 
power to establish a coalition, and to achieve a positive outcome that aligned broadly with 
their separate national interests.   
 
37
                                                 
33 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International policy’.   
34 APEC membership at the time of Evans’ concept of niche diplomacy included Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States.   
35 The Cairns Group comprising Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay was unique in the way that it linked 
developing and developed nation for the purpose of promoting a unified view on agricultural trade reform in the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO).   
36 The Cairns Group, viewed on 20 October 2009, < http:// www.cairnsgroup.org> 
37 Evans, ‘Australia’s foreign policy response to global challenges’, p.2. 
 Far 
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more than the pursuit of altruistic goals, Evans is convincing in his submissions that the 
strategic intent of the good international citizen policy was two-fold.  Firstly because ‘in a 
globalised, interdependent, fast-travelling, fast-communicating world, a lot of what at first 
sight seem to be just remote and abstract values issues really do have the capacity to impact 
quite strongly on our traditional security and economic interests’.38  Through this argument, 
Evans places the pursuit of global interests not only on a par with, but within the same space 
as the pursuit of national interests: a theme which clearly resonated with the participants in 
the 2008 Australian 2020 Summit.39
Secondly, Evans states that while certain activities (particularly aid-related activities) may 
appear to be of little benefit to the national interests ‘there is nonetheless a reputational 
advantage which accrues and can be very useful indeed when an issue comes along that is 
more important to us than to others, and on which we want others’ support’.
   
 
40 Under Evans 
foreign ministerial-ship, Australia consistently pursued numerous opportunities to carve out a 
reputation as a ‘good international citizen’, focusing resources (in line with the principles of 
niche diplomacy) onto the key areas of development assistance, human rights and the 
environment and squarely linked to other regional policy objectives, such as the Pacific.41
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Australia 2020 Summit, Final Report, p.359. 
40 Evans, ‘Australia’s foreign policy response to global challenges’, p.2. (emphasis added) 
41 Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, p.40.  
  
The focus was clear, and the foreign policy intent particularly in relation to opportunities for 
reputational advantage was a strategic one.  Through his ‘good international citizen’ 
approach, Evans had clearly connected Australian foreign policy approach of the day 
(reputational advantage) to Nye’s (then undocumented) concept of soft power.   
 
161 
 
Canada and Norway provide similar examples, frequently cited within contemporary public 
diplomacy literature, of middle power states that have also developed the notion of ‘niche 
diplomacy’ in building effective soft power capacity to exert influence on the global stage. 
For example, Canada has utilised its dual French, English heritage and connections to build a 
distinct and active role on the international stage, including within international organisations 
that span the Commonwealth to la Francophonie.42  Canada’s high profile contributions to 
development assistance projects along with a significant role in international peacekeeping 
efforts43, and demonstrated leadership in the international effort to ban anti-personnel 
landmines44 have enabled the Canadian Government to build Canada’s credibility as an 
international good citizen.45
Similarly, for Norway, niche diplomacy is concentrated in building opportunities for shared 
peace.  For example, Norway is known for the Nobel Peace Prize, a clear voting pattern 
within the United Nations, and work in facilitating outcomes for peace.
  
 
46 Through these open 
and publicly communicated activities, Norway has cultivated a distinct identity and 
attractiveness on the global stage, and improves its influence.47
                                                 
42 Henrikson, ‘Niche diplomacy in the world public arena: the global corners of ‘Canada and Norway’, p.68.  
43 According to Canadian politician, David Kilgour as at January 2004, ‘More than 125,000 Canadian military 
personnel and thousands of civilians have been deployed in conflicts from Ethiopia/Eritrea, to East Timor, 
Kosovo, Bosnia, Cyprus, Sierra Leone, Central America and a host of other "hot spots"—including, most 
recently, Afghanistan’.  D Kilgour, ‘Canada’s Peacekeeping role: then and now’, Presentation to University of 
Alberta, 26 January 2004.  
44 Also known as “the Ottawa Process”.  Henrikson, ‘Niche diplomacy in the world public arena: the global 
corners of ‘Canada and Norway’, p.68. 
45 Henrikson, ‘Niche diplomacy in the world public arena: the global corners of ‘Canada and Norway’, p.68.  
See also Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’.   
46 Including in the Middle East (the Oslo Process) commenced in 1993 as an open, time-bound diplomatic peace 
process aimed to end the conflict between Israel and Palestine.   
47 Henrikson, ‘Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: the Global Corners of Canada and Norway’, p.70-
73. 
  Through Norway’s ‘ruthless 
prioritisation of target audiences and concentration on a single message, (Norway as a force 
for peace in the world), Norway has developed a voice and presence out of proportion to its 
162 
 
modest size and resources’.48  Both Canada and Norway have grappled with challenges in 
isolated geographic positioning, though with an abundance of natural resources.  While 
military capacity is moderate, both states have ‘extensive diplomatic outreach’ and used 
networks to great advantage.  The ability to project themselves and their image overseas 
through public diplomacy approaches has been a significant element in their diplomatic 
practice.49
4.2.1 Addressing values, identity and image 
 
 
The contrast to be made between Australia and the states of Norway and Canada appears to 
lie in consistency and strategic alignment of objectives and outcome.  Australia’s indirect 
focus on public diplomacy through good international citizenship and concerns with the 
broader global audience ceased slowly with the change in federal government and subsequent 
changes in foreign policy priorities, approach and responses from 1996.  By contrast, Norway 
and Canada appear to have developed and maintained their reputational advantage (soft 
power) through a consistent focus of resources into areas of identified strength (niche 
diplomacy) and clear communication and engagement with broad foreign audiences (public 
diplomacy). 
 
Without deviating at this stage into an in-depth examination of values, identity and image, 
this thesis cannot ignore the need to undertake a brief discussion of the role played by public 
diplomacy in promoting a nation’s identity, its values and image specifically, as these 
elements are highlighted as the primary currencies of soft power.  In the words of former 
Foreign Minister Downer, ‘At the core of foreign policy are Australian values, which guide 
our approach to the world.  Our national identity informs our foreign policy, not the other 
                                                 
48 Nye, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics, p.112. 
49 Henrikson, ‘Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: the Global Corners of Canada and Norway’, pp.70-
73. 
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way around’.50
A nation’s values and identity generally speaking, are developed and constructed to reflect 
the history, traditions, symbols, and political foundations and institutions of a nation as they 
have evolved over time.
 As Downer’s statement demonstrates, current academic literature and 
government rhetoric brings each of these elements to the fore, but there is little available 
information provided as to what national identity and values really are, and how they might 
fit together for the purpose of developing and delivering public diplomacy policy and 
programs.   
 
51  In terms of how they fit together, theorists Henderson and 
McEwen suggest that values are a useful tool in shaping and reinforcing national identities.  
They suggest that ‘values contribute to defining the collective conception of national identity, 
describing the people that make up the nation, and what it is that binds those people together, 
while distinguishing them from others’.52 From that point, Melissen notes that the image of a 
nation is ‘merely the projection of identity’.53
Indeed, the introduction of values into discussion creates an additional layer separating the 
practice of public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy not mentioned previously.  The 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations sets the parameters for the establishment of 
official and workable diplomatic relations between states with differing values, policies and 
systems in place.  The preamble to that Convention expressly notes that the Convention itself 
is ‘premised on the belief that an international convention on diplomatic intercourse 
privileges and immunities would contribute to the development of friendly relations among 
   
 
                                                 
50 A Downer, ‘Foreign policy values and the media’, Speech to the National Newspaper Publishers’ Conference, 
28 August 2006.  
51 A Henderson, N McEwen, ‘Do Shared Values Underpin National Identity? Examining the Role of Values in 
National Identity in Canada and the United Kingdom’, National Identities, Volume 7, Issue 2 June 2005, p.173. 
52 Ibid. 
53 A Gonesh and J Melissen, ‘Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice’, Diplomacy Papers, No.5, Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, December 2005, p.19.   
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nations irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems’.54
While identity and values are intangible and slippery concepts, they are central in the 
discussion of public diplomacy. To borrow the boiled down definition of public diplomacy 
from Newton Minnow, the high profile former chairman of the United States Federal 
Communications Commission, public diplomacy is ‘the process of explaining and advocating 
American values to the world’, it becomes clear that while not always articulated in the 
official definition, values and identity are at the heart of what is public diplomacy.
  By linking values 
more closely to the development and delivery of foreign policy strategy through public 
diplomacy, it would appear that states may apply some flexibility in their interpretation and 
application of the Vienna Convention, and may pursue an agenda of political transformation 
through public diplomacy strategies based on values, where differences are not in the 
strategic national interest (the concept of transformational public diplomacy will be picked up 
in more detail in the next chapter).   
 
55 
Together, the elements of values and identity are packaged as the national image, or persona 
defined in terms of Jungian psychology as the ‘façade that is presented to the rest of the 
world’.56
                                                 
54 Preamble, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. 
55 N Minnow, former chairman of the RAND Corporation Board of trustees and former chairman of the Federal 
Communications Commission, quoted in Wolf, Rosen, ‘Public Diplomacy: how to think about and improve it’, 
p.iii. 
56 C Jung, ‘Psychological Types’. Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 6. Princeton University Press, August, 
1971.  
  While Jung’s definition has application primarily to the psychological study of 
individuals it is also relevant to the persona (or image) which is constructed by the nation-
state.  The national image may be presented in a multitude of ways, including through the 
media, the Internet, personal networks, publications, cultural displays, conferences, and the 
behaviour and visibility of its people – all activities utilised by public diplomacy.  The 
national image, along with the national identity, and values are at heart of what makes a 
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nation state attractive to a spectrum of audiences (that is, to foreign publics in like-minded 
states, or those living in nations with contrasting values and political systems), and form the 
basis from which nations build their soft power. Leonard, Small and Rose note that ‘there is a 
dynamic relationship between who you are and what you do’.57
Public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public goods 
which can create either an enabling or disabling environment for individual transactions.  Work on 
particular issues will feed off the general image of a country and reflect back onto it – in both positive 
and negative directions.
 Leonard furthermore links 
this notion of identity to public diplomacy whereby:  
58
The Senate Inquiry addressed the issue of Australian image both through the Inquiry 
proceedings and in the Final Report.  Participants to the Inquiry indicated that there was work 
to be done to improve Australia’s image overseas. According to DFAT officials, Australia’s 
public diplomacy program is intended to convey the ‘broad message to the outside world that 
Australia is diverse, dynamic and pluralistic’.
 
 
59
Some commentators, including participants in the Senate Inquiry process, and Australian 
writers like Chris Wallace note that in the absence of a unique message about the Australian 
identity underpinned by credible values, many overseas (and domestic) audiences 
automatically default to images of the natural environment.  One participant in the Senate 
 The concern that surrounds such a message is 
that it is not a message that is unique to Australia, but is mirrored by many other Western 
nations, and does not necessarily differentiate Australia on the highly competitive global 
playing field.  It is not clear whether, or to what extent this message has been successfully 
received, by which audiences, and to what end.  
 
                                                 
57 Leonard, Small, Rose, ‘Public Diplomacy in the “Age of Schisms”’, p.6. 
58 Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, Public Diplomacy, p.9. 
59 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2007, 
p.16. 
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Inquiry, a representative of foreign media stated, ‘Australia has not really had a great interest 
in its image overseas, apart from that we have to look nice and cuddly because we want to get 
the tourists here’.60 Australian author, David Malouf commented a decade ago that ‘visitors 
to our country are still drawn mainly because of the promise of exotic landscapes and 
creatures, by sun, surf and the special interest of our Indigenous people; they are seldom 
disappointed’.61 Yet he continues to note that these elements do not provide full insight in 
into the ‘complex vision of who we are and what we have achieved’ and a place relevant to 
‘the international present’.62A more recent essay by Australian writer, Chris Wallace notes 
that ‘the wider world has locked us into a virtual Nolan painting circa 1955, with embroidery 
at the edges courtesy of Paul Hogan’s films of the 1980s’.63 She concludes that the ‘trail out 
of this impasse is unclear’.64  DFAT officers currently serving overseas (and holding 
responsibility for public diplomacy activities) openly acknowledge the deficit in Australia’s 
image noting that ‘Australia has no national dress, national songs nor literature that are 
widely embraced… and we are left with an apologetic use of indigenous imagery (which 
most of us do not understand), Crocodile Dundee images of the outback (where few of us 
live), kangaroos (which we shoot) and Kylie.  Hardly enough to define a country’.65
As an interesting contrast, political rhetoric surrounding Australian values and identity are 
clear. For example, the values underpinning the Australian identity are frequently noted in 
broad terms as liberal and democratic values that form the basis of a free, pluralistic society, 
manifested through such notions as freedom of speech, protection of human rights and 
 
 
                                                 
60 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, Thursday 12 April 
2007, p32. 
61 D Malouf, Foreword in ‘Securing our Future’, Major Performing Arts Inquiry Final Report, Commonwealth 
of Australia, Canberra, 1999, p94. 
62 Ibid. 
63 C Wallace, ‘Clean, orderly and laminex coloured’, Re-Imagining Australia, Griffith Review, Griffith 
Graduate Centre, August 2008, p.136. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Interviews, Confidential Source including current and former Senior DFAT Officers August-September 2009.   
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freedom of the media, freedom of religion.66
equality of opportunity for individuals regardless of their race, religion or ethnic background.
 According to the Life in Australia publication 
produced by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship since 2007 for people applying 
to live in Australia either permanently or temporarily, Australian society values: 
Respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual, freedom of religion and commitment to the rule of 
law, parliamentary democracy, equality of men and women, and a spirit of egalitarianism that embraces 
mutual respect, tolerance, fair play and compassion for those in need and pursuit of the public good; and 
67
It is not clear which Australians, outside of those working in the relevant bureaucracy 
provided input into the definition of the Australian values for the Department of Immigration 
and Citizenship.  While those people applying for visas to come into Australia must sign their 
understanding of and commitment to these Australian values, there is some evidence to 
suggest that these values are not necessarily fully understood, nor consolidated within the 
broad Australian society.
   
 
68
almost all our popular images express anti-civic values, and do so very powerfully.  The great heroes 
celebrated in Australian myth (who are white and male) are outlaws. They are Ned Kelly, or they are non 
functional or dysfunctional white males who can’t bond with anyone – like the Man from Snowy 
River.
  Indeed events such as the Cronulla riots, and the more recent 
bashings of Indian students in Melbourne provide high profile examples of a possible fracture 
between the political rhetoric and broad Australian sentiment when it comes to Australian 
values.  Continuing this theme of incongruence in Australian values, prominent Australian 
writer and expatriate businesswomen, Jill Kerr Conway argues that: 
69
                                                 
66 T Ewins, ‘Contesting the constructs of national identity and values’, Online Opinion, 27 September 2007. 
67 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Life in Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2007. 
68 Certainly, those citizens born in Australia are not required by Government to read, understand or sign their 
commitment to obey such values.   
69 Kerr Conway, quoted in Wallace, ‘Clean, orderly and laminex coloured’, p.139.  
   
 
If Australia is to pursue effective, strategic public diplomacy, and to project the Australian 
identity and underpinning values towards the rest of the world (including through a 
mechanism like the Life in Australia publication), there is room to widen the debate, 
consideration and input around identity and values.   
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Without dwelling overly on the negative aspects of the values debate, there are also positive 
outcomes to be gained through broad community debate relating to an: 
…enlarged notion of who we are, what we are about and why we are here. Perhaps we need to look 
further, wider, deeper into Australia ourselves…and think about what is in front of us instead of settling 
for the received story.70
understand and embrace Indigenous Australia, including through the introduction of Indigenous folk-
lore, imagery, language and colours through Australian schools, create and protect national customs and 
cultural icons, support and promote Australian technical experts and intellectual talents overseas, and 
promote Australia overseas as the oldest nation on the planet. 
   
 
 The same DFAT officers quoted earlier also provide some ideas, including that Australia 
needs to: 
71
4.2.2 Australia’s place within Asia – a question of identity and values 
  
 
The purpose of this thesis is not to define Australia’s values, identity or image.  However, the 
discussion highlights a richness of ideas within the Australian public that could be harnessed 
into a meaningful discussion and definition of values, identity and image for the purpose of 
promoting Australia overseas. Such an exercise would be costly to the public purse, but both 
challenging, exciting and potentially extremely productive.  As will be discussed in a later 
chapter, this level of public engagement can be achieved most effectively through various 
public diplomacy mechanisms (utilising technology solutions, such as e-policy initiated by 
Canada to gain public input into the development of foreign policy), and can contribute 
positively to subsequent and outward public diplomacy activities.   
The discussion about how the Australian identity and underpinning values have been subject 
to ongoing challenges by virtue of the tension that exists between Australia’s geographic 
location within the Asia Pacific region, and largely European cultural makeup and historical 
                                                 
70 C Wallace, ‘Clean, orderly and laminex coloured’, p.141.  
71 Interviews, Confidential sources including current Senior DFAT Officers, August-September 2009.   
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ties, identified in the previous chapter vis a vis Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory.  As 
alluded to previously, Australia has for much of the last century thought of itself, and been 
thought of as ‘an Anglophonic and Anglophilic outpost – tied by history, language, culture, 
economics and emotion to Europe and North America’.72  Such positioning has been 
reinforced by factors such as Australia’s unwavering alliance with the United States, the 
white Australia immigration policies of the past, the popularity of the One Nation anti-Asian 
sentiment in Australian politics through the 1990s, and a voting connection (that continues 
today) to the Western and Others Group (known as WEOG) within the United Nations 
General Assembly system.73  Yet the reality of Australia’s geographic positioning, and 
subsequent implications for the broader Australian national interest, has encouraged attempts 
at the deliberate reframing of the national identity and values for the Asian Pacific 
audience.74
As discussed earlier, the Australian identity debate and rhetoric has moved back and forth 
markedly since 1983 as the various political leaders from Hawke to Keating, to Howard, and 
now to Rudd, have sought to make their mark on Australia’s foreign policy approach, 
respond to external events and crises and build strategic regional alliances to protect national 
interests.  Under the Hawke and Keating Labour administrations from 1983 to 1996, 
Australia sought to expand and deepen engagement and its identity within the Asia Pacific 
   
 
                                                 
72 Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, p.348.   
73 A Burke, ‘Australia’s Asian Crisis’, Australian Humanities Review, 2001.  Extract from Anthony Burke, In 
Fear of Security: Australia’s Asian Anxiety, Pluto Press Australia, Sydney, 2001, 
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74 R Garnaut, ‘Australia and North East Asian Ascendency’, Report to the Prime Minister and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, AGPS, Canberra, 1989; R Robison, ‘Asian Engagement Necessary’, The Australian, 28 
October 1998; A Milner, ‘The Rhetoric of Asia’, in Cotton J, and Ravenhill, J (eds), Seeking Asian Engagement, 
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‘Australia’s dilemma between geography and history: how consolidated is engagement with Asia’ Australian 
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region.75 Australia’s role in regional coalition building, particularly through the APEC forum 
was pronounced.  Inspired by the outstanding economic growth of the region Australian 
policy faced up to its geographic location,  Australian leadership began to talk of living in an 
East Asian hemisphere nation, and sought to move Australia’s regional approach ‘beyond 
comprehensive engagement to an new plane of partnership and integration’.76  Commentators 
on international policy even wrote of the ‘Asianization of Australia’.77  Yet this accelerated 
pace of Australian engagement with Asia and the accompanying rhetoric created also a sense 
of unease and resistance and ignited cultural uncertainties within both intellectual and 
mainstream thinking.  In particular, this fracture reflected a disconnect between Australian 
and Asian values.78
The spectacular rise of the Asian economies from the 1980s through to the late 1990s against 
difficult odds and despite unconventional practices ‘encouraged the sense of Asian-ness and 
with it a strong element of cultural assertiveness’.
    
 
79
                                                 
75 Refer to, Keating, Engagement: Australia faces the Asia Pacific, Evans, Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations 
in the World of the 1990s’; and G Sheridan, Living with Dragons: Australia Confronts its Asian Destiny, Allen 
and Unwin, Sydney, 1995.  
76 A Milner, ‘Neighbours must be our priority’, The Australian, 1 August 2000. 
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Australia’s Search for a Regional Identity, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2003; M Curry, Identifying Australia’s Region: 
From Evatt to Evans, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.49, No.1, May 1995, pp17-31, Stephen 
Fitzgerald, Is Australia an Asian Country?; and Dutton, M and Kessler, K, ‘Australia’s Asia: An Illiterate 
Future’;  Beeson, Jayasuriya, ‘The Politics of Asian Engagement: Ideas, Institutions and Academics’; Higgott 
and Nossal, ‘Odd man in, odd man out: Australia’s luminal position in Asia revisited – a reply to Ann Capling’, 
pp.623-634; A Robertson, ‘Australia’s position in Asia: closer than ever’, Policy, Vol 22 (2), Winter 2006, 
pp26-32; and P  Gorjao, ‘Australia’s dilemma between geography and history: how consolidated is engagement 
with Asia’.   
79 Milner, ‘Neighbours must be our priority’. 
  The geographic spread of the economic 
growth sparked vigorous debate and discussion on significance and importance surrounding 
the role of Asian values in creating the conditions for the economic boom.  The ‘Asian 
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economic miracle’ represented a uniquely Asian model, which ‘thrived on co-operative rather 
than individualistic principles, and upon sets of moral values that ensure individualistic 
behaviour is responsible to the larger interest of social cohesion and economic progress’.80
Such rhetoric has been a powerful force in East Asian public diplomacy consolidating the 
populations of diverse nations, towards East Asian regionalism and promoting Asia as a 
culturally cohesive region with a distinct set of Asian values that set the region apart from 
western society.
  
 
81  It is evident that deep cultural factors exist providing a sense of cohesion 
and solidarity (notably against the West), within the region.  The difficulty is that varying 
interpretations abound as to the precise origins and nature of Asian values, and they appear to 
exist and operate in a subjective, ambiguous and undefinable sense.  On this point, political 
commentator, Sheridan notes that the ‘very cultural forces, [are] too subtle, too slippery, 
above all too alive, to be captured by a document designed by a government 
committee’.82
I have very serious doubt as to whether such a thing as Asian values really exists…If it has any meaning 
at all it is merely a convenient way of describing the heterogeneous, conflicting and complex network of 
beliefs, prejudices and values developed in the countries which for geographical purposes have been 
grouped in Asia.
Barr highlights the difficulty in defining Asian values by quoting Singapore’s 
(then) Foreign Minister who, in closing the 1977 Asian Values and Modernization 
Conference noted:  
83
Nonetheless, given the focus on Asian cohesion, while the nations of Asia were receptive to 
Australian regional initiatives including through the APEC framework, individual nations, 
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including Malaysia did not fully embrace Australia as a natural member of the region.84  As a 
vast island desert continent made up of a small, homogenous population, supporting a liberal 
parliamentary democracy, an adversarial media and with strong links on the one hand to a 
colonial past and on the other to ‘an overbearing power bereft of moral fibre’, Australia is at 
times seen as an anomaly to the region.85
 some of our neighbours see us – or some of us – as still racist, uncouth, assertive, self-righteous, 
intrusive, and pre-occupied with sporting prowess; as unwilling to make the effort to understand their 
cultures and the complexities of their societies.
  Former Australian Ambassador, Richard Woolcott 
noted bluntly that: 
86
Woolcott’s concerns around the Australian identity in the Asia Pacific are shared clearly by 
author and academic Alison Broinowski who quotes the stereotyped images of Australians 
according to Asians as, ‘distant and irrelevant, British and second-rate Western; stooges of 
the United States and lacking in independence; …uncouth and rude; racist and ignorant of 
Asia; …simple and uncultured, …and not Asians’.
  
 
87 More recently, Australian former Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke reconfirmed the importance of the Australian image to advancing 
strategic interests in Asia, commenting that ‘even today, for many Asians, and particularly 
the Chinese, Australia was little more than a big farm or a big quarry’.88
Such comments suggest that Australia simply had not invested sufficiently in the long term 
elements of public diplomacy that build upon commonalities, including commonality in 
values.  The raft of high level leaders and ministerial visits and associated rhetoric, which 
characterised the diplomacy efforts of the Hawke-Keating era may not have been enough to 
demonstrate the required level of understanding and engagement with the distinct and 
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86 Ibid. 
87 Broinowski, About Face, p.11. 
88 R Hawke, Australia and China Relations, Australia-China Futures Dialogues - Annual Leader's Lecture, 
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complex societies and populations within the region.  Broinowski quotes Indonesian scholar 
David Reeve who comments on Indonesian perceptions of Australia in a way that might be 
relevant for the perceptions held across Asia, noting that ‘negativity about Australia was 
largely due to the fact that Australia had provided nothing in its defence, no dispassionate and 
intellectually compelling counter-story to which Indonesians have access’.89
image like culture has a “soft edged” reputation in official Australia.  It is an area that serious politicians 
and bureaucrats stay out of.  But perceptions of Australia… define its acceptability in the region, and 
underlie many of the decisions that are made about engagement with Australia.
  However as 
Broinowski also notes: 
90
 
   
Remembering that public diplomacy is about ‘building the Australian image and reputation in 
a way that might advance national interests on the global stage’, there is value in revisiting 
the concept that image and identity are central themes that must run through the many strands 
of public diplomacy activity.91
Drawing on Payne’s words, ‘our international reputation can either promote or undermine our 
foreign policy objectives’,
  As Senator Payne noted in the presentation of the Senate 
Report to Parliament, the connection between Australia’s image and reputation and 
subsequent ability to influence the regional and global agenda in ways that promote 
Australian foreign policy interests is strong.   
 
92
                                                 
89 Broinowski, About Face, p.231. 
90 Ibid, p.230.  
91 Wesley, ‘Planning Australia’s Foreign Policy Future’, p.1.   
92 Senate Hansard, 16 August 2007, p.43.   
 this thesis does not propose that Australia launch a full scale 
public relations campaign to identify and brand a possible Australian image.  However, the 
officially presented Australian image, ‘that Australia is an open liberal democracy, and 
tolerant society’ does little to differentiate this country from many others in the competitive 
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global environment.93 The 2020 Summit Report initiated an important conversation in this 
regard noting that ‘Australia must be smart and creative in exercise of its international 
influence’.94  Melissen suggests that the first step in improving public diplomacy practice is 
to ‘make an effort to express a nation’s identity - who the citizens of the country are and what 
they stand for’. 95  Siracusa similarly proposes an Australian Year Book that provides a 
collection of essays that tell the rich and textured story of Australia’. 96  More so as 
Broinowski points out, ‘rarely do the debaters ask what identity people in other [Asian] 
societies ascribe to Australia’.97 According to Broinowski, critics within the region complain 
that ‘Australians state, they don’t ask, they talk down and as a result they don’t hear, or don’t 
comprehend, what others think’.98
4.3 T he elements that shape public diplomacy actions 
  Further conversations around the Australian image might 
do well to take this statement as their launching point to start the discussions across both 
domestic and foreign audiences about what is important about the Australian identity, and 
how can that identity be best conveyed for a strategic outcome. 
 
The evolving discussion and definitions provide insight into the nature of public diplomacy, 
but are not entirely helpful in establishing a clear picture of the purpose, shape and scope of 
activities that are employed through public diplomacy.  For example, despite the lengthy 
discussions initiated through the Senate Inquiry, the concept and actions defined as public 
diplomacy remained vague and ever-elusive for many of the participants. This is not 
surprising; public diplomacy is ‘far from uniform’, and the activities which may be classified 
                                                 
93 T Holloway, Economic Counsellor, Australian Embassy in Beijing, presentation on Australia-China 
Relations, Beijing, 28 October 2009.  
94 Australia 2020 Summit, Final Report, May 2008, p.357.  
95 Gonesh and Melissen, ‘Public Diplomacy: Improving Practice’, p.19. 
96 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2007. 
97 Broinowski, About Face, p.219.   
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as public diplomacy are extensive.99  Any attempt to prescribe the activities that may be 
viewed as public diplomacy would simply be impractical, because of the fluid nature of the 
subject matter, and extensive array of opportunities.  Additionally, as Evans clearly submits 
in his arguments about the ‘good international citizen’ approach, a number of government-
generated activities like defence, aid or humanitarian relief programs, while not specifically 
designed to achieve a public diplomacy outcome, may nonetheless have a positive impact on 
the promotion of a nation’s image.100
Taking an instrumentalist view of public diplomacy activities, Sharp defines public 
diplomacy as, ‘the process by which direct relations with the people in a country are pursued 
to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented’.
   
 
101
the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural and educational programming by an 
advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country or countries that will enable 
target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of the advocate country’s foreign 
policy objectives.
  McClellan 
progresses a similar line defining public diplomacy as: 
102
Naren Chitty, Foundation Chair in International Communication and Head of the Department 
of International Communication at Macquarie University, pursues a similar line to Sharp and 
McClellan noting that public diplomacy comes in different forms, ‘an important bundle of 
approaches …in winning over domestic and external public opinion in relation to foreign 
policy’.
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101 Sharp, ‘Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of Public Diplomacy’, p.106. 
102 M McClellan, ‘Public Diplomacy in the Context of Traditional Diplomacy’, Address to the Vienna 
Diplomatic Academy, 14 October 2004, viewed on 20 October 2009, < 
http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/45.htm> 
103 N Chitty, ‘Public Diplomacy, Developing the Road Rules’, Submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Regarding the Nature and Conduct of Public Diplomacy, April 2007, p.12. 
  Importantly, both McClellan and Chitty articulate a clear linkage between public 
diplomacy activities and the advancement of foreign policy.  This is a critical aspect in 
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defining public diplomacy, also picked up in the definition provided by the Senate 
Committee.   
 
The complexity in establishing the shape of public diplomacy is due in part to the lack of 
clarity which surrounds the definition of public diplomacy mentioned earlier, but more 
importantly, due to the recognition of the dynamic nature of the activities employed; the 
wide-range of potential contributors to a public diplomacy program, distinct audiences to 
which messages are conveyed, and the fluid environment within which this occurs. In their 
discussion of public diplomacy, Evans and Grant reinforce the notion that ‘that there is no 
single approach to be employed, rather that the approach and tools utilised in each instance of 
public diplomacy will depend on the objective intended and audience targeted’.104 Van Ham 
and Melissen draw similar conclusions that there is no one size fits all approach to public 
diplomacy.105
In McClellan’s view, the three streams of culture, information and education constitute the 
major platforms from which a range of activities may be proactively launched for nations to 
engage with foreign audiences for the purpose of building a nation’s image and influencing 
and persuading foreign publics for positive foreign policy outcome. McClellan starts to 
  Therefore, based on the consensus that there is little value in simply listing 
public diplomacy activities in isolation, this thesis will approach public diplomacy from the 
perspective of the factors that are considered to shape the scope and nature of public 
diplomacy activities.  Such factors include the content focus, the objective and the potential 
outcomes that drive public diplomacy development, and the categories of activities that may 
be relevant to these.   
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provide concrete shape to the understanding of what public diplomacy looks like and his 
perspective is widely supported. 106  In particular, there is evidence to demonstrate that 
McClellan’s views were relevant to the Australian context as proposed by public relation 
academic Smyth in her 1995 publication which states that ‘public diplomacy programs cover 
the three areas of information, education and cultural relations’ 107 as appropriate in ‘the 
shaping of attitudes in other countries in a way which is favourable to our national 
interests’.108   This view reveals the practical and operational aspects of public diplomacy, 
where the academic definitions discussed in the previous chapter may be lacking.  McClellan 
teases public diplomacy activities out into broadly tangible, actionable and measurable 
categories.  In support of this approach, the Canadian government states that public 
diplomacy includes, ‘cultural events, conferences, trade shows, youth travel, foreign students 
in country; Canadian studies abroad and visits of opinion leaders’.109 In a similar approach, 
d’Hooghe scopes out the range of operational instruments employed in China’s public 
diplomacy efforts as ‘instruments such as the media, internet, events and projects, celebrities, 
and publications…newspapers and journals’. 110
Nye also incorporates the identified content streams of information, education and culture but 
from a different perspective.  Nye refers to these streams as having relevance across each of 
the three dimensions he identifies as shaping public diplomacy ‘requiring relative proportions 
 Essentially both examples of public 
diplomacy at work can be distilled back to the broad categories noted previously of 
information, education and culture.   
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of direct government information and long-term cultural relationships’. 111   The three 
dimensions examined by Nye include i) daily communications, involving an explanation of 
domestic and foreign policy decisions; ii) strategic communication; and iii) the development 
of lasting relationships with key individuals.112   DFAT largely adopts Nye’s dimensions as 
the core of the official approach to public diplomacy in the submission to the Senate 
Inquiry.113
Before exploring Nye’s dimensions of public diplomacy, McClellan also reminds us that 
there are five layers of message or strategic communication, the ‘communication pyramid’ 
that he considers requires consideration in the public diplomacy context.
  Each of these dimensions, and the type of activity they generate is then relevant 
to the Australian context and will be explored in more detail below.   
 
114  These stages, 
represented from the most broad through to the most targeted include, i) creating awareness; 
ii) developing interest; iii) developing knowledge; iv) growing advocacy; and v) action.  
McClellan indicates that each layer of the communication pyramid represents a sequential 
step process for public diplomacy, where each layer supports the next, for the ultimate 
purpose of achieving actions intended to advance the strategic interests of the advocate 
nation.115
An additional primary layer of ‘providing information’ is required in adapting the 
communications pyramid to the Australian context, based on the feedback provided by 
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Australian government agencies, and particularly DFAT through the Senate Inquiry.116  For 
example, during the Senate Inquiry hearings, a senior DFAT officer referred to the 
information provided to both foreign and domestic audiences through annual reports, fact 
sheets and other information publications produced by DFAT (primarily online), as 
significant to the public diplomacy program.  As the same official noted, ‘the annual report is 
another resource that people can use to get a sense of the overview of what our foreign and 
trade policies are all about’.117 While important to government governance and reporting 
processes, this type of information is purely a one-way stream of information about the 
advocate state.  Providing information in the form of annual reports, country reports, trade 
statistics and national profiles will generally occur as a routine function of any Ministry or 
Department of Foreign Affairs.118  By nature, such information provision does little to engage 
or encourage dialogue with the audiences, as one Senator commented in discussion with the 
DFAT official during the Inquiry, ‘I do not know that a lot of people read your annual 
report’.119
4.3.1 Daily communications 
  The various layers of communication are relevant to each of the dimensions of 
public diplomacy identified by Nye, and may be utilised across each of the three dimensions 
to varying degrees to achieve a specific outcome.   
 
The first dimension of daily communications highlights the need for governments to 
communicate to both the domestic and foreign public the nature, rationale and implications of 
decisions made on a day-to-day basis.  This dimension is based upon the 24/7 data stream to 
which many domestic and foreign publics have access.  Government officials in most nations 
have encouraged close relationships with media, and in particular international media to 
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ensure that an explanation of domestic politics reaches foreign publics.  Currently there are 
over 120 foreign correspondents based in and registered as operating from within 
Australia. 120
The tools most frequently employed to achieve awareness within the target country include 
radio or television broadcasts, media relations, or mass cultural events.  Activities such as 
localised Radio Australia broadcasting, positive media coverage relating to Australian 
initiated projects relevant to the target audience; or possibly presentations made by high 
ranking government officials of the advocate state to a broad target audience in their local 
language are employed effectively to create awareness of the advocate state.  Frequently, 
local languages or locally engaged staff might be employed to engage in awareness creating 
strategies as a more relevant and appropriate way with the audience.  For example, where 
budget has allowed, the use of local presenters utilising local languages such as Bahasa 
Indonesian has been a strategy utilised by Radio Australia in its broadcasts within the Asian 
region.
  These correspondents play an important role in reporting on domestic 
Australian events to foreign publics.   
 
121
Leonard warns that a failure to engage foreign publics in the explanation of domestic policy 
can have unintended yet serious consequences.  For example, racially motivated riots which 
occurred in Sydney suburbs including Cronulla, leading the government to employ ‘lock-
down’ tactics for a brief period were reported extensively in foreign media.  The 
internationally distributed newspaper, The Guardian, reported on the riots as ‘a day of racial 
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unrest that turned a popular beachside suburb into a battleground… in the worst race riots 
Australia has witnessed’.122  In his speech to the National Newspaper Publishers’ Conference 
in 2006, Alexander Downer former Minister for Foreign Affairs conceded that in this 
instance ‘people overseas got the impression that law and order had broken down across 
Sydney, which was not the case’.123  Based on the broad and negative international media 
coverage of the events, and Downer’s subsequent remarks, it would appear that the 
Australian Government may have failed to adequately involve foreign media in its daily 
explanation of events and issues.  A similar example might be made of the Australian media 
response to the Indian student bashings which occurred in Melbourne in 2009.124
Implicit in the daily communications requirements of public diplomacy activity is the need 
for a central international media watch and rapid response capability to address or answer to 
misleading or negative information reported in foreign media which has the potential to 
damage a nation’s image and soft power.  This informational activity is ‘largely reactive 
aimed at containing rumours rather than spreading truth of a higher order’.
 
 
125
it monitors global news and issues a one page report each morning with alerts as needed so that busy 
policy makers focus not only on the news environment in Washington or America, but also around the 
  For example, 
the United States Department of State has become adept at this kind of rapid response 
information based activity, having established a 24 hour media watch capability as part of the 
massive public diplomacy apparatus aimed at improving the United States image in the 
Moslem world. In her November 10, 2005, testimony before the House Committee on 
International Affairs, the (then) Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, 
Karen Hughes described the activities of the rapid response office at the state department: 
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world. This has already proven to be an effective early warning system that helps us respond quickly to 
misinformation or emerging stories. 126
DFAT reports to engage in such a model of rapid response activities, ‘ensuring that negative 
stories do not have an adverse cumulative effect’.
 
 
127  In action, rapid response is media 
focussed and may include the preparation of ‘talking points’ or media responses for 
ambassadors and other diplomatic staff on key media issues.128  The Cronulla riots received 
such attention, as did the Indian student crisis. 129  Of interest, a senior DFAT official 
commented in interview that at that point in time (July 2009), DFAT’s Images of Australia 
Branch was wholly focused upon responding to negative media regarding the Indian student 
incidents with no resources or budget to move outside the scope of such daily issues 
management.130  Crisis and daily communications management is an important component of 
public diplomacy practice, though relatively minor in terms of impact and value on building 
longer term relationships with foreign audiences.  However, as the The Guardian, Downer’s 
comments, and the recent Lowy Institute Report all indicate there is room for sustained 
improvements in Australia’s approach to ‘issues management’.131
4.3.2 Strategic communications 
   
In his description of strategic communication, Nye refers to the need for the development of a 
simple set of themes that may be focused around specific policy initiatives.  As if adopting 
Nye’s approach, DFAT points the Senate Inquiry to the need for ‘targeted information and 
                                                 
126 Former Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes quoted in M Hand, 
‘Department of State ‘rapid response office’’, PR Week, 17 November 2005. 
127 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of 
Australia’s public diplomacy program, p.22. 
128 Ibid.   
129 Interview, Senior DFAT official, 13 July 2009.   
130 Ibid.   
131 O’Riordan, ‘Race Riots turn Sydney suburbs into Battleground’, The Guardian, 12 December 2005;   
Downer, ‘Foreign policy values and the media’;  Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education 
and the Costs to Australia’.   
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campaigns that play an important role in influencing official perceptions about the public 
image of Australia’. 132 There are a number of activities which fall into this category of 
strategic communications, including role of ambassadors and diplomatic staff in engaging 
directly with foreign publics and with the media on issues of concern.  DFAT points to issues 
such as ‘Australia’s position on the World Trade Organisation negotiations, bilateral FTA 
negotiations, Australia’s engagement in the Middle East, and efforts to fight terrorism’ as 
examples of issues requiring a strategic communications approach.133
Strategic communication is at the centre of the US approach to promoting a positive image of 
the US and Western liberal democracy into the Moslem world in an effort to counter 
terrorism.  To this end, Former Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, 
Karen Hughes publicly noted the ‘importance of ambassadors to speak out on major issues, to 
do more speeches and television interviews… in ways that are clear, concise and 
coordinated’.
    
 
134
plans to set up regional public diplomacy platforms to expand our television presence, and make 
programs such as our speaker’s bureau more targeted and strategic, noting work on a technology 
initiative to make greater use of web chats, graphics, streaming video perhaps even text messaging to 
help amplify our message and make it relevant to younger audiences.
 Hughes also referred to: 
135
Other examples of strategic communication include the fostering of direct relationships with 
foreign journalists, and sponsoring improved networks, through a journalist exchange or visit 
program within a host country.  Many states utilise their own media networks to broadcast 
programs into a range of external states.  DFAT sponsors the Australian Broadcasting 
 
 
                                                 
132 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of 
Australia’s public diplomacy program, April 2007, p.22.   
133 Ibid.   
134 Former Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes quoted in M. Hand, 
‘Department of State ‘rapid response office’’.  In line with Hughes approach, at a presentation by the American 
Consul-General to Bond University in May 2009, the Consul General noted one of her key official duties was to 
‘tell and promote the American story overseas’.  
135 Former Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes quoted in Hand 
‘Department of State ‘rapid response office’’.   
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Corporation (ABC) to provide a television service into the Asia Pacific.  Known as the 
Australia Network, the ‘service contributes to Australian public diplomacy efforts through the 
delivery of high quality and contemporary programming in education, arts, culture and drama 
as well as through the provision of news and current affairs into the region’.136 Additionally, 
DFAT sponsors radio broadcasts via the ABC’s Radio Australia which frequently provides a 
service into areas of the Asia Pacific area where television or other media are less likely to 
penetrate.  Currently DFAT estimates that Radio Australia reaches an audience of 100 million 
across the Asia Pacific region, and is celebrating seventy years of broadcasting within the 
region.137
Cultural diplomacy, generally understood as a subset of public diplomacy involving ‘the 
exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their 
peoples to foster mutual understanding’ can be utilised effectively within Nye’s second 
dimension of strategic communication.
 
 
138  According to DFAT, cultural projects provide a 
‘neutral platform for projecting an image of Australia and generating a better understanding 
of our values’.139
it is not uncommon for an exhibition to be sent from one country to another to coincide with a state visit 
by the head of that country.  The presence in another country of great cultural objects or works of art can 
give tremendous focus to the culture and history of the country from which they have come.
 For example, the Director of the National Gallery of Victoria explained 
during the Senate Inquiry into Australia’s public diplomacy program that: 
140
                                                 
136 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade regarding the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program, p.5. 
137 There is no evaluation data either collected or available that provides evidence of the impact of such a wide 
net of broadcasting.  This is not inconsistent with the Australian Government’s overall output or activity focused 
approach to public diplomacy.  Evaluation of the impact of public diplomacy activities, including through 
opinion surveys was one of the recommendations made by the Senate Committee.  Also regarding seventy years 
of international broadcasting refer to Radio Australia website: http://blogs.radioaustralia.net.au/70/ 
138 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.22. 
139 R Sorensen ‘Artists help public diplomacy to push Australian 'soft power', The Australian, 17 April 2007. 
140 G Vaughan, Director, National Gallery of Australia, quoted in Senate Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2007.   
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Furthermore, a bureaucrat from the City of Melbourne Council participating as a witness in 
the Senate Inquiry noted that incorporating cultural elements, including a performance by the 
Melbourne Symphony Orchestra, into negotiations between the City of Melbourne and the 
City of Milan ‘provided the Consulate-General with very high level access into the city of 
Milan that they were not able to get just by struggling through the normal diplomatic 
channels’.141
A highly successful strategic communications campaign delivered by Tourism Australia 
some twenty five years ago was known as ‘Come and Say G’Day’.
  Cultural diplomacy is an important part of the strategic communication process 
of public diplomacy.  The one off engagement of a national orchestra, the touring of a 
national art exhibition or indeed presentation of a new film to coincide with an official 
diplomatic activity can be effective in promoting a particular theme or responding to a key 
issue.   
 
142  The campaign utilised 
Australian icon Paul Hogan, already internationally known for his Crocodile Dundee persona 
from the movie of the same name, and specifically targeted the American public from 1984 
through to 1990, inviting them to come to Australia to ‘throw another shrimp on the 
barbie’. 143  While there was minor public controversy within Australia around Hogan’s 
stereotypical culturally deficient image, ‘the campaign was hugely successful, and in just 
three months, Australia leapt into America's top ten ‘most desired’ holiday destinations, 
having previously failed to make the top 50. Visa applications skyrocketed.’144
                                                 
141 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, Thursday, 15 
March 2007, p.20. 
142 ABC Television, The Gruen Transfer, ABC, 18 March 2009, found at:  
http://www.abc.net.au/tv/gruentransfer/stories/s2518823.htm 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
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More recently, the highly publicised world-wide release of Baz Lurhmann’s film Australia 
provides a contemporary example of Australian strategic public diplomacy communication 
Ironically this contemporary campaign relies on a movie that promotes a 1940s image of life 
in Australia’s Northern Territory, drawing on the predictable themes of the macho bushman / 
drover, overt racism and the White Australia policy, ties to British colonialism and shifting  
dependence upon the Americans at time of Japanese aggression in the Pacific, all set in the 
wide-open space and mixed with a tinge of Australian sarcasm and mockery.  Australia 
represents a A$50 million advertising campaign sponsored by Tourism Australia based 
around the theme of promoting Australia in a ‘fresh and compelling’ light as a tourist 
destination, ‘at a time when the tourism industry is struggling in a tough market made worse 
by the tyranny of distance, a strong Australian dollar and the high price of fuel’.145 The movie 
was released in seventy countries, including Australia.  The advertising campaign, supported 
by long-term, under-pinning structures including internet campaigns, fact sheets, campaign 
kits, media releases and ongoing localised appearances by high profile Australia actors Hugh 
Jackman and Nicole Kidman, ran from October 2008 until the middle of 2009.  The public 
announcements, key interviews and information surrounding the campaign, including release 
of the movie have been tightly coordinated through Tourism Australia, and the network of 
Australian diplomatic staff have been involved in the promotion of the campaign.146
Generally strategic communications programs such as advertising campaigns or tourism 
promotions run over a medium term.  Such programs should be measurable in terms of 
contribution made towards achievement of the key outcome for which the program was 
developed, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative measures. The ‘Come and Say 
G’day’ campaign, provides an example of successful Australian public diplomacy in action, 
  
 
                                                 
145 Tourism Australia, Baz Lurhmann to conceive ad campaign, Tourism Australia Media Release, 29 July 2008. 
146 Ibid. 
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with measurable strategic outcomes.  Tourism Australia states that the key markets aligned 
with the release of Australia included ‘those markets from which Australia generates most 
visitation: the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, South Korea, France and Italy’.147 Tourism Australia has a range of mechanisms 
for measuring the success (that is, the economic benefit derived from the uptake and 
acceptance) of their campaigns, including for Australia.  For example, in the month following 
the release of the movie, Tourism Australia had identified that 580 million people worldwide 
had been exposed to the campaign, the number of visitors to the Australia.com website has 
increased by 17 percent, box office rankings on a country by country basis were high, 40 
positive media visits had taken place, worldwide tickets sales amounted to USD$150 million, 
and national admissions at that stage stood at three million dollars.148  Despite this, a critical 
indication of success for such a campaign must be the impact that it has on tourism, measured 
through international visitor numbers.  While there were positive one-off anecdotes about the 
number of tourist bookings made as a direct result of the movie, it is clear that international 
visitation is on the decline. Tourism Australia’s Managing Director, Geoff Buckley blames 
the current global economic crisis for the downturn, noting instead that ‘ by keeping Australia 
front of mind amongst consumers we can minimise the impact of the crisis this year and lay a 
foundation for a return to growth in 2010’.149
Evidently, Australian strategic communications programs have achieved some measurable 
success in obvious markets (particularly the United States, Europe and Japan), largely by 
relying upon well used and stereotypical images of both the natural Australian environment 
 
 
                                                 
147 Tourism Australia website found at http://www.tourism.australia.com/Marketing.asp?sub=0451&al=2913.By 
curious contrast, the target markets identified in a separate statement on the website, Tourism Australia lists 
Australia’s top ten markets (in terms of no. of visitors annually in descending order), as New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, Japan, United States of America, China, Singapore, Germany, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.   
148 Tourism Australia, ‘Movie Drives Publicity Boom’, Tourism Australia Media Release, 14 January 2009.  
149 Geoff Buckley quoted in, ‘Movie Drives Publicity Boom’. 
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and Australians themselves. Yet, as Robyn Archer articulated in the Tenth Manning Clarke 
Lecture there remains a fundamental problem with campaigns such as Australia, namely a 
problem of authenticity, which is, in public diplomacy: 
…important, [and] one of the problems many have had with the film Australia is that it lacks 
authenticity. Not just that it starts with documentary newsreel, leading the audience to think this will be 
factual, and then proceeds with pure fiction, but that many have come away saying ‘this is not Australia 
and I don’t want the global cinematic audience to think so.150
while more recent surveys have revealed an increased interest in Australia’s intellectual and cultural 
achievements, knowledge of our technological capabilities remains at a comparatively low level…and a 
more complex and well rounded image of Australia than currently exists would greatly help us to build the 
sort of multidimensional relations in Asia that we seek.
 
 
As discussed earlier, some (including those practitioners working in the field) might argue 
that the Australian image, identity and underpinning values are far richer than our expensive 
strategic communications programs let on.  Evans noted in 1995 that: 
151
While Evans’ view may be dated, this thesis suggests that in light of comments made through 
the Senate Inquiry process and by interview participants, Evans’ view remains valid today.  
Archer adds to the tenor of Evans’ view, in her 2009 lecture regarding Australia’s national 
identity which can be applied to the projection of that identity in the globalized world noting 
that “Perhaps [it is] not whether we survive or not, but in which way we survive, with how 
much strength and dignity, and to what degree an authentic sense of national identity is 
nurtured, as opposed to that which is myopic, naive and kitsch’.
  
 
152
                                                 
150 R Archer, ‘The Price of Survival’, Tenth Manning Clarke Lecture, National Library of Canberra, 3 March 
2009 accessed on 9 December 2009 at: 
  Bearing in mind the 
arguments launched by scholars such as Melissen who advocate the ‘two way engagement 
model of public diplomacy’, the Australian public may be ready to engage in a fresh dialogue 
http://www.manningclark.org.au/html/Paper-Archer_Robyn-
The_Price_of_Survival.html.   
151 Evans, Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the world of the 1990s, p.71. 
152 Archer, ‘The Price of Survival’.   
189 
 
about what constitutes the Australia image, identity and values that are portrayed overseas 
through strategic communications.153
4.3.3 Lasting relationships 
   
 
The third key dimension to public diplomacy activities relates to the ‘development of 
relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, 
seminars, conferences, and access to media channels’.154
                                                 
153 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice, p.18. 
154 Nye, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics, p.109. 
 This third dimension deals with 
those relationships that are developed predominantly through people-to-people linkages 
(incorporating each of the elements of information, education and culture), that deliver 
fundamental and long-term trust and change in relations between states.  Diplomats are 
generally on the front-line of establishing lasting relationships within the host country, but as 
noted earlier from a traditional diplomacy perspective such relationships exist primarily at the 
government to government level without branching out to grassroots.   
 
The communication requirements of government-to-government contact are vastly different 
to the informal and less predictable demands of public outreach and relationship building.  
This is an area in which the skills and attributes of diplomats in the field may be tested as 
they adapt to integrating public diplomacy activities into the scope of their daily work.  There 
is significant opportunity for public diplomacy to leverage the goodwill, grassroots 
relationships and networks created through officially sponsored personal contacts which are 
not primarily intended to be public diplomacy activity.  For example, the relationships that 
may develop between Australian peace-keepers or Australian Federal Police and local 
communities in East Timor or the Solomon Islands can play a significant role in the building 
of a positive image of Australia within the broader community. 
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Included within this third dimension are those relationships formed with foreign publics 
through cultural, media or educational visit programs – usually targeted at certain sectors of 
the foreign public audience.155  Frequently bilateral institutions, councils or foundations (such 
as the nine that exist within Australia) operate to support key relationships through funding 
and coordination. However, there is a significant challenge in the ability of the state to track 
and maintain the positive relationships developed through such programs.156  The work of the 
bilateral institutions, councils or foundations is extremely valuable in fostering opportunities 
for exchange, but limited due to a small funding pool made available through DFAT.157  The 
evidence presented to the Inquiry was not clear whether any of the foundations, councils or 
institutes evaluate the programs they run, and the Senate Inquiry called for greater 
accountability from each of these.158
Other organisations linked to the foundations frequently undertake the networking, 
coordination and communications functions on behalf of the foundation and/or DFAT.  One 
such successful entity is Asialink, established by the University of Melbourne and Myer 
Foundation. With an authoritative submission and presentation regarding Australian public 
diplomacy to the Senate Inquiry, Asialink receives funding from DFAT and other sources ‘to 
work with business, government, philanthropic and cultural partners to initiate and strengthen 
Australia Asia engagement’.
   
 
159
                                                 
155 Refer also to Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives’, p.86, for further discussion 
about public diplomacy activities aimed at ‘social process of building relationships and fostering harmony’.  
156 For example, the failure of DFAT to adequately track the person-to-person relationships created through 
exchange programs was highlighted through the Senate Inquiry. 
157 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, pp.189–193. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Asialink website found at: http://www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au/about_asialink 
  The scope of work undertaken by Asialink includes, ‘high 
level forums, international collaborations, school programs and cultural exchanges, Asialink 
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engages the corporate, media, arts, education, health and community sectors – reaching from 
primary school children to prime ministers – in Australia and Asia’.160
An additional and untapped source of potential relationships with foreign publics exists in a 
nation’s diaspora – ‘those nationals who live offshore on a permanent or long-term basis’.
 The scope of work 
falls clearly within the boundaries of building lasting relationships through public diplomacy, 
with enormous breadth of reach utilised by DFAT, yet several members of the Senate Inquiry 
Committee were unaware of the public diplomacy focus of work carried out by Asialink.  
Similarly, DFAT’s approach to such entities appeared through the Senate Inquiry process to 
be ad hoc.  Asialink and other organisations of a similar ilk provide an excellent resource and 
network for DFAT in building and maintaining strong personal relationships, and might be 
better coordinated and supported for this purpose.    
 
161 
As noted in the previous chapter, research undertaken by the Lowy Institute reveals that ‘the 
Australian diaspora is large, at approximately one million people; prosperous, well educated, 
well connected, mobile and well disposed to Australia’. 162
Ultimately building lasting relations ‘works best with a long term horizon’. 
  The diaspora of any nation 
provides an immediate network often deeply engaged with foreign publics.  There is 
enormous potential for any nation to connect and engage with the diaspora network as an 
additional means of promoting its image effectively and building soft power through people-
to-people connections.   
 
163
                                                 
160 Ibid. 
161 M Fullilove, C Flutter, ‘Diaspora the world wide web of Australians’, Lowy Institute Paper 04, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 2004, p.vii. 
162 Ibid p.vii. 
163 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.18.  
 As Zaharna 
notes, relationship building strategies are ‘best measured by their duration, strength and 
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perceived satisfaction among the parties’.164  The scope and nature and objectives of the 
activities required to build lasting relations are vastly different to both those required for the 
crisis response, and strategic communications.  Relationship building is about cultural or 
educational exchange opportunities, conferences, visits or other ways of enabling person to 
person dialogue.165     In many ways, this final dimension as described by Nye offers the most 
true form of public diplomacy that not only facilitates the understanding and engagement of 
foreign audiences, but more importantly enables the influencing of foreign audiences at times 
when it counts, and is particularly relevant in countering security threats including those 
posed by terrorism.166
4.3.4 Cultural diplomacy 
   
 
Cultural diplomacy requires separate consideration as a distinct subset of activity within the 
broad scope of public diplomacy. 167  There is agreement among other scholars, that the 
cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy are indeed entwined. 168  Therefore, cultural 
diplomacy is approached within this thesis as a subset of public diplomacy and an important 
tool in building and maintaining lasting relationships.  Indeed, ‘culture is a powerful 
instrument in the hands of diplomats to pursue national interest in an un-intrusive, intelligent, 
convincing and cost-effective manner’. 169
                                                 
164 Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives’, p.92.  
165 Ibid.  Zaharna provides a range of relationship building activities that include cultural and educational 
exchanges, leadership visits, cultural and language Institutes, development aid projects, and non-political 
networking schemes.   
166 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.60. 
167 Zaharna makes the point that ‘few scholars or practitioners are able to articulate what a relationship building 
approach would entail beyond conducting more cultural and educational exchange programs,’ and for this 
reason, ‘some scholars argue for keeping cultural relations separate from public diplomacy’. Zaharna, ‘Mapping 
out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives’, p.92.   Melissen, is one such scholar who distinguishes clearly 
between cultural relations and public diplomacy, but from a position of pragmatism recognises the ‘growing 
overlap’ between the two.  See Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.23.  See also M Rose and N 
Wadham-Smith, Mutuality, Trust, and Cultural Relations, The British Council, London, 2004.   
168 C Schneider, ‘Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy that Works, in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power 
in International Relations, Melissen, J (ed), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, pp.147-168. 
169 http://textus.diplomacy.edu/textusBin/BViewers/oview/culturaldiplomacy/oview.asp 
 Melissen observes that the accent of cultural 
diplomacy is increasingly on engaging with a foreign audience,…on mutuality and the 
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establishment of stable relationships, …on the long-haul, …and on winning hearts and minds 
and building trust’. 170
Because cultural exchange usually involves the sharing of or engagement in creative 
expression, it is enjoyable, and cuts across traditional boundaries and attracts natural 
audiences.
 This description, even from Melissen’s viewpoint, places cultural 
diplomacy well within the bounds of public diplomacy more generally. 
 
171 As with public diplomacy itself, the parameters of cultural diplomacy are fluid.  
Scneider defines cultural diplomacy as ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art and other 
aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding’. 172  
Scholars such as Mette Lending of Norway argue that cultural diplomacy extends beyond the 
traditional boundaries of ideas, information and art, as noted earlier, to incorporate a 
‘country’s thinking, research, journalism, and national debate’.173  Based on Lending’s broad 
definition, culture provides an open window into the identity and values of the state, honing 
in on the currencies of soft power.174  For this reason, cultural diplomacy is likened to the 
‘linchpin of public diplomacy’ provides a common ground for lasting relationships of trust 
upon which political, economic and military agreements may be made.175
Drawing upon the definition of public diplomacy discussed earlier, the intent of any cultural 
diplomacy program should be to develop soft power capabilities, to engage public opinion, 
gain influence and shape political agendas beyond the boundaries of the traditional diplomacy 
and statecraft.  While cultural diplomacy activities may be subtle in nature, there should be 
 
 
                                                 
170 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.21. 
171 Schneider, ‘Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy that Works’, p.147. 
172 Ibid.  
173 M Lending, Change and Renewal: Norwegian foreign Cultural Policy 2001-2005, Royal Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2000, p13-14.   
174 The currencies of soft power being ‘values, culture, policies and institutions’, as articulated by Nye, Soft 
Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, p. 30-32. 
175 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.27. 
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no mistaking the requirement for underlying intent or foreign policy objective. Much more 
than propaganda, public relations or even nation branding, the soft power capability that 
comes from cultural diplomacy, ‘is as important as the usual bilateral economic and political 
negotiations that go on at government-to-government level’. 176   If successful, cultural 
diplomacy may deliver real and tangible benefits to the foreign policy agenda of the 
implementing state.  This would obviously include linkages from cultural diplomacy 
programs to increased investment and improved economic performance through tourism and 
trade, but more so, cultural diplomacy activities might be explicitly linked to achieving 
international strategic priorities, such as positive outcomes on climate change and global 
security (including anti-terrorism). 177
                                                 
176 Sorensen,‘Artists help public diplomacy to push Australia’s soft power’, The Australian, 17 April 2007 
177 Refer to Broinowski, About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia, p.232.   
  However, it needs to be noted that in the case of 
Australia such a proposition has not ever been sufficiently tested, let alone investigated or 
developed either internally via DFAT or independently.   
 
Cultural diplomacy is overtly values-and-identity driven, and provides a foundation for large 
audiences to connect through creative and personal experiences with areas in which they find 
a commonality in values and identity.  Experiences of other states, including the United 
Kingdom, China and Germany indicate that there is strategic value to be found in this subset 
of the broader public diplomacy field.  Further exploration of the approaches taken by other 
states, and a comparison to key Australian approaches provides a basis for contrast with 
Australia’s program.  Such exploration reveals that Australia has taken steps to implement a 
reasonably active cultural diplomacy program, but one that is to some degree directionless, 
conducted at times for its own sake, and requires rethinking.  
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The United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany have embedded cultural diplomacy 
into the bureaucracy through the establishment of the British Council and Goethe Institute 
(founded in 1934 and in 1951 respectively).  Both institutions are largely subsidised by 
government, but exist as autonomous institutions with the purpose of promoting the language 
and culture of the respective states abroad.  China’s Confucius Institute, and the French 
Alliance Francais networks follow a similar approach.   Other states, while not formally 
recognising cultural diplomacy through structural or institutional entities such as these, can 
point to significant funding of cultural exchange and activities abroad (whether such activity 
includes exchange programs for youth, or supporting a major performing arts initiative 
overseas), usually sponsored through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   
 
These cultural structures and networks have relevance to the states from which they originate. 
As Wesley comments, the Goethe Institute emerges following World War Two as a 
deliberate attempt on the part of Germany to repair and rebuild a national identify and 
reputation, both internally and externally; the Confucius Institute are a critical thread in 
progressing China’s strategy of peaceful rise; Alliance Francais ensures the French language 
is preserved and spoken across the globe.178 Such cultural exchange can impress audiences, 
and change broader attitudes and perceptions about a culture or state, ultimately contributing 
to soft power reserves of the state. 179
This view of cultural diplomacy is supported through Australian practice.
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178 Goethe Institute Website: 
  DFAT plays a 
coordinating role in Australia’s cultural diplomacy program through the relevant statutory 
bodies, including the AICC and the Australia Council for the Arts. The AICC defines the aim 
http://www.goethe.de/enindex.htm, Confucius Institute Online: 
http://www.chinese.cn/en/, Alliance Francais Australia: http://www.alliancefrancais.com.au/ 
179 W Adams, ‘The Art of Diplomacy’, Time Magazine, March 2, 2009, p.42. 
180 For early evidence of Australian support of cultural diplomacy refer to Smyth, ‘Managing Australia’s Image 
in Asia’.   
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of cultural diplomacy, ‘to engage overseas audiences through the delivery of high-quality and 
innovative arts and cultural promotions to increase their understanding of Australia's 
contemporary identity, values, interests and policies’.181
However, while the positive rhetoric exists around the role of cultural diplomacy, others, such 
as former Australian Ambassador, Christopher Lamb are not convinced of the inherent value 
or effectiveness of cultural diplomacy in advancing Australian strategic interests.
  
 
182
4.3.5 Australian cultural diplomacy  
 The 
arguments around public diplomacy are at times vague and rely largely on anecdotal 
evidence.  In the case of Australia, as indicated through interview comments, there are gaps 
in what culture is presented, to which audiences, why, and, what is achieved.   
 
 
Certainly, Australian cultural diplomacy programs are modest compared to those of the UK, 
France, Germany and China.  However, as noted by Wesley previously, Australia has not 
necessarily defined a raison d’etre for the Australian cultural diplomacy program.  Perhaps 
ahead of his time, Australian author, David Malouf provided pertinent observation, from an 
Australian perspective regarding the potential for states to leverage culture for economic 
benefit,  
when we think of other places, France or Britain or Italy, or the US, what comes first to our mind as 
characterising their contribution to the world, their identity or style, is the arts they have produced books, 
paintings, films, their orchestras and opera companies, their galleries, their music.  Either consciously or 
not, it is this that guarantees for us that the goods we buy from them, everything from high tech to clothes 
and perfumes and domestic appliances, will be of the highest quality, both of performance and design.  
Shouldn’t we assume that others will make the same assessment of us?183
                                                 
181 Australian International Cultural Council website.  Found at http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/about.htm 
182 Christopher Lamb, Interview, 13 May 2009.  Michael Wesley also noted his scepticism of the strategic value 
of public diplomacy generally, and also cultural diplomacy in interview: Wesley, Interview, 13 July 2009.    
183 Malouf, Foreword in ‘Securing the Future’, p.94.  
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Malouf expands upon his observation to provide some direction for Australian policy when 
he suggests that:  
our potential customers for sophisticated commodities might be more inclined to believe in the high 
standard of what we have to offer if they see from the films we make, the books we produce and from what 
we offer in the way of theatre, opera, galleries, music that we are a society that demands and produces 
work of the highest quality.184
we at the NGV [National Gallery of Victoria] have for many years lent entire exhibitions and are 
increasingly lending individual works of art to other museums of art around the world.  We feel that 
in doing this we are contributing to Australia’s international standing and profile.
   
 
More recently, yet along similar lines to comments made by Malouf as noted above, 
Vaughan, highlighted the bearing of cultural sophistication on the Australian image when he 
told the Senate Inquiry that: 
185
to promote Australia overseas through the arts and culture, reinforcing Australia’s standing as a stable, 
sophisticated, tolerant and innovative nation with a rich and diverse culture and promoting an accurate 
and positive image of Australia’s Indigenous people.
   
 
The AICC is a consultative body comprising government appointed representatives from 
DFAT, Austrade, Tourism Australia, Australia Network, the Department of the Environment, 
Water, Heritage and the Arts, Screen Australia and the Australia Council for the Arts, along 
with a range of members representing the business, arts and community sectors.  The stated 
objective of the AICC, which meets twice a year is: 
186
The AICC determines the priority countries for cultural diplomacy, along with a country 
specific focus per year.  These priorities, as discussed earlier in this thesis, are not necessarily 
linked to the broader foreign policy objectives.  Indeed the AICC appears to work in isolation 
   
 
                                                 
184 Ibid.  Malouf’s statements were made in the context of Australia’s 1999 Major Performing Arts Inquiry Final 
Report, and while ‘cultural diplomacy’ per se was not referenced specifically within the report, such statements 
indicate that the underpinning elements and understandings of cultural diplomacy were resonating at that time 
within enclaves of Australia’s cultural sector. 
185 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2008, p. 
37. 
186 AICC website found viewed on 20 October, 2009, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/aicc/about.htm> 
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from the greater foreign policy development areas of DFAT.187
Events such as the Venice Biennale are utilised by galleries like the NGV as an opportunity 
for Australia to showcase and raise the profile of the best of Australian contemporary art in 
front of a diverse and prestigious international audience.
  Such isolation may explain 
the sense of disconnect between the many cultural activities that Australia promotes overseas, 
and the subsequent lack of significant impact of such activities on advancing strategic 
objectives.   
 
188 Australia’s presence at the 2009 
Venice Biennale, managed by the Australia Council, successfully presented a contemporary 
and diverse image of Australia, particularly through the works of four emerging artists in the 
Once Removed exhibition.  The exhibition was intended to resonate with international 
audiences via ‘its themes of displacement and environmental issues, while also revealing a 
diversity of work by early career Australian artists’.189 The artists comprising Once Removed 
represented culturally diverse backgrounds – including emigrant, immigrant and Indigenous-
Chinese perspectives of Australia.  The pavilion style, highly competitive approach of the 
Vienna Biennale, requires a precision and clarity of approach by exhibiting states that will 
engage international audiences while articulating a sense of national place and identity.190
                                                 
187 Interview, Confidential Source, DFAT Senior Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
Branch, DFAT, 22 June 2009.   
188 Venice Biennale Australia: http://www.australiavenicebiennale.com.au/. 
189 Australia 53rd International Art Exhibition, Once Removed, Australia Council for the Arts, 2009, viewed on 
20 October 2009, <http://www. australiavenicebiennale.com.au/once-removed> 
190 F Fenner, Once Removed, Australia 53rd International Art Exhibition, Australia Council for the Arts 2009, 
viewed on 20 October, <http://www. australiavenicebiennale.com.au/once-removed> 
  
Importantly, the curator of Once Removed indicates through her essay accompanying the 
Once Removed installation an understanding of the soft power that is  derived by a nation 
through such an event, not only from quality of the art itself, but implicitly through the choice 
and themes of the artists: 
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Over the past two decades, a politically-led re-articulation of Australia’s place in the world has resulted in 
a surge of interest from local and international audiences in Aboriginal art, and a new Australian 
preparedness to engage with the cultures of neighbouring Asian and Pacific nations.191
Another notable example of Australia’s cultural diplomacy exchange and soft power is 
evident in the permanent exhibition of Australian Indigenous contemporary art in the 
entrance to the recently opened museum of world Indigenous art, Musee de Quai Branly.
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more than 300,000 art works and artifacts from Asia, Africa, Oceania and the Americas. What makes 
Australia's contribution unique is that, at the request of architect Jean Nouvel, eight Aboriginal art works 
made especially for the museum will be embedded in its walls, ceilings and glass frontages.  In contrast 
to many other artworks, at the time of opening, seven of the eight Australian artists were living, and were 
striking in their blend of the traditional and contemporary.
  
The Museum features:  
193
The exhibition aligns with the recognition that contemporary Australian Indigenous art has 
attracted interest and attention around the world since the 1970s.  As Vaughn of the NGV 
confirmed to the Senate Inquiry, ‘there is a general acknowledgement that this is a significant 
contemporary movement within the international context, and many exhibitions of Australian 
Indigenous art have been sent overseas in recent decades’.
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From that perspective, the permanent exhibition of Australian Indigenous art within the 
Museum is a significant promotion of Australia.  As Australian arts writer, Jeremy Eccles 
noted in his review, ‘with five million visitors passing through the Museum each year, it will 
be noticed’.
  
 
195   Some even refer to the building (one of three making up the Museum 
complex) as ‘the Australian building’.196
                                                 
191 Ibid.  
192 Musee de Quai Branly Website accessed at:  http://www.quaibranly.fr/en/ 
193 J Button, ‘Artists’ stories will live on forever in Paris’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 September, 2005. 
194 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, Thursday 15 
March 2008, p. 37. 
195 J Eccles, ‘Musee de Quai Branly’, Australian Art Review, February 2006, viewed on 20 October 2009, 
<http://www.artreview.com.au/art/profiles/galleries/musee-du-quai-branly.aspx> 
 As would be expected, Australian diplomats played 
196 Ibid.  As noted in ‘Design for Diplomacy’, the design and appearance of the embassy or other structure 
directly related to the state overseas, can reflect the values of the state, and may symbolise the characteristics of 
the state identity, such a vitality, enduring strength, decency and innovation.  As such the qualities of the built 
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a major role in facilitating connections with the Indigenous artists.  The Australian Embassy 
in Paris also ran a cultural program to convey a positive and strong image of Australia’s 
Indigenous people and culture to coincide with the Museum opening. 197
For example, at the time of the Museum’s opening, a large proportion of Australia’s 
Indigenous population across urban, regional and remote communities within Australia were 
(and continue to) enduring chronic ‘disadvantage with respect to life expectancy, child 
mortality, access to early childhood education, educational attainment and employment 
outcomes’.
  
 
The significance of the Musee de Quai Branly opportunity for positive cultural diplomacy is 
impressive.  However, cultural diplomacy serves a purpose and has its limits.  In this case, 
there are also difficulties in reconciling the image of Australia’s Indigenous people and 
culture presented by the Australian Embassy, and the reality for many Indigenous people 
living within Australia, both prior to and following the exhibition launch.  Not to diminish the 
significance or importance of the international presentation of such artworks, the message 
they send to foreign audiences may be slightly skewed, and more aligned to propaganda than 
public diplomacy.   
 
198 Indigenous communities continue to be characterised by far higher rates of 
domestic and family violence issues, alcohol and drug abuse, incarceration, and deaths in 
custody than other identified community groups within Australia.199
                                                                                                                                                        
structure can ‘contribute to the conduct of diplomacy, encourage international commerce and enhance cultural 
exchange’.  Refer to The American Institute of Architects, ‘Design for Diplomacy: New Embassies for the 21st 
Century’, A Report for the American Institute of Architects 21st Century Embassy Taskforce, Washington DC, 
2009, p.2. 
197 DFAT Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy 
program, April 2007, p.14. 
198 Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Jenny Macklin MP, ‘Closing 
the Gap’,  Budget Statement 2007-2008, 13 May 2008. 
 Shortly after the Musee 
199 Ibid.  The Budget Statement provides one source of information regarding the situation of Indigenous 
Australian peoples and communities.  There is a substantial body of evidence available through both Federal and 
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de Quai Branly exhibition was opened to the (world-wide) public, the Australian Federal 
Government, under the leadership of Prime Minister John Howard, launched Operation 
Outreach as part of the a Northern Territory National Emergency Response (NTER): an 
Australian Defense Force operation to address child sexual abuse in the Northern Territory 
communities.200 Within this context, it is unlikely that many Indigenous Australians were 
aware then, or are even aware now of the prominence of Indigenous cultural artworks in the 
Paris museum.201 This example highlights a concern that messages conveyed through cultural 
diplomacy may be disingenuous, and breach to varying degrees the underpinning requirement 
for truth and credibility in public diplomacy.202  The example sits uneasily alongside the 
comments from DFAT officers that they must rely upon apologetic indigenous images in 
promoting Australia (‘which they do not understand’).203
Perhaps the lesson for Australia is that in the case of cultural diplomacy we do not necessarily 
need to believe or follow through on what we promote.  While this may be the case for 
Australia, such an approach would align with difficulty to strategic foreign policy, without 
crossing a line into propaganda.  Furthermore, such an approach would breach the widely 
held views, that truth and credibility are underpinning principles for successful public 
diplomacy.
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If we are to grow, we need our artists to sing with authentic voices. The early colonial painters’ eyes 
were often betrayed by their cultural backgrounds – they painted Aboriginal people with European 
 Drawing upon the similar themes in Archer’s critique of Australia Archer 
reminds us of the importance of authenticity in the projection of national identity: 
                                                                                                                                                        
State Government and non-government sources pointing to the entrenched and chronic disadvantage of 
Indigenous Australian peoples.   
200 Department of Defence, ‘Friendly hand Lent to Help Solve Outback Problems’, Media Release, 27 June 
2007. 
201 There is no specific market research or literature on this point, rendering this a purely speculative statement 
on the part of the author.   
202 As may be the case with other examples of Australian cultural diplomacy, such as Australia the movie.  
203 Confidential Interview, Various, senior DFAT Officials, posted overseas, 9 September 2009.  
204 A Henrikson, ‘Credible Public Diplomacy: Truth and Policy, Persuasion and People’, The Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs, Vol. 32:3, Special Edition, 2008, pp.5-6; R Woolcott, ‘Truth Spinning out of Control’, The 
Canberra Times, 6 March 2007; Ross, C, ‘Pillars of public diplomacy’.  
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features, the trees were not the right kind of green. By the late nineteenth/early twentieth century, though 
artists may still have needed the authority of European education and experiences, their eyes told them 
something different – the Heidelberg mob quite literally ‘saw the light’ and we started to have an 
authentic visual record of Australia.205
 
 
4.3.5 Strategic impact of humanitarian assistance 
 
This thesis is careful not to overlook the public diplomacy impact that is achieved through 
humanitarian assistance and development programs.  For example, Australia engaged in this 
indirect form of public diplomacy in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.206  Ten 
days after the tsunami occurred, then Australian Prime Minister Howard announced a 
$1 billion contribution to a newly formed Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction 
and Development (AIPRD).207 Australia’s actions were widely applauded in both the national 
and international media.208 Nationally, the media portrayed the announcement as a foreign 
policy master stroke in developing close ties with Indonesia in keeping with Australia’s status 
as a regional actor. Through this single announcement, Australia came to be considered as the 
world’s most generous post-tsunami donor at the time.209 The strategic contribution of such 
humanitarian and aid actions to Australia’s public diplomacy program should be 
acknowledged, even though such actions are not initiated, nor publicly recognised for their 
public diplomacy impact. There is value in noting such actions, otherwise known as the 
‘diplomacy of deeds’, may create, as a by-product, a certain amount of goodwill, which may 
provide leverage for other public diplomacy activities.210
                                                 
205 Archer, ‘The Price of Survival’.   
206 Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, Australia's $1 billion tsunami-related aid package to 
Indonesia: progress on the eve of the March ministerial meetings, Research Note No. 36, 7 March 2005.  
207 Ibid.  
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid.  
210 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, Wednesday 14 
March, 2007, p.13. 
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AusAID engages routinely and as a matter of core business in the provision of development 
assistance, channelled particularly to key nations within our region, including the Pacific.  
The forms of such assistance are extremely broad and extend well beyond the provision of 
humanitarian relief in the event of a natural disaster, such as that provided at the time of the 
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Other creative and strategic examples are found in projects 
such as the Australian-Indonesian Education Partnership.  Through the Partnership, Australia 
has committed $355 million to the building or expansion of two thousand junior secondary 
schools (including five hundred junior secondary Islamic schools), as part of a basic 
education program. 211   Prima facie, the project is intended to support the Indonesian 
Government ensure universal education for Indonesian children up to the end of Secondary 
School education. 212  An additional aspect of the project includes the commitment of a 
further $755,000 specifically earmarked to allow Indonesian teachers to visit Australian 
schools and to maintain ongoing avenues of online communication between Australian 
teachers and students and their counterparts in Indonesia. 213
It is clear both through the information presented to the Senate Inquiry, and further 
exploration of public diplomacy activities through this chapter that public diplomacy is on the 
Australian political and bureaucratic agenda (and has been for some time), and is manifested 
  While not a specifically 
promoted public diplomacy strategy at work, there is strategic value to be derived from such 
a project.  Not only will the communities (including local officials) be more likely to develop 
a favourable predisposition to Australia as a result of strong project marketing, but the project 
provides an opportunity for the Australian Government to directly and positively influence 
the teachers and young students attending the schools.   
 
                                                 
211 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Australian-Indonesian Partnership reaches 1,000 schools – 1,000 
to go’, Media Release, 12 August 2008. 
212 Ibid.  
213 Ibid.  
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through a great many and varied activities, that involve a range of diverse actors both in the 
development and the delivery of the activity.  Indeed, Australia’s public diplomacy program 
is made up of many parts.  For ease of reference and organised discussion, this thesis has 
drilled into the types of activity, rather than examined public diplomacy by agency or even 
activity type.  Because of the sheer scope of the activities, to take such a route would 
potentially be cumbersome and unproductive for the purpose of this study.214
                                                 
214 However, for future reference, such an ‘audit’ of government initiated public diplomacy activity would be 
valuable activity to undertake, and was within the scope of the Senate recommendations.   
  In all, the level 
of diverse public diplomacy activity, varying budgets and scale of some activities, when 
viewed with the general level of confusion about public diplomacy within the Australian 
professional community, the absence of clear strategic outcomes, and inconsistent and 
sometimes unflattering perceptions of Australia and Australians, reinforces the original theme 
of this thesis that: the sum of the parts is indeed less than the whole.     
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CHAPTER 5:  PUBLIC DIPLOMACY – AN INSTRUMENT OF 
FOREIGN POLICY 
 
5.1 The components of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign 
policy 
 
Having explored the current status of public diplomacy in the current Australian context, with 
reference to the emerging definitions and practice shaping public diplomacy activities, the 
purpose of this chapter is to now align public diplomacy to key foreign policy concepts, 
incorporating an appreciation for both the policy process and policy content. This analysis 
drives to the core of the critical gap in Australian public diplomacy as identified through this 
thesis. The aim therefore, is to begin to unravel the layers of consideration that support the 
delivery of effective public diplomacy in line with strategic foreign policy priorities.   
 
The Senate Inquiry noted in the Final Report that the ‘paucity of material on public 
diplomacy in Australia, and confusion surrounding the use of the term was one of the most 
striking features of the Inquiry’. As a result, the Inquiry spent a significant amount of effort 
on establishing an understanding of the meaning and significance of, and exploring the scope 
of activities encompassed by Australia’s public diplomacy program.  While the Inquiry 
covered these areas, and revealed a great many parts to the Australian public diplomacy 
program, the Committee fell short of identifying or developing a mechanism for these parts to 
be viewed as a consistent and coherent whole.   
 
In particular the Committee did not venture into further analysis of public diplomacy from a 
more in-depth policy context, highlighting a significant gap in Australian understanding of 
the concept of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy. The responsibility of this 
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thesis therefore, is to specifically address this gap in understanding and apply a logical 
framework that might enhance discussion and understanding of public diplomacy, with 
specific reference to public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy in the Australian 
context.  In particular, to be effective at a strategic level public diplomacy must be ‘more than 
a series of ad hoc responses to changing events…’, indeed public diplomacy ‘…must be 
incorporated into the ground floor of foreign policy’.1
Chapter 5 is central to delivering upon this thesis’ responsibility.  Much of the discussion 
sparked through the Senate Inquiry was overtaken with the discussion of public diplomacy 
activities or outputs.  DFAT led the charge with a submission weighted towards 
demonstrating the breadth of activity carried out by the department.
 
 
2  The Committee 
commented upon the ‘sheer number of activities’ presented by DFAT and other government 
agencies, but acknowledged that Australia’s public diplomacy activities are not well 
understood by Australians in general’.3  The activity-based approach tends towards 
disorganisation and distraction, without improving the fundamental understanding of why 
public diplomacy is important to the strategic foreign policy interests of the state, and what 
public diplomacy can achieve from a strategic standpoint.4
This approach, while indicative of fundamental gaps in theoretical understanding of public 
diplomacy, is also indicative of Australia’s still immature development in relation to the full 
and contemporary concept of public diplomacy.  With the recognised limitations of 
Australia’s current public diplomacy program in mind, the Senate Committee reminds us that 
  
 
                                                 
1 C Ross, ‘Public diplomacy comes of age’, Washington Quarterly, vol 5, no.2, spring, 2002, p1.  
2 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of 
Australia’s public diplomacy program, DFAT, Canberra, April 2007.   
3 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, 
p27. 
4 Henrikson, ‘What can Public Diplomacy Achieve?’, p.1. 
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‘clearly, it is in Australia’s interest to make sure that its public diplomacy programs are 
effectively meeting their objectives, that it is strategically and deliberately tailoring its public 
diplomacy in support of long term foreign policy objectives’.5
The tenor of international discussion indicates public diplomacy is a concept that ‘matters 
more than ever…and plays a critical role in establishing a country’s position in the world, and 
delivering tangible policy objectives’.
  This chapter explores the need 
highlighted, but not taken up further by the Senate Inquiry, to understand public diplomacy as 
an instrument of foreign policy.     
 
The connection between public diplomacy and foreign policy is a theme that resonates in 
international literatures on public diplomacy (particularly from authorities such as Melissen, 
Henrikson, Hocking). However, the discussion around this theme tends to remain at a 
superficial level.  This chapter takes the discussion to greater depth, exploring the key policy 
process phases and the implications for strategic policy development and delivery within 
those stages. Such discussion provides the scaffolding upon which a policy-based public 
diplomacy framework can be further constructed.  The policy-based framework, examined 
further in Chapter Six, provides a new comprehensive way of viewing of public diplomacy.  
The policy process and content perspectives identified through this and subsequent chapters, 
and utilised in the framework have not been examined or drawn together in this way before, 
and provide a unique lens through which the practitioner can identify, develop and deliver the 
many parts that make up a public diplomacy program in a consistent and coherent way.    
 
6  Hocking also reminds us, ‘public diplomacy remains 
a technique for achieving policy objectives’. 7
                                                 
5 Ibid. p.25. 
6 Melissen ‘Between Theory and Practice’; p.24. 
7 Hocking, ‘Rethinking the new public diplomacy’, p.37. 
 Furthermore, with reference to the impact of 
public diplomacy in connecting with the broader public audience and building soft power, 
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Hocking quotes Hill who pointed out that ‘the rationale of the soft power paradigm is that 
people are targets of foreign policy’.8   Yet, as reported by the Senate Committee, Australia is 
not necessarily engaged in the discussion of emerging trends in the theory and practice of 
public diplomacy, nor is public diplomacy considered in strategic planning of longer-term 
foreign policy objectives.  Australian commentators such as Wesley openly admit that they 
are sceptical of the strategic foreign policy value to be derived from public diplomacy.9
Wesley’s views reflect the historical rationale, also presented by Evans and Grant, that public 
diplomacy has not ever been relevant to the ‘serendipitous’ Australian experience or foreign 
policy approach.
   
 
10  For example, Australia has not ever had to focus on re-building an image 
in the same way that the Germans did after their devastating defeat in World War Two.11  
Nor has Australia ever felt the obligation or need that appears to fall upon great civilisations 
or cultures to systematically spread their culture or language across an uncivilized world, as 
the French have through Alliance Francais, the British through the British Council or the 
Chinese through the Confucius Institute.12
                                                 
8 Ibid, emphasis added. 
9 Interview, Michael Wesley, Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 13 July 2009.   
10 Wesley, ‘Planning Australia’s Foreign Policy Future’, p.1.  
11 Interview, Michael Wesley, Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 13 July 2009.  See 
also Evans, Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, p.69. 
12 Ibid. However, Australian practitioners might be cautioned against relying on the usual excuses as to why 
public diplomacy has little relevance to Australia.  Comparing the Australian experience with that of post world 
war Germany or to the early experiences of France, China and Britain is of little value, firstly because the 
Australian experience was vastly different, and secondly because the public diplomacy methods and outcomes 
in use following World War II and through the Cold War period have since evolved sufficiently to be 
distinguished from those exercised in the post world war environment.   
  As Executive Director for one of Australia’s 
leading think-tanks on international policy, Wesley holds an influential position among the 
opinion-leaders, and his view will be important in any further discussions of public 
diplomacy.  While at the time of interview Wesley remained to be convinced about the 
strategic policy merits of public diplomacy in Australia, his more recent writings demonstrate 
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a small but evident shift in thinking to incorporate considerations of public diplomacy in 
specific policy matters.13
The brief attention paid by the Australian Government to public diplomacy strategies during 
the 1990s reflected an early pragmatic recognition of a shift in the Australian international 
outlook, and a corresponding need for the Government to establish Australia’s international 
positioning, and ‘reputational advantage’ via lasting (regional) relationships and alliances, 
and with a strong Asian-Australian identity.
   
 
14  However, this brief attention to public 
diplomacy as a strategic foreign policy instrument during the 1990s (preceded by decades of 
traditionalist foreign policy), was subsequently followed by a return to overtly traditionalist 
foreign policy.15
More importantly, the international environment, and Australia’s place in that environment 
has shifted substantially. The foreign policy founded in ‘serendipity’ is not longer relevant 
nor appropriate.  Australia must operate within an international system in which the power 
dynamics are far more complex and fluid, and the issues confronting the global community 
 As a result in the change in administration, public diplomacy did not 
progress past the very early stages of development within the Australian foreign policy 
structure.  Ultimately, the impact of Prime Minister Howard’s more traditionalist approach to 
foreign policy development and delivery saw public diplomacy fade into the background of 
Australian foreign policy, while at the same time in other parts of the world the public 
diplomacy moved to the forefront of innovative foreign policy and practice.   
 
                                                 
13 In particular, refer to Wesley, ‘China an unfamiliar terrain’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 September, 
2009.  As Wesley notes, ‘Getting China right means Australia must make the effort to better understand 
China…’ emphasis added.  The reference to ‘understanding China’ directly relates to public diplomacy 
activities that enable wider understanding of the target foreign audience.   
14 Evans, ‘Australia’s foreign policy response to global challenges’. 
15 Howard was not a supporter of overt public diplomacy activities, but nonetheless by virtue of events and 
situations played a role in fostering strategic elements of public diplomacy, including through Australia’s high 
profile role in brokering solutions with the International Monetary Fund during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
alongside the strong Australian response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004.  Both are examples of indirect 
public diplomacy impacting positively on the Australian image and reputation.   
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and the players in that community are indeed ‘wicked’; that is they involve ‘complex 
interdependencies emerging between social, environmental and economic issues, and across 
national, regional and international policy spheres’.16  Dealing with ‘wicked problems’ 
requires not only agreement between governments, but also agreement and deliberate action 
of targeted and mass population groups if solutions are to be developed and progressed.17
The globalised and competitive world in which Australia now seeks to secure a place will 
require innovations and adaptations in diplomatic practice, and new forms of engagement 
with foreign audiences, who hold the power of influence.  The very recent shift in global 
dialogue, governance and management towards the G20 presents Australia with the 
opportunity to exercise creative diplomacy and skilful persuasion across a range of audiences 
and nations.  Consequently this shift brings about significant change in addressing some of 
the most pressing issues of national concern, including global economic performance and 
climate change.
  
Public diplomacy can have an impact within this sphere.   
 
18
                                                 
16 The terminology of the ‘wicked’ problem is relatively new and frequently applies to issues or problems that 
reflect a significant degree of social complexity, among other defined characteristics.  The term was first coined 
by Horst Rittel in  H Rittel and M Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’, Policy Sciences, Vol 4, 
1973, pp. 155-169.  For further reading, see also, K Christensen, ‘Building Shared Understanding of Wicked 
Problems - Interview with Jeff Conklin’, Rotman Magazine, Winter 2009; J Conklin, ‘Wicked Problems and 
Social Complexity’, Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems, Wiley, October 
2008, p.1.  The statement made by L J Peter that ‘some problems are so complex that you have to be highly 
intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them’, may apply to these wicked global problems, 
such as climate change, quoted in .Conklin, ‘Wicked Problems and Social Complexity’, p.1. 
17 For example, McClellan’s communication pyramid becomes relevant, where the public diplomacy methods 
employed must be appropriately engaging of the audience to spark action by that audience.   
18 D Shanahan, ‘Kevin Rudd looks for wider role in G20 as he launches global campaign’, The Australian, 10 
September 2009.    
 To achieve significant and strategic outcomes in this environment, public 
diplomacy can not be seen as an ‘add-on’ to diplomatic efforts, but must align closely to the 
development and delivery of foreign policy. 
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The Senate Inquiry devoted considerable time contributing to the understanding of what 
public diplomacy means to various players within Australia, including across the actors 
involved in delivering various aspects of Australia’s public diplomacy program.  From this 
perspective, the Inquiry was impressive in the breadth of witnesses involved, scope and depth 
of content covered during a relatively short timeframe of operation.  The nature of the 
questioning highlighted aspects of why public diplomacy might be important from an 
international perspective, including a discussion of soft power, alongside an examination of 
public diplomacy structures and activities, and identification of possible deficiencies in the 
Australian context.  However, while the Senate Inquiry illuminated many facets of public 
diplomacy, the discussion lacked strategic logic, which according to Gregory, is not unusual 
in discussions relating to public diplomacy.19  The Senate Committee unravelled many 
threads relating to the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of an Australian public diplomacy program, but was 
not positioned to address the questions that remain around ‘why public diplomacy?’. Nor was 
the Committee positioned to weave those threads together into any meaningful or logical 
pattern for understanding public diplomacy.  As a result, the Final Report presented a picture 
of Australian public diplomacy program as a series of fragmented and ad hoc responses to a 
changing environment, otherwise referred to as a ‘hotch-potch’.20
 
  The Inquiry outcome did 
not produce recommendations that would enable Australian public diplomacy to be framed or 
organised differently to deliver coherent and tangible policy objectives in the Australian 
context.  This is the point at which the responsibility of this thesis, to specifically address the 
existing gap in understanding and apply a logical framework that might enhance discussion 
and understanding of public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy in the Australian 
context, becomes relevant.   
                                                 
19 See B Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’, p.285.  
20 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’, 
p.62. 
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The growing body of international literature around public diplomacy presents different 
perspectives on this emerging field of contemporary public diplomacy.  Gregory and Cull 
approach public diplomacy through a chronological lens pivoting around Edmund Gullion’s 
introduction of the phrase ‘public diplomacy’ in 1965 with the establishment of the Edward 
R. Murrow Centre for Public Diplomacy at Tufts University.21 However, a chronological 
discourse does not adequately unravel the many layers that make up public diplomacy, nor 
set public diplomacy into context as a policy framework.  Others seek to present public 
diplomacy as an examination of the public diplomacy methods and techniques.22
For this reason, there is value in drawing together key concepts in foreign policy thinking into 
a public diplomacy framework that allows the practitioner to apply a degree of organisation 
and logic in a policy context.  To do this, this chapter will firstly draw upon and examine 
 Once again, 
while providing a platform for organising discussion, such a perspective does not necessarily 
distil the critical features of public diplomacy, nor provide sufficient guidance on when 
certain methods should be employed above others, and for what purpose.   However, the 
work of Henrikson and Leonard, supported by Melissen tends to anchor the discussion of 
public diplomacy more closely to a policy perspective, and strikes a chord.  This perspective 
is of most value to the practitioner with an interest in strategically and deliberately tailoring 
public diplomacy in support of long-term foreign policy objectives.  
 
                                                 
21 In his essay Cull provides a history of the term public diplomacy which is centred around Gullion’s coining of 
the phrase in 1965 with the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Centre for Public Diplomacy at Tufts 
University.  Use of the phrase was a clever exercise in word politics and marketing, as devised by Gullion.  
Public diplomacy was successfully relaunched as a fresh alternative to the phrase ‘propaganda’, which had 
accumulated negative connotations as a result of the previous decades of the Cold War.  Through his reinvention 
of the term, Gullion abandoned the negative baggage associated with the term ‘propaganda’ and presented a 
more sophisticated and savvy image than could even be achieved through use of the term ‘public relations’.  
Refer to Cull, ‘Public diplomacy before Gullion: the evolution of a phrase’, and Gregory also ‘Public 
Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field’.   
22 Zahara, McClellan, Sharp and Rasmussen all present different discussions of public diplomacy from an 
instrumental perspective. Refer to Zaharna, ‘Mapping out the Spectrum of Public Diplomacy’; McClellan, 
‘Public Diplomacy in the Context of Traditional Diplomacy’ ; Rasmussen, ‘Discourse analysis of EU public 
diplomacy: messages and practice’; and Sharp, ‘Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Techniques of 
Public Diplomacy’.   
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aspects of the work of Gyngell and Wesley in their definition of the Australian foreign policy 
process.23
The policy process must be examined in parallel with the distinct and separate thread of 
thinking supported in the work of contemporary European scholars and practitioners, 
(Henrikson, Melissen, Hocking and Leonard) in relating public diplomacy objectives and 
methods to the recognised strategies that drive foreign policy.
  Gyngell and Wesley bring together the practitioner and academic perspectives in 
describing the foreign policy process, as it occurs in Australia.  Their work looks specifically 
at how Australia deals with the outside world, and outlines a clear process for the 
development and delivery of foreign policy.  
 
24  As shall be seen, 
Henrikson’s work supported through writings of other contemporary scholars provides deeper 
analysis of the broad foreign policy continuum, and identifies the major strategic 
considerations and subsequent tactical instruments deployed by governments through public 
diplomacy.25
5.1.1 Understanding foreign policy concepts 
 
   
Firstly, this chapter must set the scene for a discussion around key foreign policy strategies.  
To do so, requires first a definition of policy (which, for the purposes of this thesis should be 
read as public policy) and subsequently foreign policy, and to briefly outline the structures 
and processes involved in the development and delivery of such policy.  Gyngell and Wesley 
define policy quite simply as ‘the promotion and protection of given social values within the 
                                                 
23 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, pp.17-57. 
24 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, Hocking, 
‘Rethinking the New Public Diplomacy’; and Leonard, Small, and Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the ‘Age 
of Schisms’’.   
25 While key scholars such as Melissen, Hocking, and Leonard each articulate the generic and important link 
between public diplomacy and foreign policy, their works do not go as far as Henrikson’s to articulate more 
closely the foreign policy strategies that might be applicable, and how public diplomacy might progress those 
policy strategies.  Henrikson concedes that his work then stops short of defining the methods of public 
diplomacy that sit best against each of the foreign policy objectives.  This thesis addresses this gap within the 
proposed framework.  A. Henrikson, ‘What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve’, p.7. 
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boundaries of state responsibility by agents of the state’, and note that ‘each department of 
government is assigned responsibility for monitoring a certain policy space’.26 The definition 
reveals a classical outlook on policy that is aligned with the equally contemporary, though 
more confined Bridgeman and Davis statement that policy is ‘an authoritative statement by a 
government about its intentions’.27 Essentially, the consistent classical view of policy which 
provides a foundation for further discussion of the public diplomacy system is that policy 
relates to the decisions and actions that ‘must to some degree have been generated or at least 
processed within the framework of governmental procedures, influences and organizations’ 
(as opposed to the decisions and actions of those outside the public sector, such as private 
corporations).28
From this definition of public policy, there is a natural extension into a discussion of the 
policy subset of foreign policy described by Gyngell and Wesley as ‘the anticipation of and 
response to disturbances…that either originate from sources external to the country, or can be 
addressed at sites external to the country’.
  
 
29 Foreign policy, like any matter of public policy, 
emerges from within the political environment, in which a government administration 
exercises its authority to make decisions and implement actions on behalf of the broader 
community of citizens.  Bridgman and Davis describe policy in this environment as ‘an 
authoritative response to a public issue or problem’; adding that ‘it is intentional, purposeful 
and structured and both requires and tests decision-making’.30
                                                 
26 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.22. 
27 P Bridgman, G Davis, Australian Policy Handbook , Allen and Unwin, 1998, p.5.  The Policy Handbook has 
been adopted across Australian bureaucracy as an authoritative and comprehensive practitioner focused guide to 
policy making in Australia.  In particular, the ‘policy cycle’ outlined in the Handbook has been integrated into 
best practice guidelines within both Commonwealth and state jurisdictions.  Consequently Bridgman and Davis 
are regarded as authorities in the area of Australian public policy.   
28 Hogwood and Gunn, Policy Analysis for the Real World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, p.12. 
29 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.23. 
30 Bridgman, Davis, Australian Policy Handbook , p.6.   
   
 
215 
 
Australian based public policy practitioner, Richard Curtain notes that public policy making 
is ‘first and foremost about determining objectives or societal goals, the latter of which might 
include issues such as the principles to underpin the conduct of foreign affairs, how to 
promote internal social cohesion, how to best meet citizens’ needs during major life cycle 
changes’.31 Curtain further argues that based on the broad and complex nature of issues dealt 
with in public policy, it ‘must, at the very least be effective, efficient, and long term in 
perspective’.32  Each of these aspirations present challenges for policy-makers in any field, 
but particularly in the case of foreign policy, which incorporates a range of additional 
structures, processes and relationships applicable to the international sphere which are not 
normally present in the domestic sphere.  Indeed, for this reason foreign policy is by nature 
‘highly varied and unpredictable’.33
5.1.2 Foreign policy structures 
  
 
Despite the inherent complexity and unpredictability of foreign policy development and 
delivery, there are opportunities to analyse key foreign policy strategies that have been, and 
continue to be exercised by states in enabling a reliable response to or active management of 
disturbances in the external policy space.  In each instance it is also possible to deconstruct 
the policy strategies further to identify patterned linkages between the strategy and 
appropriate public diplomacy activities.    
 
The system of government that supports policy-making, includes both political and non-
political actors and layers of decision-making, leadership, coordination and action.  While the 
role of DFAT with respect to public diplomacy in Australia has already been raised and 
examined throughout this thesis, the structures that sit behind and around DFAT, can in some 
                                                 
31 R Curtain, ‘Good public policy making: how Australia fares’, Agenda: a Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Reform, Volume 8, Number 1, 2000, p.35. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.39. 
216 
 
cases play an even more important role in understanding the development and delivery of 
foreign policy through public diplomacy.  Interestingly, this is not a view that is necessarily 
held within DFAT, and comments made by DFAT officials currently working overseas 
(including in policy roles that encompass public diplomacy responsibilities), indicate a view 
that there is no role for any other agency outside DFAT, and outside agencies need no 
information.  As one official responded, ‘no other Australian Government agency has any 
active role, so we coordinate, implement then clean up the empties and sweep away the butts 
afterwards.  The rest of the public service is absent unless they are selling something’.34  On 
the point of an overall lack of understanding about public diplomacy across the Australian 
public service, one official commented, ‘why should they understand it when they have no 
role to play’?35
Policy is generated as a result of an initiative that either drives, or responds to shifts in the 
environment in such as way as to ‘protect or promote given social values within the 
responsibility of the state’.
  These statements support the view proposed earlier within this thesis that 
DFAT officials themselves may be out of step with current trends in and requirements of 
contemporary public diplomacy, particularly in relation to public diplomacy’s link to policy, 
and the role played by other government and non government agencies in giving effect to 
such policy.   For this reason, this chapter will provide a brief overview of the political 
structures that can give effect to policy within the Australian system. 
 
36  Policy priorities and initiatives are generated and determined 
from within the political leadership.37
                                                 
34 Interview Confidential Sources, Senior  DFAT officials posted overseas and currently working to give effect 
to Australia’s public diplomacy program overseas, 27 May 2009, 29 July 2009, 9 September 2009. 
35 Ibid.   
36 Bridgman, Davis, Australian Policy Handbook, p.5. 
37 Ibid.  Which in the Australian federal system, refers to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the latter of which 
comprises portfolio Ministers as determined by the Prime Minister.   
 The role of the Prime Minister in the policy process 
cannot be understated.  Former Australian Prime Minister, John Howard asserted the practice 
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that, ‘the Prime Minister sets out his priorities and strategic direction for each portfolio in a 
letter sent to respective Ministers shortly after they are appointed’.38  In assessing the merits 
of Howard’s approach, Professor Patrick Weller provides useful context in noting that ‘the 
influence of prime ministers and their impact on policy will depend on their capacity to 
cajole, persuade or bully cabinet colleagues – either individually or collectively – into 
accepting their solutions’.39
During the last decade, Australia’s Prime Ministers with the strong and consistent support of 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, have played a significant role in the setting of Australia’s 
foreign policy agenda.  From the late 1980s, the Hawke-Evans and Keating-Evans 
partnerships drove an active agenda of Australian engagement in Asia, and international good 
citizenship, buttressed by a reliance on the mechanisms of multilateralism. Public diplomacy 
was publicly placed on the foreign policy agenda as an opportunity to ‘cast the net much 
wider, beyond the influential few to the ‘uninvolved’ many.
 
 
40   Subsequently, Howard’s 
interest and expertise in foreign policy grew during his time in the role, and was influenced 
by the significant international crises and events that occurred while he was in a leadership 
position. 41  Howard, supported in his leadership by Foreign Minister Downer, ultimately 
played a formidable role in the setting of policy agendas which moved to ‘practical politics 
based upon the national interest and Australian values’. 42
                                                 
38 John Howard quoted in Bridgman and Davis, Australian Policy Handbook , p.11. 
39 Patrick Weller quoted in Bridgman and Davis, Australian Policy Handbook , p.11.  Weller is the Director or 
the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University. 
40 Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, p.66.   
41 For further reading on Howard’s interest in foreign policy refer to Firth, Australia in International Politics; 
Kevin, ‘Foreign policy’, in The Howard Years, R Manne (ed); Robertson, ‘Australia’s Position on Asia: closer 
than ever’; Capling, ‘Twenty years of Australia’s engagement with Asia’ in addition to Kelly, Howard’s 
decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal. 
42 Kelly, Howard’s decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal, p.3. 
 Howard’s cynicism of public 
diplomacy was clearly articulated on a number of occasions but most clearly when he noted 
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‘while it may build on a nation’s popular image or appeal, and add diversity to relationships, 
public diplomacy is no substitute for political, economic or strategic substance’.43
By contrast, Rudd has come into the role of Prime Minister with definite and ambitious views 
on foreign policy shaped in part as a result of his experience as a diplomatic practitioner.
  
 
44  
Much of the rhetoric and symbolism employed by Rudd, particularly in his first year of office 
pointed to a greater level of sympathy for the role of public diplomacy in the conduct of 
international relations.  At the strategic and political level, Rudd is clearly utilising public 
diplomacy (including through high level visits by himself and members of his Cabinet) to 
influence global power dynamics and decision-making, securing a legitimate place for 
Australia.  However, as the budget and annual statements of key agencies (PM&C and 
DFAT) indicate, Rudd’s natural alignment to public diplomacy practice has not been 
translated into more concrete outcomes at a policy level for Australia’s ongoing and broad 
public diplomacy program. 45
The public service, ‘the collection of departments, and agencies, staff and resources that 
make up the machinery of government’, 
  Suffice to say, that Australian leaders exercise their influence 
over the foreign policy agenda.  Through Cabinet and the policy structures of the 
bureaucracy, the foreign policy agenda can then be developed and delivered.   
 
46
                                                 
43 Bubalo, ‘Football Diplomacy’, p.10. 
44 Kelly, Howard’s decade: an Australian foreign policy reappraisal and Gyngell, ‘Ambition: The emerging 
foreign policy of the Rudd Government’.  
45 For example, under Rudd, Australia’s public diplomacy has continued to wear budgetary cuts, for example, 
Australia’s cultural diplomacy program has been cut by $20 million over four years.  Other budget cuts while 
less evident, are equally as significant.  During interview, one senior DFAT official from the Consular, Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs Division noted that Australia’s public diplomacy program was funded only $3 
million this year.  Confidential Interview, Senior DFAT official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
Division, 22 June 2009.   
46 Bridgman, Davis, Australian Policy Handbook , p.15. 
 holds the bulk of responsibility for policy 
development and delivery (including through activities, services and programs) and is 
generally organised in departments that align with defined portfolio streams (such as health, 
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education, justice, and so on). Each government department actively pursues and monitors 
the development and delivery of public policy relevant to its portfolio space.  For many 
departments, such policy activity relates solely to activity within the domestic sphere.  
Generally where aspects of policy relate to the international sphere they have been addressed 
and responded to by the department with responsibility for foreign policy.  However, the 
impact of a global world is that increasingly domestic and international policy issues collide, 
and policy responsibility extends across a range of departments.  The Senate Inquiry 
revealed, (contrary to the view of some DFAT officials), that within the Australian 
Government some 22 departments carry some responsibility for areas international policy and 
have an interest in public diplomacy activities.47
Within Australia’s machinery of government structure, the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (PM&C) plays a primary role in setting and coordinating government policy in total 
by ensuring that decisions taken across government are consistent with each other and with 
the overarching policy position set by cabinet.
  Generally, DFAT assumes a lead policy 
role, but this is not always the case.   
 
48
                                                 
47 The number of government departments operating within the international policy space will vary from time to 
time depending upon the machinery of government changes implemented by respective administrations.  
48 Bridgman, Davis, Australian Policy Handbook , p.15. 
 The role played by PM&C in the 
development of public policy, and including foreign policy is pivotal, yet is frequently 
overlooked in literature relating to foreign policy making in Australia.  In fact, PM&C plays 
an overarching and strategic role – a role that cannot be over-emphasised, and provides for a 
dominant presence in setting and shaping the foreign policy agenda.  The role of PM&C in 
developing and directing Australian foreign policy is significant by virtue of the connection 
and responsibility of the department to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.  While the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet together set the overarching strategic agenda for Australian policy, 
PM&C takes responsibility for the coordination and overall direction of the policy 
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implementation process across the scope of government agencies.  Specific to foreign policy, 
the International Strategic Policy Unit within PM&C reports to have a dedicated focus on 
strategic international and foreign policy issues and is responsible for advising on Australia’s 
foreign, trade and aid policies.   
 
As an aside, the extent and method of interaction between the International Strategic Policy 
Unit and DFAT is not clear.49
Foreign policy concepts and structures, as they operate within the confines of the state, play a 
fundamental and practical role in the development and shape of foreign policy.  The 
development and shape of Australia’s public diplomacy program as an instrument of both 
strategic and operational foreign policy is also determined within these parameters.  DFAT 
suggests through the evidence presented to the Senate Inquiry that the department ‘has 
integrated public diplomacy into the policy fabric of the department’s work as a core 
mainstream activity’.  However analysis of the current corporate plan and organisational 
structure of DFAT, along with comments made by DFAT officials both within Australia and 
operating overseas suggest that public diplomacy is well outside the current policy thinking 
and structure.  For example, the Images of Australia Branch located within Consular and 
  The publicly produced departmental materials provide little 
insight into the agency’s interpretation of the Prime Minister’s engagement with the concept 
of public diplomacy.  PM&C did not make a submission to the Senate Inquiry nor was the 
agency called upon to produce evidence to the hearings.  Despite several attempts for contact, 
departmental officials were unresponsive to requests to participate in an interview for the 
purpose of this thesis. There appears to be a gap in the continuity of strategic thought around 
public diplomacy at this critical juncture in the policy structure.      
 
                                                 
49 Refer to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, 
<http://www.dpmc.gov.au/national_security/index.cfm> 
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Protocol Division of the department (considered to be more aligned to the operational service 
delivery lines of DFAT’s consular and protocol work) is structurally separate from the key 
policy areas of the department.  DFAT officers confirmed the lack of synergy between their 
policy focus and their understanding of public diplomacy, stating that ‘DFAT public 
diplomacy is a “lowest common denominator” of the international component of other 
departments’ projections of Australia overseas plus the best [DFAT] can manage with a 
shrinking budget’.50
5.2 The foreign policy process 
   
 
While the task of engaging Australia’s political masters and policy structures to more fully 
support public diplomacy is a challenge, aligning public diplomacy more closely to the policy 
process, particularly within DFAT is not an insurmountable task.  Through the construction 
of a framework, the purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that public diplomacy not only 
fits but is inextricably linked to the development and delivery of foreign policy.  Armed with 
the understanding that there are numerous structures and actors contributing to the policy 
process more broadly within Australia, it is then important to touch on the policy process 
itself.   
 
 
The initial scaffolding to be constructed for the public diplomacy framework comes from the 
phases identified by Gyngell and Wesley as making up the foreign policy making process.51
                                                 
50 Interviews, Confidential Source, Current and Former Senior Officials, DFAT, 13 May 2009, 27 May 2009, 28 
May 2009, 29 July 2009, 9 September 2009. 
51 The Gyngell and Wesley foreign policy making process has been identified as contributing to the scaffolding 
for the public diplomacy policy framework to be developed through the thesis.  For sources of relevance to 
foreign policymaking in Australia refer to Firth, Australia in International Politics, T Kevin, ‘Foreign policy’, 
in The Howard Years, R Manne (ed), Black Inc, 2004, pp.291-313; and A Cooper, R Higgott and K Nossal, 
Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, UBC Press, Vancouver, 1994; P 
Gorjoa, ‘Australia’s dilemma between geography and history: how consolidated is engagement in Asia’; and C 
Ungerer, ‘The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy’.     
 
Other studies and research into foreign policy decision-making and processes, including that 
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undertaken by Charles Hermann et al, are acknowledged and have relevance to the 
overarching themes provided by Gyngell and Wesley. For example, Beasley, Kaarbo 
Hermann and Hermann examine the specific dynamics, actors, processes and choices that 
impact critically upon foreign policy decision-making, and established a framework for 
‘classifying the people involved in foreign policymaking into decision units’.52 Such research 
provides a background that demonstrates the broad international study of foreign policy 
making processes, that have relevance to the discussion of public diplomacy.  However, the 
Gyngell and Wesley policy process forms the primary platform from which the discussion of 
how public diplomacy may be aligned to foreign policy in this thesis, because of its practical 
and realist approach to the foreign policy process, and particular applicability to the 
Australian context.  Gyngell’s strong background in the policy process at the highest levels 
(as Keating’s former senior foreign affairs adviser), lends credibility and authenticity from 
Australian practitioner viewpoint.  This is an asset to be leveraged if this thesis is to achieve 
the aim of making public diplomacy more relevant and accessible to the practitioner.  As 
Kevin notes, ‘At a time…when classic literature on Australian foreign policy risks being left 
behind’ the more contemporary Gyngell and Wesley’s Making Australian Foreign Policy ‘is 
quickly becoming standard text’.53
This thesis draws upon the level defined by Gyngell and Wesley, comprising ‘four distinct 
but inter-related levels of activity a) strategic, b) contextual, c)organisational; and d) 
operational’.
  
 
54
                                                 
52 R Beasley, J Kaarbo, C Hermann, M Hermann, ‘People and processes in foreign policymaking: insights from 
comparative case studies’, International Studies Quarterly, 2001, pp.217. See also M Hermann and C Hermann, 
‘Who makes foreign policy decisions and how: an empirical inquiry’, International Studies Quarterly, 33, 1989, 
pp.361-387; A Rosati, ‘Developing a theory of foreign policy: the evolution of American foreign policy’ Paper 
presented at the Conference on New Directions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, Ohio State 
University, May 1985.  
53 Kevin, ‘Foreign Policy’, p.311. 
54 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.25. 
 Each of these levels, labelled and incorporated into the first column in Table 3 
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and Table 4 at Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively, is important to the process of policy 
making.  However, the aim of unpicking the distinct threads of the policy process is not to 
oversimplify the process, as Gyngell and Wesley note the practitioner must be aware that 
‘policy-making occurs simultaneously at all of these levels, the boundaries are constantly in 
flux, and the actors and participants may vary and are not mutually exclusive to any level’.55 
Defining and delineating each of the levels at which certain policy development and delivery 
processes and activities occur, allows for a clearer picture of the actual dynamics and 
considerations that inform policy making.56 While it may be unrealistic to produce or rely 
upon a set of pre-determined processes or routines in the development of policy to achieve 
expected outcomes, it is reasonable to argue that for a policy to progress from the 
germination of an idea or initial response to shift in the external environment, the process 
must be considered carefully, with consideration given to the various actors, structures, 
processes and relationships that occur at each phase.  
 
Each layer of activity identified in the Gyngell and Wesley model and adapted into the first 
column of the policy based public diplomacy framework requires brief attention, before more 
detailed examination of the policy strategies themselves. For ease of understanding the policy 
phases will represented at the start of each new section as a horizontal continuum, (bearing in 
mind that the policy phases appear as a vertical axis in the Framework), highlighting the 
specific policy under discussion for that section, as shown below:   
 
Foreign Policy Process Phases: 
Strategic phase Contextual phase Organisational phase Operational phase 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid.   
56 Ibid. 
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5.2.1 The strategic phase 
 
Strategic phase Contextual phase Organisational phase Operational phase 
 
 
Foreign policy activity occurring at the strategic level is that of the highest order reflecting 
authoritative statements of political commitment or priority regarding the pursuit of the 
national agenda on the international stage.  The strategic phase is reinforced by the basic 
premise set out by Hermann and Herman that: 
At the apex of foreign policy decision making in all governments or ruling parties is a group of actors – 
the ultimate decision unit – who, if they agree, both have the ability to commit the resources of the 
government in foreign affairs and the power or authority to prevent other entities within the government 
from overtly reversing that decision.57
High level policy statements are usually articulated or endorsed by the political leadership, 
and are passed on to the machinery of government, that is, the structures of government 
agencies and departments that support the political process, for more detailed development 
and delivery. The outcome at this stage may also take the form of a White Paper, or budget 
statement. Strategic policy statements and rhetoric are usually aimed to appeal to a broad 
public audience, which incorporates the government, bureaucracy, diplomatic community, 
and importantly the electorate as a whole.  From this perspective, engagement of the 
audiences can be critical, particularly when the policy involves publicly unpopular choices, 
such as the introduction of trade liberalisation measures, or sending troops into situations of 
conflict.
   
 
58  Strategic policy positions are usually secured to arguments of public interest and 
national values, while providing a degree of political latitude for various interpretations in 
application.59
                                                 
57 Hermann, Hermann, ‘‘Who makes foreign policy decisions and how: an empirical inquiry’, p.362.  
  
58 ABC Online, ‘I’m responsible for Troops to Afghanistan: Howard’, ABC News Online, 9 October 2007: 
http://abc.gov.au/news/stories/2007/10/09/2055035.htm; Bartlett, ‘More Aussie Troops to Afghanistan’, 
Bartlett’s Blog, 23 February 2006, http://andrewbartlett.com/?p=143, M Fiel, ‘Australia-US FTA: Still A drain 
on Economy’, The Age, 10 February 2009; M Fiel, ‘Do Tariffs Matter?’, The Age, 10 December 2008.   
59 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.25. For example, Australian strategic policy on 
climate change might be to support an Emissions Trading System.  However, the strategic policy does not set 
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During the former Howard Government, Alexander Downer, as the then Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, released two white papers (In the National Interest – released in 1997; and 
Advancing the National Interest released in 2002), setting out Australia’s strategic longer 
term foreign policy priorities and objectives for that time, with a strong emphasis on ‘security 
of the Australian economy, jobs, standard of living and way of life; …while being responsive 
to the values and ethics of the Australian people’.60
After nearly two years of leadership, the Rudd Government has not yet produced a white 
paper on foreign policy, and has consequently been criticised for not articulating the strategic 
path for Australia’s forward foreign policy.
  Each of these white papers were 
developed with the contribution of academics, business leaders, and former policy-makers.  
The white papers themselves were the central outputs of the strategic policy process and set 
out the roadmap for foreign policy development and delivery.  
 
61
                                                                                                                                                        
out the detail of the rules and requirements that will regulate such a scheme, nor necessarily the targets 
themselves.  These have been matters for subsequent parliamentary debate, further detailed analysis, 
consultation and drafting.  C Kerr, ‘Rudd Denies Early Poll Plan over Emissions Trading Scheme’, The 
Australian, August 14 2009;  L Taylor, ‘Libs Stick to Emissions Targets by Other Means’, The Australian, 3 
December, 2009.   
60 A Downer, Advancing the national interest: Australia’s foreign policy challenge, Media Release, May 7 
2002;  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade 
Policy’, White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997.  
61 In his Current Issues Blog, ‘Rudd needs clearer idea to stem growing disarray’ posted on 5 July 2008, Senator 
Russell Trood calls for the Rudd Government to ‘immediately prepare and issue its own foreign policy white 
paper’ on the basis of a ‘significant shift in the main trends of international affairs, substantial reorientation in 
government policy and need for restatement of principles and direction to regain clarity of purpose’. 
  However, Rudd initiated the Australia 2020 
Summit early in his tenure, which incorporated significant discussion with a range of 
business, government and community stakeholders regarding Australia’s foreign policy 
challenges and priorities. An argument might be suggested, that in the twenty-first century 
the format of the 2020 Summit is an equivalent to the traditional White Paper approach.  In 
line with contemporary public diplomacy practice, the methodology and format driving the 
2020 Summit was that such an activity be broadly accessible and engaging for the Australian 
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domestic public, and televised for viewing rather than printed for reading.62 As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, Rudd himself, ‘dominates the formulation of Australian foreign policy 
more securely than any of his predecessors’ and the use of the white paper mechanism may 
be more a reflection of style, preference and experience.63  Rudd has clearly articulated a 
firm, and as Gyngell notes, an ambitious strategic policy direction through statements and 
speeches outlining an ambitious agenda for Australia on the international stage, and these 
initiatives themselves also reflect the strategic phase of policy development.64 Through such 
statements Rudd has alluded to a strong role for public diplomacy, for example in ‘creative 
middle power diplomacy’ in which Australia ‘should use its influence to build coalitions of 
support with others on issues of global significance’.65  As noted by Allan Gyngell, Rudd 
‘speaks about Australia as a regional power prosecuting global interests’.66  In support of 
Australia’s foreign policy objectives at the regional and international level, Rudd has pointed 
to activities that will enable greater people-to-people linkages, understanding and 
engagement within the region.  For example, Rudd has pointed with some urgency to the 
need for Australia to pursue greater understanding of regional cultures and to ‘become the 
most Asia literate country in the collective West’.67
                                                 
62 ABC Online , ‘Australia 2020 Summit’: ABC News, 18-20 April 2008: 
   
 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/events/2020/.  The ABC provided online coverage of the 2020 Summit events, 
ideas and participants through the Summit weekend.  Opinion, 2020 Summit: Not just Another talkfest, The 
Australian, 4 February 2008. M. David,’ 2020 Summit: Rudd Vision to Map Future’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 
February 2008, Some criticism of the Summit focused on the format and methodology claiming that the Summit 
was simply a political public relations stunt, and those involved were given a false mandate.  See for example, 
ABC Online, 2020 Summit a PR Stunt, ABC News, 21 April 2008, viewed on 20 October 2009, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/04/21/2222966.htm> 
63 Gyngell, ‘Ambition: the emerging foreign policy of the Rudd Government’, Lowy Institute Analysis, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, Sydney, December 2008, p.1.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid, p5. For more on the background to Australia’s middle power diplomacy, see Cooper, Higgott and 
Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers; and Ungerer, ‘The Middle Power Concept in Australian Foreign Policy’, for 
a more recent discussion.   
66 Gyngell, ‘Ambition: the emerging foreign policy of the Rudd Government’, p.5. 
67 Ibid. Supported through government rhetoric also, for example J Gillard, ‘Call to Action:  Asia Literacy for 
Every Young Australian’, Presentation to the Australia Education Foundation Forum, 8 May 2008.   
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At the strategic level, Rudd could be said to have embarked on a strategic public diplomacy 
program himself, also involving several senior ministers through a hectic travel agenda 
through mid to late 2009 enabling high level meetings with leaders in India, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Russia, Peru and the United States, all in an effort to build new relations and 
strengthen critical international links.68  The primary purpose for the travel was to engage in a 
strategic campaign that would build support and recognition of the G20 grouping (of which 
Australia is a founding member) as the premier forum for global governance and economic 
management’.69
Such a campaign, founded in public diplomacy has substantially increased the international 
standing of both Kevin Rudd and of Australia.
  
 
70
                                                 
68 D Shanahan, ‘Kevin Rudd looks for wider role in G20 as he launches global campaign’, The Australian, 10 
September, 2009.  
69 G Milne, ‘Kevin Rudd’s G20 force shifts world order’, The Australian, 27 September, 2009. The international 
travel agenda has included senior members of Rudd’s cabinet, including Julia Gillard, Stephen Smith, Simon 
Crean, and Martin Ferguson.  The G20 was created during the 1997-98 Asian Financial crisis as a mechanism 
for bringing finance ministers together. As a founding member of the grouping at that time, Australia won 
significant recognition and according to Paul Kelly’s review of the Howard decade gained soft power credibility 
within the region for the role played in assisting Asian nations manage the financial crisis.    
70 Ibid. 
  This position may be further strengthened 
through the winning of a seat on the Security Council in 2013 (for which a separate and 
equally intense travel agenda has been underway). Though a public diplomacy program relies 
upon more than travel and high level meetings, success in the latter initiative may well 
depend upon how well Australia engages and influences the rest of the world on a range of 
other levels.  Rudd’s approach to such strategic foreign policy matters is clearly underpinned 
by attention to the importance of public diplomacy within the political and strategic spheres.  
However, such an approach is not reflected further within the Australian policy process, and 
Fullilove, Director Global Issues program at the Lowy Institute for International policy 
pointedly notes that ‘Rudd intends to…single-handedly elevate Australia’s international 
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profile, as seen in his initiatives on the G-20, Asia-Pacific architecture and nuclear 
weapons’.71
                                                 
71 M O’Hanlon and M Fullilove, ‘Barack Obama, Kevin Rudd and the Alliance: American and Australian 
Perspectives’, Lowy Institute Perspectives, Lowy Institute for International Policy, August 2009, p.8. 
   
 
What might be lacking from the current strategic picture is the opportunity for robust debate, 
engagement and consensus building beyond the boundaries of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, to incorporate departmental policy heads and opinion leaders.  There is a sense of 
disconnect that exists between these. At present, while Rudd’s strategic public diplomacy 
agenda appears to promote strategic foreign policy outcomes, the lack of clear and broad 
based understanding of the goals is proving to be problematic, and DFAT along with the rest 
of the bureaucracy appear to be getting left behind.  The challenge for Rudd lies in the 
translation of his personal and professional high-level engagement with public diplomacy to 
an understanding and acceptance of public diplomacy value and strategies more broadly by 
Cabinet, Parliament, bureaucracy and other key actors (such as second and third tier 
governments, local communities, academic institutions, think-tanks, non governmental 
organisations and media).  At this point, public diplomacy must be seen as more than high 
level global soirees and positive rhetoric delivered in the languages of the globe.  At the 
strategic level, making the connection between policy and public diplomacy is critical, 
because the overall policy objective will become the enabling vehicle that allows for 
consideration of public diplomacy within each subsequent layer of the policy process.  
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5.2.2 The contextual phase 
 
Strategic phase Contextual phase Organisational phase Operational phase 
 
 
The contextual phase in policy making usually signals the movement of a policy initiative 
from the Government decision-makers to the bureaucracy; in the case of foreign policy this is 
usually to DFAT via PM&C. The contextual phase may be likened to the business-casing 
phase for a policy idea or initiative, in which the policy initiative is interrogated, and 
response options scrutinised, in light of a range of contextual factors (including political, 
economic, social, cultural, factors) and associated risks.  The outcome of this process will 
allow for the prioritisation of the policy within the broader scope of Government activity.  In 
particular, the nature of the international situation and environment, and the potential impact 
of the policy response on other competing or complementary initiatives must be assessed 
taking into account ‘the identities, dispositions or relative power of the states involved in an 
issue or potential response; other foreign (or domestic) policy commitments of the state, and 
coalitions and understandings crucial to the conduct of other strands of foreign policy’.72
                                                 
72 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.29. 
   
 
Based on an assessment of these factors decisions regarding the preferred policy option and 
appropriate contingencies are made.  In some instances, decisions require compromises and 
the trade-off on competing policy priorities. For the purpose of public diplomacy, this thesis 
expands upon the Gyngell and Wesley description of contextual factors, to include the 
consideration of two distinct elements; i) the target audience at which the particular strategy 
is aimed; and ii) the proposed public diplomacy approach.   
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In relation to target audiences, while public diplomacy is by definition aimed broadly at 
foreign audiences, there are many layers and groupings of audiences.  Not only will the 
different groupings respond differently to the same message, depending upon the context of 
the message, there may be a greater imperative to only reach certain target audiences in order 
to achieve the required outcome.  In other words, effective public diplomacy teases out the 
target audiences that are relevant to the strategic objective, an exercise that is particularly 
critical where limited resources are available for public diplomacy activities.73
Once identified, there is scope to tailor messages for specific themes and different audience 
groups – whether they are defined by interest, language, culture, location, demographic, or 
economic status.  As Ross asserts understanding the differing needs of the audience, even 
where the underlying message is the same for those audiences, is critical: ‘an information 
campaign in support of open trade or religious freedom will employ vastly different images 
and words for different audiences. The values that stand behind such efforts, however, are 
enduring’.
  Generally, 
audiences will be categorised into specific groups of people, such as political leaders, opinion 
leaders, diaspora networks, policy makers or friendly networks.  Audience needs within these 
categories will vary from state to state, depending upon a range of variables, including 
whether they are urbanised or rural, developed or less developed, and will influence the 
nature and delivery of the public diplomacy activity.   
 
74
                                                 
73 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.42; also, Batora, 'Multi-stakeholder Public Diplomacy of Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway 
and Canada Compared'. 
74 Ross, ‘Pillars of Public Diplomacy: Grappling with Public Opinion’. 
 Contemporary discussions about public diplomacy recognise that because of the 
close interplay between international and domestic policy, domestic constituencies are 
increasingly considered as an audience for public diplomacy strategies.  Traditionally, the 
targeting of domestic constituent audiences fell into the arena of public affairs, yet Melissen, 
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Fiske de Gouveia and Henrikson acknowledge that in the current fluid and interconnected 
environment, some states are increasingly incorporating consideration of the domestic 
audience within public diplomacy strategies.75
iii)  development of lasting relationships, including cultural and academic exchanges 
that build upon personal relationships and experiences.
   
 
The second underpinning element within the contextual layer of the policy process requires 
identification of the desired public diplomacy approach, given an understanding of the 
strategic objective, environment and audience.  There are frames of reference already in 
existence that provide a level of guidance to the practitioner at this point, including for 
example, Nye’s approaches which categorises the shape of public diplomacy activity into the 
i)  day to day communications, explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy 
decisions and responding to crises as they occur;  
ii)  strategic communication, building upon a central theme or policy based campaign; 
and  
76
In addition, as discussed within the previous chapter, McClellan’s communications pyramid 
might also provide an alternative frame of reference in pinpointing the intended outcome of 
the public diplomacy activity.
  
 
77
Understanding both the strategic objective and applying a contextual frame to that objective 
are critical steps in the development of a public diplomacy approach that matches the policy 
objectives.  By drawing upon both the Nye and McClellan perspectives related to public 
diplomacy approaches, as relevant to the identified audience, the practitioner moves closer to 
developing a public diplomacy strategy that will achieving the strategic policy objectives.    
 
 
                                                 
75 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.13. 
76 Nye, Soft Power – the means to success in world politics, pp. 108-109. Refer also to Chapter Four: Public 
Diplomacy in Action. 
77 Refer to Chapter Four: Public Diplomacy in Action.  Along similar lines, Zaharna seeks to establish two 
frameworks for public diplomacy activity, i) informational framework and ii) relational framework.  Zaharna 
then maps public diplomacy activities to each of these frameworks depending upon whether the purpose of the 
activity is to provide information, or build relationships.  See Zaharna, ‘Mapping the Spectrum of Public 
Diplomacy Activities’.   
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5.2.3 The organisational phase 
 
Strategic phase Contextual phase Organisational phase Operational phase 
 
 
The organisational phase identified by Gyngell and Wesley refers to structural mechanisms 
that allow policy to move from a strategic concept through a concrete deliverable. This level 
in the policy making process may involve the bureaucratic policy structure as a whole, or 
simply a single department such as DFAT (in the latter case, there may be coordination and 
negotiation across a range of interested work areas). The organisational phase involves 
considerations both of ‘the process for guiding a policy response through the existing 
organisational structures; alongside the process of marshalling and apportioning resources to 
that issue’.78
Factors highlighted through the contextual phase, including the including the significance, 
urgency, audience, and approach, of an issue will impact on the organisational considerations.  
However, the organisational considerations to a policy issue will not necessarily require new 
initiatives, but rather should enable identification of the responsible decision-makers and 
relevant stakeholders, coordination mechanisms and potential networks for delivery of the 
public diplomacy activities.  A robust organisational structure will support effective policy 
and public diplomacy planning and delivery.
   
 
79
                                                 
78 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.30. 
79 Bridgman and Davis, Australian Policy Handbook , p.6; Hogwood and Gunn, Policy Analysis for the Real 
World, p.12. 
 For example, issues of an increased 
complexity and significance, touching on the policy space of a range of organisations, are 
likely to require an enabling point that allows the policy initiative to move from the strategy 
level through to the contextual level, as well as rigorous coordination, consultation and 
conflict management mechanisms that run across the bureaucracy and allow contributions 
from other sectors, and use of multiple delivery networks, all overseen by one agreed 
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decision point.  As noted earlier, the International Strategic Policy Unit, PM&C might play 
such an enabling role.80  In the current model, DFAT provides the coordination, consultation 
and conflict management role (within government via the IDC), with the diplomatic service 
as the central, though by no means the only, delivery network.81
The establishment of public diplomacy purpose-specific organisational entities by some states 
is a direct response at the organisational level to that ensuring that the public diplomacy 
activities of those states are delivered in line with the strategic policy objective. The United 
Kingdom provides a model of organisation developed deliberately as a result of the Lord 
Carter of Coles Public Diplomacy Review conducted in 2005, and following on from the 
earlier Wilton Review of March 2002.
There are opportunities for 
the IDC to improve effectiveness in tapping into and linking a broader range of external 
bodies and individuals with active interests in public diplomacy, while promoting the 
overarching public diplomacy themes. 
 
82  Following the Lord Carter Review, the organisation 
of public diplomacy in the United Kingdom was restructured to enable improved 
coordination and coherent delivery of the United Kingdom’s public diplomacy method.  The  
restructured organisation was characterised by three significant components, the first of 
which is the Public Diplomacy Board, chaired by the Foreign Office Minister with the 
defined purpose of improving public diplomacy effectiveness through i) setting of strategic 
direction ii) monitoring and evaluating outcomes; and iii) making recommendations on 
resource allocation.83
                                                 
80 Though, in the case of current performance on public diplomacy the enabling link may be dysfunctional.  
81 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Senate Inquiry on the Nature and Conduct of 
Australia’s Public Diplomacy, p.8. 
82 Public Diplomacy Board Terms of Reference, found at British Council website, viewed on 20 October 2009, 
<http://www.britishcouncil.org> 
83 Ibid. 
  The second component is the British Council, an international 
organisation charged with promoting British cultural relations and educational exchanges 
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throughout the world.  With sites in each continent across the globe, the work of the British 
Council purports to ‘strengthen understanding and trust between and within different 
cultures’.84  The third organisational component of the United Kingdom’s public diplomacy 
organisation is the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) world service which claims to 
be the world’s leading international broadcaster, with content broadcast via television, radio, 
internet and mobile phone in 32 languages.85   The latter two organisational components are 
coordinated via the first component (the Board), with input from the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (the FCO, also represented on the Board).86
In the case of Australia, bureaucratic organisation and coordination of public diplomacy is led 
by DFAT through an Interdepartmental Committee (IDC), which brings officer-level 
representatives together from those agencies with an interest in public diplomacy.  The IDC 
meets quarterly to ‘ensure not only sharing of information, but to promote opportunity for 
collaboration in response and resourcing’.
   
 
87 The Senate Committee threw light on the breadth 
and scope of public diplomacy activities conducted by the range of agencies with 
international policy responsibilities.  As noted in the Final Report, ‘the numerous agencies 
involved in public diplomacy and the diversity of their interests mean that public diplomacy 
programs may not always integrate or mesh smoothly’.88
                                                 
84 British Council website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.britishcouncil.org> 
85 BBC website, viewed on 20 October 2009, http://www.BBC.co.uk/world_service/ 
86 The current United Kingdom’s organisational approach to public diplomacy via the public diplomacy board is 
the product of the 2005 Lord Carter of Coles’ public diplomacy review.   
87 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of 
Australian’s public diplomacy program, p.8. 
88 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.95. 
  The more recently released Lowy 
Institute’s Report on the Australian Diplomatic Deficit reveals that in Australia, ‘18 of the 
current 19 Commonwealth government departments now have a dedicated international 
policy area… and virtually every contemporary policy issue has an international 
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dimension’.89 Yet, in contrast to the Lord Carter Review in the United Kingdom, the Senate 
Committee while noting concerns about the organisation and coordination of the range of 
agencies involved in giving effect to Australia’s public diplomacy program, did not 
recommend full scale or even moderate restructure.90
Other organisational components active within the Australian public diplomacy program 
include the AICC, the Australia Council, and the nine bilateral FCIs.  The coordinating role 
of DFAT is consistent thread across each of these components.  Of particular note, the ABC 
is a central strand to Australia’s public diplomacy program.   Importantly, the ABC has been 
subject to various internal reviews over recent years.  The most recent restructure of the ABC 
which occurred in February 2007 created ABC International as the overarching unit to, 
‘promote the ABC's values of honesty, fairness, independence and respect by facilitating 
cross-cultural communication, encouraging awareness of Australia and building regional 
partnerships’.
     
 
91  Within ABC International, the ABC’s broadcasting arms of Radio Australia 
and the Australia Network, the ABC ‘connects audiences in Asia and the Pacific through 
programs that complement and enrich their lives and foster informed dialogue’.92  To do this, 
the ABC currently broadcasts Australian content via radio, television and online services to 
41 countries and in seven languages, with a specific focus on the Asia Pacific region, and 
regular weekly audiences of over 20 million.93
                                                 
89 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our instruments of 
international policy’, p.14.  The Lowy Institute Report statistics regarding the number of government agencies 
varies from those statistics previously quoted from Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy.  The 
reason for the variance is the change in government administrations between publications.  Since taking office 
Rudd has overseen the rationalisation of Commonwealth government agencies.  
90 Refer to the recommendations provided in the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image’.  Also this point was supported in interview, 
Senator Russell Trood, 13 January 2008 and 30 June 2009.   
91 ABC website, found at http://www.abc.net.au/international/ 
92 ABC, Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program, 
ABC, April 2007, p.6. 
93 ABC website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.abc.net.au/international/> 
  ABC International extends beyond pure 
broadcasting, and the International Division fosters opportunity for exchange in the media 
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sector.  For example, the ABC has established a partnership with AusAID for the delivery of 
formal capacity building assistance to public broadcasters and the provision of informal 
collegiate support to fellow public broadcasters.94
Each of these significant threads of Australia’s official public diplomacy program is 
coordinated, via the relatively flat coordinating structure offered by DFAT, and the DFAT-
led ICD.  Nonetheless, there is a sense provided by the Senate Committee that the activities 
of government agencies extend well beyond the parameters coordinated by DFAT, and as a 
result, the overall public diplomacy program is without the necessary guidance or direction of 
any single overarching strategic body of coherent direction. 
   
 
95 The potential challenges 
presented by the complex and diverse range of public diplomacy activities were raised by 
former Australian Ambassador and witness to the Inquiry, Geoff Miller when he noted, ‘…a 
stance in one specialised, perhaps quite technical area can easily, if run unchecked, come to 
assume a weighting in a relationship that tilts it in an unwanted direction, even though this 
may not be intended by the government as a whole’.96
The Senate Committee supported the general view that Australia needs a whole-of-
government approach to public diplomacy, and expressed concern at the level of 
representation and overall impact of the IDC.
 
 
97
                                                 
94 Ibid. Though reference of this partnership not readily visible via AusAID website or corporate information.   
95 The Senate Committee questioned many government agencies about their public diplomacy activities 
including the Department of Defence, Invest Australia, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 
Department of Education, Science and training, ABC, Australian Sports Commission, Australian Film 
Commission, Australia Council for the Arts, Museums Australia, and the National Gallery of Victoria.  Senate 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our 
Image’, pp. 44-46. 
96 G Miller, ‘Current and Emerging Challenges to the practice of Australian diplomacy’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol 56, No. 2, 2002, p.200. 
97 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.108. 
  A number of witnesses to the Inquiry were 
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‘less than enthusiastic about the work of the IDC’.98 With particular reference to public 
diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy the Committee was not persuaded that the IDC 
has formulated a strategic public diplomacy plan, nor that the IDC ‘took advice from or 
consulted with the relevant policy makers in DFAT’.99
The role and responsibilities of DFAT as a coordinating body on matters of public diplomacy 
are also not entirely clear, and many entities operating within the sphere of public diplomacy, 
but outside federal government, including tertiary institutions, not-for-profits, media, 
museums, and state and local governments were consistent in noting a lack of active 
engagement with DFAT.
  
 
100  In their submission to the enquiry, RMIT lamented that ‘while 
DFAT undertakes much useful work with Australian universities, there is little coordinated 
recognition of the role they [universities] might play in this regard’, and more pointedly that, 
‘the role and significance of the role of universities in Australia’s public diplomacy program 
is poorly articulated and relatively unexplored, and hence not well supported’.101
Despite noted concerns, the Senate Committee’s conservative recommendations were 
directed simply to strengthening of the ICD via the level of representation (departmental 
secretary level) and accountability (reporting to Parliament).  Senator Trood conceded during 
interview, that ‘had the Senate Committee recommended a full scale restructure of the public 
diplomacy program, including the demolition of the IDC and establishment of a separate 
  Ultimately, 
Australia’s current public diplomacy program appears to be not well supported by a robust 
infrastructure that connects public diplomacy to policy thinking and planning.    
 
                                                 
98 Ibid, p.103. 
99 Ibid p.109. 
100 The governance mechanisms separating the DFAT IDC, and DFAT Images of Australia Branch from the 
AICC, and FCIs is hazy and unclear and has the potential to lead to confusion of roles and responsibilities as 
well as significant gaps in understanding.   
101 Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Submission to the Senate Inquiry on the nature and conduct of 
Australia’s public diplomacy program, RMIT, Melbourne, April 2007, p.1.   
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entity, such as an advisory board to establish the parameters for the Australian public 
diplomacy, there was a real likelihood that because of resource implications, no action would 
progress and the IDC would remain completely unchanged.’102  For this reason a moderate 
and pragmatic approach amending the composition to a senior executive officer level, and 
regularity of the existing IDC was suggested instead.  Interestingly, when the concept of an 
overarching advisory board was suggested to one senior DFAT officer involved in the daily 
management of public diplomacy activities, that officer commented ‘such a body would only 
add to the already onerous coordinating burden borne by DFAT’.103 According to that 
official, the task of coordinating public diplomacy activities across the existing structure was 
problematic because of the paralysing effect of many strong and varied opinions involved.104
At this point, there is sufficient evidence to point to serious shortcomings with the current 
organisation of Australia’s public diplomacy program, and potential opportunities for 
improvement, whether through more senior representation at the IDC, or via other 
mechanisms are yet to be tested.
  
Such a statement again points to a lack of overall strategic direction and understanding of 
public diplomacy.   
 
105
  
  The fact remains that the organisational considerations 
must form a part of the practitioners’ thinking in order to maximise the impact of public 
diplomacy activities.   
                                                 
102 Interview, Senator Russell Trood, 10 January 2008 
103 Interview, Confidential Source, Senior DFAT Officer involved in public diplomacy activities, 22 June 2009.   
104 Ibid. 
105 Of interest, the Australian Government response to the Senate report notes without commitment that ‘the 
IDC will continue to take a strategic, coherent approach and will look at engaging other non government 
entities, and other levels of government…the composition and role of the IDC will evolve’.  Australian 
Government Response to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Report: 
Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our Image, p.9.  
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5.2.1 The operational phase 
 
Strategic phase Contextual phase Organisational phase Operational phase 
 
 
The operational level refers to the tactical activities involved in the actual delivery or 
implementation of policy.  For the purpose of this thesis, it is at this phase in the policy 
process that the actually activity is carried out for a particular audience, to give effect to a 
particular policy.  Considerations at this point are pertinent to the front-line activities and 
what happens on the ground.  For example, the operational phase involves considerations 
around how public diplomacy will be actioned, including the method/s or instrument/s to be 
used depending upon the context (including audience and identified approach).   
 
The most well known public diplomacy methods include high profile visits involving prime 
ministers, cabinet members or ambassadors, and speaking engagements (use of local 
language or subtle cultural cues may be an impressive factor), strategic communications and 
campaigns, cultural, educational or media exchanges and broadcasting of particular content.  
Additionally, as identified in the previous chapter, development assistance opportunities are 
‘more subtle programmes of influence that engage with rather than target foreign publics’.106
The diplomatic service posted overseas is the central network through which public 
diplomacy activities are delivered.  As at July 2008, Australia’s diplomatic service was 
  
Because of the relational basis of public diplomacy, changing needs of target audiences and 
the connectedness with innovations in communications technology, the methods used in 
public diplomacy are inexhaustible, with numerous variables for implementation and appear 
to evolve and adapt in an organic way to meet with the shifts in the environment.   
 
                                                 
106 Hocking, ‘Rethinking the new public diplomacy’, p.36. 
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spread across ‘91 diplomatic missions or posts, with 29 percent of those based in Asia, 24 
percent in Europe, 12 percent shared across the South Pacific, Americas and the Middle East, 
and 7 percent in Africa, and the final 4 percent based at multilateral posts (such as the United 
Nations, World Trade Centre etc)’. 107  According to the 2007-08 annual report data, the 
portfolio agencies of DFAT, AusAID and Austrade are collectively responsible for 
approximately 1238 Australian based officers posted across those 91 missions or posts (the 
DFAT submission to the Senate Inquiry indicated that a far smaller number of those officials, 
approximately 232 DFAT officials ,would be directly engaged in public diplomacy).108
DFAT’s written and oral and evidence to the Senate Inquiry pressed the point that all 232 
Australian staff employed overseas carry out public diplomacy activities as an integrated 
component of core duties.
  
 
109   As a previous Assistant Secretary of DFAT’s Images of 
Australia Branch noted to the Senate Committee, ‘All of our [DFAT] officers are expected to 
take public diplomacy seriously and to see how it fits into their normal foreign policy and 
trade work’.110
                                                 
107 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit – Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.17.  
108 Of the total 1238 officials employed, 542 are employed by DFAT, 592 by Austrade and 104 by AusAID.  
DFAT and Austrade also employ local staff members totalling 2067.  DFAT, DFAT Annual Report 2007-08, 
Australian Government, Canberra, 2008, Appendix 2; AusAID, AusAID Annual Report 2007-08, Australian 
Government, Canberra, 2008, p.264; Austrade, Austrade Annual Report 2007-08, Australian Government, 
Canberra, 2008, p.131.   
109 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Senate Standing Committee Inquiry into the 
nature and conduct of Australia’s public diplomacy program, p.8. 
110 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, 14 March 2007, p.147. 
 DFAT can point to public diplomacy programs across 85 of the overseas 
locations, with activities ranging from public advocacy campaigns, seminars, speeches, media 
releases, major cultural events and promotions, conferences exhibitions and displays. 
Interestingly, despite the range of activities conducted, all DFAT officials interviewed for the 
purpose of this thesis suggested that they had little to do with public diplomacy, also noting 
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that the coordination of such activities was generally relegated to the locally engaged staff.111
At the operational level, the responsible individuals will be required to draw upon their 
experience and skill to make decisions, frequently within compressed timeframes and in 
rapidly changing situations. More importantly, the ability to engage and influence, not only 
government officials but foreign audiences via a range of channels may be confronting to the 
skill set of many traditional diplomats working within a traditional model.
  
Statements supporting this view support the disconnect that exists between DFAT rhetoric 
and a deeper understanding of the policy significance of public diplomacy.  
 
While the diplomatic service is intended to represent the core of the public diplomacy 
delivery network there are many other actors involved - intentionally or not, and in direct and 
indirect interactions in the delivery of public diplomacy.  The diplomatic network is 
complemented by this raft of external actors, including the media, academics and universities, 
non-government organisations, and individuals.  The Senate Committee highlighted the fact 
that the personal networks developed through cultural and educational exchange programs, as 
well as Australia’s overseas diaspora are potent, yet largely untapped resources that could be 
utilised to strategic effect in delivery of Australia’s public diplomacy program.   
 
112  International 
scholars and academics acknowledge that ‘the skills, techniques, and attitudes of a traditional 
diplomat in particular are challenged by the emerging requirements of public diplomacy’.113
                                                 
111 In support of this statement, the author acknowledges that a recent employment advertisement appeared on 
DFATs website seeking a person, from within Vietnam to undertake public diplomacy activities as a locally 
engaged staff member on behalf of the department.  The advertisement was accessed in early 2009 at 
 
Furthermore, there is growing recognition in international discussions that traditional training 
methods were ‘no longer enough’ for diplomats who are also expected to carry our public 
http://www.vietnam.embassy.gov.au/.  
112 Interview, Senior DFAT Official, Consular, Public Diplomacy and Parliamentary Affairs Division, 22 June 
2009. 
113 Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, p.3. 
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diplomacy activities.114  For example, the key public diplomacy tasks of the diplomat posted 
overseas might include creating ‘understanding for the home country’ which would also 
involve the capacity to reach out to people in the host country, ‘connecting with the active 
publics’.115
In recent years, DFAT has engaged private public relations firm, Media Gurus to provide 
specialised public diplomacy training to staff preparing for an overseas posting.
   
 
116 There is 
limited information available regarding the training of DFAT and other government officials 
in this field of public diplomacy.  DFAT officials interviewed for the purpose of this thesis 
were not willing to release the public diplomacy handbook (referred to in the DFAT 
submission) and noted that the contract with Media Gurus had not been renewed following 
the Senate Inquiry. For these reasons there are arguments put forward that diplomats versed 
in traditional diplomacy are not sufficiently equipped to take on the practice of public 
diplomacy.117
Understanding and evaluating outcomes, so that policy delivery might be refined and 
improved is an important aspect of good policy making and implementation. The Gyngell and 
Wesley policy process is deficient in the respect of reviewing the activities that occur at the 
operational or tactical phase of the policy process against the strategic objective through a 
monitoring and evaluation loop. The omission of this review and evaluation loop from the 
Gyngell and Wesley model is consistent with what Wesley refers to as Australia’s mindset of 
  That is, it requires different skills, techniques and attitudes than those found in 
traditional diplomacy.   
 
                                                 
114 Conference on ‘Challenges for Foreign Ministries: Managing Diplomatic Networks and Optimising Value’, 
Summary of discussion,  31 May–1 June 2006, Geneva, p. 4, quoted in the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs Defence and Trade Report, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building our Image’, p.12.   
115 Ibid.   
116 Media Gurus are self marketed as ‘consultants in strategic communications’, see:  
http://www.mediagurus.com.au/.   
117 Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, p.3. 
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‘short-termism’ when it comes to foreign policy, and is reflective of current practice within 
DFAT. 118   Indeed, the actual deficit in the evaluation of Australia’s public diplomacy 
program was not lost on the Senate Committee.  The current focus of Australian public 
diplomacy rhetoric turns largely on the quantity of public diplomacy activities or outputs.  
However, this thesis suggests that the public diplomacy activity itself, which is considered at 
the tactical end of the policy process while significant, is of least consequence in the public 
diplomacy equation.  Rather, as submitted earlier, it is the impact or effectiveness of the 
public diplomacy activities on achieving that objective that should dominate the discussion.  
In the case of Australia, there is little attention, outside an internally driven DFAT review of 
activities, to the linking of public diplomacy activities once delivered to the strategic 
objective through a mechanism that enables the long term evaluation of public diplomacy 
impact.  The evaluation of public diplomacy activities as highlighted through the Senate 
Inquiry process, is not a straightforward exercise, and one witness to the Inquiry asserted that 
‘a lot of agencies are stuck at the activity measure and struggling with how to determine 
effectiveness’.119
                                                 
118 The Bridgman and Davis policy cycle incorporates evaluation as a clear requirement for good policy making.  
Evaluations particularly those undertaken over sufficient time will allow for a determination on the effectiveness 
of a policy and its implementation.   
119 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.179. 
  The Senate Committee noted there is a valuable role for the Australian 
National Audit Office (ANAO) in undertaking a performance audit of DFAT’s public 
diplomacy programs.   
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5.3 Foreign policy drivers 
 
The scaffolding for the second stage of the policy-based framework is set up through the 
identification and application of key foreign policy strategies. Henrikson’s work identifies 
and describes the five key foreign policy strategies evident in foreign relations over the past 
fifty years.  Each of these policy strategies is of relevance to public diplomacy activity, and 
provides the logic for understanding and applying public diplomacy activity to strategic 
policy objectives.  In Henrikson’s view key foreign policy strategies that hold relevance for 
public diplomacy include i) consolidation, ii) containment, iii) penetration, iv) enlargement 
and v) transformation.  These five policy strategies provide the base foundation, but there is 
room to expand the framework to incorporate recent policy strategies that have developed 
both internationally and in the Australian context in response to particular challenges within 
the international environment.   
 
In particular, for the purpose of this thesis an additional three strategies have been identified.  
The first of these, being particularly relevant to the Australian context, is the strategy of vi) 
engagement which has been a consistent theme in Australian foreign policy approaches 
(particularly towards the Asia Pacific region) across recent government administrations, and 
recently upgraded by Prime Minister Rudd.  The next additional foreign policy strategy, vii) 
stabilisation is also particularly relevant to the Australian experience, and has emerged more 
clearly in the Australian approach to the Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific 
(otherwise known as the ‘arc of instability’). Inspired by Australian National University’s 
Paul Dibb, stabilisation of the ‘arc of instability’ has been taken up with renewed energy by 
the current Rudd government, though under the nomenclature of the ‘arc of responsibility’.120
                                                 
120 The phrase ‘arc of instability’ was used by Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb to refer to the region stretching 
from East Timor, through Papua New Guinea and into the South West Pacific, as noted in  Graeme Dobell, ‘The 
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Lastly, adding to the framework is the policy strategy of viii) diversion recently articulated by 
the recently appointed Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the US 
Department of State in 2008.121
The framework, set out at Table 3 is not intended to prescribe practice, but rather to reflect or 
guide practice in an organised and logical sequence.   To some extent the framework offers a 
policy continuum that follows both a chronological and developmental sequence.  For 
example, the strategy of ‘containment’ emerged through the Cold War years, that of 
  Diversion is incorporated as an interesting policy response to 
combat the recruitment of young disadvantaged youths into terrorist groups, and may have 
some relevance to Australian interests, particularly in Indonesia.   These additional three 
strategic policies have been identified and added to the framework to ensure the 
contemporary focus of the framework, and ensure a relevance to Australian foreign policy 
and public diplomacy programs.   
 
Each of these policy concepts are generally familiar to foreign policy makers, and have 
shaped the actions and activities of state international interactions and relations over recent 
decades.  However, through the consideration of the strategic, contextual, organisational and 
operational implications of the policy process from a public diplomacy perspective, 
practitioners can align, attach and deliver a public diplomacy strategy that will assist in 
achieving the strategic objective.  When drawn together in an appropriate framework, each 
strategy can be deconstructed into appropriate layers, and aligned with the relevant public 
diplomacy tools.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Pacific ‘arc of instability’’, Correspondent’s Report, ABC Radio National, 20 August 2006.  More recently, 
Rudd has instigated a shift in terminology relating to the Pacific, referring instead to the ‘arc of responsibility’.  
See for example C Hawksley, ‘Australia’s aid diplomacy and the Pacific Islands: change and continuity in 
middle power foreign policy’, Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol 21(1), p.36; also T Vestergaard, ‘Man at 
work: Rudd walks Asian tightrope’, Asia Times Online, 17 April 2008.   
121 Glassman, in U.S. ‘Public Diplomacy and the War on Ideas’. 
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‘enlargement’ is equated to the 1990s, and the strategies of ‘transformation’ and ‘diversion’ 
have been articulated more recently (2006 and 2008 respectively).122  However, as with any 
dynamic system, such strategies do not only or always occur in a linear timeframe, and 
practical examples will demonstrate that the policy strategies and their associated public 
diplomacy activities may overlap, or be implemented simultaneously or out of sequence – 
depending upon the context, external influences and desired outcome.  The policy of 
containment, while relevant to the Cold War years, may also be relevant to contemporary 
foreign policy discussions.123
Consolidation 
  Each policy requires further consideration.   Consideration will 
turn firstly to the key foreign policy drivers that have been identified on the international 
stage.  Following consideration of the internationally recognised foreign policies, the thesis 
considers those policies that have been identified as particular to the Australian context. 
While each policy will be further examined in isolation, together they form a part of the 
larger framework.  In an effort to support the understanding of the framework as a whole 
through this section of the thesis, the policy continuum will be represented at the start of each 
new section, highlighting the specific policy under discussion for that section, as shown 
below:   
 
Key Foreign Policy Drivers of Public Diplomacy: 
Containment  Penetration Enlargement Transformation Diversion 
 
 
Key Australian Foreign Policy Drivers of Public Diplomacy: 
Regional Stability Engagement  
                                                 
122 For example, the policy of ‘containment’ was articulated by George Kennan within the US Administration 
during the 1950s, see G Kennan, ‘The Origins of Containment’ in T Deibel, and J Lewis, Containment: Concept 
and Policy, National Defence University, Washington DC, 1986, pp.29-30.  The policy of ‘enlargement’ was 
coined through the US Clinton Administration of the 1990s, see D Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement: The 
Clinton Doctrine’, Foreign Policy, No. 106, Spring, 1997, p.114. On the policy of ‘transformation’ see Rice, 
‘Transformational Diplomacy’. Lastly with regard to the policy of ‘diversion’ refer to Glassman, ‘How to Win 
the War on Ideas’.   
123 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.18. 
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5.3.1 Consolidation 
 
Consolidation Containment  Penetration Enlargement Transformation Diversion 
 
 
The exploration of the policy strategies commences with the discussion of the underpinning 
strategy of ‘consolidation’ described by Henrikson as, ‘the political process of increasing the 
understanding of, and confirming the support for a country, and its policy activity within the 
sphere of the country’s own allies, friends and partners’.124  The strategic objective of the 
consolidation strategy is to build or reinforce a sense of cohesion in common values, purpose 
or identity within the grouping in order to achieve a successful outcome.  Consolidation 
involves public diplomacy activities that are aimed at a core community of like-mindeds, 
with the objective of building and validating identity.  One significant factor of consolidation 
is that the domestic audience is always incorporated as a part of, and sometimes the only 
audience within the ‘core community’.125
Public diplomacy in a contemporary context builds substantially upon the traditional and 
internally focused activity of public affairs (government communication aimed at the 
domestic constituency to build internal support for policy activity), because it links the 
domestic constituency into a broader community, and to both internal and external policy 
impacts.  In his analysis of the theory and practice of public diplomacy, Melissen asserts the 
importance of engaging domestic audiences in the public diplomacy process because, 
‘separating public affairs from public diplomacy is increasingly at odds with the 
interconnected realities of global relationships’.
   
 
126
                                                 
124 Ibid, p11. 
125 Ibid.   
126 Melissen, ‘Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice’, p.13. 
  Potter, in examining Canada’s public 
diplomacy response also notes that the increasing availability of information ensures that 
diplomats are accountable to their domestic constituency for the actions and statements made 
248 
 
abroad; and ‘increasingly being called upon to become good communicators at home, not just 
when they are assigned to a foreign posting’.127 While Melissen cautions that governments 
need not be overly concerned with the ‘domestic societisation of diplomacy’ (or public affairs 
activities), it is sufficient to note that the inclusion of the domestic audience is an integral part 
of the consolidation strategy implemented through effective public diplomacy.128
In their submission to the Senate Inquiry, the International Public Affairs Network (an 
informal association of former members of Australia’s whole-of-government international 
public affairs organisation, which operated from 1939 to 1996), note that the term public 
diplomacy is ‘so contestable that definitions and explanations of the term precede most uses 
of it’.  However, for the purpose of their submission the International Public Affairs Network 
also use the terms public diplomacy and public affairs at times interchangeably, indicating 
some sense of overlap and confusion in the use of terminology.  In particular, their 
submission notes that ‘Australia established its first specialist international public affairs or 
   
 
It is in the sphere of consolidation that public diplomacy intersects to an extent with the well 
known field of public affairs, a field in which government communicates with its domestic 
public on matters of domestic policy.  There is evidence, particularly in the Australian 
context  
of unresolved tension relating to this intersection between public diplomacy and public 
affairs, and it is an area that deserves brief attention within the context of the consolidation 
strategy.   
 
                                                 
127 Potter, ‘Canada and the New Public Diplomacy’, p .6. 
128 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.13.  In the case of Australia, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
had been home to a specialised public affairs branch (with specialist media skills), until it was abolished on cost 
saving grounds at the time in 1986.  During the 2007 Senate Inquiry into Australia’s public diplomacy program 
a consortium of public affairs professions (including those who had been engaged within the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade), pointed to this departmental restructure as indicative of critical flaws in Australia’s 
approach to public diplomacy, undermining Australia’s ability to engage effectively with domestic and external 
audiences on critical issues of foreign policy.  
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public diplomacy agency, the Department of Information, in 1939. 129   In no other 
submissions or discussions are the terms public affairs and public diplomacy equated in such 
a way.  The work of Melissen in particular points to a clear overlap between public affairs 
and public diplomacy, but also notes that the two concepts remain distinct.130
of other countries and shaping their opinions and shaping their image of us.’
 
 
The Senate Inquiry indicates that Australia’s past record on public diplomacy has had a 
minimal focus on the consolidation of its domestic audience.  When questioned about the 
emphasis of its public diplomacy activities, a responding DFAT officer noted that ‘aspects of 
what the department does under the general heading of ‘public diplomacy’ are in fact directed 
at the Australian population, but primarily for us—and this goes for foreign ministries the 
world over—public diplomacy is about reaching out to the populations and decision-makers  
131
Indeed, Australia’s 2020 Summit, a forum bringing more than 1000 Australians of varying 
backgrounds together to discuss key issues on the national agenda, and shape Australia’s 
long-term policy for Australia’s future, was a clear example of consolidative public 
diplomacy at work.  Prime Minister Rudd convened the 2020 Summit, ‘the largest genuine 
community consultative forum in Australia’s history’ to consolidate Australia’s goals and 
identity with reference to both domestic and international politics.
  However, 
this emphasis may in fact change under the Rudd Government.   
 
132
                                                 
129 International Network of Public Affairs Specialists, Submission to the Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade, 3 April, 2007, p. 9. viewed on 
(http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/fadt_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-2007).   
130 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice, pxx.  The view that public diplomacy and public affairs are distinct 
activities is also supported in Zarharna, ‘Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives’; and Heller 
and Persson, ‘The Distinction Between Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy’.  
131 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, Wednesday 14 
March 2007, p.4.  
132 G Davis, ‘Australia’s 2020 Summit Final Report’, Letter of Transmittal, 28 May 2008. 
  The Summit followed 
on from other similarly symbolically powerful events, including Australia’s signing of the 
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Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, and the formal apology issued by Rudd to Australia’s 
Aboriginal stolen generations.133
traditional geographic parameters, nor common cultures (in fact, the nations brought together into such 
groupings may in other circumstances harbour intense rivalries and sometimes hostilities towards one 
another), public diplomacy aimed at consolidation accentuates the common psyche and interests.
  Each of these events received significant media coverage in 
Australia and abroad, and genuinely impacted on the perceptions of domestic and foreign 
audiences alike.    
 
Public diplomacy requires domestic engagement and support, but as is demonstrated through 
the strategy of consolidation, it moves beyond domestic borders, and entwines the regional 
and international perspectives.  Regional geographic or economic groupings and alliances are 
important in forming a base from which nations can jointly influence multilateral policy 
directions, and tackle significant global issues such as bird flu, climate change or economic 
crisis.  The European Union (EU), and the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) along with the Commonwealth and APEC are examples of communities which 
utilise public diplomacy tools to consolidate their identity and positioning.  While not always 
based on:  
134
Public diplomacy as a method for achieving consolidation usually involves high level 
conferences or other high profile / visibility events – where commonalities in values and 
cultures are emphasised.  Henrikson points to the 2006 Commonwealth Games held in 
Melbourne which brought together athletes and audiences from the 53 nations of the 
Commonwealth in a spirit of goodwill, as a prime illustration of consolidation through public 
  
 
                                                 
133 C Porteous, ‘World Cheers as Rudd Signs Kyoto’, The Courier Mail, 4 December 2007; D Welch, ‘Kevin 
Rudd Says Sorry’, The Age, 13 February, 2008.   
134 For example, the Cairns Group the is a ‘unique coalition of 19 developed and developing agricultural 
exporting countries with a commitment to achieving free trade in agriculture, comprising: Argentina, Australia, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay.  Refer to Cairns Group Website, viewed on 20 
October 2009, <http://www.cairnsgroup.org/map/index.html> 
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diplomacy.135  As Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon stated at the time, ‘For 
a Commonwealth Games, first of all you need a Commonwealth’.136 In the same way, the 
symbolism surrounding the meetings of the APEC Leaders reflects public diplomacy 
consolidation strategy.  Whether they are wearing batik shirts in Indonesia, dryzabones in 
Sydney or ponchos in Peru, the concept of all Leaders from across the 21 nation economic 
grouping dressing in the one national garment is a highly visible and effective demonstration 
of commonality in purpose and focus. 137    While it may appear trite or superficial, 
consolidation strategies such as the annual APEC Leaders’ photo provides an avenue for 
nations to reinforce their national identities within the regional group even when there may be 
inherent tensions in the value and cultural positions of those states.138
Cultural exchange is an important vehicle for consolidation through public diplomacy.  For 
example, the EU currently funds the European Children’s Cultural Exchange, a three year art-
centred program involving 10-14 year-old students from the European Union countries of 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Italy, Romania, and Turkey (EU candidate nation), as a means of 
fostering understanding and acceptance.
   
 
139  A number of projects recently initiated with the 
ASEAN grouping bring together the publics of member states through the ASEAN student 
exchange and ASEAN youth festival. 140   More recently in March 2007, ASEAN states 
celebrated ASEAN's 40th anniversary ‘in what can be referred to as a grand display of public 
diplomacy’.141
                                                 
135 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.11. 
136 D McKinnon  quoted in Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.12. 
137 APEC Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.apec.org/apec/member_economies.html> 
138 Opinion, ‘APEC Outfits Keep Leaders Dryzabones’, The Australian, 8 September 2007; M Davis, ‘The 
Good, the Bad, and the Poncho, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 November 2008.   
 Music bands from the various ASEAN member states were involved in an 
event that strategically brought together the publics of those member states in Singapore in an 
139 European Children’s Cultural Exchange Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, 
<http://www.ecceproject.eu/www/> 
140 ASEAN Website: www.aseanregionalforum.org. 
141 http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/Singapore. 
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atmosphere of camaraderie.  Events and activities such as these which engage a range of 
publics together are strategically designed to build networks, promote regional integration 
and consolidate an identity.  On their own, such activities may appear to be frivolous, but as 
part of public diplomacy strategy, they consolidate and solidify relationships and strengthen 
the platform from which cooperative ventures or positioning may subsequently be launched.    
 
In Henrikson’s view consolidation is the most important of the strategies – because it is the 
most likely to achieve positive outcomes, and provides a foundation for moving forwards 
towards other more targeted strategies.  For this reason he asserts it provides a ‘necessary step 
– an absolute precondition – of all the others’. 142
                                                 
142 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.11. 
  It is the strategy that should be 
implemented first and maintained for effective development of other public diplomacy 
strategies.  Based on Henrikson’s approach, provided a state has developed and consolidated 
its position with its domestic constituency, as well as with like-mindeds within its core 
community, other foreign policy strategies will be more likely to work.   
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5.3.2 Containment 
 
Consolidation Containment  Penetration Enlargement Transformation Diversion 
 
The second strategy which can be delivered through effective public diplomacy is that of 
‘containment’.143  Containment is essentially a ‘defensive and reactive concept, designed to 
limit the further spread of powers or influences, not necessarily another country as such, that 
are deemed to be harmful or threatening – or are just too big and powerful for comfort’.144  
The strategy of containment was first articulated by George Kennan, a career Foreign Service 
Officer, and adopted by United States President Truman as a key foreign policy strategy for 
fighting the expansion of Soviet communism through the Cold War years (1947-1989).  
According to Kennan, ‘The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet 
Union, must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies.’ In particular, by countering ‘Soviet pressure against the free 
institutions of the Western world’ through the ‘adroit and vigilant application of counter-
force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the 
shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy.’145
Such a policy, Kennan predicted, would ‘promote tendencies which must eventually find 
their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.’ In the face of 
criticism from within the United States administration, Kennan qualified that his approach 
was not about the use of military force, but involved economic, political and information 
elements.  In particular he referred to the use of ‘psychological warfare including overt 
propaganda and covert operations’ – both of which may imply both a propagandistic 
  
 
                                                 
143 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.17. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Kennan, ‘The Origins of Containment’ in Deibel, and Lewis  Containment: Concept and Policy. 
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approach and an approach based on public diplomacy, which begs the important question: is 
public diplomacy simply a euphemism for propaganda? 
 
For traditionalists such as Berridge the distinction between public diplomacy and propaganda 
is not sufficiently clear. In Diplomacy Theory and Practice, Berridge defines public 
diplomacy as ‘propaganda – a form of political advertising designed to influence a foreign 
government’s external policy’. 146   At the same time, scholars of propaganda define 
propaganda as ‘the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the 
transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the 
interests of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly’. 147
The blurring of the lines between public diplomacy and propaganda is furthered by 
propaganda scholar Richard Holbrooke, ‘Call it public diplomacy, call it public affairs, 
psychological warfare, if you really want to be blunt, propaganda’.
  
From this definition, it would appear that propaganda and public diplomacy may be seen to 
follow a similar methodology.   
 
148 For Australian scholar, 
and former diplomat, Alison Broinowski the distinction between ‘public diplomacy’ and 
propaganda is one of perspective, ‘it is what governments would like to succeed in, - that is, 
converting people in other countries to see our point of view and agree with it.  That is 
propaganda, except we always say propaganda is done by our enemies’.149
                                                 
146 Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, pp. 126-127. 
147 D Welch, ‘Powers of Persuasion’, History Today, 49, August, 1999, pp.24-26;  Melissen, ‘Between Theory 
and Practice’, pp.16-19.  
148 R Holbrooke, ‘Get the Message Out’, Washington Post, 28 October, 2001.  See also Cull, ‘Public diplomacy 
before Gullion: the Evolution of a Phrase’; and W Lippman, ‘Today and Tomorrow: Talking about Talking’, 
Washington Post, 19 November 1953.   
149 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 11 April 2007, 
p.18. 
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However, Melissen is careful to clearly establish critical differences between propaganda and 
contemporary public diplomacy, and he asserts that the ‘distinction lies in the purpose and 
method of communication’. 150   Firstly, public diplomacy seeks to influence through 
information and education that aims to broaden the audience’s perspectives and options; 
where propaganda serves to influence through information that narrows perspectives and 
closes down options.  Without dwelling on the negative connotations associated with 
propaganda, the patterns and methodology of propaganda based communications have been 
evidenced through Nazi and Communist regimes of the past (and in recent times in 
Communist China). 151   In these examples, the methodology of propaganda involved 
persuasion through one-way communication from the authority to the public audience 
(domestic and external).  By contrast, successful ‘modern public diplomacy involves 
persuasion through a two-way communication process that seeks to engage the audience in a 
dialogue process, based on a liberal notion of communication with foreign publics’.152
To further the distinction, Melissen quotes Jay Black in making this point, ‘whereas creative 
communication accepts pluralism and displays expectations that its receivers should conduct 
further investigations of its observations, allegations and conclusions, propaganda does not 
appear to do so’.
   
 
153
                                                 
150 Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’, p.18, See also Gregory, ‘Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an 
Academic Field’.  
151 Zaharna, ‘Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives’, pp.89-90.  For discussion of propaganda 
in use in closed or authoritarian regimes, see also Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics, pp. 
49-50.  
152 Potter, ‘Canada and the new public diplomacy’; see also Fiske de Gouveia, ‘The Future of Public 
Diplomacy’.   
153 J Black, quoted in Melissen, ‘ Between Theory and Practice’, p.18. 
  While most states, including those based in Western democracy and 
liberal values, have and will continue to engage in propaganda at times, propaganda has been 
considered to be an instrument of choice used by authoritarian regimes such as North Korea, 
Iran, Stalinist Russia and China in manipulating both domestic and foreign opinion via state 
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generated information that does not seek to engage, but bombards audiences with a single 
message, often lacking in credibility.  For example, the main themes of North Korean 
propaganda are visible at the Demilitarization Zone (DMZ) separating North and South 
Korea.  Signs with slogans reading ‘Our General is number one,’ or describing North Korean 
Leader, Kim Jong Il as the ‘Sunshine of the 21st century’ while another one reads, ‘Oppose 
America’ are all forms of current propaganda, and are quite separate and distinct from the 
current use of information through public diplomacy to engage publics.154
In her analysis of the rise of China’s public diplomacy programs, d’Hooghe extends upon the 
distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy by defining the latter as being ‘about 
engaging publics, not just informing them: it is about establishing long term relationships that 
will build trust’.
   
 
155   d’Hooghe’s definition highlights the added dimension of building 
trusting relationships which takes public diplomacy beyond the concept of information and 
communication and into diplomacy.  It also implies a fundamental need for public diplomacy 
to be founded in truth and fact, not just political spin.  As Leonard points out, ‘simple 
propaganda often lacks credibility’. 156
…good public diplomacy does require a great deal of listening and interaction with the groups being 
targeted.  It is a two way process, where one party is actually listening to the other party and then 
accommodating some of their interests and concerns.  If that process takes place, public diplomacy then 
does not become a tool in propaganda.
  Such concepts present challenges for governments in 
moving their public diplomacy programs away from propaganda, whether they be in China or 
Australia, in working beyond traditional and official circles and political timeframes. 
Australian academic, Kerr elaborates on this point in her contribution to the Senate Inquiry: 
157
                                                 
154 M Chinoy, ‘North Korea’s Propaganda Machine’, CNN International Edition, 1 March 2003. 
155 d’Hooghe, ‘The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy’.   
156 M Leonard quoted in Nye, J, Soft Power – the means to success in World Politics, p. 125. 
157 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 11 April 2007, 
p.23. 
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Based on the argument that public diplomacy is sufficiently distinct from propaganda it is 
useful to identify a more recent application of containment through public diplomacy.  
Henrikson notes the current application of the containment strategy to the ‘rising China’.158  
The former United States Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice during trilateral talks with 
former Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer and Japan’s Foreign Minister, Taro 
Aso referred to the need for the containment of China, ‘I think all of us have a responsibility 
and an obligation to try and ensure that the rise of China will be a positive force for the 
international community and not a negative force’.159
The audiences generally targeted through a policy of containment may include domestic 
audiences, but are more generally foreign audiences of a like minded approach (for example, 
as noted previously, Japan and Australia - and the broader Asian region were the targeted 
audiences for the Americans in recent containment-related discussions on China).
  The Final Report of Australia’s 2020 
Summit highlighted concerns around ‘the growing influence of China in the region’, 
particularly because China’s visibility had increased rapidly and there remained uncertainty 
over what it was seeking to achieve, particularly in the long-term’.   
 
160
                                                 
158 Henrikson, ‘What Can public Diplomacy Achieve?’, p.18. 
159 M Gawenda, ‘Rice and Downer in Talks on How to Contain China’, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 March 
2006.   
160 Ibid.   
  The 
public diplomacy approaches may slide between all three of Nye’s public diplomacy frames 
depending upon the containment requirements, including the day-to-day trouble-shooting 
through the daily media, a longer strategic campaign that seeks to build knowledge and spark 
some form of advocacy, and relationship building to develop longer term trust if warranted.  
The sort of tools used to give effect to policies of containment today through public 
diplomacy, include ensuring the free flow of ideas through information education and cultural 
exchange with publics of the targeted state. These tools provide for two-way understanding 
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and sharing to build relationships of trust and mutual regard, which enable opportunities for 
dialogue and influence. For example, Wesley’s recent comments about the current challenges 
for Australia’s relationship note that, ‘getting China right means Australia must make the 
effort to better understand China…’.161
A recent Australian example of this policy strategy in action, might be the containment of 
negative Indian press regarding the treatment of Indian students travelling to and living in 
Australia for the purpose of obtaining a tertiary qualification.  With the outbreak of negative 
Indian media, DFAT moved quickly into rapid response mode working at both ends of the 
public diplomacy spectrum, combating negative press via media outlets on the one hand, and 
ramping up a series of diplomatic visits and high level discussions with broad and positive 
media coverage on the other.
  The reference to ‘understanding China’ directly 
relates to public diplomacy activities that enable wider understanding of the target foreign 
audience.     
 
162   This activity was in addition to the ongoing media and 
youth exchanges aimed at building positive bilateral and personal connections to the benefit 
of both countries.163
  
    
                                                 
161 Wesley, ‘China an unfamiliar terrain’, (emphasis added).  
162 Dubey, ‘Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under’, The Indian Times, 3 June 2009.  Bolt, ‘We’re not 
the racists’, Herald Sun, 3 June 2009, BBC News, ‘India Calls Off Australia Events’; Wesley, ‘Australia’s 
Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.10; Healey and Trounson, ‘Moves to 
Safeguard Indian Students; News.com, ‘Australia Assumes Safety of Indian Students’, Australian Associated 
Press Online, 7 August 2009: 
http://livenews.com.au/news/student_violence_prompts_rudd_to_visit_India/2009/8/7/215406; Banham and 
Gilmore, ‘Rudd Forms Indian Violence Taskforce’, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 June 2009.   
163 The Australia India Focus, Newsletter of the Australia India Business Council, May 2009.   
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5.3.3 Penetration 
 
Consolidation Containment  Penetration Enlargement Transformation Diversion 
 
The third strategic driver penetration is again a confined strategy to break open ‘areas of 
influence deep inside the target territory’.164
As Henrikson observes, the terminology used in an international relations context reflects its 
use in the commercial world.  For example, market penetration refers to the situation where a 
product or brand penetrates a new market either by taking customers away from a competitor, 
attracting new users to a product, or convincing existing users to use more of the product or 
service.  In the commercial world, penetration usually involves tactics such as price cutting, 
increased advertising, better positioning and/or improved distribution of the product or 
service.
  The strategic objective driving the penetration 
strategy is to build a network of confidence and influence within specific groups of elites that 
may be useful in times of crisis, and will translate into uptake of political or economic 
products (such as goods or services, or multilateral policy direction).  The audience for 
penetrative public diplomacy is targeted to groups of foreign elites who may hold some 
source of influence within their own state.   
 
165
                                                 
164 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.24. 
165 Description of ‘the marketing strategy of penetration’ found at Wikipedia, viewed on 20 October 2009,   
<http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/maket_penetration> 
 In foreign policy, penetration can be achieved through the public diplomacy 
activities of educational and cultural exchange – where people-to-people relationships are 
established.  The initial relationship provides leverage to access and influence expanded 
networks within the targeted state.  Television and radio programming, along with the use of 
internet technology are all effective in penetrating and influencing otherwise hard-to-reach 
groups.   
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The strategy of penetration is less effective when utilised in isolation of other strategies.  In 
particular, it is aligned to a degree with the strategy of containment (and has also been carried 
out effectively through an intelligence role).  The two strategies were employed together by 
the United States against the former Soviet Union during the Cold War – to contain the 
spread and influence of communism, and to offer to individuals a taste of democratic 
values.166  The latter was made possible through targeted exchange programs which were 
aimed at scholars, students, scientists, engineers, dancers, and athletes.  Practitioners, such as 
former United States Foreign Service Officer, Yale Richmond, claims that the 
implementation of various cultural exchange programs which brought some fifty thousand 
Soviet Union citizens to the United States, and many Americans to the Soviet Union, 
ultimately led to the demise of the Soviet Union.167  According to Richmond the contacts and 
exchanges between American and Soviet Union intelligentsia occurred from about 1954 
through to 1988 in culture, information, science and technology.  These exchanges which 
were conducted for the most part openly and under agreement, and resulted in an increase in 
Western influence among the Soviet Union intelligentsia at a time when the intelligentsia 
were attracted to Western themes and values.168 Ultimately, according to Richmond such 
influence had a significant impact on the direction of policy development of the Soviet 
Union.169
                                                 
166 Henrikson,  ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.24. 
167 Y Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: the Raising of the Iron Curtain, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania, 2003.   
168 Ibid, p. xiv.   
169 Ibid.  For example, Richmond notes that one such beneficiary was Alexander Yakovlev, who later became 
Mikhail Gorbechev’s adviser, and was ‘considered by many to be the author of the Soviet Union’s glasnost 
policy’.  Giles Scott Smith takes this point up in noting that ‘whereas most forms of public diplomacy work 
involve the presentation of image and information, exchanges directly involve the human factor, where an 
engagement with the personality and psychology of the participants is central’.  G. Scott Smith, ‘Exchange 
Programs and Public Diplomacy’, in Nancy Snow and Phil Taylor (eds), Routledge Handbook of Public 
Diplomacy, Routledge, New York, 2009, pp. 50-56.   
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More likely this is overstating the impact of penetration.  However, penetrative activities can 
provide long-term leverage points for opening up a crack of influence within a key territory.  
A contemporary example highlighting the possibilities for penetration through public 
diplomacy is evident in the work of Australian-born playwright, Daniel Keene.  Keene, 
introduced to the French theatre scene with some assistance from the Australian Embassy in 
Paris, has since had numerous works translated and performed in European theatres, and is 
now considered to be one of Europe’s most notable contemporary playwrights.170  While 
Keene’s works do not specifically promote an image of Australia, they are considered to be 
challenging and confronting, sophisticated and emotionally sensitive pieces.171  That Keene 
has been so well accepted and awarded by the European cultural elites reflects well on 
Australia, and could provide a strategic opening into the elite grouping through which the 
Australian diplomats may manoeuvre to build further relationships.  However, Keene’s work 
does not feature in the DFAT summary of public diplomacy, and as such also provides 
evidence of ‘loose or weak’ coordination of Australia’s public diplomacy program.172
Successful penetration, which may occur through targeted radio broadcasting of Australian 
current affairs in local languages, is deemed to be extremely effective in building pockets of 
support in diverse areas, such as Indonesia or the Pacific islands, and supporting relationships 
between countries.
 
 
173
                                                 
170 Interview, Robyn Archer, 3 November 2007. 
171 Ibid.   
172 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 11 April 2007, 
p.24. 
173 Radio Australia Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/> 
  Radio Australia, despite having a significant funding cut over the last 
decade, currently broadcasts political, business and educational content into a range of 
foreign communities, such as Honiara, Suva, Nandi, Port Vila, Nuku’alofa and Dili – 
frequently in local languages, and through the goodwill of local governments and national 
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authorities to utilise airwaves. 174  Anecdotally, Radio Australia suggests that Australia is 
positioned to achieve positive outcomes through such broadcasting, including in establishing 
an understanding of Australian attitudes and affairs within a values based framework that 
promotes rule of law, equity of opportunity and respect for human rights’.175  However, as 
discovered through the Senate Inquiry process, there is little in terms of substantive or 
statistical evidence to support this claim.176
5.3.4 Enlargement 
 
 
Consolidation Containment  Penetration Enlargement Transformation Diversion 
 
 
Enlargement or ‘expansion of the ideological, economic and also political sphere of a country 
and its allies on a very broad front, rather than to prise open a beachhead of influence within 
a country’ was enunciated by former United States President Clinton in his 1993 address to 
the United Nations General Assembly. 177  As the United States’ first Cold War President, 
Clinton was under some pressure to define the US foreign policy strategy in a way that 
moved the United States beyond Kennan’s cold war strategy of containment in recognition of 
the changed world order.  At this time, the United States found itself to be the world’s only 
superpower with troops deployed across unstable crisis situations including Bosnia, Somalia, 
Haiti and Iraq.  Multilateral economic initiatives, including the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), APEC, and the Group of Seven (G-7) had moved onto Clinton’s 
foreign economic policy agenda.178
                                                 
174 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2007, 
p.65.  However, Broinowski counters that from about 1992-2002, Australia’s reputation in Indonesia was poor, 
and this image was not improved in any way by ‘the sale of the Cox Peninsula transmitter to a fundamentalist 
Christian organisation for broadcasts into Indonesia by shortwave radio [rendering] Radio Australia [to be] 
barely audible’.  See Broinowski, About Face, p.231. 
175 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2007, 
p.65. 
176 Ibid, p.69. 
177 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’ p.24. 
178 Brinkley, ‘Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’, p.114. 
  In this context, the Clinton administration developed the 
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strategy of enlargement, ‘signifying the notion that as free states grew in number and 
strength, the international order would become both more prosperous and more secure’.179
The enlargement blueprint developed by Clinton’s administration focused upon ‘four key 
points; i) to strengthen the community of market democracies – including our own – which 
constitute the core; ii) to foster and consolidate new democracies or market economies 
wherever possible especially in states of special significance and opportunity; iii) to counter 
the aggression and support the liberalisation of states hostile to democracy; iv) to help 
democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.’
 
 
180
Enlargement is a strategy that clearly incorporates elements of consolidation, containment 
and penetration where relevant.  As such and guided by the four points above, the basic 
premise of the enlargement strategy is to ‘extend ‘Western enlightenment’ where it was 
possible to do so’.
 
The concept of enlargement was by no means a blanket expansionist approach, and Clinton 
freely acknowledged that market competitiveness was at the heart of his foreign policy 
strategy.   
 
181
                                                 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Henrikson , ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve?’ p.24. 
 The Clinton administration subsequently justified its withdrawal or 
avoidance of intractable military interventions, and prioritised its focus towards enlargement 
through those states most open to market forces, including Mexico and the Asia Pacific.  
Clinton utilised United States involvement in multilateral groupings including the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), APEC and NAFTA, as key vehicles for deployment of 
the enlargement strategy.   
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From a public diplomacy perspective, the enlargement strategy works in an outwards 
direction starting with the foreign public audience already open to (if not engaged in) the 
concepts of democracy or market economy, towards those less aligned with such concepts - 
almost as a reverse adaptation of the Cold War ‘domino effect’.  The concept of democracy 
for the purposes of the enlargement strategy is loosely adapted to ensure alignment with the 
United States’ primary strategic and economic interests.  For example, in prioritising its 
audience for the enlargement strategy the Clinton administration did not quibble over 
significantly differing interpretations of democratic principles, as long as market forces were 
positive in the targeted nation. 182   In this way that Clinton justified his focus on the 
economies of South Korea and Mexico while disregarding the less strategic concerns in sub-
Saharan Africa or South America.183  While at times difficult to sell internally, the impact of 
Clinton’s enlargement strategy has been to bring more states to the table, whether for NATO 
or APEC without threat, and on the basis of inclusion.184
Enlargement is progressed through activities based on strategic communications and lasting 
relationships. Henrikson states, ‘enlargement requires a large organising vision, not just small 
penetrative devices’.
     
 
185
                                                 
182 Brinkley , ‘Democratic enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’, pp.115-116. 
183 Ibid.   
 Therefore, high profile conferences, visits, speeches and symbolic 
gestures by political leaders, ministers and senior diplomats all feature as a part of the 
campaign.  The United Nations and other multilateral fora provide opportunities for pursuing 
184 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.31.  See for example, NATO, ‘NATO’s Open Door 
Policy’, Nato Online Library: http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/opendoor.htm.  The discussion of Clinton’s 
policy of enlargement cannot proceed without recognition of scholarly criticism of enlargement as the 
promotion of US hegemony and the underpinning motivations of global capitalism, as progressed by Clinton, 
and subsequently by US President George W. Bush.  For example, refer to:  N Chomsky, Hegemony or 
Survival, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2003; N Chomsky, ‘A Century Later’, Peace Review, Vol 10(3), 
1998, pp.313-320;  E Meiksins Wood,  ‘Kosovo and the new imperialism’, The Monthly Review, Vol 51(2), 
viewed on 12 April 2010 at: < http://www.monthlyreview.org/699wood.htm>; E Meiksins-Wood, Empire of 
Capital, Twayne Publishers, Boston, 2005.   
185 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’, p.29.  See also A Lake, ‘From Containment to 
Enlargement’, Remarks at the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Washington 
DC, 21 September 1993. 
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an enlargement strategy. Cultural diplomacy and exchange fostering targeted person-to-
person relationships, and promoting cultural uptake appear to provide effective outcomes. 
 
Recent activities by China to increase its influence and role as a responsible player in global 
international relations through its ‘harmonious world’ strategy may be seen as an adaptation 
on the enlargement strategy.  d’Hooghe notes in her examination of China’s public diplomacy 
strategy, that the concept of ‘harmonious world’, underpinned by an earlier strategy of 
‘peaceful rise’ is built upon four key pillars, including ‘i) effective multilateralism with a 
strong role of the United Nations; ii) development of a collective security mechanism; iii) 
prosperity for all through mutually beneficial cooperation; and iv) tolerance and enhancement 
of dialogue amongst diverse nations’. 186 By promoting its concept of harmonious world, 
China employs public diplomacy to send the message that its rise will not be destabilising, 
but will be peaceful, in an attempt to counter regional the perception that a rising China might 
pose a threat.187
Interestingly, a key public diplomacy tool utilised by China to achieve this outcome is the 
establishment of the Confucius Institutes and Colleges aimed at ‘promoting the friendly 
relationships with other countries and enhancing the understanding of the Chinese language 
and culture among the world Chinese learners’.
  
 
188  Between 2004 and 2007, China had 
established a total of 128 Institutes (six of those in Australia) incorporating each continent 
across the globe, with applications pending on a further 400 Institutes.189
                                                 
186 d’Hooghe, ‘The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy’, p.10.   
187 Ibid.  According to one Chinese official, ‘China should help people from other nations acquaint themselves 
with Chinese culture, including its traditions, religions and particularly the Chinese way of thinking. This will 
help China overcome its cultural deficit’. Anon, ‘China Threat Fear Countered by Culture’, China People’s 
Daily, 26 May 2006; Jumbo, ‘Confucianism Vital String in China’s Bow’. 
188 d’Hooghe, ‘The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy’, p.29.   
189 Ibid. 
  The Confucius 
Institutes not only facilitate the spread of China’s culture and language, but reinforce the 
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value of China’s ancient culture to a contemporary audience, enhancing China’s overall 
attractiveness.   
5.3.5 Transformation 
 
Consolidation Containment  Penetration Enlargement Transformation Diversion 
 
The transformation strategy was most fully articulated by the former United States Secretary 
of State, Condoleeza Rice during her address to The George Washington University School 
of Foreign Service in 2006, and the policy subsequently became more widely utilised within 
the US Bush Administration.  Rice defines the objective of transformational diplomacy as 
working through diplomacy ‘to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will 
respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international 
system’.190 In this way it is the fundamental character of regimes that is driving the United 
States foreign policy, and a desire to interact with a view to changing dangerous or 
undesirable regimes into ‘responsible sovereigns’.191  Rice qualifies this strategy as one that 
must be delivered in partnership with recipient states, (and therefore not through paternalistic 
approaches), at a grassroots level. In a clear alignment of the transformational strategy with 
the concept of public diplomacy, Rice asserts that ‘in doing things with people, not for them, 
we seek to use America’s diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their own lives and 
to build their own nations and to transform their own futures’.192
                                                 
190 Rice, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’ . 
191 U.S. State Department Director of Policy Planning, Stephen Krasner quoted in Henrikson, ‘What Public 
Diplomacy Can Achieve’ p.35. 
192 Rice, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’. 
 What Rice does not say, but 
is implied in her presentation, is that such activities will improve the American image and 
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reputation abroad, positively impact on American soft power and ultimately enable greater 
influencing power.193
Transformation is a significant progression from the enlargement strategy, because it reflects 
a recognition of the threats posed to United States national security and prosperity by poorly 
governed or weak states where democratic principles and institutions are compromised or 
simply do not exist.
 
 
194  Rice’s explanation of transformational diplomacy outlines the clear 
impact of this strategy upon the traditional structures and networks of diplomacy, and she 
notes that ‘public diplomacy is an important part of every diplomat’s job description’.195  For 
example, the starting point for delivering on the transformation strategy is to build a strong, 
well resourced and trained, adaptable and flexible diplomatic force to be focused on those 
states where democratic principles and institutions are lacking.196
represent America in an emerging community of change… working with foreign citizens in difficult 
conditions to maintain security and fight poverty and make democratic reforms, not only as expert 
analysts of policy but as first-rate administrators of programs, capable of helping foreign citizens to 
strengthen the rule of law, to start businesses, to improve health and to reform education…It’s not just 
about reporting on countries. It’s not just about influencing governments. It’s about changing people’s 
lives.
  Rice notes that the role of 
diplomats would be to: 
197
 
   
                                                 
193 Fukuyama notes the value of Rice’s speech on transformational diplomacy as ‘an effort to reorganize the 
nonmilitary side of the foreign-policy establishment’ makes for a welcome change.  However, with criticism of 
US foreign policy that follows similar lines to that of Chomsky and Meiksins Wood, Fukuyama expresses 
concern about how such change might be implemented, particularly as ‘What is needed now are new ideas, 
neither neoconservative nor realist, for how America is to relate to the rest of the world — ideas that retain the 
neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but without its illusions about the efficacy of 
American power and hegemony to bring these ends about’.  Refer to F Fukuyama, ‘After Neoconservatism’, The 
New York Times Magazine, 19 February 2006.   
194 To address the possibility of confusion between the enlargement and transformational strategies, there is 
value in briefly noting that Clinton’s enlargement strategy was premised upon extending the principles of 
democracy and liberalism primarily associated with the West, through those states that were ready to move in 
such a direction. Enlargement draws upon the role of institutions, such as APEC for establishing parameters and 
building consensus. However, transformation  takes a more radical approach to the working with that may be 
fundamentally different in values and culture, and through guerrilla diplomacy tactics (ie non conventional 
diplomacy) enabling a fundamental shift in those values and culture in a way that benefits the interests of the 
initiating state.     
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. Rice notes that ‘the fundamental character of regimes now matters more than the international 
distribution of power’; also, Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve?’, p.32. 
197 Rice, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’. 
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As such Rice calls for the repositioning of diplomats as ‘the new front line of diplomacy in 
the field – outside the major capital cities of Europe and in the cities and country sides of the 
developing world, in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia’.198
Rice alludes to the need for structural change to the diplomatic network in order to deliver 
upon the proposed changes required by the transformation strategy.  These include the 
establishment of America Presence Posts, or rapid response networks or teams of diplomats 
who could be deployed within regional areas to monitor and assist on specific issues or 
challenges within a defined area.
   
 
199 Technology is also identified as playing an increasingly 
important role in supporting such diplomatic networks, including through virtual presence 
posts and digital meeting rooms that would ‘enable foreign citizens to engage online with 
American diplomats’.200
The strategy of transformation incorporates elements of all the five strategies identified in the 
policy continuum.  There is a significant degree of consolidation involved in engaging both 
 While there is no clarity provided as to why foreign citizens would 
want to engage directly with American diplomat, this line of thinking might follow the FCO 
precedent of setting up blogs by diplomats to promote the work undertaken overseas, and 
make the foreign diplomat more accessible to the ordinary person.  Alternatively, such a 
proposal might also fit with the Glassman policy of diversion, whereby diplomats engage 
with a particular demographic to influence their significant life choices, and provide dialogue 
about options that might be available to the person.  In this way, ongoing, targeted and 
relevant communications with foreign audiences, including through local language radio, 
television and Internet sites are seen to be critical instruments of the transformation strategy.    
 
                                                 
198 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’ p.33.  See also Walter Russell Mead, ‘Goodbye Paris, 
Hello Chad’, Los Angeles Times, 29 January 2006, and Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 
‘Transformational Diplomacy’, Fact Sheet, 18 January 2006: http:www.state.gov./r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm. 
199 Rice, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’.  
200 Henrikson, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’ p.33.   
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domestic audiences (and most particularly foreign service recruits and existing officers) as 
well as like-minded foreign audiences in taking up the cause of transformation.  It is a much 
more difficult, dangerous and long-term path for any diplomatic service and requires 
substantial underpinning belief in the moral standing of the cause.  Transformation 
incorporates elements of the containment strategy in limiting the impact or influence of rogue 
regimes, while at the same time taking steps to penetrate target groups and divert young 
people away from extremist activities as a part of the transformation process.  If successful 
transformation will bring about the enlargement of the driving state’s influence, through the 
spread of democratic principles and institutions, driven largely by that state’s diplomatic 
networks working with the foreign publics at a local level.    A word of caution is required 
when applying the United States defined transformation strategy, as some academics and 
policy commentators may view the United States implementation of transformation as a 
purely imperialist or interventionist approach.   
5.3.6 Diversion 
 
Consolidation Containment  Penetration Enlargement Transformation Diversion 
 
Diversion is a relatively new policy term, which does not factor in Henrikson’s strategic 
policy approach to public diplomacy policy, but is relevant to the discussion of strategic 
foreign policy drivers of public diplomacy.  The diversion policy has been introduced more 
recently by the former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the United 
States Department of State, and fits neatly within the public diplomacy strategy spectrum.  
During several press conferences and interviews, Glassman has referred to the need for a 
diversion strategy aimed at ‘the channelling of young people away from violence with the 
attractions of technology, sports, culture, education and entrepreneurship’.201
                                                 
201 J Glassman, ‘A Leader on Fighting Terrorism’, Miami Herald, Tuesday, November 25, 2008. 
 Glassman refers 
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to this policy in the context of diverting young Islamist extremists away from terrorist 
activities against Western nations.  He also notes that it is a concept that has application in a 
range of unstable environments, such as Colombia, where the extremist Revolutionary Armed 
forces of Colombia (FARC), rely on the ability to ‘hijack vulnerable, impressionable, youth 
people looking for adventure and linking it to a doctrine of hatred, fantasy, greed and 
hysteria’.202
The Miami Herald reported in November 2008 anecdotal evidence that a large number of 
young Colombians find themselves caught up for years in a violent extremist group with little 
chance of an escape.  Using the Colombian example, it is reported that anti-FARC 
campaigners have recently employed internet technology, such as Facebook.com to target 
and engage these young people as well as a broader audience in a campaign against FARC.  
As a specific anti-terrorism strategy, the ‘aim is to undermine the ideology of a violent 
extremist group and disrupt its flow of recruits by offering productive alternatives’.
   
 
203  
Utilised now by the United States as a distinct strategy in the so-called ‘war on ideas’ 
diversion adopts the more immediate and realistic goal of diverting impressionable segments 
of the population from the recruitment process.204
Based on information around current practice, the diversion strategy is highly targeted and 
specialised in its approach and message.  The key audience targeted through the strategy of 
diversion includes those young people ‘at risk’ of turning to extremism, (usually as an 
alternative route to poverty or traditional/conventional lifestyle where there are few other 
 
 
                                                 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Glassman, ‘US Public Diplomacy and the War of Ideas’, S Brodzinsky, ‘Facebook Used to Target Colombia 
FARC’, Christian Science Monitor, February 2008; Anon, ‘Colombia Marches Against Hostage Takers’, The 
Economist, 7 February 2008.   
 
271 
 
pathways or opportunities).  The tools tend to be based on new technologies and mediums 
that are appealing and engaging for young people, including through the Internet, or mobile 
phone technology.  Popular group based mediums such as ‘Facebook’ have proven successful 
in Colombia, in connecting young people from differing backgrounds in the free exchange of 
ideas, providing insight into other options and pathways and influencing attitudes.205
in this new world of communications, any government that resists new Internet techniques faces a greater 
risk: being ignored. Our major target audiences – especially the young – don’t want to listen to us lecture 
them or tell them what to think or how wonderful we are.
  This 
strategy provides an opening for successful public-private partnerships in the field of public 
diplomacy where private organisations are in a position to deploy the latest, most captivating 
social networking technology in such a way to assist government policy delivery.  As noted 
by Glassman, such partnerships are essential, because: 
206
The diversion strategy has emerged through niche examples provided by Glassman, and is 
clearly a strategy that aligned with the United States public diplomacy program.  Diversion 
provides an interesting addition to the policy strategy continuum for this thesis, and has been 
included because of the strong focus on garnering public opinion to influence outcomes, 
through social networking and new technologies.
  
 
207
                                                 
205 J Glassman, ‘A Leader on Fighting Terrorism’, Miami Herald, Tuesday, November 25, 2008. 
206 J Glassman, ‘Public Diplomacy 2.0: A New Approach to Public Engagement’, presentation to New America 
Foundation Washington DC, December 1, 2008; S Brodzinsky, ‘Facebook Used to Target Colombia’ FARC’; 
Anon, ‘Colombia Marches Against Hostage Takers’. 
207 While evaluating the impact of  new technologies is not fully understood, it is likely that the techniques for 
evaluating social marketing, (surveys, forums etc) will remain relevant.  .  
  In particular, as noted previously 
technologies that utilise mobile phones and the internet, are proving to be effective in the 
space of younger generations, regardless of location or socio-economic conditions. For 
example, Twitter, which allows for ‘a heady mixture of messaging, social networking, 
"micro-blogging" and something called "presence," shorthand for the idea that people should 
enjoy an "always on" virtual omnipresence’ has emerged at the time of writing this thesis to 
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provide further opportunities for technology in the public diplomacy space.208 While twitter 
has become a popular and frivolous marketing tool for celebrities and individuals, it has 
become an effective tool for political organisation having been utilised in the US presidential 
elections by (then candidate) Barack Obama, and more significantly in recent Iranian 
elections by large numbers of people organising protests, gaining useful analysis of results, 
and to share information regarding police crackdowns on protests.209 While the measurement 
of use and impact of such technologies is not clear, the fact that the US state department 
officially requested Twitter to delay scheduled maintenance on its global network during the 
Iranian election period to ensure individuals in Iran would remain connected provides strong 
anecdotal evidence of the value of technologies. 210
                                                 
208  Anon, ‘Twitter’, The New York Times, 26 April 2010, viewed on 26 April at: 
 Indeed, the application of new 
technologies such as Twitter in engaging populations and audiences are not only growing 
rapidly, but appear limitless, and must be considered essential in any discussion about public 
diplomacy.   
 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/twitter/index.html?inline=nyt-org. 
209 Ibid.   
210 Ibid.   
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5.4 The Australian policy perspective 
 
The policy strategies outlined above reflect key foreign policy strategies that have been tested 
and employed in the international arena by various nations at key times during the past fifty 
years.  As discussed, each of those policy strategies has some degree of relevance to the 
Australian experience and approach to the world during that same period. Yet, Australia has 
also articulated two additional and distinct policy strategies, namely i) regional stability and 
ii) engagement.  Both policies being specifically focused on Australia’s position within the 
immediate Asian-Pacific region.  Those two strategies incorporate similar elements, but 
remain distinct in their objective and employment and require further analysis from the public 
diplomacy perspective. 
5.4.1 Regional stability (constructive commitment) 
 
Regional Stability Engagement  
 
 
Regional stability relates to the need to bring stability to volatile external areas that are 
considered to pose a security threat to Australia.  In particular, this policy has developed with 
regard to an area known since the 1990s as the ‘arc of instability’, which encompasses the 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific (and 
including the hot spots of Fiji, Solomon Islands).211
                                                 
211 R Garnaut, Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalisation: An Asia-Pacific Contribution to the World Trade 
System, Institute of South-East Asian Studies, Singapore, 1996.  R Garnaut, ‘One System, Two Countries: 
Australia and New Zealand in the International Community, Paper Presented at a Conference of the New 
Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 6 March 2000.  G Dobell, ‘The Pacific “Arc of Instability”’, The 
Correspondent’s Report, ABC Radio National, March 2006.  For further reading regarding the definitions and 
emergence of terminology regarding the ‘arc of instability’ see also R Ayson, ‘The Arc of Instability’, Paper 
delivered to the International Studies Association, Annual Conference, Hawaii, 3 March 2005.   
  As noted earlier within this chapter, the 
recent rhetoric employed by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has seen a shift in Australia’s 
approach removing an overt reference to labelling the region as one of ‘instability’, to an 
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emphasis on the region as falling within Australia’s ‘arc of responsibility’.212 The shift in 
nomenclature, a public diplomacy exercise in itself, is supported by a policy focus that seeks 
to develop real partnership opportunities within the Pacific as a means to enabling stability.  
Such a shift may be important for the Australian Government in managing long standing 
perceptions of Australia as an overbearing paternalistic Pacific power.213
the possibility of more expensive police and military interventions, not to mention food and medical aid, 
more ethnic and political violence leading to a wave of refugees, an explosion of HIV/AIDS, and the 
possibility that power vacuums could be exploited by non regional states.
 The context for 
stabilisation comes from the notion that if states are left vulnerable because of internal 
conflict, natural disaster or poor economic and social conditions they may become a haven 
for transnational crime, or terrorism. As noted by one journalist recently, failing economies 
and unsettled politics pose danger and: 
214
activities of terrorist network, Jemaah Islamiah within the Indonesian Archipelago, police and military 
crises in East Timor, continuing challenges to stability in Papua New Guinea, ethnic violence in Vanuatu, 
the implosion of law and order in the Solomon Islands, a coup d’etat in Fiji, a constitutional crisis 
combined with unprecedented local violence in Tonga and Nauru, the region’s first properly defined 
failed state – having become centres for money laundering.
    
 
Furthermore, Australian policy analysts are cognisant of the range of potential threats and 
ongoing issues with stability in the region, that include the: 
215
Essentially these conditions require broad diplomatic activities that will connect and engage 
with local communities, influencing the stability of the communities and the individuals 
within those communities. Scholars such as Hawksley note that the policy of state-building, 
an attempt to create stability through a combined strategy of political mediation and the 
  
 
 
                                                 
212 Vestergaard, ‘Man at work: Rudd walks Asian tightrope’. Hawksley, ‘Australia’s aid diplomacy and the 
Pacific Islands: change and continuity in middle power foreign policy’.  
213 G Dobell, Australia Finds Home: The choices and chances of an Asia Pacific journey, ABC Books, Sydney, 
2001, p.104.  
214 D Mark, ‘Rudd outlines foreign policy vision’, The World Today, 5 July, 2007.  
215 Ibid. 
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consolidation of institutions’ emerges in response to challenging conditions of failing 
states.216
An externally driven or facilitated attempt to consolidate a stable, and sometime democratic government 
over an internationally recognised national territory against the backdrop of the establishment and 
consolidation of the UN and the universalisation of the system of sovereign nation states.
  Berger, provides a more detailed definition of the state-building policy as being: 
217
The underpinning policy of regional stability seeks to support economic and community 
development in a way that will combat poverty, unemployment, and poor education and build 
necessary infrastructure is ‘the best way to prevent the emergence of failed states and the 
threat of terrorism’.
   
 
 
Based on the definitions provided the state-building policy approach holds substantial 
relevance for Australia’s approach to the Pacific, particularly in relation to specific 
interventions such as the INTERFET operation in East Timor, and the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) initiative in Solomon Islands. The state-building 
policy provides a relevant backdrop to the broader policy of regional stability that will be 
pursued through this thesis as applicable to Australia’s relationship with the Pacific region.   
 
218   Australia has implemented significant defence and policing, 
development assistance and community development measures across the pacific region to 
manage the vulnerabilities in Timor Leste, Fiji and Solomon Islands.  In each case the target 
populations have been largely the local communities and indirectly, the local authorities.219
                                                 
216 C Hawksley, ‘Australian interventions and occupations: post cold war state-building in the global empire’ in 
Occupying the Other, C de Matos, R Gerster, (eds), Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, 2009,  p.175.  
For further reading regarding the conditions apparent in failing states see also, R Rotberg, ‘Failed states in a 
world of terror’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002, pp.127-140; R Rotberg, ‘The new nature of nation-state 
failure’, The Washington Quarterly, 25(3), pp.85-96.  
217 M Berger, ‘From nation-building to state-building: the geopolitics of development, the nation state system 
and the changing global order’, Third World Quarterly, Vol 27(1), 2006, p.6.   
218 Mark, ‘Rudd outlines foreign policy vision’.  
219 Interview, Confidential Source, Senior AusAID Official, 8 December 2009.  
  
The overall public diplomacy approach has been a relationship building approach based on 
276 
 
developing local community capacity through development assistance projects.220  The policy 
of regional stability is distinct in that Australia is cast in a role of a major power within the 
Pacific region, where the power dynamic is constructive and founded in the spirit of 
partnership.221
The RAMSI initiative, deployed in 2003 under a partnership agreement between the Solomon 
Islands Government and fifteen contributing Pacific nations (with Australia taking a lead 
role), provides an example of regional implementation of the stability policy.  The purpose of 
RAMSI is grounded in a policy of regional stability, alongside that of state-building ‘to 
restore law and order, strengthen government institutions, reduce corruption and reinvigorate 
the economy’.
   
 
222
Quite apart from the planned policing and military activities of RAMSI aligned more 
appropriately to state-building, there is also a significant impact of work at the personal and 
relationship level with the Solomon Islands peoples.
  Since 2003, RAMSI has involved the deployment of some hundreds of 
civilian, police and military advisors into Solomon Islands to rehabilitate infrastructure, 
institutions and communities.  
 
223
                                                 
220 Ibid.   
221 Regional stability is also known as constructive commitment in Evans, Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in 
the world of the 1990s, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1995, p.195. 
 In essence, the development of 
relationships reflects a substantial public diplomacy component to the overall mission, though 
such terminology has not been explicitly used within the official commentary.  As a Senior 
222 RAMSI Website, viewed on 20 October 2009, http://www.ramsi.org/.  See also Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, ‘Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands’, Canberra, June 2003, accessed 
at <http://www.aspi.org.au>.  Scholars such as Firth and Hawksley note that the alarmist tenor of this report 
changed the course of Australia’s policy towards Solomon Islands and the region. For further reading on the 
situation in Solomon Islands, and the subsequent development of Australian policy see Firth, Australia in 
International Politics, pp.197-209; S Dinnen, ‘Winners and losers: politics and disorder in the Solomon Islands, 
2000-2002’, Journal of Pacific History, Vol 37 (3), 2002, pp.285-98; and J Fraenkel, The Manipulation of 
Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2004.   
223 Interview, Confidential Source, Senior AusAID Official, 8 December 2009, although also noted that this 
frequently depends upon the individual involved in the provision of services, and will therefore vary.   
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AusAID official confirmed in interview, without positive public diplomacy that engages and 
influences the people of Solomon Islands the entire operation would be at risk of longer term 
transition and failure.224 In addition, depending upon public opinion, may also damage the 
reputation of Australia as lead or other contributing states within the Solomon Islands. While 
it is not clear whether consideration was given to the public diplomacy aspects of RAMSI at 
the time that RAMSI was established, it is clear that both consideration of and attention to the 
public diplomacy aspects has become an important element of the initiative.  In recognition 
of the importance of the perceptions of the local audiences an ‘the people’s survey was 
designed and implemented from 2006 as an independent way of measuring each year what 
Solomon Islanders think about progress and development issues related to the work of the 
Solomon Islands Government RAMSI initiative’.225
The survey is conducted over an expansive area of five provinces and Honiara and involves 
close to 100 focus groups and 4500 surveys.
  
 
226 The surveys themselves are focused on 
mission outcomes and closely tailored to stated RAMSI objectives, and the perceptions of 
people in relation to those people delivering assistance under RAMSI.  The survey results 
provide an opportunity for performance measurement, and demonstrate to the Solomon 
Islands people that their views are important – lending both concrete and symbolic weight to 
the ‘partnership’ approach.227
                                                 
224 Ibid. 
225 ANU Enterprise, People’s Survey 2008, RAMSI, August 2008.  AusAID, Supplementary Submission to 
Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy, Australian Government, March 2007, p.16. 
226 ANU Enterprise, People’s Survey 2008, RAMSI, August 2008.  AusAID, Supplementary Submission to 
Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy, p.16 
227 Interview, Confidential Source, Senior AusAID Official, 8 December 2009.  Though noted during interview, 
that the people’s Survey is specifically targeted to RAMSI activities, and does not give a sense of the 
community attitudes towards Australia as a result of the RAMSI activities, nor does the survey approach the 
issue of general attitudes of the people towards RAMSI nations more broadly.   
 Essentially, the RAMSI Mission provides an obvious example 
of Australia implementing the policy of regional stability.  Public diplomacy directed towards 
the local Solomon Islands communities is occurring within the framework of the RAMSI 
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Mission, but not necessarily as a key thread of policy development or implementation. The 
longer that RAMSI continues, the more important will become the need for Australia to 
examine how public diplomacy fits and might be carried out within the policy picture.228
More recently the Australian Government under Rudd has reinvigorated moves towards 
establishing Partnerships for Development to ‘achieve better economic outcomes in the 
Pacific, including through increased development assistance in response to commitments by 
Pacific nations to improve economic and financial management, to better manage essential 
infrastructure and achieve better outcomes in health and education’.
  
 
229 The recent policy 
announcement is underpinned through the commitment of A$10 million as core funding to 
support the operation of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, the region’s premier political 
organisation, and Pacific-wide programs through the 2010-11 year.230  Australian support for 
the Pacific Islands Forum, of which Australia is a funding member, provides a legitimate 
platform for Pacific Island governments to work together in negotiating programs and 
solutions to common systemic issues. In addition, the development and implementation of 
further substantial yet targeted initiatives, such as the Pacific Islands Seasonal Workers 
Scheme231 and through the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change 232
                                                 
228 Interview, Confidential Source, Senior AusAID Official, 9 December 2009.  During discussions, the official 
noted a possible scenario where the people of the Solomon Island may grow weary of the ‘regional invasion’ 
under RAMSI and may strike out at the participating countries.  This is where policy review and ongoing 
development might well consider changes to existing public diplomacy mechanisms that could either divert or 
combat such an outcome.  This concern is addressed by Sean Dorney who notes the use of the term ‘occupation’ 
by a senior Solomon Islands official to describe RAMSI’s role. S Dorney, ‘Reactions to RAMSI’, in Occupying 
the Other, p.204.  
229 Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Australia’s Commitment to Pacific Islands Forum’, Media Release, 18 March 
2010.  Australia’s aid commitment to the region for 2009-10 is estimated at A$1.09 billion see also AusAID, 
‘2009-10 International Development Assistance Budget’, Australian Government media release, 12 May 2009.   
230 Ibid.   
add 
231 The Pacific Seasonal Workers scheme is a pilot scheme auspiced by the Australian Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations that builds upon the scheme already implemented by the New Zealand 
Government, and aims to provide Pacific seasonal workers with the opportunity to work in the Australian 
horticultural industry in areas of regional Australia where there is an unmet labour demand.  The scheme allows 
for workers to spend up to seven months in Australia at a time with access to paid work and training, and the 
pilot scheme will see the approval of some 2500 visas in connection with the scheme.  See Australian 
Government Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations Website, ‘Pacific Seasonal 
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weight and credibility to Australia’s interest in partnership-based solutions. The potential 
benefit of overall development programs, underpinned by a broad regional political 
organisation based on symbolic, if not authentic partnership within the Pacific, is significant. 
The programs utilise both traditional diplomacy alongside the development of people-to-
people links, the latter of which from a public diplomacy perspective will be paramount.  
 
While the DFAT, AusAID and Defence Submissions to the Senate Inquiry demonstrate that 
the Australian Government can point to a substantial array of activity in the Pacific primarily 
stemming from development assistance, the Inquiry process nonetheless gave an impression 
that public diplomacy surrounding such activities occurs on an ad hoc basis.233
                                                                                                                                                        
Workers Pilot Scheme Home’, accessed online on 9 April 2010 at: 
  Although, 
developments in the Australian policy approach in the recent twelve months, including 
through engagement in the Pacific Islands Forum, suggest that Australia’s approach to 
activities in the region is changing, and that the Australia Government, and those government 
agencies with key portfolio responsibilities in the Pacific have begun to link overall 
engagement in the Pacific more closely to Australia’s overall strategic objectives.  However, 
public diplomacy initiatives remain patchy, and some of Australia’s key relationships in the 
region, including with Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Solomon Islands are plagued by 
political tensions.  There would be significant benefit for the government if DFAT and 
AusAID together considered and articulated a coordinated Australian public diplomacy 
http://www.deewr.gov.au/Employment/Programs/PSWPS/Pages/default.aspx.  For further examination of the 
opportunities and challenges arising from implementation of the Pacific Seasonal Workers scheme refer to J 
Ritchie, ‘Pacific Solutions? The Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme as a symbol of Australian Relations with 
the Pacific Islands’, Social Alternatives, Vol 28(4), 2009, pp.14-18.    
232 Further information on partnership initiatives aimed to support the Pacific Island Framework for Action on 
Climate Change, including on Australian contributions to global climate change adjustment funds for the Pacific 
can be found in, Australian Government, Engaging out Pacific Neighbours on Climate Change: Australia’s 
Position, Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, accessed on 9 April 2010 at: 
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/~/media/publications/international/engaging-pacific-
neighbours.ashx. 
233 DFAT, Submission to Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy , AusAID, Supplementary Submission to Senate 
Inquiry into Public Diplomacy, Department of Defence, Submission to Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy, 
Canberra, April 2007, and Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s 
Public Diplomacy: Building our Image’.   
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approach in support of the partnership rhetoric and activity from the commencement of the 
strategic policy development process through to the evaluation of performance.   
5.4.2 Engagement 
 
Regional Stability Engagement  
 
The final Australian policy strategy for exploration is that of engagement. Engagement has 
been a central policy theme for Australia’s foreign policy approach particularly toward the 
South-East Asian region since the 1980s.  The term engagement is an attempt to address 
through rhetoric at least the dilemmas and tensions of Australia’s place within the region, 
understanding that Australia’s economic interests are ties to the immediate region to the 
North.  The policy of engagement as described by Bruce Grant and Gareth Evans is distinct 
from the policy of stabilisation in that the concept describes a ‘mutual commitment between 
the countries which are in every sense equals’.234  The rhetoric of engagement has been 
generally flexible, and at various times is qualified as being either comprehensive or limited 
depending upon political imperatives at the time.  For example, as Capling notes under the 
‘Labor government’s of Bob Hawke and Paul Keating (1983-1996), Australia was unique in 
its deliberate and self conscious efforts to ‘relocate’ itself – economically, diplomatically and 
militarily – to the Asia-Pacific region’.235
v)  recognising that Australia…is a confident and natural partner in a common neighbourhood of 
regional diversity, rather than as a cultural misfit trapped by geography.
  In describing the factors that would enable 
Australia’s comprehensive engagement in South-East Asia, Evans notes the following terms: 
i)  building a diverse and substantial array of linkages with those targeted countries [South-East Asia], 
so that they have an important national interest in the maintenance of a positive relationship with 
Australia; 
ii)  continuing support for existing regional frameworks for cooperation (such as ASEAN) as well as 
exploring new frameworks (such as APEC); 
iii)  gradual development of regional security mechanisms based on shared security interests; 
iv)  working towards the inclusion of other developing nations within the region (such as Laos, 
Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia); and 
236
                                                 
234 Evans, Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the world of the 1990s, p.195.  
235 Capling, ‘Twenty years of engagement with Asia’, p.602.   
236 Ibid.   
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The targeted audience for Australia’s policy of engagement, particularly with reference to 
South-East Asia includes the opinion-makers, industry leaders and the media, along with the 
diaspora already active within these circles.  The public diplomacy approaches incorporate a 
range of levels to build relationships, including activities that develop interest, build 
knowledge, and encourage advocacy.  From this, the tactical public diplomacy activities 
require a high degree of sectoral exchange and interaction between the government, business 
and media sectors, including those opportunities facilitated through multilateral fora such as 
ASEAN or APEC.  DFAT and other agencies have demonstrated wide networks exist for the 
delivery of public diplomacy activities.   
 
The media again plays an important proactive role in selling the engagement concept 
(including examples such as the APEC Leaders picture gallery – where for example, the 
APEC Leaders congregate in Batik overshirts while meeting in Indonesia, ponchos in Peru 
and Dryzabones in Australia).  Other activities that occur below the media radar, but in a way 
to sustain personal exchange and relationships include the AusAID Youth Ambassador 
Program, and Asialink’s Leaders exchange program as well as many cultural exchanges 
(including the Australasian World Music Expo).237
The Senate Inquiry noted the value of such academic and cultural exchanges and wide 
networks across government agencies and with non government entities and scope of public 
diplomacy activity.  However, the Committee also commented on the inadequacy of the 
  However, as the Senate Inquiry revealed, 
the networks appear to be piecemeal, and not fully leveraged to promote the Australian image 
overseas. 
 
                                                 
237 For example, since 1998, nearly 2000 youth ambassadors have been sent overseas to some 20 participating 
countries, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Fiji, Kiribati, Philippines, PNG, Samoa, Vietnam.  AusAID, 
Supplementary Submission to Senate Inquiry into Public Diplomacy, p.11. 
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Australian public diplomacy strategies and infrastructure to leverage the potency of the 
connections, knowledge, networks and individuals beyond the primary event or 
connection.238
5.5 B uilding a fr amewor k 
   
 
To build a framework, the components of the policy process and policy strategies described 
through this chapter must be linked together as an integrated whole.  The following chapter 
describes the linkages between these components to construct a policy-based framework that 
allows a coherent consideration, organisation and view of public diplomacy programs.  The 
Framework is diagrammatically represented in Tables 3 and 4 (referencing key strategic 
policy drivers and key Australian strategic policy drivers respectively.   
 
                                                 
238 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p. 49. 
283 
 
CHAPTER 6:  A POLICY-BASED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
FRAMEWORK 
 
The policy-based public diplomacy framework established through this thesis is a direct 
response to systemic failures and the consistently disorganised approach taken to the 
discussion of public diplomacy; particularly within Australia, and including through the 
Senate Inquiry. As Gyngell and Wesley discuss, ‘the need to establish conceptual frameworks 
to order and make sense of the vast complexity of everyday experience is a basic reality of all 
human existence’.1
While the Senate Inquiry highlighted a range of key systemic issues currently impacting on 
the public diplomacy program, the key issue presented in this thesis is that Australia’s public 
diplomacy program operates from the periphery of diplomatic practice with little or no 
connection to foreign policy objectives.  Public diplomacy in Australia is not (and never has 
been) sufficiently linked as a whole, to the advancement of strategic foreign policy interests.  
Yet, as many international academics and practitioners working in the field of public 
diplomacy can attest, ‘foreign policy counts’.
 The central theme of this thesis has been that Australia’s public diplomacy 
program is made up of many parts, but rather than the parts coming together in a coherent and 
effective whole, the parts remain fragmented and ad hoc.   
 
2
While overall, the Senate Inquiry provided only a limited focus on the linkages between 
Australia’s public diplomacy and foreign policy, these linkages did not escape the 
  
 
                                                 
1 Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, p.207.  
2 Djerejian, Changing Minds Winning Peace, p.18. 
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Committee’s attention altogether.3   The Committee made the pertinent observation in the 
final report that ‘public diplomacy [generally] is much more than involvement in international 
conferences, exhibits, visits and exchange programs – it is a critical exercise of soft power 
and has a determining part in Australia’s ability to pursue its national objectives’.4 The 
Committee continued the observation by noting that, ‘Australian public diplomacy planning 
must benefit from engagement with Australia’s foreign policy makers’ and further reported 
that the Committee members were not persuaded that this was the case.5  Advancing a similar 
argument and in support of the Senate Inquiry’s findings, the Blue Ribbon Panel Report into 
Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit produced by the Lowy Institute pointedly notes that in fact 
‘Australia’s public diplomacy often takes the form of a series of activities such as cultural 
events and trade expos intended to cultivate favourable, if vague impressions of Australia and 
to promote Australia as an attractive destination for tourism, investment and migration – 
rather than to pursue specific international policy goals’.6  Even the organisational placement 
of DFAT’s Images of Australia Branch within the Consular Division adds weight to the 
perception that public diplomacy is ‘seen as a separate and marginal activity rather than a 
mainstream part of the policy process to be integrated with it at every stage’.7
The policy-based framework (the Framework) developed as a unique contribution to the field 
of diplomacy through this thesis, seeks to address this current issue, and provides a starting 
point for practitioners to begin to identify the role of public diplomacy in advancing primary 
   
 
                                                 
3 As noted earlier in this thesis, the purpose of the Senate inquiry was not to conduct an in depth critique of 
foreign policy capacity in relation to public diplomacy, but to ‘highlight and investigate issues of relevance to 
the national agenda’.   
4 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.44. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.32. 
7 Ibid. 
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foreign policy objectives.  The purpose of this chapter is to bring the relevant pieces of the 
public diplomacy puzzle together, and drawing on examples that are relevant to the Australian 
context, provide guidance on how the Framework might then be applied.   
6.1 Using the Framework 
 
The two threads of analysis, being the i) foreign policy process phases and ii) key policy 
strategies, provide the basic scaffolding or architecture upon which a public diplomacy 
framework is constructed.  The foreign policy process phases and key policy strategies 
provide the vertical and horizontal axis respectively of the public diplomacy framework. For 
the purpose of this thesis, the framework presents a logical pattern intended to assist the 
practitioner better understand the ‘why’, ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ of public diplomacy for 
the purpose of achieving an appropriate policy outcome. 
 
There is little complexity in the construction of the Framework.  For example, when the 
policy strategies outlined in sections 5.3 and 5.4 of Chapter Five, are linked to the policy 
phases outlined in section 5.2, together they become the scaffolding for the Framework (refer 
to Table 3 and Table 4). From this point, the Framework operates as a matrix, guiding the 
practitioner in a considered and organised way through considerations of how public 
diplomacy fits into the spectrum of foreign policy strategy, and can be utilised effectively to 
deliver upon different objectives in a way and through channels and mediums that traditional 
diplomacy is not readily able to do. As noted above, Table 3 represents the Framework as it 
stands with the key foreign policy strategies of i) consolidation, ii) containment, iii) 
penetration, iv) enlargement, v) transformation and vi) diversion.  Table 4 sets out the key 
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Australian foreign policy strategies, i) regional stability and ii) engagement.8
In bringing the pieces of the public diplomacy puzzle together, the Framework provides a 
structure that identifies firstly the strategic considerations to set the tone for any further policy 
development and delivery of any particular activities that may be associated with each of the 
policy strategies. From this point, the Framework guides consideration of the many aspects of 
public diplomacy to enable the practitioner to understand key policy objectives, align and 
deliver public diplomacy tools. However, based on the dynamic nature of public diplomacy 
practice, the Framework does not intend to, nor would be able to set out an exhaustive list of 
strategies, considerations, audiences, or activities.  As Former United States Secretary of 
State, Warren Christopher was known to have said, ‘foreign policy is a work in progress’ and 
this may be even more relevant when applied to the organic and evolving field of public 
diplomacy.
  Tables 3 and 4 
provide guidance from a generic structural perspective of how the Framework fits together, 
but are not of themselves the Framework in a final form.  The scholar or practitioner would be 
required to engage in further exploration of the key policy and process concepts, and to 
consider the implications at each stage for the Framework to support any overall strategic 
benefit.     
 
9 Public diplomacy is a dynamic area of diplomatic practice which continues to 
evolve and adapt to a changing environment; and new approaches, technologies, audiences 
and issues will continue to impact on the nature of the scope, method and outcomes related to 
public diplomacy practice.10
                                                 
8 All the identified foreign policy strategies could be incorporated into one single view of the Framework.  
However, the strategies were separated across the two tables in this thesis for ease of readability.   
9 Warren Christopher former United States Secretary of State, quoted in Brinkley, ‘Democratic enlargement: The 
Clinton Doctrine’, p.114. 
 Any framework intended to guide practice requires a certain 
10 The Framework also facilitates reflection upon the related disciplines and concepts of public affairs and 
propaganda.  While public diplomacy may share in certain aspects of each of these concepts, the Framework 
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measure of elasticity in order to keep pace with developments and maintain relevance to the 
field.      
 
For the practitioner using the Framework, the first task would be to identify and define the 
issue or problem, and from there determine the appropriate foreign policy strategy that might 
apply to the issue at hand, noting that the issue of concern may be defined in specific, bilateral 
terms, or from a broader multilateral perspective.  The foreign policy strategies are listed 
horizontally within the first row of the framework.  The practitioner would identify those 
policy drivers that may be relevant to the particular issue, and subsequently work sequentially 
through each of the policy process phases, addressing the considerations identified in the 
layers of the policy process set out in the first column of the framework.  At each phase the 
practitioner will be directed to relevant considerations. Each layer or phase leads naturally to 
the next until, at the conclusion of the process, the practitioner might identify with confidence 
the method that is best suited to the identified target audience for the required purpose.  The 
benefit of working through the Framework comes from the holistic view of the public 
diplomacy program, and targeted approach of the components of that program.   
6.2 Applying the Framework 
 
To be more than a series of ad hoc responses to changing events, public diplomacy must be 
incorporated into the ground floor of foreign policy. Policy makers could take to heart the 
maxim that a policy that cannot be explained clearly and understandably to many different 
audiences is not sustainable. To extend this line of argument, foreign policy and public 
                                                                                                                                                        
demonstrates that public diplomacy extends beyond public affairs, and propaganda, particularly in the two-way 
engagement of foreign publics to understand the impact of positioning and messages to improve upon strategic 
outcomes.    
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diplomacy are inextricable and integrated throughout the process of policy formulation and 
implementation.  
 
An effective national public diplomacy effort can be coordinated throughout the government 
to ensure that information priorities are clear, overall themes are established, messages are 
consistent, and resources are used effectively. Types of messages, language, audience, format, 
and media will vary greatly. All, however, might be part of a comprehensive public 
diplomacy strategy linked to the formulation of policy at its inception and coordinated 
broadly throughout the foreign affairs community. However, understanding the potential 
application of the Framework is difficult without practical examples. As this thesis is 
concerned with public diplomacy in the Australian context, this chapter will therefore 
examine two current issues in Australian foreign policy agenda working through the relevant 
consideration for the purpose of demonstrating how the framework might actually be utilised.  
The current issues, already identified at various stages of the thesis include i) India-Australia 
bilateral relationship; and ii) Australia’s partnership approach to the Pacific.  These examples 
will be examined in detail, as a way of illustrating the potential application of the Framework.   
 
There is value in noting that for the purpose of this thesis the emphasis of the discussion is on 
the Framework, and a demonstration of the potential application of the Framework.  As such, 
the discussion may not address the full complexity of the detailed content or background to 
the issue at hand.  Furthermore, ordinarily, the construction of the Framework might be 
facilitated from within DFAT with access to a range of other interested parties, including 
government and non-government agencies.  Discussion might be commenced at the executive 
management level, and evolve through the IDC level, including out of session, in order to 
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maintain connections with those who have the most relevant interests and contributions. From 
a practical perspective, the decisions reached through the Framework might be communicated 
through the bureaucracy via the memo or brief. Perhaps for future relevance the DFAT 
briefing template might require the author to address ‘public diplomacy implications and 
considerations for briefing relevant Ministers.11
                                                 
11 Interview, Andrew Shearer, Director of Studies and Senior Research Fellow, Lowy Institute for International 
Relations, 15 August 2009.  
  The Framework does not envisage a final 
point of conclusion, but provides a lens through which the public diplomacy program as a 
whole, or by issue might be viewed.  As such, the Framework needs to be adaptable over time 
to accommodate the variances in foreign policy and the conduct of international relations.   
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Table 3:   Policy-based Framework 
  Key foreign policy strategies and public diplomacy 
     
 
Policy Process 
Phases 
Foreign Policy Strategy 
 
Consolidation 
 
Containment Penetration Enlargement Transformation Diversion 
 
Strategic: 
Identifying the 
strategic 
objective 
To build or reinforce 
sense of cohesion, 
common purpose, 
common values or 
identity. 
 
To build consensus 
that will limit the 
spread of powers, 
influences or impacts 
that could be harmful 
or threatening. 
To gain acceptance of 
a country that will 
translate into greater 
uptake of economic or 
political product (ie. 
goods or services or 
policy direction). 
 
 
Expansion of the 
ideological, economic 
political and cultural 
sphere of a state (and 
its allies). 
To change the 
political / economic 
structure and 
approach of another 
state or group of 
states.   
To ensure that 
negative sentiments 
and day-to-day 
grievances toward the 
state and allies do not 
manifest themselves 
in terrorist violence. 
Contextual  
 
Understanding 
the contextual 
elements, 
including  
 
i) target 
audience; 
ii) PD 
approach 
 
Identify and build on 
common identity 
within the grouping in 
order to achieve a 
particular outcome 
(ie. successful 
Commonwealth 
Games). 
 
Defining what is at 
stake – social values / 
- national interest  
building/reaffirming 
an identity. 
 
 
Essentially defensive 
or reactive policy 
approach. 
 
Closely related to 
interests around 
balance of power. 
 
 
 
To build discrete 
areas of relationships 
that are based in trust 
and understanding – 
building confidence 
and influence among 
broad group of elites 
that can be useful in 
times of crisis.    
 
Breaking into a closed 
market or society for 
trade or intelligence 
 
 
Needs to occur on 
ongoing and long-
term basis. 
 
Comprehensive and 
coordinated approach 
which will take in 
elements of 
consolidation, 
containment and 
penetration. 
 
Message to be 
consistent across all 
activities and to focus 
on positives of what 
is to be achieved. 
 
Need to work through 
and build upon  multi-
lateral structures also 
at regional and 
international levels, 
eg NATO, EU, UN. 
To extend the area of 
enlightenment from 
Building partnerships 
for change  
Regional and 
transnational focus 
 
 
Encourage other 
young people within 
audience 
demographic to 
actively denounce 
violence by young 
fundamentalists – 
build on peer group 
pressure. 
 
Proactive protective 
measure 
 
Undermining adverse 
authority – 
influencing 
fundamentalist / 
highly vigilant  
grassroots cohort 
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the domestic market 
outwards into aligned 
and non-aligned areas 
 
Target 
Audience 
Domestic 
constituency or 
internal relations 
within a specified 
‘grouping’, eg 
Commonwealth 
countries or the 
European Union 
 
Broad domestic and 
international public 
audiences – usually 
targeting like-
mindeds and those 
with close interest to 
the specific issue/s 
Targeted audiences 
including specific 
people or groups of 
people within an 
external 
market/territory. 
Opinion leaders, 
Policy-makers, elites, 
diaspora friendly 
networks  
 
Next generation of 
social and political 
leaders 
Populations of other 
states (to be 
transformed) 
 
Next generation of 
social and political 
leaders 
Populations 
(generally young 
people) identified as 
at risk of turning to 
fundamentalism / 
extremism 
 
 
PD Approach Building 
Relationships 
 
Building Awareness 
Developing Interest 
Building Knowledge 
Day-to-day Response 
 
Strategic 
Communications 
Building Knowledge 
Enabling Advocacy 
Strategic 
Communications 
 
Developing Interest 
Building Knowledge 
Strategic 
Communications 
 
Building 
Relationships 
 
Building Knowledge 
Enabling Advocacy 
Leading to Action 
Building 
Relationships 
 
Enabling Advocacy 
Action 
Strategic 
Communication 
 
Building Knowledge  
Enabling Advocacy 
Leading to Action 
 
Organisational:   
Whole of 
Government –  
Whole of  
Government 
 
 
Whole of 
Government 
 
Austrade as lead with 
private sector 
influence 
Whole of 
Government DFAT as 
lead 
Partnerships with 
media,  NGO, 
education, cultural, 
trade and industry 
Whole of 
Government – DFAT 
as lead with dispersed 
on-the-ground 
networks, including 
diplomatic corps, 
media, diaspora,  
Whole of 
Government – 
Defence Intelligence / 
DFAT as lead 
Operational 
 
Public 
diplomacy 
methods or 
activities 
 
Broad engagement 
within a ‘community’, 
including the 
domestic audiences.  
 
Involves two way 
dialogue – eg 
conference / ideas 
summit 
 
May involve 
development and 
publicity of critical 
state based alliances 
and high level 
discussions  
 
Targeted Media 
releases /  
 
Media (radio/tv) 
programming; 
 
Educational and 
cultural exchanges, 
including financial 
support / scholarships. 
 
Targeted information 
pamphlets & 
Visible high level 
involvement – eg 
foreign policy speech-
making by Ministers 
or senior diplomats; 
 
Educational and 
cultural exchanges, 
including financial 
support / scholarships. 
Expanding upon and 
localising diplomatic 
presence in terms of 
numbers and 
locations of diplomats 
on the ground – esp 
outside the key capital 
areas in emerging 
centres of change.  
 
Technology that has 
popular appeal: 
Facebook, Twitter etc  
 
Methods to provide 
positive alternative 
pathways to young 
people at risk and at 
point of 
disenchantment with 
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TV broadcasts of 
concerts 
 
Art exhibitions 
 
Media coverage of 
cultural events 
 
News reports (that 
raise awareness of aid 
or assistance projects 
/ joint security or 
policing projects) 
 
May be carried out in 
target audience 
language, and by 
local people. 
 
 
 
 
Correction of ‘mis-
information’ or myth 
reporting through 
reactive media 
monitoring and 
releases 
 
Programming of 
content through local 
media 
 
Crisis driven 
responses to political 
issue – usually 
addressed through 
media and with fast 
turnaround. 
 
promotions 
 
Support of groups 
documenting human 
rights abuses in 
country 
 
Connecting with a 
disapora for internal 
information / 
networks. 
 
 
Cultural centres, 
library resources, or 
institutes promoting 
the advocate state’s 
language and studies 
 
University 
partnerships 
 
Lectures, seminars 
and academic 
programs 
 
Funded professor-
ships 
 
Research grants 
 
Book translations 
 
Connecting with and 
fostering relationships 
with a disapora to 
expand upon national 
image and networks. 
 
Development of rapid 
response diplomatic 
networks to support 
change in localised 
areas for short-term 
periods  
 
Use of technology (eg 
internet)  internet as a 
means of facilitating 
communication 
between populations 
of target state and 
driving state 
 
Increased use of –in 
language media 
reporting on local 
media channels (eg 
Arab-speaking US 
diplomats to play key 
role not only in 
response to but also in 
development and 
broadcast of news 
while in-country). 
current  cohort. 
 
Educational and 
cultural exchanges, 
including financial 
support / 
scholarships. 
 
Cultural centres or 
institutes promoting 
the advocate state’s 
language and studies 
 
 
Examples Australian approach 
to the Melbourne 
Commonwealth 
Games 
 
Consolidation of the 
Cairns Group in 
preparation for WTO 
Rounds. 
 
Building of domestic 
image in through 
Australia’s 2020  
1945 – 1986 
Cold War – 
containment of 
communism, and also 
of nuclear weapons; 
 
Political response (US 
/ Australia / Japan) to 
contain the ‘Rise of 
China’ 
 
Containment of 
negative publicity 
ABC – Radio 
Australia network 
Spread of Western 
ideology and market 
democracy 
 
Rise of China – 
Beijing Olympics 
 
Aust as ‘good 
international citizen’ 
under Evans/Keating 
 
Australian-Indonesian 
interfaith schools 
Al Gore - 
environmental 
crusade 
 
2001 - War on Terror 
 
 
Use of Facebook to 
engage with FARC 
members and provide 
alternative pathways 
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Summit 
 
ASEAN  
 
related to an event or 
occurrence -  Indian 
students being bashed 
in Australia; or 
Cronulla riots 
 
funding 
 
Notes Seen to be a strategy 
in itself as well as a 
precondition for all 
other strategies of 
public diplomacy. 
 
Extension of ‘public 
affairs’ which was 
more focused on one-
way dialogue by a 
state with the 
domestic 
constituency.   
 
Strong emphasis on 
building partnership. 
 
Activities may be 
closely aligned to 
propaganda 
depending upon the 
nature and intent of 
the message.  
Credibility of the 
advocate state is 
important.  
Nation Branding may 
emerge through this 
strategy. 
Usually coordinated 
with other PD 
activities. 
 
Product of Clinton 
administration 
 
Aligns with: 
Evans / Keating 
Smith / Rudd 
Working towards 
position on UN 
Security Council 
 
Nation Branding may 
emerge through this 
strategy. 
Started as Bush policy 
– hearts and minds 
(Rice initiative, also 
pursued by Glassman) 
Use of latest 
technology (eg 
internet)  important as 
a means of facilitating 
communication 
 
294 
 
Table 4:   Policy-based framework  
  Key Australian foreign policy strategies and public diplomacy 
     
 
Policy Process 
Phases 
Foreign Australian Policy Strategy 
 
Regional Stability 
 
Engagement 
Strategic: 
Identifying the 
strategic 
objective 
Partnership approach focused on development and security – that aim to 
improve the internal social and economic outcomes for a state or region, 
to ensure longer term political stability for other states / regions. 
To actively commit or become linked to another states - economic, 
social, cultural and militarily engagement.   
 
 
Contextual  
 
Understanding 
the context 
To address political and military instabilities; 
Encourage broad political and military stability through community 
development approach (development partnerships, assisting 
improvements in local socio-economic conditions). 
To commit and build close linkages across a range of sectors between 
states or groupings of states; 
Can include as a part of a broader grouping, e.g. regional grouping; 
Defence of isolationism; 
Defence against being marginalised by larger / more dominant powers. 
Contextual: 
Target 
Audience 
Community populations – often at disadvantage and with an interest in a 
range of matters at grassroots level including: 
-primary education and healthcare;  
-basic infrastructure; youth unemployment; micro-finance; 
-local council / authority governance; and improving security and local 
policing. 
 
Political leaders,  
Opinion leaders, 
Policy-makers,  
Elites,  
Diaspora  
Other friendly networks. 
 
Contextual 
PD Approach 
Building Relationships 
Enabling Advocacy 
Building Relationships 
Developing Interest 
Building Knowledge 
Enabling Advocacy 
 
 
Organisational:   
Whole of Government Partnerships in development assistance –also ties 
to Education, Transport and Infrastructure, NGO / IGO, Media.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whole of Government – also ties to Business, University, Media, NGO / 
IGO Sectors / Diaspora 
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Operational 
 
Public 
diplomacy 
methods or 
activities 
 
Opinion pieces / Media coverage (domestic and foreign); 
Professional exchanges building capacity (especially in providing an 
exchange for technical expertise – e.g. construction, civil engineering; 
legislation or governance; teaching; healthcare etc); 
Development assistance projects – where strong partnership element; 
Development grants; 
Radio Services. 
High level Ministerial visits; 
High level of interaction between business and government sectors; 
Media exchange / visiting journalists; 
Sectoral based exchanges (e.g. science / telecommunications / 
agriculture / medicine) all building professional linkages; 
Educational and cultural exchanges, including financial support / 
scholarships; 
University partnerships; 
Conferences and opportunities to build dialogue. 
 
Examples Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 
Cambodian Peace Process 
Australia in East Timor (INTERFET) 
Australia’s policy approach to Pacific Region “Realising the Potential”. 
 
Australia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Increased engagement in ASEAN 
Bilateral engagement in China 
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6.2.1 Australia-India bilateral relationship 
 
Consolidation 
 
Containment Penetration Engagement 
 
The starting point for each of the examples requires a determination about the overall 
objective or societal goal of the issue at hand.12  In the case of the Australia-India bilateral 
relationship, the foreign policy objective hinges on a positive trade relationship, for example, 
Australia is currently working through the feasibility of a FTA with India.13   Within this 
important trade-based relationship, the potential for Australia to deliver tertiary educational 
services to Indian students is a prominent feature of the bilateral relationship, and Indian 
students make up 17% of Australia’s international students.14  However, the violence against 
Indian students, together with migration crackdowns and education scams already highlighted 
within this thesis, present the key issue.  Not only has the worldwide criticism of Australia 
generated as a result of these incidents damaged Australia’s reputation as a safe and credible 
destination for international students (putting at risk the A$15 billion dollar industry), there 
may be a flow on effect into other areas of the bilateral relationship with India.15
For the purpose of this exercise, the issue clearly relates to the negative treatment of Indian 
students in Australia.  Media coverage both within India and within Australia has honed in on 
the violent attacks against Indian students.  The underlying theme of reports, that the attacks 
were racially motivated, has not been sufficiently disproved by the Australian authorities, and 
as noted by former Australian Ambassador to India, John McCarthy, ‘issues about the 
   
 
                                                 
12 Bridgman and Davis, Australian Policy Handbook, p.6; Gyngell, Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, 
p.12; R Curtain, ‘Good Public Policy Making: How Australia Fares’, p.35. 
13 Australian Government, Federal Budget Statements 2009-2010, Australian Government, Canberra, June 2009.  
14 Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.4; Australia 
Education International, Government drive to raise Australia’s international education profile, Australian 
Government 2009, viewed on 20 October 2009, http://www.aei.gov.au/AEI/SIA2010.htm. 
15 Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’, p.4.  
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assaults on students had a profound impact in India...The television footage...had a profound 
impact – it was non-stop. The impression that it had on Indians was serious’.16 Despite the 
‘rhetorical reassurance’17 provided by senior Australian government officials to their Indian 
counterparts, the damage is already having an impact. According to the Sydney Morning 
Herald, the ‘total number of Indians studying here is down by 5 percent this year [2010] 
compared to last’, while potential student numbers, measured through new Indian enrolment 
numbers is ‘down by 40 percent compared to last’.18
Clearly, there is an amount of damage control that must occur in an effort to minimise or 
contain the negative reports about Australia as a racist nation.  However, there is also an 
overarching imperative to bring the broader strategic nature of the relationship to light.  As 
India’s Minister for Human Resource Development, Kapil Sibal states: ‘We [Australia and 
India] have the great possibility for a long-term strategic relationship based on education’.
  
 
19  
From this position, the overarching strategic objective might be defined within the parameters 
of the bilateral trade relationship as, Australia growing a strong education trade position in 
India.  Usually the strategic policy objective would be developed within the political ranks by 
high level bureaucrats with Ministerial approval.  The supporting image or identity of 
Australia in support of this objective would be developed within the strategic phase to ensure 
the development of a single and consistent theme that differentiates and allows Australia to 
‘capture and hold attention in an already crowded international space’.20
                                                 
16 P Hartcher, ‘When Indian students suffer, Australia risks being scarred for life’, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 
April 2010.   
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  The report suggests that the estimated 5 percent drop in current student numbers equates to 
approximately 1,500 students which when translated into economic terms amounts to an annual cost of A$50 
million to the Australian education industry.  Yet, as indicated, this cost does not reflect the potential loss to the 
industry, which would be significantly larger.   
19 Kapil Sabil quoted in Hartcher, ‘When Indian students suffer, Australia risks being scarred for life’. 
20 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.51. 
 Themes that might 
be utilised in the projection of image could include Australia as a ‘smart and creative’ 
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country, where international students are welcomed and looked after while they obtain a 
quality education.  In developing such an image there would be value in the diplomatic 
network engaging in the local community to decipher and understand the needs of the target 
audience, test the acceptance of such an image, and provide advice on the most effective 
methods for engaging with the audience.   
 
In accordance with the policy phases set out within the Framework the high level strategic 
considerations would occur at the political (Minister or Cabinet) and senior bureaucrat level.  
From that point the policy initiative would flow to the departmental staff to develop the 
policy further including through the identification of relevant stakeholders who my have an 
interest in the development and delivery of the policy.  For the purpose of the exercise, the 
next key stage relates to the identification of the key policy strategies relevant to the 
overarching strategic intent. With regard to the example at hand, such strategies might 
include, i) consolidation, ii) containment and iii) penetration, and iv) engagement. Of those 
strategic policies, ‘penetration’ and ‘engagement’ might be the primary strategic focus for 
DFAT and related agencies.  However, from a public diplomacy perspective, the focus is 
likely to encompass supporting policy strategies of consolidation and containment that will 
only improve the strategic outcomes overall.  If these supporting policy areas are ignored, as 
has been seen in the past, the primary strategies are at risk, and the public diplomacy 
approach is likely to derailed by crisis management and troubleshooting.21
Despite demonstrated inadequacies, the IDC coordinated by DFAT remains the only 
appropriate forum within which to progress such a discussion, with workgroups tasked to 
progress the initiatives and actions out of session, and report back through the IDC on 
  
 
                                                 
21 Wesley, ‘Australia’s Poisoned Alumni: International Education and the Costs to Australia’; Dubey, 
‘Bollywood decides to skip shoots down under’; and Bolt, ‘We’re not the racists’. 
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progress and outcomes (as is currently the case).  Essentially, that group would be interested 
in understanding the contextual parameters (target audience and PD approach), and from 
there to consider organisational implications, that is, which organisations and networks will 
be involved in developing and delivering the activities, and the public diplomacy methods 
utilised.  Information and advice obtained through diplomatic networks should feed into the 
IDC discussion process.  The challenge for Australian practice would be to work 
collaboratively across not only agencies, but also identify and bring other entities into the 
discussion.   
 
By identifying the strategic policy drivers up front, the Framework allows practitioners to 
tease out further implications, and identify that in many cases the policy strategies will 
require slightly different stakeholders, different approaches and ultimately different methods.  
The ability to identifying the underlying complexities and nuances of public diplomacy from 
the outset is important.  For example, while there are strong synergies, each of the policy 
strategies may identify different target audiences and very different approaches to the 
interaction.  Such a realisation highlights the need for a tailored approach and allows for the 
key stakeholders to similarly tailor their involvement.  The methodology behind the 
Framework also enables a discussion of external participants in delivery of the public 
activity.  While the diplomatic network is likely involved in much of the public diplomacy 
delivery, from a planning and coordinating perspective, working through the Framework 
considerations highlights other parties that might also be similarly active in the delivery, 
including for example state and local government, tertiary education sectors, community 
NGOs and the Australian diaspora.   
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The public diplomacy methods that are actually identified and developed may vary from 
strategy to strategy, but if linked to the same strategic intent, they will demonstrate common 
themes.  For example, the activities identified to consolidate the domestic audience will be 
primarily focused upon local domestic audiences, and will combine elements of both 
informational and relationship based approaches, including community forums with the 
theme of addressing underlying prejudices or concerns and garnering domestic support for 
Australia as a provider of education to international students.  The activities focused towards 
engaging with local Indian audiences (families seeking an international education for their 
children), would aim to promote similar themes, though possibly using different methods and 
mediums as identified by the diplomatic network.  The considerations for each strategic 
policy, applicable to each policy phase are detailed in Table 5. 
 
The overarching benefit to be derived from application of the Framework in this way, in the 
development of a coherent public diplomacy strategy that moves beyond costly, resource 
intensive of crisis management, enables effective and coherent engagement with a range of 
audiences both within Australia and within India, and allows for long-term strategic 
understanding, and relationship development (beyond elite circles).  For example, local 
Australian communities might become more comfortable in welcoming the diversity of 
international students and provide information and pathways relating to personal safety, and 
community engagement; Indian (and other international) families might become increasingly 
reassured about the environment that their children will be living and studying in, and 
promote the experience to others; students themselves will develop expanded networks and 
strategies for living in Australia.  The networks of relationships established through a 
coherent consistent public diplomacy strategy will provide a more robust platform from 
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which traditional methods of diplomatic negotiation and policy implementation might be 
progressed.   
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Table 5  Australia-India Bilateral Relationship: Australia as an provider of quality education 
Policy Phases Consolidation 
 
Containment Penetration Engagement 
Strategic To build domestic 
support and pride in an 
internationally 
recognised education 
system, and domestic 
tolerance for 
international students 
generally (and Indian 
students specifically) 
as an important 
consumer of quality 
tertiary education and 
contributors to the 
Australia’s domestic 
economy and broader 
social diversity. 
 
Building a domestic 
and regional image of 
Australia as a smart 
and creative country 
offering a high 
standard of 
internationally 
recognised tertiary 
education and 
providing quality life 
experiences in a 
diverse and dynamic 
society. 
 
Building interest 
within India 
regarding the 
opportunities for 
young Indian 
students and 
professionals to gain 
a quality education 
and education / life 
experience in a 
dynamic environment 
away from home, (in 
Australia) 
To expand the 
Australian image 
within India as a 
smart, creative 
country with a broad 
spectrum, to offer 
students and 
professionals across 
education, culture 
and professional 
opportunities.  
Contextual: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Target 
Audience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PD Approach 
The broad context is to 
rebuild the credibility 
of Australia as an 
provider of 
international 
education, as well as a 
safe, tolerant and 
diverse society.  
Student bashings and 
negative media may 
stem from fears and 
prejudices.  Need to 
address underlying 
community fears and 
combat prejudices. 
 
 
 
 
Target audience: 
Young Australians – 
tertiary students and 
young professionals, 
education industry, 
service, tourism and 
retail  industries. 
 
 
 
PD Approach: 
Strategic 
communication to: 
-build awareness 
-develop interests 
-build knowledge 
 
Contain or eliminate 
negative regional 
media around the 
quality of education 
experience for young 
international students 
and professionals.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Target audience 
Journalists:  domestic 
and international. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PD Approach 
Strategic 
communication to: 
-build awareness 
-develop interests 
-build knowledge 
-enable advocacy 
Maintain and grow 
the market for the 
provision of tertiary 
education to 
international 
students.  India and 
Australian business 
ties have increased 
over recent years, 
and Australia is 
currently conducting 
a feasibility study 
into a possible FTA 
with India.  
 
 
 
 
 
Target audience 
Political leaders, 
Australian education 
providers and 
institutions,  
Indian and Australian 
business leaders and 
opinion makers, 
diaspora and alumni.  
 
PD Approach: 
Strategic 
communication: 
-build awareness 
-develop interests 
-build knowledge 
-enable advocacy 
Some cultural 
linkages exist, such 
as a common interest 
in cricket.  Build 
further linkages and 
demonstrate areas of 
commonality 
(beyond cricket) 
between the people 
of Australia and 
India.  Identify 
opportunities to share 
richness of cultures. 
The AICC has 
identified India as a 
target country for 
cultural programs in 
2012. 
 
Target audience 
Young populations: 
next generation 
social, political and 
business leaders, 
diaspora and alumni.   
 
 
 
 
PD Approach: 
Building 
relationships to: 
-build awareness 
-develop interests 
-build knowledge 
-enable advocacy 
Organisational Strategic government 
– foreign policy and 
diplomatic network, 
Strategic government 
– foreign policy and 
diplomatic network, 
Strategic government 
– foreign policy and 
diplomatic network, 
Strategic government 
– foreign policy and 
diplomatic network, 
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Australia-India 
Council, education 
providers and 
institutions, local 
government and local 
community (including 
service providers, 
retailers, housing, 
police). 
 
education providers 
and institutions, 
immigration 
authorities, local 
government and local 
community. 
education providers 
and institutions, 
Austrade, Australia-
India Council. 
education providers 
and institutions, 
Austrade, Australia-
India Council, arts 
agencies, AICC, local 
government.   
Operational Community forums – 
to generate ideas and 
discussion regarding 
importance of 
international education 
for domestic economy 
and discuss issues 
confronted by  
international students 
at grassroots level; 
 
University open days 
showcasing 
community 
involvement and 
support for students; 
 
Positive media 
coverage of local 
students travelling 
overseas, and 
international students 
within Australia. 
 
Film or food festivals 
within local 
communities, to 
demonstrate cultural 
richness – of both 
cultures 
 
Targeted media 
releases and opinion 
pieces. 
 
Journalist visits and 
exchanges; 
 
Interviews with 
Immigration / police / 
local government / 
university authorities 
for distribution 
within Indian media.  
 
Distribution of an 
Australian Year Book 
to key Indian 
journalists and 
opinion leaders.22
Targeted information 
and promotions 
provided through 
media. 
 
Developing and 
promoting 
educational and 
cultural exchange 
opportunities and 
scholarships for 
Indian students 
 
Connecting to 
Australian diaspora 
in India as key source 
of image projection 
and networks 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Visible high level 
involvement and 
visits; 
 
Connecting to 
Australian diaspora 
in India as key source 
of image projection 
and networks 
 
Developing and 
promoting series of 
educational and 
cultural exchange 
opportunities and 
scholarships for 
Indian students 
 
Developing and 
promoting series of 
high level (national 
gallery quality) 
cultural exchanges 
that promote depth of 
culture. 
 
Building on and 
promoting Australian 
cultural resources 
within India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 The Australian Year Book concept as a specific public diplomacy method is being progressed by Dr Joseph 
Siracusa, Director, School of Global Studies, Social Science and Planning, RMIT.  Interview, Dr Joseph  
Siracusa, 31 July 2009.   
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6.2.2 Australia in the Pacific 
 
Consolidation 
 
Containment Regional Stability Diversion 
 
In the case of Australia’s approach to the Pacific, the initial strategic policy intent, the image 
of Australia, and the policy strategies and subsequent outcomes are likely to be different to 
the approach noted above in relation to the Australia – India bilateral relationship.  From the 
outset the strategic intent might relate to regional stability as a partnership approach.23
From this point the primary policy strategy is that of regional stability (or constructive 
commitment).
  The 
image Australia is seeking to portray within the Region is that of a regional mentor with the 
influence to bring the regional heads to the table to facilitate joint solution building from a 
community development, and not paternalistic, approach.   
 
24
                                                 
23 Crean, ‘The Pacific Region: Realising the Potential’; Mark, ‘Rudd outlines Policy Vision’.   
24 Evans, Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, p.195. 
  The supporting strategies include ‘consolidation’, in this case to build 
regional consensus and cohesion, ‘containment’ to address negative regional media and 
potential local organised rebellion, and ‘diversion’ as a means of working with rebel leaders 
to minimise threats against stability.   The target audiences across each of the policy strategy 
areas are likely to encompass broad groups from political, business and opinion leaders and 
NGOs through to localised communities, with the approaches ranging from providing 
information to building awareness, to building relationships that will enable action. 
Depending upon the on the ground advice and information provided to the IDC by diplomatic 
officials within the region, the mediums and methods utilised in the deployment of public 
diplomacy activities will be primarily face-to-face engagement to overcome issues relating to 
socio economic conditions including language barriers, literacy skills and gaps in 
infrastructure or technology. For example, the Facebook diversion strategy employed in 
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Colombia to divert recruits away from the FARC may not be as appropriate to the Pacific 
environment.  Once again the audiences and methods might be diverse, yet the themes and 
images conveyed should remain consistent.  The considerations for each strategic policy, 
applicable to each policy phase, audiences and possible public diplomacy methods to be 
applied are detailed in Table 6. 
 
Through application of the Framework, the depth of understanding and engagement between 
Australian and Pacific public audiences might develop to allow for more targeted and 
appropriate development assistance programs, identification of further exchange 
opportunities based in mutual benefit (such as the Pacific Seasonal Workers Scheme), 
improved education and employment outcomes for Pacific Islanders, and potentially an 
increased awareness of and support for global climate change policy.  In addition, 
Australian’s regional and global standing would benefit from positive outcomes in the 
Pacific, and Australia may gain the credibility required to take on international positions on 
the UN Security Council.   
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 Table 6:  Towards a Pacific Partnership 
Policy Phases Consolidation 
 
Containment Regional Stability Diversion 
Strategic To build strong 
support for and 
recognition of 
Australia’s role  in the 
Pacific with the 
domestic Australian 
constituency and in 
other Pacific states  
 
 
To enable Australian 
troops, police, 
diplomats and 
civilians to work 
within the region 
with the support of 
the local community 
and free from harm.   
Partnership approach 
focused on 
development and 
security. 
Local individuals / 
groups who may 
incite organised 
rebellion against  
and/or seek to 
overthrow recognised 
and democratic 
processes. 
Contextual: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Target 
Audience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PD Approach 
To generate broad 
Australian community 
support for positive 
partnership and 
assistance in the 
governance, 
infrastructure and 
community services 
sector within the most 
unstable of states.   
 
To combat underlying 
fears or prejudices 
within the domestic 
community. 
 
To build a regional 
identity that will 
encourage partnership 
and solution building 
across states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional political 
leaders, business 
leaders and opinion-
makers, NGOs. 
 
General Australian 
population, as well as 
in the defence, police 
and professional 
sectors. 
 
Strategic 
communication to: 
-build awareness 
-develop interest 
-enable action 
To contain negative 
media or political 
rhetoric that may lead 
to potential 
community 
dissatisfaction and / 
or organised rebellion 
by local communities 
who see Australia as 
acting in  a 
paternalistic way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pacific community 
populations. 
 
High level and local 
opinion and political 
leaders. 
 
Regional media and 
journalists. 
 
 
Strategic 
communication: 
-build awareness 
 
 
 
 
 
To encourage 
political, social and 
economic stability 
through community 
development.  
 
Australia has played 
a lead regional role in 
delivering RAMSI to 
positive effect, 
though there is a risk 
of being seen to be 
highly 
interventionalist.  
 
Australia has a 
significant 
development 
assistance program 
into the Pacific, with 
commitments to 
improve political, 
social and economic 
outcomes.   
 
 
 
Local community 
populations across 
Pacific communities, 
local political, 
business and social 
leaders, NGOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship 
building: 
-develop interest 
-build knowledge 
-enable action 
To prevent the 
emergence of radical 
/ rebellious leaders / 
rebel elements in 
local communities; 
and build 
understanding of 
potential positive 
opportunities for 
communities and 
individuals through 
stability. The region 
has been marred by 
ethnic and political 
violence, poor socio-
economic conditions 
and instability.  
Current health and 
environmental 
challenges may only 
exacerbate tensions.  
 
Furthermore, 
Australia’s role in 
RAMSI may be seen 
to be paternalistic 
and interventionist.   
 
Disaffected local 
political, military or 
social leaders or 
marginalised 
members of 
community 
(especially young 
populations).   
 
  
 
Relationship 
building: 
-build knowledge 
-enable action  
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Organisation-
al 
Strategic government 
– foreign policy and 
diplomatic network 
 
AusAID 
 
Media and NGOs 
 
Strategic government 
– foreign policy and 
diplomatic network 
 
Media and NGOs 
Strategic government 
– foreign policy and 
diplomatic network 
 
AusAID, Austrade, 
NGOs 
 
Police and 
Community Services 
(including housing),  
Education, 
construction, 
infrastructure orgs. 
Strategic government 
– foreign policy and 
diplomatic network. 
 
AusAID, NGOs 
 
Police and 
Community Services 
 
 
Operational High level conference 
/ meetings within the 
region for state based / 
local political, 
business and 
community leaders to 
exchange ideas. 
 
Positive media 
coverage of outcomes 
and profiling of 
community successes. 
 
Cultural festival.   
 
Targeted media 
releases and opinion 
pieces. 
 
Journalist visits and 
exchanges; 
 
Face to face 
consultations. 
 
Professional 
exchanges building 
capacity. 
 
Development 
assistance projects 
and funding (with 
community 
development 
aspects). 
 
Face to face / 
ongoing 
consultations with 
local communities. 
 
Radio services. 
Radio / TV 
programming / comic 
book 
communications 
(relevant to younger 
audiences.  
 
Positive activity 
based engagement in 
community 
improvements. 
 
Targeted education / 
professional 
apprenticeship 
opportunities / 
scholarships. 
 
Face to face / 
ongoing 
consultations and 
dialogue. 
 
 
The Framework starts an organised and coherent discussion that might occur across 
government and non government agencies about the threads of public diplomacy activity that 
could underpin any given strategic policy objective.  In doing so, this thesis recognises that 
the Framework does not provide all the answers or detail.  Each aspect covered through the 
Framework requires an additional level of discussion and detail to identify at exactly ‘who’ 
will do ‘what’ and by ‘when’.  Furthermore, the Framework does not set up the evaluation of 
the activities, including the measurement of the impact of those activities on the strategic 
objective.  As noted previously within this thesis, there is a further gap relating to the 
evaluation of Australian public diplomacy.  The Senate Inquiry noted that, ‘practitioners had 
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been grappling for years with ways to measure the effectiveness of public diplomacy 
activities,… there is no single formula, and public diplomacy deals with something that is not 
necessarily tangible’.25  The area of evaluation of public diplomacy is a significant area of 
study and development, and there is currently a study underway within the ANU to identify 
and test evaluation methods.26
                                                 
25 Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building Our 
Image’, p.176. 
26 For example, Wilson and Horiuchi are working at ANU to test methods borrowed from market research and 
social and political psychology to measure the effects of public diplomacy.  
  The evaluation of the effectiveness of public diplomacy is a 
significant issue to be addressed within the field, and requires a separate line of study outside 
this thesis.  
 
However, the Framework does provide an important link to improved evaluation of public 
diplomacy, simply because the Framework ties each public diplomacy activity to a specific 
and overarching strategic policy objective/s.  From this point, and with greater clarity around 
the purpose, context and audiences targeted, organisations involved in development and 
delivery of the methods, performance measures my be more accurately defined, established 
and understood from the start of the activity (rather than activities being measured in 
hindsight).  Furthermore, as the public diplomacy activities are aligned to strategic policy, the 
effect those activities have on progressing strategic outcomes are likely to appeal to foreign 
policy makers, and might potentially assist in the process of broadening the acceptance of 
public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy.  For future reference, a consideration of 
evaluation methods might be incorporated as an additional component within the Framework 
itself.   
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CHAPTER 7:  PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN AN AUSTRALIAN 
CONTEXT – BRINGING THE PARTS TOGETHER 
 
By throwing light onto the subject of public diplomacy in Australia, the Senate Inquiry raised 
the level of awareness and interest in public diplomacy at a national level.1
Australia has an established public diplomacy program in place, and there is a great deal of 
public diplomacy activity generated from across government and NGOs towards foreign 
publics.
  The rhetoric 
introduced by the Senate Committee at the time they presented the Final Report to Parliament 
heightened the immediate sense of urgency surrounding the need to improve the effectiveness 
of the program.  The aim of this final chapter is to revisit the initial hypothesis posed within 
this thesis; that when it comes to public diplomacy in Australia, the whole is not as great as 
the sum of its parts, and present a way forward; and to provide a pathway for moving the 
discussion around strategic public diplomacy practice forward.   
 
2
                                                 
1 For example, the Inquiry generated a degree of interest across government and non-government agencies, and 
some media interest.  Hartcher, ‘Rudd offers a cheeky lesson in soft power’, Pickard, ‘Rudd Government is Bad 
for Arts’, Crikey.com, 21 January 2008; and Sorenson, ‘Artists help public diplomacy to push Australian ‘soft 
power’,.   
2 Note the Senate Committee’s remark regarding the ‘sheer volume of public diplomacy activities’ in Australia.  
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’, p.30.  
  However, as demonstrated the Australian public diplomacy program operates at the 
fringe of diplomatic practice, and has not expanded nor stretched beyond the traditionally 
accepted boundaries to meet the current challenges of the environment nor the expectations 
of the foreign public.  Through the review of international literature, analysis of the Senate 
Inquiry documentation, and discussions with contemporary public diplomacy practitioners 
and academics, the thesis reinforces the finding of the Senate Inquiry that Australia’s public 
diplomacy profile and activity is fragmented, ad hoc and disconnected from Australia’s 
strategic foreign policy interests. 
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The terminology of fragmentation suggests a phenomenon that ‘pulls apart something that is 
potentially whole’. 3  More specifically, fragmentation ‘suggests a condition in which the 
people involved see themselves as more separate than united, and in which information and 
knowledge are chaotic and scattered’. 4   This statement reflects the current sentiment 
regarding the Australian public diplomacy program.5  The program is described as a ‘hotch 
potch’, where a vast range of messages and activities are generated across some 18-19 
government agencies to undefined and random domestic and foreign audiences, with only 
limited strategic coordination provided by DFAT.6
rather that being seen as a adjunct, public diplomacy is a core element of effective international policy 
responses to contemporary threats such as extremism, terrorism and people smuggling and to other 
complex international challenges.
  Of significant concern is the fact that 
from the time of inception, public diplomacy has been conducted quite separately from those 
areas of practice most closely aligned to foreign policy outcomes.  Public diplomacy is a key 
tool of influence that Australia could deploy effectively in putting international policy in 
place.  For this to occur, it would seem that there is a need to shift thinking so that: 
7
A prominent feature of public diplomacy is the richness of layers and networks, and that 
public diplomacy entices practitioners into partnerships and collaborations that may cross 
traditional boundaries within the government and non-government sectors.  However from 
the outset, such richness and texture offered through public diplomacy messages, 
relationships and networks can pose significant challenges for organisations and individuals, 
   
 
                                                 
3 Conklin, ‘Wicked Problems and Social Complexity’, p.3.   
4 Ibid, p.3. 
5 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’.  
6 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’ and Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our 
Instruments of International Policy’, p.30.   
7 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia's Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.30.    
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particularly for those directly responsible for the deployment of public diplomacy strategies.  
If public diplomacy is not viewed from the outset as a strategic strategy, and aligned with 
tangible foreign policy outcomes and coordinated alongside traditional diplomacy channels, 
the outcomes are not likely to be effective.   A critical factor in aligning public diplomacy to 
policy rests in the strong transference of political will through to the bureaucracy, and the 
subsequent coordination of bureaucracy around a policy intent.  The Senate Inquiry 
highlighted the fact that such a strategic policy focus with subsequent coordination does not 
exist within the Australian system with regard to public diplomacy.8
Public diplomacy presents particular challenges for diplomatic practice because of the 
complexity and texture that occur in the structures, processes, relationships and activities of 
public diplomacy practice.  For example, the examination of public diplomacy does not 
develop or occur in a linear format where inputs will correlate easily into outputs, and 
relationships are clear; or even where the whole is clearly equal to the sum of the parts.  
Public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy, involves from the outset a more 
complex, multi-dimensional system of drivers, actors, processes, activities in pursuit of an 
elusive outcome.  Senator Trood acknowledged the complexity of the public diplomacy field 
during the Senate Inquiry proceedings: ‘this is a very disaggregated field.  The practitioners 
of public diplomacy are all over the country at different levels of government, and they are in 
private and public areas…’.
 
 
9
                                                 
8 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, ‘Australia’s Public Diplomacy: Building 
Our Image’. 
9 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, Committee Hansard, Thursday 15 March, 
p.11. 
 Australian author, David Malouf eloquently describes such a 
system, in a way that applies to the complex system of public diplomacy whereby, ‘their parts 
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deeply intricate, affecting one another in ways that are sometimes hard to assess; to isolate 
any one of them may be to misread the dynamics of the whole’.10
The concept of a ‘complex system, defined as a configuration of parts connected and joined 
together by a web of relationships, or similarly as a family of relationships among the 
members acting as a whole’ might be applied to the development and delivery of public 
diplomacy.
   
 
11 For example, as Wilhelm asserts the applicability of complex adaptive systems 
theory to public policy to provide a framework for the analysis of ‘instances where things do 
not operate in a clockwork manner, …are open to outside influences, are unstable, inefficient, 
unpredictable, and not controllable…’.12
Given the multidimensional and complex nature of public diplomacy, this thesis has 
identified the need to develop a new approach to understanding public diplomacy in the 
Australian context, that is closely tied to strategic foreign policy.  The resulting Public 
Diplomacy Policy-based Framework (established within Chapter Five), enables logical and 
organised discussion and understanding of the complex system that is public diplomacy.
  Such a description applies well to public diplomacy 
within the Australian context.   
 
13
                                                 
10 Malouf, Foreword in ‘Securing the Future’, 1999 Major Performing Arts Inquiry Final Report, p.94.  
  
Drawing on the systems theory approach, it is intended that the Framework present at a high 
level the complexity of government driven public diplomacy including the consideration of a 
number of strategic and contextual considerations, and enabling improved identification, 
targeting and leveraging of potential audiences. The Framework could be applicable to the 
11 B Banathy, ‘A Taste of Systemics’, The Primer Project  accessed on 9 April 2010 at 
http://www.newciv.org/ISSS_Primer/asem04bb.html 
12 K Wilhelm, An Examination of the Applicability of Complex Systems Theory to Policy Making, National War 
College, 1998, p.2. 
13 While also being mindful of Gyngell’s cautionary note that ‘academic commentators and other observers 
sometimes read more structure and order into government policies than actually exist’. Gyngell, ‘Ambition: the 
emerging foreign policy of the Rudd Government’, p.4. 
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differing foreign policy strategies driving public diplomacy, regardless of whether that 
strategy is consolidation, engagement or transformational.   
 
The Framework is not intended to provide a ‘solution’ or end point for public diplomacy 
discussions in Australia.  The complexity of the system derives from the ongoing evolution of 
relationships, audiences and methods.  For this reason the Framework should not be overly 
prescriptive, but allow for ongoing adaptation and innovation in practice where outcomes can 
be evaluated on the basis of qualitative impact against the initial objectives; and audiences 
approaches, methods and messages revised accordingly.  The Framework is intended to 
reflect a learning system that continues to improve and adapt to meet the changing needs of 
the state.   
7.1 Public Diplomacy and the challenges of strategic government  
 
In meeting the challenges not only of adapting diplomatic practice to the changing 
international challenges, public diplomacy practitioners might also utilise the Framework as a 
mechanism that aligns with the strategic government approach to policy development and 
delivery. The global and nature of the challenges on the global policy agenda requires all 
governments to interact outside traditional models.  The global agenda is complex and 
interconnected – ‘defying the capacity of the traditional silos of public sector policy 
formulation to deal effectively with them’. 14
A whole of government approach assumes the need to respond and adapt to the complex and networked 
environment of modern government…– it is about how we remain relevant in a new and fundamentally 
different world. It is not a single instrument, for, say, collaboration on service delivery. Rather it is a 
cohering principle, necessary to maintain our sense of government as a consolidated entity, a single 
  Lynelle Briggs, Australia’s Public Service 
Commissioner, summarises the challenge in delivering collaborative government action in 
the face of contemporary and complex policy challenges: 
                                                 
14 Gyngell, Ambition: the emerging foreign policy of Kevin Rudd, p.1.   
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system that can be worked upon to deliver the outcomes expected by the government and the 
community.15
Public diplomacy is not something that a government can do effectively on its own.  We think it is a 
partnership enterprise and we would like to see the actual and potential contribution of universities to 
Australian public diplomacy recognised, supported and exploited.
 
 
In their presentations to the Inquiry, non-government organisations such as Asialink, the City 
of Melbourne and RMIT articulated their support for government taking a partnership 
approach in the development and delivery of public diplomacy. Julie Wells of RMIT 
University stated: 
16
The statement is also made that there is little discussion of what the goals of public 
diplomacy might be, outside reference to supporting the specific policy goals of government 
thereby reducing it to ‘a relatively minor subset of official diplomacy’. 
 
 
17
In support of these statements, the RMIT University submission to the Inquiry notes that ‘the 
more diffuse nature of public diplomacy suggests that it is difficult for government or 
government departments working alone to achieve its goals’.
 
 
18  Effective public diplomacy 
requires significant investment by government of ideas and resources, but it also requires 
creative partnerships and engagement with agencies and individuals who can assist in 
achieving these goals.’19
                                                 
15 L Briggs, A Passion for Policy, Lecture to the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, Australian 
National University 25 October 2005, found in Essays in Public Sector, viewed on 20 October, 
 
 
http://epress.anu.edu.au/anzsog/policy/mobile_devices/pr03.html. 
16 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, Committee Hansard, Thursday 15 March, 
p.22. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
19 RMIT University Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the Nature and Conduct of Australia’s Public 
Diplomacy Program, April 2007, p.1.  
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A clear issue to emerge is DFAT’s limited reach and ability when it comes to engagement of 
agencies outside the Commonwealth government circle in public diplomacy activities.20  The 
Chief Executive of the City of Melbourne told the Inquiry that ‘we have very little direct 
involvement with the federal government and particularly the federal bureaucracy.  We think 
there is a huge possibility to expand.’21
Such a deficiency is not limited to the work of DFAT in developing and delivering public 
diplomacy.  It is an issue that faces many government departments at both the federal and 
state level.
 Reinforcing the key findings of the Senate Inquiry 
regarding the fragmented and ad hoc nature of Australia’s public diplomacy program, Wells 
elaborated on the RMIT University perspective, ‘our own relationship with DFAT is very 
constructive and positive but, one again, it tends to be issues based and ad hoc.’   
 
22
involves the outlining of a vision, the setting of objectives and targets in consultation with the public, the 
development of strategies to achieve the objectives, and the formation of collaborative arrangements 
  The concepts raised by public diplomacy in a strategic environment, such as 
collaboration, engagement and partnership with both the government and non government 
sector are part of a broader agenda of ‘strategic government’ impacting on the delivery of 
effective and efficient government business.  According the Director of the Sydney 
University Graduate School of Government, Professor Geoff Gallop, strategic government:  
                                                 
20 Of interest on this point, in his critique of 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper: Advancing the 
National Interest., Alan Dupont a Senior Fellow in Strategic and Defence Studies at the Australian National 
University, noted, ‘we still lack in this country an overarching whole-of-government approach to foreign policy, 
trade and national security.  This is a sectoral paper…There is a sense in which this is only part of the story…’.  
Refer to Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Advancing the National Interest’, White Paper, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003. For a critique of that White paper refer to The Senate Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, The (not quite) White Paper: Australia's Foreign Affairs 
and Trade Policy, Advancing the National Interest, Senate of Australia, Canberra, 2003.   
21 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, Committee Hansard, Thursday 15 March 
2007, p.15. 
22 Briggs, ‘A Passion for Policy’.  G. Gallop, Towards a New Era of Strategic Government Lecture to the 
Australia and New Zealand School of Government, Australian National University 25 October 2006, found in 
Essays in Public Sector Reform, viewed on 20 October 2009, 
<http://epress.anu.edu.au/anzsog/policy/mobile_devices/pr03.html> 
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within government and between the government and private and community sectors to carry out these 
strategies.23
In recent address to the Australian Public Service, following his appointment as Prime 
Minister, Kevin Rudd reiterated the ‘government’s agenda for the APS is to encourage 
wider participation in the processes of government from all parts of the community’.
 
 
24  
Rudd defined the ‘more inclusive policy process as engaging average Australians as well 
as experts, think tanks and business and community groups in policy development and 
delivery’, noting that the ‘more inclusive approach extends to policy implementation and 
service delivery.’ 25
                                                 
23 Gallop, Towards a New Era of Strategic Government.  Geoff Gallop served as a Minister and Premier in 
Western Australia prior to taking up the position as Director of Sydney University’s Graduate School of 
Government.   
24 K. Rudd, Address to Heads of Agencies and Senior Executive Service, Canberra, 30 April 2008.   
25 Ibid. 
 From Rudd’s perspective more inclusive government is a strategy 
that should become evident across all areas of government policy, including foreign 
policy.   
 
Rudd’s comments while aligning with the developments and trends affecting government 
policy more generally, (led to a large extent by the work of the Strategic Policy Unit in 
the United Kingdom), provide a concrete basis for DFAT to review and adjust to more 
active engagement strategies and deliver more effective outcomes through public 
diplomacy.  These comments establish a foundation for the public diplomacy policy-
based framework to be utilised as an effective tool that might enable improved whole-of-
Government thinking simply by virtue of highlighting the foreign policy objective, 
stepping out the subsequent phases of policy development and aligning public diplomacy 
considerations to each of those phases in an ordered manner.  In this way, the 
Framework becomes a trigger for coherent and consistent discussion.   
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7.2 Underpinning principles of effective public diplomacy  
 
In concluding the thesis, there is value in revisiting the common principles that have arisen 
throughout the discussion of public diplomacy, and would underpin practical application of 
the Framework, and might guide the practitioner in public diplomacy practice.  The work of 
contemporary public diplomacy scholars and practitioners, including Henrikson, Cull, 
Leonard, Sharp and Ross present a range of key public diplomacy principles i) tailored 
credibility; ii) dialogue and exchange and iii) alliances and partnerships.26
7.2.1 Tailored credibility 
  Each of these 
principles and their respective relevance to public diplomacy outcomes are examined in more 
detail below.   
 
In 2007 respected Australian statesman and former diplomat, Richard Woolcott wrote that 
‘for public diplomacy to be effective, the policies being projected need to be credible and 
have a practical change of general acceptance’.27  This has also been noted as marking the 
commonly agreed dividing line between public diplomacy and propaganda.  Whereas the 
latter may not always be grounded in credibility or substantiated fact and is unlikely to lead to 
trusting relationships, truth and credibility are seen to be central elements of any public 
diplomacy program. To quote Woolcott, ‘no amount of information activity can present to the 
public horse manure as ice-cream, or raw red wine as vintage Grange’.28
What does it really mean for a government to demonstrate truth and credibility through its 
public diplomacy efforts?  Essentially, from Woolcott’s perspective, and supported through 
 
 
                                                 
26 Ross refers to the pillars of public diplomacy in his article, ‘Pillars of Public Diplomacy – Grappling with 
International Public Opinion’. Other sources that refer to underpinning principles of public diplomacy include  
Melissen, ‘Between Theory and Practice’; Henrikson, What can public diplomacy achieve?’; Leonard, Small, 
Rose, ‘British public diplomacy in the “Age of Schisms”’; and Woolcott, ‘Stop Waltzing and Advance our 
Nation Fairly’. 
27 Woolcott, ‘Truth Spinning out of Control’.  
28 Ibid. 
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the recent research of Goldsmith and Horiuchi, alignment of truth and credibility is critical to 
the effectiveness of public diplomacy strategies, and ultimately to the successful delivery of 
the overarching policy position.  This is particularly so when dealing with a connected, savvy 
and interested public audience.  As Leonard notes ‘attempts to distort the truth will be 
exposed and will create even greater scepticism of governments’.29  In their recent detailed 
study of credibility and public opinion, Goldsmith and Horiuchi assert that ‘credibility in the 
eyes of foreign publics is critical in shaping attitudes towards…foreign policy’.30 Through 
their analysis of high level visits and statements made overseas specifically by US political 
leaders, Goldsmith and Horiuchi claim that ‘a leader who is perceived a credible abroad, even 
to a limited extent, can have a substantial impact on public opinion and foreign policy in the 
country he or she visits’.31  However, the analysis also shows that ‘as credibility diminishes 
so too does influence, while the potential for negative backlash rises’.32
While being consistent and truthful, there is scope to tailor messages for specific themes and 
different audience groups – whether they are defined by interest, culture, location, 
demographic, or economic status.  As Ross asserts, ‘there need be no contradiction between 
consistency and tailoring. For example, an information campaign in support of open trade or 
religious freedom will employ vastly different images and words for different audiences. The 
values that stand behind such efforts, however, are enduring’.
   
 
33
                                                 
29 Leonard, ‘Diplomacy by other Means’, p.2. 
30 Benjamin Goldsmith and Yusaku Horiuchi, ‘Spinning the Globe – US public diplomacy and foreign public 
opinion’ Journal of Politics (forthcoming 2009) , p.4. 
31 Ibid. p.26. 
32 Ibid, p.26. 
33 Ross, ‘Pillars of public Diplomacy: Grappling with Public Opinion’.  
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7.2.2 Dialogue and exchange  
 
The ability to build lasting relationships and partnerships founded in trust, requires a re-think 
in the way that government’s engage.  As Nye puts it, ‘effective public diplomacy is a two-
way street that involves listening as well as talking’. 34  In this way, the delivery of the 
message in public diplomacy is important, yet how it is received and understood is critical 
and the test rests with the receiver or audience. The traditional government approach of 
preaching to its audience or informing its public by means of media release without any 
avenue for discourse are no longer sufficient.  ‘All information goes through cultural filters, 
and declamatory statements are rarely heard as intended’. 35
Dialogue with the domestic audience on foreign policy is an important aspect of effective 
public diplomacy.  In the past, discourse or dialogue on foreign policy was almost 
discouraged by the foreign policy culture and bureaucracy.  This has moved in recent years, 
and developments such as the establishment in 1996 of the Joint Standing Senate Committee 
on Treaties has encouraged broader consultation and dialogue on certain multilateral issues 
between the Australian government, DFAT and the non-government sector.
  Face-to-face communication 
such as that delivered through cultural or educational exchange, and some forms of 
development assistance remains the most effective method of engagement encouraging 
dialogue.  Other forms of communication such as the Internet, and particularly two-way 
dialogue streams available through Facebook or other chat rooms are effective and targeted.   
 
36
                                                 
34 Nye, Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics, p.111 
35 Ibid. 
36 Interview, Chris Lamb, Special Adviser, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Former 
Diplomat and Australian Ambassador, 13 May, 2009. 
  Although, 
almost as a step back from building two-way dialogue and exchange in practice one senior 
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DFAT official pointed only to the DFAT annual report and fact sheets (available online) as 
the primary resources for engaging the Australian population and audiences overseas ‘to get a 
sense of what our foreign and trade policies are about’.37
7.2.3 Alliances and partnerships 
 
 
Public diplomacy has evolved into a multi-stakeholder business, with non-governmental 
organisational increasing their role in international relations alongside states.38  The notion of 
partnership is a familiar one, that is at the heart of new directions in the development and 
delivery of public policy internationally, quite apart from and now including the area of 
foreign policy. For example, the United Kingdom, Canada and Scotland have all enshrined 
the principles of partnership in the domestic policy agenda through the Compact Agreement 
model between Government and the non Government sectors. 39
From a foreign policy perspective, the partnership notion aligns with the fluid nature of 
public diplomacy.  The notion of partnership in public diplomacy supports not only the 
  Such agreements, 
traditionally negotiated by government with the community or volunteer sector establish a 
positive environment for partnership and ultimately focus all parties on a shared 
accountability for the outcomes delivered into communities, families and individuals.  The 
agreements are also underpinned by an understanding of mutual regard, the clear delineation 
of roles and responsibilities and robust regulatory frameworks – all important elements where 
parties are working towards the delivery of shared outcomes.   
 
                                                 
37 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Standing Committee, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2007, p3. 
38 Henrikson, ‘What Can public Diplomacy Achieve?’, p.32; and Ross, ‘Pillars of public Diplomacy: Grappling 
with Public Opinion’ 
39 See the UK Compact Model at:   http://www.thecompact.org.uk/ 
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government to non government collaboration, but also underpins the identified need for 
strategic of ‘whole-of-government’ approaches that cut across traditional silos.40
Partnership or collaboration is about ‘enhancing the capacity of the other partner for mutual 
benefit and a common purpose, and implies greater trust and commonality of purpose within 
a relationship than an approach based on ‘networking’ or ‘coordinating’’. 
   
 
41  Partnerships in 
public diplomacy may enable governments to channel messages more effectively and 
innovatively, and to a more diverse and wider audience while involving fewer resources.  In 
this way, partnership allows for the crossing of ‘the boundaries from the domestic sphere into 
the international sphere’, and enables various government and non-government agencies both 
within a single state or across several states to work together to deliver a single message.42
With regard to Australia’s public diplomacy program, the Senate Inquiry revealed a 
significant number of government and non government agencies actively working towards 
the promotion of positive image of Australia through public diplomacy activities.  
  
This thesis has noted the disconnect that exists currently between DFAT , other government 
agencies (across state and local tiers of Government), other entities such as the university 
sector, the non-government sector, and the Australian diaspora.  All of these entities 
representing parts of the whole, yet currently untapped resources for the development and 
delivery of public diplomacy.  Ultimately with effective partnerships in place, the whole 
when viewed together, should be greater than the sum of the parts. 
 
                                                 
40 L. Briggs, ‘A Passion for Policy’; G. Gallop, Towards a New Era of Strategic Government, K. Rudd, Address 
to Heads of Agencies and Senior Executive Service.  
41 The three stages leading to partnerships are described in the Victorian Government’s Partnership Analysis 
Tool  as including i) networking - the exchange of information for mutual benefit and requires little time and 
trust between partners, ii) coordinating -  exchanging information and altering activities for a common purpose, 
iii) cooperating - exchanging information, altering activities and sharing resources, requiring a significant 
amount of time, high level of trust between partners. 
42 Henrikson, A, ‘What Public Diplomacy Can Achieve’ p.33. 
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Commonwealth agencies actively contributing to Australia’s public diplomacy program 
include Invest Australia, Department of Education, Science and Training, AusAID, 
Department of Defence, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, and Austrade.  
However, only some of those agencies were included in the twice yearly meetings of the ICD 
coordinated by DFAT. Furthermore, other key organisations clearly operating within the 
public diplomacy space, including many universities such as RMIT, statutory bodies such as 
Asialink, the Australian Film Commission and the Australian Sports Commission and the 
local government including the Melbourne City, had limited contact with DFAT regarding 
outside of the existing public diplomacy linkages.  The result is a system that falls short of 
partnership, where it becomes clear why, as the Senate Committee reported, the whole is not 
greater than the sum of the parts.   
7.3 Australian public diplomacy:  The sum of the parts… 
 
Public diplomacy will play an increasing role in building relationships with foreign audiences 
to progress foreign policy goals in a chaotic, complex and less predictable world. More 
specifically, public diplomacy is a key tool of influence that Australia could deploy 
effectively in putting international policy in place.  Moving forward, the Lowy Institute 
suggests that the growing influence of non state actors, the complexity of international policy 
problems, and the need to assemble non-government coalitions and persuade not only states, 
but the audiences that those states represent, means that traditional diplomatic practice will be 
severely tested in coming years.43
                                                 
43 Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of 
International Policy’, p.17. 
  The traditional boundaries of diplomacy are eroding, yet 
the expectations and challenges of the international community are growing progressively 
more complex and difficult.  Public diplomacy or the ability to inform, understand, engage 
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and influence foreign audiences, will therefore become increasingly more important as a tool 
for progressing strategic foreign policy outcomes.44
Alignment of public diplomacy to strategic foreign policy objectives presents an opportunity 
for the Australian Government to move beyond the ‘hotch potch’ parts and activities that 
make up public diplomacy in Australia, and view public diplomacy as a whole and coherent 
program that is increasingly important in progressing Australia’s international interests.
   
 
45
Furthermore, the methodology of the Framework allows for public diplomacy to recognise, 
incorporate and more openly coordinate a broad range of activities not traditionally seen as 
‘public diplomacy’, across a range of approaches from information provision to relationship 
 
Without such strategic alignment, public diplomacy is likely to continue to float around the 
fringe of foreign policy, appearing only at a superficial level in rhetoric and symbolic 
gestures, one-off or randomly planned events and activities, and crisis media management. 
Against this background, the real benefits of strategic public diplomacy in tangibly advancing 
national interests might be realised.   
 
The Framework presented in this thesis provides a new view of public diplomacy that aligns 
with strategic policy in such a way as to allow the concepts and methods to become more 
accessible and relevant to the Australian practitioner.  This approach represents a significant 
shift in Australia’s traditional approach to public diplomacy, which as noted earlier has been 
to separate public diplomacy between information provision, carried out via a separate 
agency (AIS); and cultural/educational exchange, carried out as an activity separate from 
policy within DFAT.   
 
                                                 
44 Senate of Australia, Senate Hansard, 16 August 2007. 
45 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence, Committee Hansard, 11 April 2007, p.45. 
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building.46
The Framework does show that in line with the central issue of this thesis that while Australia 
has many activities in public diplomacy occurring as separate parts, and generally in isolation 
of each other, these parts could make a substantial whole.  With coherent consideration of the 
  As such, the Framework provides a starting point for Australian practitioners to 
start to engage in the complexities and opportunities that might exist in building a coherent 
and consistent public diplomacy program.   
 
However, for the diplomacy scholar, the framework is not intended to be prescriptive, and 
indeed might present limitless opportunities to identify or introduce new strategic policy 
concepts, process parameters, or activities / methods for addressing each of these within the 
field of diplomacy.  For the scholar, the Framework represents a methodology rather than a 
reference tool for exploring multidimensional and complex issues or approaches, and is the 
sort of tool Diplomacy theorists look to in order to create better theory and develop the area 
of Diplomatic Studies. 
 
The Framework therefore is not intended to provide a ‘solution’ or end point for public 
diplomacy discussions in Australia.  The complexity of the system derives from the ongoing 
evolution of relationships audiences and methods.  For this reason the Framework is not 
designed to be overly prescriptive, but to allow for ongoing adaptation and innovation in 
practice where outcomes can be evaluated on the basis of qualitative impact against the initial 
objectives; target audiences, methods and messages revised accordingly.  The Framework is 
intended to reflect a learning system that continues to improve and adapt to meet the 
changing needs of Australian diplomatic practice.   
 
                                                 
46 The various methods of structuring public diplomacy articulated by Nye, McClellan and Zaharna as discussed 
in Chapter Four, all find relevance within the Framework.   
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overall strategic intent of policy, the Australian image, and the many parts that might come 
together to deliver activities, the public diplomacy program may start to consolidate into a 
whole.  While the Framework provides a useful tool to organise discussion for this purpose, a 
key factor will lie in the ability of DFAT to shift in approach to public diplomacy, and start to 
connect and engage strategically with other relevant parties to the public diplomacy equation.   
 
In particular, while this engagement would normally include other federal government 
agencies, other bodies outside the federal boundary might be relevant, such as state and local 
government bodies, universities and the education sector, NGOs, and individuals within the 
Australian community as well as those living abroad.  Diplomats will not be immune from 
the challenge.  This thesis demonstrates the essence of traditional diplomatic skill, that is, 
‘persuasion and accommodation and of building support in other countries for one’s policy’ 
apply equally to the realm of public diplomacy.47
                                                 
47 R Woolcott, The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings, p.281.  
  However, the audience is expanding and 
moving, and the need to understand and engage with foreign audiences not just within official 
ranks inside the embassy gates, but at a local grassroots level is becoming more important.   
Developing and promoting a ‘smart and creative’ Australia that has significant impact on the 
world stage, or in advancing foreign policy interests during a challenging period of 
international relations, will come from smart and creative connections to audiences across the 
globe.  The complex and multilayered puzzle that is the new public diplomacy reflects a 
significant innovation in diplomatic practice that sits comfortably alongside the traditional 
and official methods of diplomacy.  From the Australian perspective, the pieces of the puzzle 
are becoming evident, and with some strategic, coherent direction from DFAT, including 
clear linkage into foreign policy objectives, public diplomacy might gain credibility as an 
increasingly important tool of strategic value.   
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